THE NYAYA Logic as epistemology may be called a critical reflection on metaphysics. The V aisesika, which deals with the analysis of nature, is earlier than the Nyaya, which discusses the problem of knowledge; yet we start with the latter, as it gives the main logical principles assumed by the Vaisesika as well.
Assuming that the account of the world which our minds afford us is, in the main, a trustworthy one, the Nyaya analyses the different ways in which our knowledge is acquired. They are said to be intuition (pratyaksa), inference (anumana), comparison (upamana), and verbal testimony (sabda). Though pratyaksa originally meant sense-perception, it soon came to cover all im mediate apprehension whether through the aid of the senses or otherwise. It is knowledge whose instrumental cause is not knowl edge (jnanakaranakam jnanam). In inference, comparison, etc., we require a knowledge of premises or of similarity, but such knowledge is not an antecedent condition of intuition. The word is used for the result or the apprehension of the truth as well as the process or the operation which leads to the result.
Sense-perception follows on the modification of the self pro duced by the contact of the senses with their objects. Two kinds of perception are distinguished, determinate (savikalpaka) and indeterminate (nirvikalpaka), which correspond roughly to knowl edge about and acquaintance with an object.
Inference operates "neither with regard to things unknown nor with regard to those known definitely for certain; it functions only with regard to things that are doubtful" (N. B. I. I. i.) . It derives a conclusion from the ascertained fact of the subject possessing a property which is constantly accompanied by another. We ascertain that the hill is on fire from the fact that the hill has smoke and smoke is universally accompanied by fire. Inferential reasoning is stated in the form of a syllogism of which the five members are i, proposition (prati jna) : the hill is on fire; 2, reason (hetu) : because it smokes; 3, example (udaharana) : whatever shows smoke shows fire, e.g., a kitchen; 4, application (upanaya) : so is this hill, and 5, conclusion (nigamana) : there fore, the hill is on fire. The first member states the thesis to be established. It is only a suggestion. It contains a subject or what is observed, which is generally an individual or a class, and a predicate which is to be proved. The subject is the minor term (paksa, dharmin) and the predicate the major (sddhya, dharma). The second member of the syllogism states the presence in the minor of the middle term called ground (hetu). The third takes us to the basis of inference, the major premise. Though Gautama and Vatsyayana may not have regarded the example as the illus tration of a general rule, later Nyaya looks upon it as the state ment of an invariable concomitance between the mark and the character inferred (vyaptipratipadikam vakyam). The conclusion restates the proposition as grounded. Nagarjuna is given the credit for dispensing with the last two members of the syllogism as superfluous.
Universal propositions are reached through enu meration, intuition and indirect proof. Uninterrupted agreement (niyata sahacarya) reinforced by absence of exceptions (avina bhavarapasambandha) leads to unconditional concomitances. Na ture does not always supply us with positive and negative in stances of the necessary type. In such cases indirect proof (tarka) may be used. By pointing out the absurdities in which we are landed, if we deny a suggested hypothesis, we indirectly prove its validity. Even when we observe all possible cases and strengthen our conclusion by indirect proof we cannot reach absolute cer tainty. Experience of sensible particulars, however thorough and exhaustive, cannot give rise to universal relations. Gangesa recog nizes the nonsensuous (alaukika) activity involved in the appre hension of universals (samdnyalaksana).
A cause is that which invariably precedes the effect. It is not merely accessory to but is necessary for the pro duction of the effect. Two things cannot be causally related un less there is the positive-negative (anvayavyatireki) relation be tween them, such that the presence of the cause means the presence of the effect and vice versa. Three different kinds of causes are distinguished, material (upadana), non-material or for mal (asamavayi) and efficient (nimitta). The appearance of plurality of causes is traced to defective analysis. When the effect is understood in its uniqueness (karyavisesa) it will be seen to have only one cause.
By means of comparison (upamana), we gain the knowledge of a thing from its similarity to another thing previously well known. Hearing that gavaya (wild ox) is like a cow, we infer that the animal which we find to be like the cow is the gavaya. This argument involves knowledge of the object to be known and perception of similarity. Comparison relates to the problem of identification.
The problem of sabda or verbal knowledge is mainly of theo logical interest. Certain questions of logical value are incidentally discussed. Regarding the import of words, the Nyaya holds that a word denotes an individual (vyakti), or a form (akrti) or a genus (jati) or all these. It depends on our particular interest at the moment.
The validity of knowledge is not self-established but is proved by something else (paratah
If every cognition were self-evident there would be no possibility of doubt. We discover the truth of our ideas by the test of action.
The individual self is a real substantive being possessing the qualities of knowledge, feeling and desire and aver sion. It is different from the body, the senses and the understand ing. It is all-pervading though it does not cognize many things simultaneously on account of the atomic nature of manas or the inner sense. It is unique in each individual, and we have an in finite number of souls. The soul is an unconscious principle cap able of being qualified by consciousness.
The The system takes its name from visesa or particularity. It is in the particulars of the world, pre-eminently in the particular imperceptible souls and atoms, that true individuality is to be found.
The Vaisesika adopts a sixfold classification of padarthas (objects which can be thought and named) into sub stance (dravya), quality (guyaa), movement (karma), generality (sdmanya), particularity (visesa) and inherence (samavaya), to which later thinkers add a seventh, non-existence (abhdva). That something is, is the first principle : but nothing can be without pos sessing certain qualities. Some of the qualities reside in a plurality of objects, while others are confined to individuals. The former are general qualities (sdmanya), while the latter are distinguished into permanent (guna) and transitory (karma). Inherence is a special kind of relation distinct from occasional or separable con junction. When the scheme became logical in scope non-existence was included. Later Nyaya develops this idea with great subtlety. The first three categories possess a real objective existence, while the other three are products of intellectual discrimination.
The atomic theory is developed in connec tion with the substances of earth, water, light and air. The things that we experience are made up of parts. They are therefore non eternal. Non-eternal has no meaning apart from eternal. The component particles are eternal. The atom marks the limit of division. If it were endlessly divisible, then material things would be products of an equally endless number of constitutent parts, and differences in the dimensions of things could not be accounted for. Though the atoms have no extension, their heterogeneous nature is the cause of the extension and visibility of the combina tions of atoms. Though Kanada is not clear about where the visibility of the combinations begins, his later followers suggest that an aggregate of three atoms (tryanuka), others of three double atoms, produces extension, and it is visible in the shape of the dust mote (trasarenu) dancing in the sunlight. Answering to the four kinds of material objects—earth, water, light and air, we have four kinds of atoms producing the four senses of touch, taste, sight and smell. This is why each special sense reveals a single quality, however excited. Though the qualities of earthly things, as colour, taste, smell and tangibility, vanish on the de struction of the thing itself, they are always found in their re spective atoms, though in earth and atoms of earth new qualities are produced by heat (pakaja). Water, light and air do not suffer a similar change. There can never come a time when there will be an utter annihilation of things. The atoms will abide for ever.
