ISSUS, BATTLE OF (October, 333 B•C.)• Topographically, the region in which the battle of Issus was fought is an interest ing one. The field itself lies a few miles north of Myriandrus, at, or near Alexandria (Alexandretta). It is surrounded by moun tainous country, and is approached by three passes : north-west of Issus the Cilician Gates over the Taurus range; north-east, the Amanic Gates leading to the Euphrates, and south the Syrian Gates leading into Syria and towards Sochi where Darius had assembled his army. Towards this last-mentioned pass Alexander marched, and either the Amanic Gates were unknown to him, or what is more probable he never expected that Darius, whose main strength lay in cavalry, would desert the plains. The unex pected, however, happened, and Darius, rejecting the advice of his generals, marched on the Amanic Gates which lay to the rear of Alexander. If tactically this was a bad move, strategically it was a sound one, for by advancing through this pass Darius com pelled Alexander to relinquish the initiative and fight a battle to regain command of his communications. On hearing what Darius had done, Alexander at once assembled his generals pointing out to them the danger they were in, and then counter-marched to meet the Persians.
As the Greeks debouched on to the coastal plain Alexander de ployed his army, the right wing resting on the foot-hills, and the left on the sea shore ; the front of the army was about one mile and a half from flank to flank. The Persians, who considerably outnumbered Alexander, were drawn up on both banks of the river Pinarus (Deli), their main force of cavalry being on their right. Alexander, noticing this, reinforced his left wing with the Thessalian cavalry and secured his right by a crochet of light in fantry. In front of his left wing he placed the Cretan archers and the Thracians ; the Greek mercenaries he held in reserve.
of his line of battle, and towards him Alexander charged throwing the Persians back in confusion. Then the unexpected happened. The phalanx, disordered whilst crossing the Pinarus, fell back, whereupon Alexander wheeled his right wing round to the left, and charged in flank the Greek mercenaries who were driving back the phalanx. Once he had extricated his centre the pursuit of the de feated Persians was taken up. The traditional losses given by Diodorus and Plutarch are r io,000 Persians killed and 450 Macedonians.
Tactics.—The main tactical interest in this battle is that though Alexander developed his attack from his normal order of battle he was in no way tied down by it, but adapted it to the ground and the probable actions of the enemy. He did not advance to the attack until he had secured both his flanks, neither did he direct his decisive attack against the Persian cavalry, the most formidable troops confronting him, but against the enemy's com mand, that is against Darius himself. Thus, he first decided on his objective, secondly he secured his advance, and thirdly, only then did he launch his attack which was carried out at top speed, and so simultaneously developed security and offensive power. The blow was an overwhelming one, yet in the elation of success Alexander did not lose his head, for directly he saw that his phalanx was in danger he wheeled his cavalry round to assist his infantry. By so doing he abandoned his goal in order to secure his base of action which was vital to him.
Lessons.—The main lessons of this battle are : correct distribu tion of troops to ground; concentration against the decisive point, and the maintenance of tactical direction. If the phalanx had been destroyed whilst Alexander was pursuing Darius, the whole of the Macedonian army would in all probability have been over whelmed by the Persian right wing.