Intelligence in War Time

INTELLIGENCE IN WAR TIME In war, the greatly increased activities of the home or head quarters intelligence service are mainly directed to areas outside the theatre, or theatres, of operations. In the latter, the armies in the field are provided with intelligence services of their own, who form an additional source of information for the home in telligence service, which is responsible for the further collation and distribution of the information thus received.

Field Organization.

In the field, the intelligence section of the general staff collects and collates all information regarding the enemy's forces and intentions and the theatre of war, sup plies to the commander, staffs and fighting troops all information which will assist them in preparing and carrying out plans for the defeat of the enemy and endeavours to prevent the acquisition by the enemy of similar information. To be of practical value, the information supplied must be relevant, furnished in time to be of use and in such form as will admit of its immediate appli cation by those concerned. These conditions require the closest co-operation and mutual understanding between the intelligence and operations sections of the general staff. The developments, technical and otherwise, of modern warfare have placed at the disposal of the intelligence section many resources for collecting information which were not available prior to the 1914-18 campaign. Intelligence in the field has become a large and intri cate organization, the varied and complex nature of whose duties necessitates the employment, as assistants to the general staff proper, of a large number of highly trained specialists.

Knowledge of the enemy's intentions is of supreme value to a commander, and the intelligence section should therefore pos sess throughout the campaign early, accurate and continuous in formation regarding the enemy's "order of battle," his move ments of men and war material, his tactical method, armament and equipment, the organization of his defences and rear services, the topography of the theatre of war. The relative value of these different classes of information varies with circumstances; the character of the operations may change at any moment from open warfare to stabilized warfare, or the reverse; an intelligence service must therefore be elastic both in method and organization. Method, accuracy and speed are essential for the collection, re ception, transmission and collation of information, but this work is of no value unless timely deductions can be made from the evidence available. The making of deductions, appreciations and forecasts both as to the probable action of the enemy and the prospect of successful operations undertaken by its own troops is the most important duty of an intelligence section. Its true function, in fact, is to represent the "operations" section of the enemy, for broadly speaking it provides all information concern ing the enemy, the allies and the theatre of war, whilst the opera tions section provides similar information regarding the troops of its own army.

Scope and Nature of Information.

Information regarding the enemy's "order of battle" is of paramount importance. It includes the organization, composition and strength of hostile for mations, the direction of their initial concentration and subse quent movements, their distribution, morale and fighting efficiency, the characters of their commanders, methods of recruiting and man-power available to replace wastage. The identification of units is the foundation of all "order of battle" intelligence. Move ments of men, supplies and material on a large scale normally portend some important development or a change of the enemy's plans, but as they must take place along organized lines of com munication they are difficult to conceal. Detailed knowledge of the enemy's communications system and means of transport is therefore essential; the capacity of railways, quality of roads, navigability of waterways at different seasons, system of aero dromes and auxiliary landing grounds must be carefully studied if reliable conclusions are to be arrived at regarding the size of any movement and the time required for its execution.

Full information regarding the tactics and armament of the enemy at the outbreak of war is usually available by the study of his peace training and organization; but his methods of em ploying troops and their weapons in the field must be followed very closely in order to discover new developments as early as possible. In the World War full knowledge of each other's pre war tactics and armament was possessed by the opposing armies, but almost from the beginning of hostilities modifications and new ideas were introduced, which frequently provoked counter measures. Instances were the employment of poisonous gases, flame and gas projectors, "storm troops," Stokes mortars and tanks. All the economic resources of a State may be required to meet the strain of a prolonged campaign, and accurate knowledge regarding these resources is one of the means of gauging the enemy's staying power.

Sources and Means of Collecting Information.

The main sources of information are prisoners, deserters, local inhabitants, captured documents and material, land reconnaissance and ob servation, hostile signalling communications, air reconnaissance and photography, the enemy and neutral Press and agents; the principal agencies for its collection are the fighting troops, the signal service, aircraft and secret service. The information, whether positive or negative, acquired by contact with the enemy is that on which every commander mainly relies in making his tactical plan. Hence, to keep the enemy under such close and con tinuous observation that he can make no movement without be ing detected is the primary object of all reconnaissance, whether on the ground or from the air.

Ground reconnaissance may be purely topographical, e.g., the acquisition of unmapped information about the ground; it may be tactical, e.g., to discover the enemy's positions, the strength and distribution of his defences, his tactics, movements and in tentions; or for the purpose of obtaining "identifications"; i.e., information about the hostile troops in line, their morale, ar mament and equipment, by the capture of prisoners or documents. These objects are achieved by sending out mobile troops, patrols or raiding parties, or by observation from fixed points. The latter may be visual or instrumental.

Visual observation for intelligence purposes is an organized system for the observation of all enemy activity within the range of vision of its observation posts by trained observers provided with a special equipment of maps, telescopes, periscopes, etc., its elements being generally so placed and co-ordinated that the exact location of the enemy activity recorded can be fixed by intersection. e.g., "flash-spotting." Instrumental observation is mainly automatic. by instruments disposed to receive, transform and transmit impulses from outside; e.g., sound-ranging instal lations, electrical listening posts, wireless interception and direc tion-finding apparatus.

Air Reconnaissance.

Information from the air is derived from balloon observation, aeroplane reconnaissance and air pho tography. The development of air reconnaissance and photo graphy has to a great extent revolutionized the whole service of military intelligence in the field ; not only are aircraft capable of assuming the duty of strategic reconnaissance, but the camera has made it possible to obtain, particularly in position warfare, a far more detailed and exact knowledge of the enemy's system of defence, communication and supply than has ever been pos sible before. The principal weakness of air reconnaissance and photography lies in their necessary dependence on the weather.

Balloon observation is used principally for the observation of movement by road, railways, and in back areas, of defence works, the location of hostile batteries and the observation of hostile artillery activity. Aeroplane reconnaissance is used at the begin ning of a campaign to locate the direction of the enemy's main concentration, to report on the movements and activities of the enemy's troops ; and subsequently to supply information on the latter's tactical dispositions, the construction or destruction of bridges, the construction of new defences, etc.

Strategical reconnaissance involves long-distance flights ex tending frequently to more than loom.; they are usually carried out by single aeroplanes flying at such an altitude as to minimize the chance of hostile interference; at this height, movements of troops on the ground are unnoticeable, and the information gained is largely confined to reports of railway movements, activity at important junctions, formations of large camps, etc. It is often necessary to fly at medium altitudes and to employ formations of aircraft capable of dealing with air opposition, to obtain more de tailed strategical information. Tactical information can only be obtained in sufficient detail by aircraft flying low (close recon naissance) which can be expected to distinguish troops in the open and artillery in action, and can dive near enough to the ground to clear up a definite point, such as the existence of a machine-gun emplacement or whether a trench system is occupied or not.

Photography forms an essential part of all air reconnaissance. Even in the cases of reconnaissances at high altitudes photo graphs may be expected to show road movements, tracks, camps, new works, battery positions, dumps, hospitals, light railways, telegraph lines and other signs of military activity, while in the case of close reconnaissance carried out at lesser altitudes, photo graphs taken in favourable weather enable experts to discover the smallest details of the enemy's defences.