ITALIAN WARS. The war which broke out in 1848 had for its theatre the northern provinces of Italy and was due to the inhabitants endeavouring to gain their national unity. To expel the Austrians who were in possession of Lombardy and Venetia was the principal aim of the inhabitants. The Austrians had for a long time made themselves odious by their continued repressive measures, especially during the last 20 years. The Austrian states men in Vienna, though receiving warnings from their represent atives, appeared unable to comprehend the gravity of the situa tion. Grave disorders which had to be put down by the military, occurred in 1846 on the elevation of pope Pius IX. to the chair. At that period he was known for his liberal tendencies, and the populace placed their hopes on his influence to shake off the Aus trian domination. If the Austrian authorities in Vienna failed to grasp the danger that was threatening their power in Lombardy and Venetia, the same cannot be said of Count Radetsky, the vet eran commander-in-chief, one of the ablest leaders of the 19th century. Though his reports failed to rouse the Government to the imminent danger, he had carefully trained his troops in Italy and had supervised the erection of fortifications on the Mincio and Adige. It was mainly due to him that Austria was able to retain her Italian provinces.
King Charles Albert, who assumed command of the Sardinians, did not favour a revolutionary war, but he was forced on March 23 to accede to the popular clamour. Ascertaining that Radetsky had evacuated Milan, he crossed the Ticino at Pavia and Buf falora intending to pursue the enemy, thought to be in flight. By the first week in April, he was at Cremona with 70,000 men. It was hoped by the Sardinians that in three months their forces would be doubled. Charles Albert wished to capture Mantua but, giving up the idea, he marched to Pastrengo intending to bar Radetsky's retreat to Tirol. After the action at Goito, April 8, the king crossed the Mincio, while Radetsky retreated to a position west of Verona. The Sardinian attack failed on May 6 at St. Lucia, but Radetsky refrained from following the enemy till reinforce ments arrived. He was prepared even to sacrifice Peschiera which was invested by the enemy. Nugent with part of the expected reinforcements, 15,000 strong, moved from Gorizia to Verona, har assed by the inhabitants. Evading battle with the Papal forces under Durando and Ferrari, 25,00o strong, he joined Radetsky on May 23.
Radetsky crossed the Ticino and destroyed the bridge at Mez zano Corte, whereby Ramorino was cut off from Chrzanowski's main army. Two divisions of the latter crossed the river, the remaining three stood at Vigevano and Novara. Hearing of Radetsky's advance, Charles Albert decided to meet him at Vige vano with three corps, calling the other two from Magenta. Radet sky sent three corps to Mortara, outflanking the enemy's right with one and with another guarding his own right flank at Vige vano. Mortara fell, the Sardinians hardly pressed retreating to Novara. Next day, Radetsky advanced towards Vespolate, with an outflanking detachment on Robbio. The five Sardinian divisions were drawn up at Novara, ready to receive battle that day. Owing to a false report, Radetsky believing he was faced by a rearguard, changed his plan of a massed advance on Novara, to a left wheel towards Vercelli with but one corps going to Novara.
The following morning the Austrian II. corps encountered the whole hostile army at Novara and for hours was in the greatest danger. The III. corps coming up saved the situation in the after noon and was, in its turn, followed by IV., which threatened the enemy's right. The Reserve Corps arriving, Radetsky ordered a general advance, the Sardinians falling back in disorder on Novara. An armistice was arranged that night, Charles Albert abdicating in favour of his son, Victor Emmanuel, and Radetsky giving up the advance on Turin. Thus terminated a campaign which will ever rank as a model—rapidity and secrecy, two leading military principles, being realized by Radetsky most brilliantly.
The clever policy of Cavour, her foreign minister, consolidated her position in the years following the war. He had paid many visits to Paris and tried his utmost to persuade the emperor Napo leon III. to help Italy to liberate the country from the Austrians. In the middle of July, 1858, the emperor was finally convinced by Cavour that it was for the interest of France to join Sardinia in a war against Austria. These conversations were held between him and Cavour at Plombieres, when it was decided in principle that should hostilities break out between Sardinia and Austria, France would send two army corps, gradually increasing the num ber to 200,000 men. No plan of campaign was drawn up, but a French officer was to be despatched to Turin to discuss technical matters with the leading Sardinian generals on the spot.
By Dec. 1858 events began to move more rapidly. Napoleon at the annual New Year reception of the Diplomatic corps openly declared to Baron Hubner, the Austrian ambassador, that the rela tions between France and Austria were not as good as heretofore, though his friendship to the emperor Francis Joseph remained unchanged. From that moment it became evident that hostilities were not far distant.
Both France and Austria reinforced their forces by slow degrees the result being to hamper military operations. In Austria's case it was dictated by policy as every effort was used to persuade Prussia to join her in the conflict with France. Should this be possible the principal blow would be struck by the united forces from southern Germany, the Austrians in Lombardy remaining on the defensive. By the middle of April it became evident that Austria could not hope for this assistance, but valuable time was lost in assembling sufficient forces to crush the Sardinians prior to the arrival of the French. Austria mustered i5o,000 men in five Army Corps: II., III., V., VII. and VIII., commanded by Gyulai. His plan was to fall back on Verona and await there re inforcements, but Kuhn his chief of staff suggested a march against the Sardinians, thereby forcing Prussia to a decision.
France, fearing Prussia's attitude, on her part was obliged to retain considerable forces by the Rhine, yet this was no excuse for her vacillation during the first period of the campaign. Having had three clear months she began hostilities ill prepared ; these would have ended in disaster if she had been faced by an energetic opponent. No definite plan of action was decided upon before actual fighting began, though Jomini, on Napoleon's request to give a suggestion, advised a flank attack by way of Magenta against the Austrian right. The Sardinians meanwhile were massed between Casale-Alessandria covering Turin and Genoa.
Austria's Ultimatum.—War began on April 26. Sardinia had rejected the Austrian ultimatum to disarm, despatched on the 19th, and Gyulai ordered the frontier to be crossed the following day. Having crossed the Ticino at Pavia and Bereguardo, Gyulai reached Valenza on May 3 when a report coming from Vienna stating the French were already in Turin in great strength stopped his advance. He now decided to move on Turin and attack the French columns debouching from Suza. On May 8 the Aus trians reached the Sesia at Vercelli, but reports announcing the advance of strong hostile forces on Piacenza forced Gyulai to retire to the Lomellino, with his headquarters at Mortara. A bridge was constructed at the confluence of the Po and Ticino to facilitate a retirement to the south if necessary. The French were already on Sardinian soil and were rapidly joining their allies. Some had come across the Alps by Mont Cenis and Mont Genevre, while the rest had arrived by sea, disembarking at Genoa.
By the second week in May the Allies stood : I. Corps, Voghera; II. Sale; III. and Guards, Alessandria-Tortona ; IV. Valenza Bassegnana ; a division of the V. watching the roads leading to the Duchies of Central Italy; the French mustered 150,000, with 6o,000 Sardinians. Napoleon assuming command, continued un
decided whether to advance to Piacenza south of the Po or to move via Magenta on Milan. The first encounter took place at Montebello on May 20 when Stadion was sent with 24,00o to ascertain the strength of the enemy at Voghera. After a brisk fight with Forey's division 8,000 strong, the Austrians fell back but were not pursued. This confirmed Gyulai in the belief that the French would march on Piacenza, while Napoleon imagined the Austrians intended a big offensive south of the Po.
He now gave orders to move north by a long flank march on Magenta, as proposed by Jomini. The Sardinians started on May 25, reaching Vercelli on the 29th, while the French made for Casale-Valenza, their right being protected by a division at Vo ghera and Valenza. Gyulai soon heard of the Sardinian march, but mistook it for a feint to divert his attention from the Po.
An action occurred on May 3o at Palestro, which the Sardinians were to hold, to facilitate the French crossing of the Sesia at Vercelli. Fighting was resumed the next day, when the French III. Corps participated in repulsing the enemy. The French main army was approaching Novara on June 1, while the Sardinians with the remaining French forces were around Palestro-Vercelli, the river Agogna being between them ; the Austrians might have attacked them knowing how widely they were spread out, but Gyulai decided to retreat across the Ticino, which he did next day. His idea was to retreat to the Mincio, but Kuhn, his chief of staff protested against so hurried a retirement.
Meanwhile the Allies approached the Ticino, seizing the cross ings at San Martino and Turbigo. The II. French Corps to gether with the 2nd Guard Division crossed the river an oc cupied Robeccheto early on June 3. The Allies now stood as follows : I. Corps at Lumelogno and IV. Corps at Novara ; Guard with the III. Corps, at Novara ; Sardinians at Galiate. A detach ment guarded the extreme right flank at Mortara. The French G.H.Q. being badly served by the cavalry, ascertained only early on June 4 that Gyulai had crossed the Ticino the previous eve ning.
Napoleon intended to attack the Austrian right flank with the II. Corps and Sardinians, while advancing with the main body consisting of III. and IV. Corps with the Guards against the bridges of San Martino and to force his way across. Gyulai on his part wished to give battle on June 5 holding the enemy with his right, V. and VI. Corps, at Magenta, and to strike the enemy debouching from San Martino with his remaining five corps. Events turned out differently, Mac-Mahon's detachment ad vanced in two columns early on June 4, but on approaching Buffalora at midday, met with an obstinate resistance, which held up his advance. The Austrians had 12,000 men posted there, 8,000 at Magenta, 12,000 to defend the bridges and 27,00o at Abbiategrasso. A second move was made at about 4 P.M., when the Austrians were driven back to Magenta.
Meantime Napoleon, having in hand but a small force at San Martino, awaited Mac-Mahon's advance, which would open the road for his own troops. Hearing firing from the direction of Mac-Mahon's force Napoleon sent a division of the Guards to storm the bridges and support Mac-Mahon towards Buffalora. A desperate struggle ensued, Mellinet's guards encountering 18,000 Austrians, who were trying to wreck the bridges. Urgent messages were sent to the III. and IV. Corps to forward rein forcements. The French across the Ticino were now able to hold their own for the time being, and it was fortunate for them that Mac-Mahon shortly afterwards renewed his effort to press forward, the Austrians gradually giving way before him. Hear ing that Magenta had been captured by the enemy, Gyulai gave orders to retreat late that night in the direction of Cremona Piacenza. The French feared an attack on June 5, and rightly so, as the Austrians could have collected 1 io,000 men for a re newed battle, but bearing of the retreat of the enemy, they entered Milan on June 7. Next day they drove back the Austrian rear-guard at Milegnano, the enemy retreating to the Mincio, which was crossed on June 16. That day the Emperor Francis Joseph took command of the army, having Baron Hess as his chief of staff.
Contact with the enemy was lost at the crossing of the Chiese June 15, but little skill being shown by the Allied cavalry, the Austrians assembling in full security behind the Mincio. By the 21st the Allies were over the Chiese with headquarters at Mon techiaro, numbering 107,000 French with 48,000 Sardinians. No fighting was expected west of the Mincio, isolated hostile horse men alone being visible. A balloon detachment made an ascent at Castiglione June 23 but no enemy was to be seen.
The Austrians decided to take the offensive and crossed the Mincio on June 23 over 12 bridges. By the evening they stood on the line Pozzolengo-Solferino-Medole and were 16o,000 strong. They were divided into two armies: I., Wimpffen, 70,000 men comprising III., IX., and XI. Corps with a cavalry division; II., Schlick, with I., V., VII. and VIII. Corps, including cavalry division, 90,00o combatants. The II. Corps was left at Mantua against the hostile V. Corps, which was known to be moving south of the Po. A division from the II. Corps was sent to Marcaria. Neither opponent expected a battle on the 24th. The Austrians believed the enemy would be encountered in two or three days time, while the Allies did not expect them this side of the Mincio, which they had to cross on the 24th. The Austrians had every chance of success, had they utilised the II. Corps at Mantua against the French flank and rear. Lack of initiative and excessive centralisation prevailed in their army. The battle field can be divided into two parts : the hilly (northern) part around San Martino-Solferino, the (southern) plain between Guidizzolo-Medole. The Allies stood as follows : the Sardinians on the left at Lonato; the centre: I., II. Corps and guards Cas tiglione-Montechiaro ; the right : III. and IV. Corps Medole-Cas telcoffredo. The Austrians advanced in close formation : VIII. Corps, Pozzolengo ; V. Solferino; I. Cavriana ; III. Guidizzolo ; IV. Volta; IX. Robecco-Medole; XI. Cereta. Their plan was to hold the Allies by incessant attacks, while making for Car pendolo from the south against the allied right. Their march forward was to begin at 9 A.M. on the 24th.
Firing between the outposts began at 5 A.M. east of Castiglione and gradually the I. and II. French Corps were involved in fighting around Solferino. To the south the IV. Corps was also shortly engaged in a fierce encounter at Medole. The III. de layed by crossing the Chiese, was hurrying forward, but on approaching Castel Goffredo heard rumours of a hostile move ment from the south which did not take place. The II. Corps being held up at Casa Morino asked in vain for help from the IV. and the latter in turn pressed the III. to assist it. In the north the Austrian VIII. Corps was hotly engaged from day break and held up the Sardinians, after seizing San Martino, by incessant attacks throughout the day. By 11 A.M. the Austrians were desperately defending Solferino and to ease the situation, the Austrian emperor ordered the II. Army to advance on Cas tiglione, instead of Carpendole. But all attempts were made in vain against the French III. and IV. Corps which were attacking in their turn. At 2 P.M. Solferino was captured, thanks to the assistance of the guards. The II. Army, receiving a second order from Francis Joseph, made a fresh effort, but at 3 P.M., the I. army having begun to fall back, the battle was practically lost and the Austrians began their retreat to the Mincio. On the ex treme right the VIII. Corps repulsed every Sardinian attack, fall ing back only when informed of the II. Army's retreat. There was no pursuit. The Austrians fell back on Verona, having lost 22,000 men, while the Allies counted 17.000 casualties. An ar mistice was concluded at Villa franca, on July 8, Austria ceding Lombardy, while Napoleon received Savoy and Nice from Sar dinia.
Austria was forced by her political circumstances to assemble two armies, one on her northern frontiers, against Prussia, and a much smaller one against Italy. She relied, to make up for her numerical inferiority, on her small but highly-trained forces, and on her strong defensive position in the Quadrilateral. The Italians now numbered 250,000 infantry and 13,00o cavalry, with 480 guns. By an agreement with Prussia, Italy was to invade Venetia, mobilizing her forces, for that purpose, in the middle of April, 1866, and concentrate them in two groups : Three army corps r ro,000 strong at Lodi, Cremona and Piacenza under King Victor Emmanuel, La Marmora acting as Chief of Staff. Cialdini with eight divisions was on the south bank of the Po with head quarters at Bologna, and had 70,000 men. A volunteer force under Garibaldi guarded the extreme left flank and was to in vade Tirol. The Italians, knowing the Austrians were weak in numbers, believed they would await them around Verona. They would cross the Mincio, advancing on Custozza and hold the Austrians, while Cialdini passing over the Po would invade Venetia in the rear of the enemy.
The Austrians under the Archduke Albert, with General John as Chief of Staff, disposed of but 75,000 well trained troops. He took up a central position between Montagnana and Lonino within reach of either Rovigo or Verona, as he learned the enemy would advance in two separate armies from two direc tions : one from the Mincio, the other from south of the Po. On June 20 orders were issued to advance to Verona, the Arch duke intending to attack the Italian king ; hostile cavalry was known to be along the Mincio and Po, and Garibaldi was ad vancing into Tirol. On the 23rd the Archduke having completed his concentration between Verona-Pastrengo sent his troops into the hills, his plan being to take the offensive the next day, striking the Italians when they would be advancing towards the Adige. The Italians not expecting serious resistance, ad vanced with little precaution.
When at Villafranca the Italians were checked by artillery and cavalry, and 20,000 remained inactive all day. Meanwhile they fell in with the main hostile forces on the heights of Pes chiera-Custozza. The Austrians in their turn began the attack along the whole line. Battle raged all day with varying success till about 5 P.M. when the Italians were forced to retire to the Mincio. A fortnight later the Archduke and the bulk of the army were transported to defend Vienna against the Prussians and when hostilities closed in Austria the Archduke was sent with 155,000 men to Isonzo. No further fighting took place, how ever, and peace was signed October 3, Austria losing Venetia, though the Italian navy sustained a crushing defeat at Lissa on July 20 when attacked by Tegetthof. Only in 187o however did Rome once again become the capital of Italy the French being obliged to withdraw their garrison from the Eternal City after the French Empire had fallen. (A. SMI.)