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Italo-Turkish War

ITALO-TURKISH WAR. Following the diplomatic dis cussions which took place between Rome and Constantinople dur ing the summer of 191I, an ultimatum from Italy was delivered to the Porte on Sept. 28, demanding Turkey's consent to a military occupation of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. A period of 24 hours was set by the ultimatum, and as the Turkish reply did not meet the Italian demands a state of war was declared as from 2.3o P.M. on Sept. 29.

Italian Naval Activity.

Military action was slow to suc ceed the formal declaration of war, and it was not till Oct. r r that the first transports reached Tripoli. Meanwhile the Italian navy had been busy. On Sept. 28 a squadron appeared off Tripoli, and notice was given that if the town were not surrendered it would be bombarded. The obsolete fortifications were bombarded for two hours on Oct. 3, after the Turkish authorities had declined to surrender the town. By next day, the Turkish garrison, acting upon order received from Constantinople, had retired into the sandy plains, and on Oct. 5, a force of 1,600 sailors was disem barked. Meanwhile hostilities had been begun elsewhere. On Sept. 29 and 3o Italian destroyers under the command of the duke of the Abruzzi sank the Turkish torpedo-boats off Prevesa in Epirus and on Oct. I Admiral Aubry left Augusta to go in search of the Turkish fleet, which the declaration of war had found at Beirut. But the orders given him were suddenly countermanded, and instead of steaming to the Aegean in order to intercept the Turks, he was sent to Tobruk, which was occupied by a detach ment of sailors on Oct. 4. The renunciation of the attempt to cut off the Turkish fleet was inspired by political reasons.

Italian Expeditionary Force.

A week elapsed between the landing of the sailors at Tripoli and the arrival of the expeditionary force, and it was not till Oct. 20 that all the equipment had been put on shore. The force consisted of some 9,00o rifles with a few field and mountain batteries and two squadrons of cavalry. There was very little transport, for it had not been anticipated that the Turks would retreat towards the interior and receive support from the native tribesmen. That Neshat Bey, the Turkish commander in Tripoli, did receive this support was largely due to two men Ferhat Bey, deputy for Tripoli, and Suleiman el Baruni, a Berber from Fessato, who was deputy for the Jebel region. Meanwhile Homs, Derna and Benghazi had been occupied. There was some resistance at each place, especially at Benghazi, but the first fight ing of any importance was a sudden attack on Oct. 23 upon the Italian lines at Shara Shat in the Tripoli oasis, backed by a rising behind the lines. Two companies of Bersaglieri were cut to pieces, and the rest of the regiment were hard put to it to hold their own.

Further attacks led to a withdrawal of the line, and to the clear ing of the oasis behind the trenches. Large reinforcements were sent from Italy, and by the fourth week in November General Caneva, who was in command of the expedition, had about 25,000 rifles and 16 batteries. He took the offensive, and in two actions cleared the oasis and sent the Turks and their tribesmen allies packing. Turkish headquarters were established at Aziziya, some 3om. south of Tripoli.

Political Aspect.

At the beginning of November the Italian Government had considered the possibility of extending the theatre of war, on the sea at least, hoping to induce Turkey to give up the struggle. Austro-Hungary intervened, backed by Germany, invoking Article VII. of the Triple Alliance. Italy's action being limited in this way, it was necessary to solve the problem directly, but the task was more difficult than it need have been owing to the limitations laid upon General Caneva by the Italian Government. General Caneva's orders appear to have

been that he must not risk reverses or suffer heavy loss. In the circumstances, an expedition in pursuit of the Turks, and their mobile allies seemed hardly practical. In any event, months went by without any action of importance in Tripolitania. In Cyrenaica there was one fight near Benghazi, when a force of Arabs who had come near the town were attacked and severely punished. Derna was closely beset throughout the winter, and Enver Bey, who Lad succeeded in reaching Cyrenaica towards the end of the year, or ganized a formidable resistance, securing relative unity among the tribesmen, and a willingness to co-operate with the Turks, which had never before existed.

Italian Offensive Renewed.—In April, the long spell of in action in the western province came to an end, and from that time onward the resistance of the Turks and Arabs was gradually broken by a series of operations at various points. In April Italian warships appeared off the entrance to the Dardanelles. They were fired on by the Turkish forts and their answer drew a fresh and very energetic protest from Vienna. The northern Aegean was left alone by the Italians henceforth, but in May the island of Rhodes and 12 small islands of the Sporades (subsequently famous as the Dodecanese) were occupied by Italy. During the summer there were a number of successful actions in Tripolitania, and peace ne gotiations were begun at Ouchy in August. Progress was very slow, and it was not until Oct. 15, when two important victories had been won by the Italians, at Derna and Sidi Bilal (near Zan zur) that the Treaty of Ouchy was signed.

Conclusions.—The conduct of the Tripoli campaign was preju diced, first, by the failure of the Italian Government to judge the situation correctly, and secondly, by the limitations which were laid upon the military command. It was not possible at once to launch a desert expedition, and the difficulties of an advance to the Jebel, through country largely waterless, may be said to justify the adoption of a less ambitious plan. What is difficult to understand is the practical veto upon action of any kind, which immobilized large forces from December till April and delayed the carrying out of the policy which eventually put an end to hos tilities, the policy of extending the area of operations and striking a blow whenever the chance offered.

The operations of the summer changed the situation, but Italian prestige was not wholly restored by the later successes, or by the subsequent actions against the tribesmen who did not lay down their arms when the treaty was signed. The policy of the Govern ment bore heavily upon the army, which came in for much unfair criticism and increased the difficulties of those who undertook the administration of the country after the peace. The troubles which were to come with the outbreak of the World War may be traced in part at least to the hesitations and uncertainties of the six months following the landing.

T. Barcla

y, The Turco-Italian War (1912) ; G. von Gravenitz, Geschichte des Italienischen-Turkischen Krieges (1912– '4); F. MacCullagh, Italian Warfare in Tripoli (1912) ; W. K. McClure, Italy in North Africa (1913) Enver Pasha, Um Tripolis (1918) . (W. K. McC.)

italian, turkish, tripoli, oct and turks