IZVOL SKY, ALEXANDER PETROVICH ( 1919), Russian statesman, was born at Moscow on March 17, 1856, of an ancient Polish family long settled in Russia. He graduated at the Imperial Lyceum of St. Petersburg (Leningrad) with the highest honours attainable, and entered the diplomatic service. He held appointments at Bucharest, Washington and at the Vatican, where he was charged with the resumption of re lations between the tsar's government and the Holy See.
Izvolsky married Countess Toll, a friend of the dowager Empress Maria Feodorovna, to whose influence he owed much of his professional success. His next posts, as minister plenipo tentiary, were in Belgrade, Munich and Tokyo. From the Japa nese capital he warned Lamsdorff, his chief, of what was brewing for Russia in the Far East, but without effect ; his attempts to compose the differences by arranging the Marquis Ito's mission to Europe (1902) and obtaining moderate Japanese proposals (1904) were also thwarted. Before hostilities broke out Izvolsky was transferred to Copenhagen (1903). In 1906 he succeeded Count Lamsdorff as minister of foreign affairs, a post which he held until 1910. From 1910 to 1917 Izvolsky was Russian Ambassador in France. After the revolution he died in Paris Aug. 16, 1919.
As foreign minister Izvolsky has no claims to real greatness. He was a clever diplomatist—according to King Edward VII., the cleverest in Russia—with a very definite and circumscribed aim which he pursued with unflagging energy, an endless variety of means and untiring perseverance. When he became foreign secretary, France and Russia were but nominally allies, each one speculating on the intentions of the other; and the cardinal principle of his policy was to convert that alliance into an effective reality. This he did with occidental thoroughness. Hence he strove to draw Britain, Italy, Turkey, Bulgaria and Rumania into the Entente. Accepting as an axiom the inevitability of a great European war, the principal belligerents being France and Germany in the west, and Russia and Austria in the east, he came to the conclusion that between those future enemies there might be episodic arrangements and temporary makeshifts, but no complete settlement except by war.
Izvolsky's first success was the liquidation of the war with Japan, which he accomplished with remarkable foresight, breadth of view, thoroughness and moral courage. The next and more difficult task, the final elimination of the causes of Anglo-Russian rivalry, was begun by the arrangement with Britain about Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet (1907). This reconciliation definitely
baffled Aehrenthal's scheme which the Russian tsaritza favoured— of a renewal of the Three-Kaiser Alliance.
Soon after this Izvolsky sounded Vienna unofficially as to how Austria would view an attempt by Russia to obtain the freedom of the Straits. Aehrenthal, then minister of foreign affairs, who was still .on relatively friendly terms with Izvolsky, replied unofficially that no objection would be raised if Russia agreed to the annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina. This ques tion and answer were, however, followed by a marked coolness in the mutual relations of the two empires, and the matter dropped. The two states came together again when charged by Europe to draft and execute a scheme for the reform of justice in Macedonia. But Austria secretly obtained from Turkey a railway concession in the sanjak of Novi Bazar. In St. Peters burg, London and Belgrade the news aroused intense indignation. But after King Edward's visit to Reval (June 1908), Izvolsky in formed Aehrenthal that Russia had no objection to the Sanjak Railway if Austria would assent to an Adria Railway for Serbia. At the same time he proposed that the tsardom should obtain the freedom of the Straits and Austria promulgate the annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina. Izvolsky and Aehrenthal then met at Buchlau, the Moravian residence of Count Berchtold (Sept. 15, 1908), and agreed to this arrangement. Izvolsky held that he made the proviso that the two points be referred to a European Conference, while Aehrenthal asserted that he announced the an nexation as impending. Both were probably right. A few days later the annexation was proclaimed, whereas Russia was kept out of her quid pro quo owing to British-French opposition.
The resulting personal and national tension almost brought war within sight, but Russia being unprepared, it was staved off.
Izvolsky attempted to draw Italy into the orbit of the Allies; but in spite of this Russia and Germany seemed for a while to become friends again, and during the Tsar's sojourn in Ger many Izvolsky was relieved of his office and sent Paris as ambassador, remaining, however, the real head of his country's policy until the outbreak of the World War, for which his enemies often held him responsible. But the hyperbole is unjustified. His policy, like that of Aehrenthal, was a sequence of cruel illusions for which the peoples had to pay.