The Future of Infantry

THE FUTURE OF INFANTRY If we recognize as we must that infantry as constituted and trained to-day can make no headway against machine-guns in normal open country, where will be their place on a future battle field? Should we be content to regard them merely as a human reservoir for supplying machine-gunners to the ranks of a de fensive position and the tanks of a mobile force ; or, for filling up conquered territory with a flood of military "police" ? Even these two "residuary" roles may be restricted. For military opin ion is gradually coming to realize that it is not economy of force to employ six vulnerable men to man-handle one machine-gun in action when, if placed in a light tank, two men can bring it into action and out, switch it quickly to any required sector and main tain fire while in movement—thus, in Napoleon's phrase, multi plying "force by velocity." And although even advanced military opinion still believes that a crowd of infantry are necessary to play the "walking on" part of occupying conquered territory, it is a reasonable suggestion that this might be controlled as effec tively and with less provocation, to the inhabitants—by a sprin kling of engineers protected by tanks and aircraft, sitting at the sources of light, heat, power and water supplies. Moreover, un less this vast "residue" is to wait at home until the war is won, they will be moved forward very slowly on their feet. If there is one feature of past wars which air power, even uncombined with gas, has relegated to the lumber room of history, it is that of sluggish marching columns on roads. It is not necessary to assert that they would be destroyed ; mere alarms and consequent dispersal might prevent them reaching enemy territory or any battlefield until the enemy's defeat had been accomplished by more mobile instruments.

For all these reasons the conversion of the residuary bulk of the infantry to more effective service—or, in the case of conscript armies, to work in which they can swell the production of wealth in peace and munitions in wars—is indicated. The process will doubtless be slow so long as the public are content to pay high premiums for inadequate military insurance, and military authori ties remain slow to shed old habits—whether of spending thought, spending lives or spending money.

There is however scope for a revived light infantry—a highly trained corps d'elite of small numbers compared with present standards. For although the decisive struggles of history have normally been fought in the plains, theatres of minor war include mountainous, wooded or otherwise difficult country where the man on foot—because of his unique locomobility—must still play an important, even the most important part. Again, while the use of infantry to attack in typically bare or rolling country, such as the greater part of Europe, is merely a homicidal enterprise, these commonly contain areas where fighting men on foot are useful, if not essential. Such areas include woods, broken ground, villages or defiles obstructed by natural or artificial obstacles. Here tanks, even the diminutive machines now being produced, may not be able to pass, and gunfire from a distance may prove ineffective.

Thus we see that as tanks were aptly called landships, so the infantry of the future will be land-marines—to act as the land ing parties of the armoured "land-fleet" of to-morrow. For such a complementary role only a small portion of the infantry strength of to-day would be necessary, and this reduction might be made to enhance their effectiveness, directly and indirectly; directly, by renewing their pride of "arm" through allotting them a spe cialized, instead of a "general" role, and by diminishing their "superfluous" casualties through a real dispersion of the target which they offer. After the war, the new tactics of infiltration and manoeuvre were incorporated in the recast infantry doctrine but, in the tedious process of winning theoretical acceptance, their practical application was whittled away. How can the thousand men of an infantry battalion find room and cover to infiltrate and manoeuvre on a frontage of 800 yards or less, which is all the French doctrine accords, or even on a frontage of i,000 yards, as is laid down as normal in the British manual? Such conceptions may be heading for another and more fatal Somme.

Indirectly, a reduction in numbers would contribute to mobility. For while no army could hope to provide sufficient mechanized transport for its present numbers of infantry, future "land marines" might be carried in the vehicles of a mobile armoured force. Just as mounted infantry (q.v.) were trained to ride on horseback as well as to fight on foot, so, in this motoring age, there is no reason why men should not be trained both to drive a fighting vehicle and to act on foot as skirmishers, dismounting from their vehicles. With smaller numbers, too, pay can be higher and a higher standard of selection enforced. For in a professional army man-power and its upkeep is the dearest item. Similarly, when infantry work of wider scope and at greater range is needed, an armoured force might be accompanied by armoured infantry carriers. Even in this case we should fulfil the law of economy of force if such infantry were also qualified to form spare crews for fighting vehicles. What infantry might lose in numbers they would gain in status ; the mockery of calling them "the decisive arm" will be no compensation for treating them as mere barrage-follow ers; but to be the picked light infantry of a mechanized army would constitute a greater distinction than being called the can non-fodder mass of past wars.

The Training of Infantry.

How should the training of in fantry be developed in order to fit them for a new effective role? The answer is simpler, though more difficult of execution, than it seems. For the right training was foreshadowed in the methods devised in 1918. Unhappily, instead of being developed, they have been allowed to lapse. No greater error is current to-day than that infantry is the most easily trained arm, for none needs more care, more skill if it is adequately to play its part. And the rea son why it is a difficult arm to train is because it possesses so few concrete elements. It is concerned with tactics and ground. To train infantry to be tactically minded is to exercise an art, whereas to train gunners is to apply a science; the one requires an artist the other a calculator. The man in the ranks of the ar tillery, the tank corps, the air service, is often a mechanic— executing a concrete task in a definite manner. Initiative is the province of the officer, but even he in the subordinate ranks of other arms is largely concerned with producing a material effect. But the infantryman's use of material—his weapons—is only complementary to the use he makes of tactics and ground before he gets to grips with his enemy. Because of the variety of ele ments with which he has to deal, the infantry commander is apt to confine himself to such parts of the subject as he himself knows best. Hence a tendency to over-emphasize such matters as drill, musketry, bayonet fighting, which can be easily mastered by the intellect of the average officer. Hence also the neglect of tactical training, which demands thought and is difficult to learn and teach because it deals with moral and variable factors and requires a modicum of imagination.

The right tactics of infantry must be based on nature and human nature, not on mechanics or geometrical perfection. Yet it is almost incredible how in the past showy evolutions deduced from the parade-ground have persisted on the battle-field. The future infantry must be permeated by the best doctrine which the war can teach, and this doctrine must be expressed in language so simple and by metaphors and illustration so clear, that it can be as readily grasped by subalterns and corporals as by general officers. Its manual of instructions should be as intelligible to the Australian bushman as it is to the staff college graduate.

In 1806-15 the British were capable of a sustained effort in the theory of tactics as originated by Sir John Moore, and there is no reason why infantry should not to-day be trained to as high a pitch of comparative excellence. These tactics would be based on the little group of men following a corporal whom it knows because he has trained it. In the hurly-burly of modern war these little groups retain cohesion because men will follow a leader whom they see close to them, whose voice they can hear and whose presence is familiar. These groups will act by infiltration and manoeuvre, not fearing the isolation due to a wide dispersion of the groups, because they know that in dispersion lies safety, and because the comradeship within the group is a more real support than that of a continuous line, wherein each man felt himself a single peg in a long row.

For decades the infantries of all countries attempted to pro duce tactics suitable to new weapons and conditions of war, by multiplying the lines which were successfully used by their fore runners in the days of the musket—with its short-range and slow rate of fire—and of the case shot and solid shot of the artillery. They moved shoulder to shoulder with intervals. The idea of manoeuvre was absent. Even down to the closing stages of the World War the action of infantry units in battle—as distinct from a skirmish or an affair of outposts—was confined to frontal attacks. Manoeuvre was the weapon of the higher commanders only.

In any large action each of the infantry units was allotted only a fraction of the frontage of the force of which it formed a part. This narrow sector was hedged in on either side by neighbouring units of a corresponding size. How then was it possible for at tack or defence on the part of infantry units to be aught but straight to their front? How can they manoeuvre if they have no space to move in? And how can they be expected to move to a flank if they possess no intervals and no flanks? The opportunity came when the range and deadliness of modern weapons began to enforce dispersion. But instead of exploiting it, military ortho doxy has rather sought to restrict it—as a deplorable evil—and clings to pre-war methods.

Before the World War lines of infantry in extended order made rushes and utilized ground; they fired in small bodies and opened at long ranges; at the decisive points they were gradually thick ened up into a crowd. These crowds surged forward at a given signal and assaulted to their front. But the infantry soldier was so near his neighbour in these sham battles that he had scarcely sufficient space to load and fire his rifle without hitting one of his friends; the units became so mixed together in the process of thickening up that neither the corporal nor the subaltern could exercise control over his own men or any unit ; often he could not find them during the decisive stage of the battle. Fortunately the "cease fire" sounded and re-organization took place; but in 1914-18 there was no "cease fire" and no umpires and the warring infantries were slow to learn. This was no doubt inevitable, and is a sufficient reason to try now to gather the lessons of 1918, but it must be remarked regretfully that the tactical experiences of 1918 have not been embodied in the tactical handling of units in 1928. Official manuals seem always to lag behind their own age, and in fact human nature did conquer the old line formation be fore the groups were officially sanctioned. The evolution was the more natural because the real opponent—the machine-gun—was also a firing "point" rather than a firing "line." These two factors, combined with the general dispersion of troops on the battlefield, served to bring about the articulation of infantry into indepen dently moving "points" each and all capable of manoeuvre. This therefore should be the keynote of future infantry tactics. Infan try must only be used for attack in country which gives them adequate natural cover for infiltration and manoeuvre. They must be given frontages wide enough for them to find and use cover, and to ensure that their approach is more or less unsuspected. They must avoid stereotyped methods of movement. They must probably revert to individual weapons.

The only infantryman of use in modern warfare is one so highly trained in the use of cover that he can stalk machine-guns, and so highly trained as a shot that he can pick off their crews at close ranges. For volume of fire infantry cannot compete with mechanized arms—it is an arresting comparison that even the small and immature Armoured Force formed in 1927, which in cluded but one battalion of tanks, had a greater "fire-pumping" capacity than a whole infantry division had previously. Extreme accuracy of fire is the only justification for the infantryman. In his training, too, the old instinct of alignment must be eradicated and replaced by a sense of direction. This is all the more im portant because the World War introduced a new element— smoke (q.v.). Mist or fog has often been a decisive but acci dental factor in battle, but with the introduction of artificial fog which can be projected at the will of the user, the enemy's view is impeded while his own movements take place in daylight until he reaches close quarters. Thus smoke is an invaluable aid to infiltration, and although, like most other inventions it has been much neglected since 1918, it will be indispensable to the infan try of the future. Whereas the slender artillery of to-day can give the infantry no adequate barrage, it could provide an effective blanket of smoke with the same quantity of shells. Lastly, if infantry is to possess an adequate agility its weapons and equip ment must be lightened. In fact the infantryman of the future must be equipped as an athlete.

The Control of Infantry.

Do these individualistic infiltra tion tactics involve a complete abandonment of control? By no means. The group itself was a step towards the restoration of control if only in the lowest grade. Reformed and modernized drill could be the means whereby the scale might be raised. In recent generations we have seen that armies retain drill move ments for the parade-ground and throw them aside when they go on active service. As human nature in battle retains its instinc tive habits it is scarcely surprising that in moments of crisis one has seen men advancing, against the deadly fire of machine-guns, in close-packed bodies. But if drill were brought up to date on the lines of dispersed order and the group, it would constitute an ingrained method of control that could be used to quicken the manoeuvre of deployed units and direct them to take advantage of local situations. Voice control would be out of the question, but so long as signals were few and simple, visual control could be used particularly if a clearer means of signalling were devised. Let anyone with experience of war ask himself if there were not moments in his recollection when he might, had his men been drilled in such a system, have saved precious minutes, an oppor tunity which never returned, by the use of a signal instead of the slow method of sending a message by runner. The old close order was under control but modern fire has made it impossible. With extended order the battle developed into the chaotic move ments of an uncontrolled mob at the decisive point. An ingrained system of battle drill might enable a unit when deployed into its fractional parts, to be manoeuvred, to be opened or closed in "concertina" fashion according to the ground and local circum stances. Such a system was embodied in the post-war training manuals. But it was made an addition to instead of a substitute for the existing close order drill. Hence the claims of parade ground ceremonial, always dominant in practice, have restricted its application. Thus we solemnly inculcate on the parade-ground a set of evolutions which date from the Crimean battlefields, but to-day bear no relation to tactics—as they were first meant to.

(See SMALL ARMS ; CAVALRY ; TANKS ; also STRATEGY ; TACTICS ; WAR.) (F. I. M.; B. H. L. H.) BIBLIOGRAPHY.-(a) History: Xenophon, Cyropaedia; Parker, The Bibliography.-(a) History: Xenophon, Cyropaedia; Parker, The Roman Legions (1928) ; F. Aussaresses, L'Armee Byzantine ¢ la Fin du siecle (1909) ; C. Oman, The Art of War in tke Middle Ages (1924) ; T. A. Dodge, Gustavus Adolphus (Boston, 1895) ; C. H. Firth, Cromwell's Army (1902); M. Guibert, A General Essay on Tactics (trans., 1781) ; J. F. C. Fuller, British Light Infantry in the r8th Century (1925) and Sir John Moore's System of Training (1925) ; F. Grose, Military Antiquities (1812) ; J. W. Fortescue, History of the British Army; E. d'Hauterive, L'Armee sous la Revolution; W. von Scherff, The New Tactics of Infantry (trans., 1873) ; Balck, Tactics, Infantry (trans.) ; E. M. Lloyd, A Review of the History of Infantry (1908). (b) Modern: B. H. Liddell Hart, Science of Infantry Tactics (1923) ; and the infantry training manuals of the various national armies.