Mei Ji Period

MEI JI PERIOD KOmei was succeeded by his son Mutsuhito, aged 15, who under the title of Meiji (meaning Enlightened Government) became the best known name in modern Japan. The new Shogun Keiki was a man of ability and mature intellect who had been convinced by events that it was impossible for Japan to continue in se clusion. He gave proof of his convictions by attempting to re model the army and navy on European lines and by sending his brother to see the Paris exhibition. But there was a strong party against him in which the DaimyOs of Satsuma, Tosa and Choshia were prominent. In Oct. 1867 YOdO, the chief of Tosa, presented to him a memorial setting forth the difficulties of the present position and suggesting that the administration should be restored to the emperor. Keiki at once summoned a conference of heads of clans in KyOto and informed them that he approved of the suggestion and intended to surrender his authority to the throne. The proposal was accepted without discussion, and the resigna tion was formally tendered and accepted. Thus ended the system of government which had been established by Iyeyasu in 1603.

Keiki left KyOto secretly and retired to his castle at Osaka, but the clan of Tokugawa were not so ready as their lord to give up their privileges. Their enemies also, the clans of Satsuma and ChOstia, were not satisfied and, suspecting Keiki of an intention to come back, induced the court to take measures against his followers which were, perhaps, needlessly irritating. All officials connected with the Tokugawa were deprived of the offices they held in Kyoto and the ShOgun's troops were removed from the palace gates which it was their ancient privilege to guard. Keiki could not restrain the indignation of his followers, and at last reluctantly allowed them to march against Kyoto. The attempt was a failure and they were beaten back. Keiki fled to Yedo and made unconditional submission, but in the north the struggle was not over till August 1869. The Matsudairas of Aizu resisted with especial stubbornness until their stronghold of Wakamatsu was taken and, as mentioned above in speaking of Iyeyasu's in stitutions, an attempt was actually made to proclaim the princely Abbot of Ueno as emperor. This prince's life is an instance of the extraordinary careers which Japanese can have. Ordained in his youth, he was head of the temples of Nikko and Ueno. At the age of 19 he was carried off to the north and proclaimed emperor. When his partisans were defeated, he was unfrocked and sent to study in Europe, where he spent seven years. On his return he commanded in Formosa, under the name of Prince Kitashirakawa, and a Shinto temple d€dicated to him is one of the principal sights of the capital of that island. Yenomoto, an officer in the Shogun's navy, who had recently returned from a stay of six years in Europe, fled with several ships to the island of Yezo (Hokkaido), which was then an almost unknown country, and established himself in Hakodate with the intention of found ing an independent state. Hopeless as was their cause, he and his followers showed the greatest courage and skill and for six months kept at bay all the forces sent against them. When their fortress was at last captured their lives were spared and Yenomoto and others eventually held important posts under Meiji.

In 1868 two unfortunate attacks on European officials were made near Hyogo. But adequate reparation was offered and the Japanese officers held responsible were ordered to commit suicide in the presence of foreign witnesses. In his Tales of Old Japan, Lord Redesdale (Mitford) has given a most impressive account of the terrible rite of harakiri at which he was officially present.

In considering the extraordinary changes effected in the Meiji era, it must be remembered that only the nobles and the mili tary class, about one-sixteenth of the population, were concerned in them. The mass of the people were amenable to discipline, but had few anti-foreign prejudices. They were, of course, alarmed when they were told that Japan was going to be over run by barbarians and there were misunderstandings with in dividual foreigners. But from early times they had always been ready to assimilate when opportunity offered. In the 7th century they eagerly adopted Chinese usages: in the i6th, considering the small number of missionaries, the number of converts to Christianity was surprising. Kaempfer observed that the Japanese "have so much sense and innate curiosity that if they were not absolutely denied free and open conversation and correspondence with foreigners they would receive them with the utmost kind ness and pleasure," and in the 19th century Europeans often noted the contrast between the cordial hospitality which they received from the ordinary folk and the fierce antipathy shown by of ficials and Samurai. But even in the upper classes it is clear that there was a strong movement of curiosity and acquisitiveness. As far back as the time of Hideyoshi there was a craze for wear ing Portuguese clothes, and Iyeyasu was anxious to import such inventions as he considered useful. But his successors formed the deliberate conviction that intercourse with Catholic Europe was a national danger, and had their knowledge been wider, had they known the history of Goa and Ceylon, of Mexico and Peru, can we suppose that they would have changed their conviction? The fear that Japan might become a European dependency was by no means absurd. The closing of the country to foreigners was the work of a few individuals and so was its re-opening. But it is clear that both in the 17th and 19th centuries what was done by the few was not disapproved by the many.

The collapse of the Yedo Government was not unnatural: it had lasted longer than the rule of the Ashikagas and HOjos, and in its later phases it showed the same feature of a want of really able men. The grouping of the clans about 1865 indicates that the great south-western fiefs, which had always been quasi-inde pendent, wished to contest the supremacy of the Tokugawas. It was a chieftain of Tosa who suggested the abolition of the Shogunate, and probably many in Satsuma desired to secure some sort of pre-eminence for their own house. Besides this, the move ment in favour of Shinto had created a wide feeling that the emperor was not allowed to exercise the power which was his by right. But what is truly surprising is the manner in which not only individuals like the last Shogun but, later on, whole classes like the Daimyo and Samurai surrendered their privileges in what they believed to be the interests of their country. Consider ing everything, the opposition offered to the astonishing changes which took place between 1867 and 1878 was very slight.

Another remarkable feature is that, whereas in previous critical epochs the ultimate settlement and reconstruction were the work of some man of genius such as Yoritomo, or Iyeyasu, no such figure appeared now and no individual or noble house reaped the harvest of the change. The prime movers were Samurai like Kido, Ito, Inouye, Matsukata, Okuma and Yamagata who won great dis tinction, but merely aspired to posts attained by any success ful public man in Europe. The emperor, indeed, found himself in a new and much higher position, but obviously the change was not due to the ability or ambition of Komei or his young son Meiji. The latter, however, at once began to act (on the initiative of his council of course) as the sovereign of Japan in a way un known to his predecessors. In Feb. 1868, he informed the foreign representatives that he had assumed the supreme executive authority and that his title should be substituted for that of the Shogun in existing treaties. An imperial rescript was also pub lished notifying his subjects that "intercourse with foreign coun tries shall in future be carried on in accordance with the public laws of the whole world." His Majesty also appeared out of doors, received diplomatists and summoned the nobles to the palace, where he took in their presence what was called the char ter oath. Like many Far Eastern documents, this charter seems to consist of moral maxims rather than of definite legal state ments, but it promises that a deliberative assembly shall be sum moned, that all classes shall have a share in the government and that justice, not ancient custom shall in future be the guiding principle of the administration. As a further sign of the change which was being made the emperor and his court removed to Yedo, which henceforth bore the name of Tokyo, or the eastern capital, as distinguished from Kyoto. The abolition of the ShOgunate and the accession of Meiji are generally called by Japanese the Restoration (Isshin), the idea being that the right ful powers of the emperor were now restored to him.

The Abolition of Feudalism.

In the early days of the Restoration it had probably not been realized that the unification of the nation, which was one of the watchwords, implied the abolition of feudalism. Yet it became clear that this was neces sary. As things stood every feudal chief collected and spent the revenues of his fief, and was an autocrat within his own terri tory. There was no homogeneous system of law operative through out the empire. It is not easy to see how unification and uni formity could have been achieved by imperial edicts or any form of compulsion, but such was the spirit of the times that the change was made spontaneously and without any difficulty. In 1869 the chiefs of the four great western clans of Satsuma, Tosa, Chashii and Hizen publicly surrendered their fiefs to the emperor begging him to re-organize them and bring them under the same system of law. The idea is said to have originated with Okubo Toshimichi of Satsuma and the example of the four clans was quickly imi tated. In making this remarkable surrender the Daimyos followed the advice of their leading clansmen, who doubtless thought that they might find better opportunities for a brilliant career under the new regime, but still men like the chiefs of Satsuma and Tosa must have been inspired by a rare patriotism, for they gave up an almost regal position without any return. The em peror acknowledged the sacrifice in a laconic rescript, but it was decided to proceed with caution. The feudal chiefs were appointed as governors of the districts in which they had ruled and the Samurai retained their salaries and positions. At the same time the distinction between the court nobles and the Daimyos or feudal chiefs, who had previously ranked below them, was abol ished. But the system of local autonomy thus introduced was clearly transitional, and in 1871 a second edict was issued by which territorial nobles ceased to be governors and a system of local autonomy was abolished ; taxes were to be paid into the Treasury and all officials were to be appointed by the central Government. At the same time the chiefs of Satsuma, Tosa and Choshil accepted ministerial office in Tokyo and sent contingents of troops to form the nucleus of a national army. But the Samurai still remained a great difficulty. They were the essence of the feudal system, but now that it was abolished their existence had no meaning and their stipends practically became pensions. There were about four hundred thousand men in receipt of in comes mostly hereditary which had been granted them in con sideration of their devoting themselves to military service. In 1873 a decree announced that the Government was ready to commute these pensions at the rate of six years purchase for hereditary and four years for life pensions, one half of the com mutation to be in cash and one half in bonds bearing interest at the rate of 8 per cent. The Samurai were allowed to give up their swords and to engage in other occupations. Contempt for money was part of their code and they showed their loyalty to it by the fortitude and resignation with which they accepted these disadvantageous conditions. Only in Saga was there a small rebellion. At first the commutation was voluntary but further legislation followed. A conscription law made every adult male liable to military service without regard to his social standing, and in 1876 commutation was made compulsory and the wearing of two swords, the ancient badge of the warrior, was forbidden. This overtaxed the already sorely tried temper of the Samurai. It was not the financial loss which wounded them but the ruthless destruction of their old ideals and customs. Before a generation accustomed to another outlook and new occupations had time to arise, the incomes, traditions, rights and status of the gentry were all swept away: military service be came a necessary part of everyone's life instead of a special career, and all this was done by a Government which when it first started could not have lasted a day without the support of the Samurai. Feelings like this played a great part in bringing about the Satsuma rebellion.

The Satsuma Rebellion.—This was the only serious reaction ary movement with which the Restoration had to contend and the wonder is that there were not more. The immediate cause was a dissension in the cabinet respecting the question of declaring war on the Koreans. They had treated Japan with discourtesy and when the change of administration was notified, had sent a contemptuous reply which the Japanese Government thought it prudent to conceal for the time. In 1875 they fired on a Japanese gunboat which was surveying the coast. The gunboat replied and got very much the best of the fighting which followed. The majority of the cabinet thought that war was most undesirable at this juncture, but some members who were in favour of it re signed. The principal of these was Saigo Takamori, who retired to his native district of Satsuma. He had played a brilliant part in the Restoration and was a man of commanding character and presence ; his ambitious character also doubtless influenced his conduct at this time. Satsuma was in many ways an excep tional province and the natives had a strong individuality. It had rendered little more than nominal obedience to the ShOguns : its chief had contributed more than anyone else to the establishment of the new Government by setting the example of surrendering his fief, and the people were disposed to welcome European inventions. But they remained a clan of fighting men and disliked the recent social changes. Saigo settled down in a country seething with discontent and established there schools of arms in which young Samurai were trained in the old tradi tions, and also in gunnery and other branches of modern military science. He soon had an efficient and devoted army of 40,000 men and in 1877, shortly after the publication of the edicts finally abolishing the status of the Samurai, he declared war, not of course against the emperor but against his majesty's evil counsellors. The struggle lasted eight months and Saigo's defeat was apparently due to his having made the mistake of turning aside to invest the castle of Kumamoto and wasting men and time in a long siege. If he had advanced to the main island, he would certainly have found the Government unprepared to oppose him, and it is impossible to say what the issue might have been. As it was, SaigO and a band of devoted followers were all killed or committed suicide in a last battle fought out side Kagoshima. The result of this rebellion was most important, for it demonstrated to the people that the new army created by the Government was not to be despised. They had put 65,000 men into the field and had proved that military virtue was com mon to all Japanese and not the exclusive property of the Samurai class. It is remarkable, too, that not one of the Satsuma men in the service of the Government, military or civil, forsook it during the rebellion, not even SaigO's younger brother, who was himself a distinguished soldier. Yet Saig5 did not suffer in the public esteem : he had been stripped of his honours as a rebel during his lifetime, but the court restored them posthumously in 189o, his son was made a marquis and a statue was erected in his honour at the entrance of Ueno park.

Reforms.

In the years following 1868 all manner of reforms were introduced. All the restrictions on Japanese going abroad were removed : Christianity was permitted, vaccination, posts and telegraphs, and steamships were introduced. The press became a power. The first railway (between Tokyo and Yokohama) was built with the assistance of English engineers and opened in 1872. Torture was abolished and European dress was prescribed for officials. European and American advisers were freely em ployed and the indiscriminate imitation of everything European was in danger of leading to vandalism and stupid blindness to the many beauties and merits of Japanese culture.

Though the general tendency was to adopt European institu tions indiscriminately and too rapidly, the administration showed some circumspection in introducing parliamentary government. In the charter oath the emperor was made to say that all things must be determined by public discussion. But the first delibera tive assembly was composed of nobles and Samurai only. It had no legislative powers and was dissolved after two sessions. In 1874 arrangements were made for annual meetings of provincial governors and the first was convened in Tokyo. These officials also had no legislative powers and being appointed by the cabinet could not be said to be in any way representative of the people. Their function was simply to keep the central administration in formed of events and public feeling in their district. The founda tions of a legislative assembly were indeed laid in the next year when a senate (Genro-in) was appointed by imperial decree. Its duty was to discuss and revise all laws prior to their promulga tion. Though this senate was abolished in 1889, yet Genr6 or elder statesmen continued to play an important part in politics and were frequently consulted by the emperor. Even at the present day (1928) it is of ten announced that Prince Saionji, the only surviving Genro, had been so consulted, for instance, about the formation of a new ministry.

The Government seemed disposed to let the question of repre sentative institutions drop, but one of the leaders of the Restora tion, Itagaki Taisuke, insisted on keeping it before their notice. He resigned his post in the cabinet, like Saigo, because he was in favour of war with Korea and retired to his home in Tosa, where he began a campaign in favour of representative government, and was joined by discontented Samurai and by many ambitious young men who had visited Europe or America, and found on their return that they could not obtain the posts that they desired. When the Satsuma rebellion broke out Itagaki took ad vantage of it to present a memorial in which he charged the ad ministration with restraining public opinion by oppressive meth ods, and demanded the creation of a legislative assembly. But still the Tosa Liberals were not really demanding popular government in the European sense, and it is on record that Itagaki would have been satisfied with an assembly consisting half of officials and half of non-official Samurai. Having mastered the Satsuma re bellion, the Government felt emboldened to refuse even this, but they had a disagreeable surprise when next year, 1878, Okubo Toshimichi, who had been prominent as an opponent of Saigo, was assassinated by sympathisers of the latter who came not from Satsuma but from Kaga. They gave themselves up to justice and stated that one of their motives was to call attention to the Government's failure to grant representative institutions. Two months after the assassination an edict was issued ordering the establishment of elective assemblies in various prefectures and cities. A property qualification was prescribed for the elec tors and members. The duties of the assemblies were to levy and spend local taxes, subject to the approval of the Home Office, and they were authorized to address the central Government. On the whole they worked well, but, though they were a good school for future parliamentarians, they did not at all satisfy the ambi tion of Itagaki and his friends. He redoubled his agitation and was helped by the growing power of the Press. He founded the first political organization in Japan under the name of Jiyfito or Liberal party. As its members indulged in great freedom of speech, their meetings were frequently broken up by the police, which attracted both attention and sympathy. In 1881 another political party was founded by Okuma Shigenobu who seceded from the ranks of the Administration. It was called the Shim pa° or party of progress. It might be supposed that this party would have united with the existing Liberal party, but they did not combine and indeed were rather hostile to one another. In studying recent Japanese politics, one must remember a feature which even now has hardly disappeared. A party is a body of men who follow a certain leader to whom they owe loyalty and from whom they expect reward. It is in fact the ancient clan re appearing in another sphere. The party may advocate certain principles, but its essence does not consist in any programme or platform, and identity of principles does not mean identity of party. Also the House of Peers has parties of its own which may from time to time support parties in the lower house but are not identical with them.

The Constitution.

The Administration felt the gravity of the popular demand but still would not allow itself to be hurried. An edict was issued in Oct. 1881, declaring that a National Parlia ment was to be established in 1890 in order that the imperial purpose of gradually creating a constitutional form of govern ment might be accomplished. In the interval of nine years which remained, the Government made preparations for the coming change. At the Restoration in 1868, the mediaeval form of the executive had been revived, but in 1885 it was replaced by a cabinet on the European model, at the head of which was a minister-president. Ito was the first to fill the post. The senate was abolished and a privy council (Sumitsu-in) composed of persons who had won distinction in the public service was ap pointed.

The laws were reformed and codified. A criminal code, modelled on that of France, was brought into practice in 1882, but was subsequently modified in 1890 and 1908. Civil and commercial codes were not drawn up until 1899, and followed in the main the principles of German law. It was agreed that the future legislature should consist of two houses, peers and commons, but it was necessary to define the peers, and in 1884 an imperial rescript established five orders of nobility rendered in English as: princes, marquises, counts, viscounts and barons. In 1887 the court ceremonial and the imperial household were reorganized on the German model.

Financial questions were also taken in hand, for the national treasury was in a bad way. The Satsuma rebellion had greatly increased the already heavy liabilities of the Government and there had been a large issue of inconvertible paper currency, which had fallen 6o% as compared with specie. In 1879 the Yokohama Specie bank was founded, and in 1882 the Bank of Japan to which was reserved the privilege of issuing notes, other banks being deprived of this right which they had previously enjoyed. This issue of convertible silver notes brought paper back to par and it remained so for ten years. The railway, postal and telegraphic services were steadily extended : harbour works were constructed and the foundations of a strong mercantile marine were laid : numerous students were sent at the public ex pense to complete their studies in Europe or America, and the system of competitive examinations was introduced. The Govern ment, however, did not receive in all quarters the credit which it deserved. The Opposition, while waiting for the Constitution, became more violent in its methods, not even shrinking from assassination. A class of political bullies called Soshi came into existence who, like the ancient Ronin, but without their romance, often terrorized the capital. The ministers had not yet assimi lated European usages sufficiently to think of arguing or defend ing themselves in public speeches, but they gave extraordinary powers to the police. Meetings, associations and newspapers were frequently suppressed and many SOshi were summarily banished or imprisoned. The Constitution was at last solemnly promul gated in 1889. It had been drafted by Marquis Ito who had visited Europe and America in order to study on the spot various systems of parliamentary government. According to its pro visions two chambers were created, the House of Peers and the House of Representatives, with the rights of legislating, imposing taxes and petitioning the emperor. The upper house consisted of not more than 30o members, including (a) all princes and mar quises, (b) one-fifth of the remaining peers, elected by them selves, (c) citizen delegates elected by the fifteen richest men of each district, (d) men of learning and ability nominated by the emperor. The House of Representatives consisted of 300 members, the electorate consisting of persons who paid at least fifteen yen in direct taxes.

His majesty opened both chambers in Nov. 189o. Prince Yamagata was induced to act as prime minister but handed over the office to Matsukata, the minister of finance, in 1891, and the career of the new parliament was at first far from peaceful. One of the great objects of Itagaki and his followers had been to abolish the clan system, but they found to their regret that it flourished under parliamentary institutions even better than be fore. The Sat-chO, as the two great clans were compendiously termed, managed to get the running of the whole machine into their hands, Satsuma controlled the navy, finance and industries; Chashii the army, civil service and education. Also the cabinet's tenure of office depended solely on the emperor, and his ministers took their mandates from him and not from parliament. Hence it was impossible to turn a ministry out by a mere vote : it could be made to fall only by obstruction which rendered legislation and finance impossible and, as many of the Opposition had suf fered imprisonment or fines during the recent period of agitation, the virulence of their attacks knew no bounds. Had not the House of Peers been consistent in its support of the Government the necessary routine of administration might have become diffi cult. But a great change occurred in the attitude of the Opposi tion when war with China broke out in 1894. There has never been any doubt about the patriotism of any Japanese party, and when once the interests of the country were at stake all com bined to assist the administration.

Treaty Revision.—Bef ore passing on to the wars of modern Japan, it will be well to say a few words about a question which exercised the minds of both Japanese and foreigners during many years, namely the revision of the treaties made with foreign Powers. In 1882 when the first conference met in Tokyo to con sider the possibility of settling this question, the situation was as follows. Since the signature of the first treaty by Commodore Perry, a number of others had been made with foreign Powers and as they all contained a most favoured nation clause all were practically identical. The principal provisions were (a) Kanagawa and five other ports were opened to foreign trade and foreigners were allowed to reside within a radius of about 24 miles round each, called treaty limits. (b) Foreigners enjoyed extra-terri toriality; that is to say, they were exempt from the jurisdiction of Japanese law courts and were justiciable only to their own con sular courts. (c) A very low rate of import duties was fixed, mostly 5% ad valorem. In the days of their early ignorance the Japanese found these arrangements quite convenient, for extra territoriality saved much trouble. But when they began to go abroad they soon perceived that the situation had another aspect which was most galling to their national pride. It meant that they were not really treated as the equals of other nations and were regarded as people who could not be trusted to administer justice or impose reasonable duties, although all the Western Powers trusted one another to this extent. As hostility towards foreigners soon died out, no objection was felt to giving them freedom of residence if Japan could obtain judicial and tariff autonomy. As early as 1876 a treaty which gave the Japanese most of what they desired was concluded with the United States, but it was of little use, except as an admission of principles, for it contained a clause saying that it would come into force only when the other Powers made similar agreements. Meanwhile the

laws were revised with the assistance of French and German ex perts. The negotiations which began in 1883 lasted no less than eleven years and the delay was not entirely due to the hesitation of foreigners. Mexico, Russia and Germany signed agreements, when suddenly Japanese opinion seemed to change. It was pro posed that for a few years f our foreign judges should assist the Japanese courts in trying cases in which foreigners were con cerned and this was bitterly denounced as derogatory to the national dignity. The patriots of the Opposition began to talk of the danger of Japan being swamped by a foreign invasion and a bomb was thrown at Count Okuma, the minister of foreign affairs, which blew off his leg. Naturally the Japanese Govern ment thought it well to proceed with caution and public opinion began to change again. Negotiations recommenced and a new watchword, probably inspired by the Government, "Treaty revision and equal rights" became popular. Great Britain, which had hitherto shown little disposition to make concessions, now came to the front and in 1894 consented to a new treaty which abolished extra-territoriality and gave Japan the right to fix her own import duties and a monopoly of the coasting trade. Similar treaties with other Powers were soon concluded and the emperor issued an edict declaring in unequivocal terms that it was his desire to abolish all distinctions between natives and foreigners. 1899 was the date fixed for bringing the treaties into force and it was duly observed. Complete tariff autonomy, how ever, was not obtained till 1911.

In the period following the institution of parliamentary govern ment, Japan undertook two considerable wars, one with China (1894-5) and one with Russia (19o4-5). She also took part in the expedition to Peking (1900) and made an alliance with Great Britain. Looking back, one can see that this military activity was well timed. During the period of metamorphosis external en tanglements had been avoided: coming when it did, military and naval success consolidated the nation. The severest critics of the new regime had to admit that it had made of Japan a State which was accepted by the world as one of the Great Powers, capable of competing with the others in peace or war. As early as 1874 an incident occurred which might have led to a breach with China, if not carefully handled. A ship from the Ryii-kya islands was wrecked on the coast of Formosa, then nominally Chinese territory, and its crew were barbarously treated by the natives. Representations at Peking had no result, so the Japanese sent a punitive expedition to the island. The Chinese Government pro tested, and the matter was arranged by the intervention of the British minister at Peking, Japan agreeing to withdraw her troops and China to indemnify her for the expenses of the expedition. The political status of the Ryil-kya islands was obscure and com plicated. They had a king of their own : for about two centuries they had been rather fitfully administered by the Daimy6 of Satsuma, and they paid occasional tribute to both China and Japan. In 1875 Japan boldly made them into a prefecture, prob ably knowing that no serious trouble would occur. China pro tested and discussions ensued, but Japan kept the islands. The king received a pension and subsequently was made a marquis.

In dealing with the question of Sakhalin at this period the Japanese showed themselves eminently pacific. Some Japanese had settled there as early as 162o, but Russians arrived in 1847 and under the Shogunate there were negotiations for the partition of the island, which led to no result. Apparently both parties came to the conclusion that the territory was not worth much. At one time the Russians seemed not unwilling to sell the whole, but the Japanese withdrew from the bargain and in 1875 agreed to an arrangement by which they recognized Russia's title to the whole of Sakhalin, while Russia recognized Japan's title to the Kurile islands.

The Chinese War.—At first, Japan's attitude towards Korean questions was similarly pacific. As related above, the majority of the cabinet refused to declare war in 1875, though Korea had offered provocation, and some of the ministers resigned. Japan proceeded to treat Korea in the same way as she had herself been treated by Commodore Perry. A considerable fleet was sent to demand a treaty of amity and commerce. This was signed in 1876 and three Korean ports were opened to foreign trade. When one remembers the ambitions of Hideyoshi in the 16th century and likewise the ultimate fate of Korea, it is hard not to think that Japanese statesmen were already meditating the conquest of the peninsula, but their avowed policy was perfectly pacific and rea sonable. They claimed the right of trade and residence, just as western countries had claimed it in Japan, and they wished to introduce reforms, fearing that the state of Korea might become so bad that other Powers might have an excuse for intervening to restore order and for establishing themselves in a position in conveniently near to Japan. But continual difficulties were created by the Government of Peking, which adhered to the ancient doctrine of tributary states. It was the immemorial policy of China to surround herself with petty states which might act as buffers to break the shock of foreign contact: if any other Power interfered with these states she protested, but if they mis behaved themselves, she admitted no responsibility. Such a re lationship had worked well in the middle ages, but it was clearly not practicable in the new era of international intercourse which had already begun. On the one hand, China seemed to recognize the independence of Korea by permitting the conclusion of treaties with Japan and subsequently with other countries : on the other, a Chinese resident, who practically directed all im portant affairs, was stationed at Seoul. The members of the Min family to which the queen belonged were allowed to monop olize office and misgovern the country and, whenever there was a rising, Chinese troops were despatched to suppress it. On two occasions, in 1882 and 1884, the Japanese legation was burnt in the course of outbreaks, partly, it would seem, owing to the Korean hatred of Japanese immigrants, many of whom were low class adventurers. After the attack in 1882, Japan was allowed to have troops in Seoul for the protection of the legation, and in 1885 a convention was concluded with China by which each Power undertook not to send troops without notifying the other.

In the following years some reforms were introduced in Korea: the customs service was reorganized and foreign settlements were opened, but the Japanese continually had reason to complain that they were prevented from enjoying the commercial rights guaranteed to them by treaty and that the Chinese resident prevented them from obtaining redress. In 1894 another rising against the Korean Government broke out. The Chinese sent a force of 2,500 men to suppress it and conformably to the con vention notified the Japanese, describing Korea at the same time as a tributary state. The Japanese Government replied by send ing 8,000 men and stated that they would not be withdrawn "without some understanding which would guarantee the peace and good order of Korea." As the rebellion, which had been the pretext for China's intervention, had meanwhile died a natural death, the Japanese further stated that the dispatch of any more Chinese troops would be regarded as an act of hostility. In spite of this the Chinese sent by sea 1,200 troops which encountered the Japanese cruiser "Naniwa." There is some discrepancy in the accounts of what occurred, but it is generally stated that the Chinese fired first. At any rate, their ships were sunk and the troops perished. War was declared by both nations a few days later on Aug. 1. The campaign which followed was a succession of triumphs for Japan. The Chinese entrenched themselves at Phyong-Yang (the same town which had figured in Hideyoshi's campaigns) and made leisurely preparations for defence. The Japanese took some time to arrive, but when their columns con verged on Phyong-Yang they carried all the positions in a day, with great loss to the Chinese and little to themselves. On the very next day, Sept. 17, they won a brilliant naval victory at the mouth of the Yalu river. They then took Port Arthur and Talien wan with little difficulty, but had a stubborn fight with the re mainder of the Chinese fleet at Wei-hai-wei. But there, also, the Chinese were obliged to surrender and the war was at an end, having lasted seven months and a half. The Chinese sent Li Hung-Chang to negotiate terms and he signed a treaty of peace with Ire, the prime minister, on April 17, 1895, at Shimonoseki. It recognized the independence of Korea and ceded to Japan Formosa and the Pescadores islands, as well as the southern part of Manchuria: China was to pay an indemnity of 200,000,000 taels and to give new facilities to foreign trade. Japan had now a disagreeable experience of European diplomacy. Russia, Ger many and France presented a joint note recommending that the territory ceded on the mainland should not be occupied per manently, and it was understood that they were ready to enforce this advice by an appeal to arms if necessary. The Japanese Government grasped the position and yielded at once, but the incident long rankled in the memories of both ministers and people.

In the years between the Chinese and Russian wars there were no fewer than six ministries, but these vicissitudes were signs of the rise and fall of various cliques rather than of any serious change in policy. The two important struggles which went on all the time and continued until quite recently were, first, the contest between the oligarchs of the great clans and the more radical elements and, second, the contest between civil and military authorities for the upper hand. A significant event in parliamentary history was the foundation of, the Seiyukai party by Prince Ito in 1900. It corresponded to some extent to a liberal party in Europe, but the sentiments enunciated in its original manifesto are so vague and non-committal that one might suppose all Japanese would accept them. But Prince Ito's action implied that a cabinet ought to represent a party, a principle which had not been admitted by any one of his eminence before. The position of Prince Yamagata, then prime minister, became un tenable and for the fourth time Prince ItO formed a ministry, but held office for less than a year.

The Japanese emerged from the Chinese war with the island of Formosa and a free hand in Korea. They took possession of the former without much trouble, although the Chinese population rose in what was known as the Black Flag rebellion. In 1896 a Japanese administration was introduced into the island and it was duly divided into departments and prefectures. But, con sidering the length of time it has been in Japanese hands, the process of introducing peace and order has not been so rapid as might have been expected, for even now the unruly tribes of the north-eastern portion are imperfectly subdued and still practice head hunting.

Korea.

In Korea, too, there were many difficulties. Chinese obstruction being now removed, the Japanese tried to introduce reforms which they hoped might lead to the establishment of order and the increase of trade. Count Inouye was sent to Seoul for this purpose, but seems to have erred by excess of zeal. His successor, Gen. Miura, was even less successful and came into collision with the queen, who was a woman of most masterful character. A conspiracy was formed in which Japanese were implicated and in Oct. 1896, the palace was surprised and the queen was killed with all her suite. As the Japanese legation was accused of being privy to this conspiracy, the minister and his staff were at once recalled and put on their trial at Tokyo,. but were acquitted. The results of the whole incident in Korea were disastrous. The king took refuge in the Russian legation and remained there for two years, during which time he did his best to nullify all the reforms extorted under Japanese pressure and gave valuable concessions to the Russians, including the right to cut timber in the valley of the Yalu river. In 1898 the Germans occupied Kiao-Chiao in Shantung as an indemnity for the murder of two missionaries. Immediately afterwards Russia received from China a lease of the Liaotung peninsula, although three years before she objected to the cession of the same region to Japan, and permission to construct a branch of the Trans-Siberian railway through Manchuria from north to south. Soon after this, in 5900, came the Boxer rising and the siege of the legations at Peking. Japan acted throughout in concert with the Powers of Europe and, being the nearest country geographically, was the first to send a force to relieve not only her compatriots but the Europeans and Americans who were beleaguered in Peking and Tientsin. The conduct and results of this expedition were most gratifying to the Japanese: their troops co-operated with Europeans on an equal footing : practical comparison showed that they were inferior to none in efficiency and discipline and their behaviour was good, better in fact than the behaviour of some of the European troops. All this was eminently satisfactory to the authorities at Tokyo, but at the same time the action of Russia caused them the gravest anxiety. One result of the Boxer troubles was that Russia remained in military occupation of Manchuria and this, combined with strong pro-Russian feeling in the official circles and also among the populace of Seoul, created a position most dangerous for Japan's interests. Japan undoubtedly desired peace and while realizing that war might be inevitable did her best to avoid or postpone it. She acted in concert with Great Britain and the United States, and Russia was induced to sign a treaty pledging herself to withdraw her troops from Manchuria in three instalments.

Anglo-Japanese Treaty.

The position of Japan was further strengthened by the Anglo-Japanese Treaty (the precursor of the Anglo-Japanese alliance) which was signed on Jan. 30, 1902. It recognized "the independence of China and Korea, the special interests of Great Britain in China and of Japan both in China and in a peculiar degree, politically as well as commercially and industrially, in Korea, and the rights of both parties to take such measures as may be indispensable to safeguard those interests either against the aggressive action of any other Power or in the case of disturbances in either country." In the event of either party becoming involved in war with a third Power, the other party was to remain neutral unless "any other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against that ally, when the other high contracting party will come to its assistance and will conduct the war in common and make peace in mutual agreement with it." The Russian War.—Russia did not withdraw her troops from Manchuria at the dates fixed, and the Japanese Government opened direct negotiations at St. Petersburg (Leningrad). They proposed that Russia and Japan should each recognize the other's status in Manchuria and Korea respectively: that both Powers should respect the territorial integrity of China and Korea and be parties to an engagement that all nations should have equal commercial and industrial opportunities in Korea and Manchuria. The negotiations lasted for five and a half months, but Russia proved unyielding and unconciliatory. The representations made in St. Petersburg were received with a silence that seemed dis courteous. As the position became intolerable, the Japanese severed diplomatic relations on Feb. 6, 1904. The war which followed contained many striking incidents, especially the cap ture of Port Arthur and the annihilation of the Russian fleet by Admiral Togo. The details are given in a separate article (see Russo-JAPANESE WAR).

Brilliant as had been the victories of Japan, it was doubtful if she could continue the contest. In Russia the war had never been popular with the nation and the inglorious struggle had been most depressing. When, therefore, in June 1905 the President of the United States made an offer of mediation it was gladly ac cepted. The plenipotentiaries of both countries met at Ports mouth in New Hampshire, and on Aug. 29, 1905, the treaty of peace was signed. It recognized Japan's "paramount political military and economic interests" in Korea : provided for the evacuation of Manchuria by both parties : transferred to Japan Russia's lease of the Liaotung peninsula, together with the southern section of the Manchurian railway from Port Arthur to Kwang-cheng-tse and all collateral privileges, mining or other: and ceded to Japan the southern half of Sakhalin. It was agreed that Japan should receive £4,000,000 on account of moneys spent in maintaining Russian prisoners. But, with this trifling exception, Russia refused to pay any indemnity and the Japanese plenipotentiaries did not dare to imperil the negotiations by in sisting. But the Japanese public were indignant at the terms. The war had cost 170 millions sterling and 230,000 men killed or wounded, and the material gain in return for this expenditure seemed totally inadequate, however great might be the increase in prestige. Angry riots broke out at Tokyo, and the police build ings were burnt, but no better terms were obtainable. The prime minister, Prince Katsura, resigned, feeling that he could not face the diet. He made it, however, a condition that his suc cessor, Prince Saionji, should carry through a measure which he had prepared for the nationalization of the railways of the empire and this was duly done in 1906. Katsura returned to power in 1908 and it was pretty plain that an arrangement had been made to enable him to retire until the nation's anger at not receiving an indemnity had subsided.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

His services had indeed been considerable for just before the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed, he had concluded a new treaty of alliance with Great Britain. Unlike the agreement of 1902 it did not deal with the independence and integrity of Korea, but it bound the contracting parties to come to each other's assistance and conduct war in common, if "by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action wherever arising on the part of any other Power or Powers either party should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or special interests." These were defined as (a) the maintenance of peace in Eastern Asia and India, (b) the independence and in tegrity of China and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations there, (c) the maintenance of the territorial rights of both Powers and the defence of their special interests in Eastern Asia and India. In the same year a third treaty was signed with China confirming the transfer to Japan of Russia's rights in Manchuria. Two other agreements concluded with France and with Russia in 1907 further consoli dated Japan's international position.

In view of the Treaty of Portsmouth the Powers withdrew their legations from Seoul and replaced them by consulates, and the Japanese sent Prince Ito as resident-general. A comprehensive scheme of reforms was introduced embracing law, police, edu cation, taxation and currency. At first the Korean Government was asked to effect the necessary changes by employing Japanese advisers. But no attention was paid to the advice of these officials and a new arrangement was made in 1907 by which the resident general practically became a governor with legislative and execu tive powers, including authority to appoint and remove officials and to employ Japanese in the administration. Prince Ito also found it necessary to disband the standing army, as being in efficient and a useless expense. The soldiers resisted vehemently, and many of them formed the nucleus of an insurrection which lasted two years. Though the proposed reforms seemed excellent in conception, they were perhaps enforced somewhat drastically and were most distasteful to the natives. While Prince Ito was on a visit to Harbin in 1909 he was assassinated by a young Korean, who claimed that he was avenging the wrongs of his country. Naturally the attitude of the Japanese Government became more severe : the insurrectionary movement of the dis banded soldiers was repressed with considerable loss of life, and it was shortly decided that the country must be annexed to the Japanese empire. This was done by an imperial rescript in 1910. The Russian war had been costly but the Japanese were not afraid of spending money to secure military efficiency. Six divisions were added to the army and a new law of conscription was introduced, the general result of which was to provide within 10 years a fully trained army of 1,500,00o men and half a million recruits who could be used for reinforcement. New ships, arsenals and dockyards were built. Of course the financial burdens of the nation increased. The national debt rose from 56 millions sterling in 1904 to 227 in 1908, and taxation became very much heavier. It is indeed surprising that there was no serious financial em barrassment, but the development of trade and industry, im proved economic conditions, and the good international status of Japan combined to prevent any crisis.

Japanese Immigration into America.

Although the rela tions of Japan and the United States had hitherto been excellent, a question now began to arise which is still troublesome and from time to time creates difficulties. This is Japanese immigra tion into American territory, especially California. To a less extent the same question affects British Columbia. Experience shows that the Japanese do not settle willingly in new countries where the climate and standard of comfort are not what they are accustomed to, such as their own territories of Formosa and even Hokkaido, but that they gladly migrate, at least temporarily, to regions like the Pacific Coast of North America where the pioneer work of colonization has already been done and conditions are to their liking. In 1908 it was stated that there were more than sixty thousand Japanese in California who did not intend to become American citizens but to make money and return to their homes. They were objectionable to other classes of the popula tion, partly on account of the difference in their customs, but chiefly because they were ready to work for longer hours and less wages than labourers of European descent. The State legis lature of California made certain enactments designed to restrict the entry and residence of Japanese, and this produced intense popular indignation in Japan. In order to understand the attitude of the Japanese Government and people in this matter, which is still far from settled, it must be remembered that the recurring cause for irritation is not so much the actual inconvenience which may be occasioned by restrictive enactments, as the implication which seems to be contained in them that the Japanese are not really the equals of Europeans and Americans, but belong to an inferior race. President Roosevelt attempted to calm the anti Japanese agitation in California without much success, but in 1911 the Japanese Government made an agreement (originally concluded with Canada, but subsequently extended to the United States) by which without surrendering any of their treaty rights they voluntarily undertook to limit the immigration of their subjects. This was known as the "Gentleman's Agreement" and though it by no means closed the question, it was admitted that the Government of Tokyo were sincere in their efforts to exe cute it.

It also became apparent that there was a divergence between American and Japanese views as to Manchuria, for in 1910 Mr. Knox, the Secretary of State, made an unexpected proposal that all railways in that district should be neutralized. This sug gestion was not to the taste of Russia, China or Japan and fell through, but it had the result of bringing Russia and Japan to gether. They signed an agreement by which they pledged them selves to maintain the status quo in Manchuria and to abstain from any unfriendly competition in developing that region. In the same year a modification was made in the Anglo-Japanese alliance. A general treaty of arbitration between Great Britain and the United States was then under discussion, whereas the treaty with Japan, without mentioning any names, provided for the possibility that Great Britain might be her ally in the event of a war with the United States. It was now stipulated that nothing in the treaty should entail on either contracting Power the obligation to go to war with any third Power with whom a treaty of general arbitration might be in force. This new treaty was for ten years and after that period was to continue auto matically unless denounced by either party.

Death of the Emperor Meiji.—In 1911, Marquis Katsura, who had been premier for nearly five years and had accomplished various financial reforms as well as the annexation of Korea, re signed and was succeeded by Prince Saionji, the leader of the Seiyukai party. Next year the Emperor Mutsuhito, better known as Meiji, died and the period called by the same name came to an end. His decease caused profound regret and was an event of unusual importance for the nation. It cannot be said that he initiated or was responsible for the amazing changes which oc curred in the Meiji era and even under his "enlightened Govern ment" the sovereign was hidden by a veil which makes it hard to tell how great was the part which he personally played. But all accounts agree that he was a man of strong and even obstinate character and that after he attained manhood no important steps were taken without his knowledge and consent. It is known that he interfered in national crises and apparently he was never on the wrong side. During the 45 years that he was emperor he witnessed and took part in a succession of extraordinary changes such as can hardly have occurred in any other one reign in any other country of the world and, unlike most revolutionary changes, they were not to the detriment of the monarchy. Though he delegated his authority, he did not impair it and he retained until his death the veneration and devotion of his people.

He was succeeded by his son Yoshihito, born in 1879, who adopted as the title of his reign Taish5 or Great Righteousness. Soon after his accession the Saionji cabinet fell, because the mili tary party insisted on having two army divisions in Korea, to which the other ministers were opposed on grounds of economy. Other short and confused ministries followed.

Prince Katsura returned to political life, but found the lower house intractable. He then resigned and started in 1913 a political party called Rikken Doshikai, the Constitutional Comrades associ ation. It attracted a large membership but unfortunately its founder died almost immediately. The Yamamoto cabinet which followed (1913) was also short lived owing to a naval scandal and the trial of high officers on the charge of having accepted bribes from a foreign company in connection with the building of a Japanese warship.