THE VEDANTA The Vedanta Sutra attempts to set forth the teachings of the Upanishads in a consistent way. Its short aphorisms are unintel ligible by themselves. Many different systems ranging from pure non-dualism to explicit dualism attempt to interpret the Sutra. The chief of them are those of 8aricokara, Ramanuja and Madhya.
in his sys tem asks whether there is anything in experience which may be regarded as foundational and discusses the claims of the different factors of experience to that title. Our senses may de ceive us and our memory may be an illusion. The waking tracts may not be different from dream worlds, where also we visit places, handle shadows, and battle with ghosts. Though all ob jects of experience may be open to doubt, there is something which is beyond all doubt. Every one is conscious of the existence of one's own self and no one thinks "I am not." The self cannot be doubted or denied for "it is the essential nature of him who denies it." Though we cannot know it by thought, it does not entirely escape us. It is the object of the notion of self (asmat pratyayavisaya) and is known to exist on account of its immediate presentation (aparoksatvat). This self is distinct from the body, the senses, and the understanding. It is the principle of conscious ness which is unaffected when the body is reduced to ashes and the mind perishes. It is one, universal and infinite.
Logical knowledge based on the distinction of subject and ob ject is not final. The real excludes all relations, but logical knowledge is relational in character. The real simply is, but we attempt to characterize it in knowledge and no predicate is found adequate to it. In judgment, we equate the real with the unreal, the subject with the object. We attribute to the Atman activity, agency and enjoyment. All our knowledge is strictly speaking non-knowledge (avidyd). The ascertainment of the ultimate real ity by the exclusion of all that is imposed (adhyasta) on it is wis dom (vidya). Avidya is another name,for our finitude. When its roots are cut our bondage is broken. Sarinkara admits the reality of intuitional consciousness where the distinctions of subject and object are superseded.
adopts the distinction between truth (paravidya) and empirical truth (aparavidya). The latter is not illusory or decep tive but only imperfect or relative. The empirical world is not self-existent or real. Yet there must be a reality on which it rests. Even if we regard the whole universe as merely imaginary there must be something which is the basis of all imagination. That reality is Brahman. As it is opposed to all empirical existence, it is given to us as the negative of everything that is positively known. We cannot even call it one (ekam). It is to be called non-dual (advaitam). It is the wholly "other" but not non-being.
When we are not content with such negative accounts we describe it as the personal God (Lfvara). God is the absolute cast through the moulds of logic.
Maya.—Every object in the world tends to pass away from itself to something else. The categories of time, space and cause which bind experience are self-contradictory. Our knowledge of the world is inconsistent. When intuitional expe rience arises the pluralistic universe is sublated. The term mays registers the imperfection and relativity of the world. It does not mean that the world is a mere illusion. Sarirokara's refutation of Buddhistic subjectivism is decisive on this question. While he traces the world to avidyd (ignorance) he takes care to point out that this ignorance is cosmic in character. The phenomenal self and the phenomenal world are mutually implicated facts. The mind with its categories on the one side and the world which it construes through them on the other hang together.
We cannot conceive the relation between the world and the absolute. The question of relation has meaning only if we have two "distincts," but the world is not distinct from Brahman. The finite is the infinite hidden from our view through certain bar riers. When we intuitively recognize the absolute the relative dis appears; when we discuss about the relative there is no absolute to which it has to be attached. The problem arises on account of a confusion of standpoints. If Brahman is to be viewed as the cause of the world it is only in the sense that the world cannot be explained apart from Brahman, though the latter is in no way touched by the world of appearance. Brahman is the basis of the apparent existence of the world (vivartopddana).
The individual soul is different from the Atman. Its divine na ture is concealed by the external adjuncts (upddhis) of the sense organs and vital airs which form the subtle body. These, together with karma, accompany the soul in its migrations. Moksa or sal vation is the lifting of the veil of ignorance which conceals from the soul the truth that it is and always has been one with Brahman. The road to realization lies not through something done or ac complished but through knowledge or the sweeping aside of the delusive veil of ignorance. Sariikara is clear that this insight can not be attained without the discipline of moral life. Insight is not so much an answer to a riddle as a victory in a battle.
Ramanuja endeavours to 'show that the God of religious faith is not the unconditioned abstraction of Satimkara but a personal being whose reality need not be doubted simply because our knowledge of him is imperfect. The sense of personal communion with God involves a real fellowship with an other. The supreme Brahman has internal differences (svagata bheda). Souls and matter are comprehended within the unity of the supreme as attributes to the substance or parts to a whole or body to the soul which animates it. Though attributes of God, souls and matter are in themselves substances possessing qualities with their own distinct modes, energies and activities. Souls, mat ter and God are different on account of their natural differences (svarupabheda) but one on account of their identity (aikyam) of the modes and substance. Identity means only inseparable ex istence (aprthaksiddhi).
For Ramanuja, causation is only an alteration of state. The creation of the universe from Brahman is not a production of something new but only a change of condition. It is a modification of that which is subtle into that which is gross. In the causal con dition Brahman has for his body or mode the conscious (cit) and unconscious (acit) entities in their subtle form, while in the effect condition they are in a gross form.
Ramanuja does not accept the explanation of the world and of the individual souls as mere productions of ignorance envelop ing the nature of Brahman. If the multiplicity is due to human ignorance, then there should be no such world for God. But Scrip ture tells us of God's creation, etc., which means that God reckons with the world of multiplicity. We cannot regard the world as un real, like the mirage, for while the activity prompted by the latter is unsuccessful, that based on the knowledge of the objects is suc cessful. The reality of the world established by perception cannot be sublated by Scripture as the spheres of perception and Scrip ture are different. Simply because objects do not persist we can not conclude that they are unreal.
While for amkara, freedom consists in the removal of a bar rier and the entering into the secure realization of a permanent and inalienable truth, for Ramanuja, it is communion with God to be reached by devotion and faith. The individual is not effaced when the goal is reached but maintains his self-identity and enjoys the fruit of his faith in unending felicity.
Madhva stands out for unqualified dual ism and insists on the five great distinctions of God and soul, God and matter, soul and matter, one soul and another and one part of matter and another. Reality is of two kinds, independent (svatantra) and dependent (paratantra). God is the only inde pendent reality; matter and souls are dependent. God controls souls and matter though he does not create or destroy. He is the efficient but not the material cause of the universe. Though abso lutely dependent on Brahman, the individual souls are essentially active agents and have responsibilities to bear. While God is all pervading, the souls are said to be of atomic size. They yet per vade the body on account of the quality of intelligence. No two souls are alike in character.
This brief sketch of Indian philosophy indicates the main lines of a singularly manifold philosophic development. It has been impossible to touch in this article on all the special points of in terest or doctrinal variations. For these the student must consult special articles and treatises.
B. Keith, The Religion and Philosophy of the Bibliography.-A. B. Keith, The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upanisads, Cambridge, Mass. (1925), careful and critical but overcautious; R. D. Ranade, A Constructive Survey of Upan isadic Philosophy, Poona (1926), contains important extracts in San skrit ; B. M. Barua, Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy, Calcutta (1921) ; S. Radhakrishnan, Philosophy of the Upanisads, London (1924) ; P. Deussen, Philosophy of the Upanisads, Edinburgh (1906), follows Samkara ; J. L. Jaini, Outlines of Jainism, Cambridge, (1916) ; M. Stevenson, The Heart of Jainism, Oxford (1915) ; A. B. Keith, Indian Logic and Atomism, Oxford (1921) ; Faddegon, The Vaisesika System, Amsterdam (1918) ; J. C. Chatterji, Hindu Realism, Allaha bad (1912) ; F. H. Woods, The Yoga System of Patanjali, Cambridge, Mass. (1914) ; V. S. Ghate, Vedanta, Poona (1926) ; P. Deussen, The System of the Vedanta, Chicago (1912) ; Max Muller, Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, London (1899) ; S. N. Das Gupta, History of Indian Philosophy, Cambridge (1922) ; S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy (2 vols.) London (1923 & 1927) ; expository & critical; E. W. Hopkins, The Ethics of India, New Haven (1924). Transla tions: R. E. Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanisads, Oxford (1921), a good translation ; author's introduction unsympathetic ; H. Jacobi, Jaina Sutras, (2 vols.) , Oxford (1884, 1895) ; A. Chakravarti, Kunda kundacarya's Paucastikayasara, Allahabad (192o) ; S. C. Ghoshal, Nemicandra's Dravyasarizgraha, Arrah (1917) ; T. C. Jaini, Umasvat's Tattvarthadhigama Sutra, Arrah (192o) ; Ganganath Jha, Nyaya Sutra (1919) ; Nanda Lal Sinha, Samkhya Philosophy, Allahabad (1915), with Vatsyayana's Bhasya & Udyotakara's Varttika, Allahabad contains translations of important Sarfihkhya texts; G. Thibaut, The Vedanta Sutra with .a hkara's commentary (2 vols.), Oxford (1890 & 1896) ; G. Thibaut, The Vedanta Sutra with Ramanuja's Com mentary, Oxford (19o4) ; E. B. Cowell and A. E. Gough, Sarva dartanasayYigraha, London (1882) . (S. RA.)
