Instinct in Man

INSTINCT IN MAN. The current views regarding human instinct at the beginning of the modern period are very well repre sented in Lord Herbert of Cherbury's De Veritate ("On Truth"), published in 1625. In enumerating the human faculties Lord Herbert starts with "Natural Instinct." This has two aspects. On the one hand, it is the source of the motives which urge both men and animals irrationally to seek to preserve their lives and to secure happiness. On the other hand, it furnishes certain in nate principles of knowledge—"common notions," Lord Herbert called them. The prevailing usage of the word "instinct" up to the middle of the century is fairly well represented by Lord Herbert's Instinctus Naturalis. In the discussion of human in stinct, however, the first aspect was more and more emphasized. "Natural propensity," or "natural inclination" was essentially the meaning of the word, when applied to the human being.

New Meaning of Instinct.

During the 19th century, and especially of ter Darwin, the problem of instinct began to be ap proached from a new standpoint. The direction of approach was now from the side of animal behaviour, in place of human con duct. The word "instinct" was taken as designating forms of be haviour which were not acquired by an animal through experience and learning, but provided for congenitally in the animal's struc ture, and manifested on the first occasion of performance, if not perfectly, at least adequately to secure the survival of the in dividual and the continuance of the species. When this meaning was carried over to the case of the human being, the stage was set for the acute controversy regarding Instinct in Man, which has characterized the first three decades of the loth century. The two parties in this controversy are, on the one side, those who adhere more or less firmly to the original meaning of the word "instinct" as "natural impulse" or "urge," and, on the other side, those who, taking their departure from the complex types of in stinctive behaviour characteristic of some of the lower forms of life, take the word as meaning "congenitally organized patterns of behaviour." On the whole the line of division between these opposing views corresponds in psychology to the line between the introspectionist and the behaviourist, and in general philosophy to the line between the finalist and the mechanist.

The controversy has largely centred round the problem of the relation of Instinct to Intelligence or to Habit. As far as the science of psychology is concerned the opposing standpoints can be reconciled. If we define psychology as the science which studies the behaviour of the living organism, and seeks to under stand and interpret that behaviour in terms of the inner life of thought and feeling, it is possible to preserve the traditional sense both of "psychology" and of "instinct," and at the same time to cover the new fields in both cases. There is no opposition between Instinct and Intelligence, provided we consider both at the same level in the animal scale. Low down the scale there is almost com plete provision in the structure of the organism at birth for all actions necessary to preserve its own life, and to secure the con tinuance of the species. The part left for intelligence to play is insignificant, and we have no evidence of the presence of any high degree of intelligence. Higher up the scale the congenital provision for necessary actions is incomplete, and a special supple menting through individual learning is required. Intelligence has a more important role to play, and the evidence for the possession of the necessary intelligence begins to accumulate. At the top of the animal scale the congenital provision in the structure of the organism for those actions which are necessary to maintain life is incomplete and fragmentary in the highest degree, so much so that there may well be doubts in some cases whether it exists at all. At this level the part which intelligence must play becomes very important, and the evidence for a high degree of intelligence becomes overwhelming. From the bottom to the top of the scale, however, there is evidence of the presence of a powerful impulsion from within, urging the organism towards actions, guided by such intelligence as there is, which tend to serve great biological ends. It was this impulsion, to which the name "instinct" was originally given, and it is this impulsion upon which we must concentrate attention, if we would understand human instinct.

Instinct and Emotion.

The chief human instincts—regard ing instincts from this "impulsion" point of view—are those as sociated with fundamental human emotions, like fear, anger, sex love, parental love, etc. The relation of Emotion to Instinct has been another fruitful source of controversy. Early and modern writers are both agreed that there is some close relation. By the early writers the relation was more or less tacitly assumed. William James, on the other hand, in more recent times, explicitly asserted it. It was left to William McDougall, however, to define the re lation more precisely, and the controversies have centred mainly round McDougall's work. According to his view each instinct has associated with it a characteristic emotion, which is always the stable and peculiar mark of the activity of that instinct. This view has been challenged by A. F. Shand, who maintains that McDougall has reversed the actual relationship, and that the activity of an instinct is rather to be regarded as a constituent element in the activity of an emotional system. J. Dreyer has also criticized McDougall on the ground that he has over-simplified the situation, and that emotional excitement always exhibits a bi polarity characteristic of the whole life of feeling, so that, even if we admit that emotional excitement always accompanies in stinctive activity, we must assume that two emotions of opposite polarities—"joy" and "sorrow" emotions—are involved in the case of each of the instincts. Dreyer, however, refuses to admit that all instinctive activity necessarily involves emotional excite ment, holding that emotion is experienced only when the instinctive impulse is facilitated or impeded in the attainment of its end, and that some instincts, like imitation and play, have no characteristic at all associated with them. Larguier des Bancels, again, holds that emotional excitement represents in essence a disorder of instinct.

Enumeration and Classification of Human Instincts. McDougall's teaching in its general features has been widely ac cepted, more particularly as regards the enumeration of the human instincts. His list includes: the instincts of fright or escape, pug nacity, repulsion, curiosity, self-display, submission, sex, acquisi tiveness, the parental instinct, the gregarious instinct, the hunting instinct. To these must be added: imitation, play, certain simple instincts showing themselves in early childhood, the natural appe tites, and possibly the wandering instinct. This enumeration is based on the view of Instinct as natural impulse. Writers who approach Instinct from the behaviour side, like Thorndike, for example, enumerate many more, while the psycho-analysts, though making extensive use of the notion of Instinct, rarely attempt any enumeration at all. S. Freud, the leader of the psycho-analysts, employs the term "wish" in a sense which is practically equivalent to "impulse" or "instinct." The classification of human instincts presents considerable dif ficulty. The most popular classification is probably into ego in stincts, sex instincts, and herd instincts. This classification is based on the Freudian psychology, but it is unfortunately bio logical rather than psychological. At least two psychological classi fications have been suggested : into instincts of attraction, re pulsion and aggression, and, harking back to Plato, into appetitive and reactive instincts, and under each head into general and specific. W. H. R. Rivers, who may be said to mediate between the views of the psycho-analysts and those of McDougall, has suggested a classification of an entirely new basis. He contends that the activity of some instincts shows an "all-or-none" char acter, a want of control and discrimination, while in other cases there is a grading of intensity of action, and a delicate adjustment of activity to end. The two types might therefore be called "pro topathic" and "epicritic," respectively. This distinction seems equivalent to a distinction between presence and absence of emotion.

For instinct in animals see ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.-W.

McDougall, An introduction to Social PsyBibliography.-W. McDougall, An introduction to Social Psy- chology (1908) ; E. L. Thorndike, Educational Psychology (1912-14, bibl.) ; A. F. Shand, The Foundations of Character (1914) ; Trotter, The Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War (1916) ; J. Dreyer, Instinct in Man (1917, bibl.) • W. H. R. Rivers, Instinct and the Unconscious (192o) ; L. L. Bernard, Instinct: A Study in Social Psychology (1924) ; S. Freud, The Ego and the It (1927). (J. DR.)