The Rise of the Left

THE RISE OF THE LEFT Depretis.—The fall of the Right on March 18, 1876, was an event destined profoundly, and in many respects adversely, to affect the course of Italian history. Except at rare and not auspi cious intervals, the Right had held office from 1849 to 1876. For years the men of the Left had worked to inoculate the electorate with suspicion of Conservative methods and with hatred of the imposts which they nevertheless knew to be indispensable to sound finance. Moreover, the redemption of the railways by the State had been fiercely opposed by the Left, although its members were for the most part convinced of the utility of the operation. When, at the beginning of March 1876, these contracts were submitted to parliament, a group of Tuscan deputies, under Cesare Correnti, joined the opposition, and on March 18 took advantage of a chance motion to place the Minghetti cabinet in a minority. Depretis, successor of Rattazzi in the leadership of the Left, was entrusted by the king with the formation of a Liberal ministry. Besides the premiership, Depretis assumed the portfolio of finance ; Nicotera, an ex-Garibaldian of somewhat tarnished reputation, but a man of energetic and conservative temperament, was placed at the min istry of the interior; public works were entrusted to Zanardelli, a Radical doctrinaire of considerable juridical attainments. Great difficulty was experienced in finding a foreign minister willing to challenge comparison with Visconti-Venosta, and the choice fell upon Melegari, Italian minister at Berne and an old friend of Mazzini.

The new ministers had long since made monarchical professions of faith, but although their patriotism and loyalty were above sus picion, they were nevertheless considered to be tinged with an almost revolutionary hue. The king alone appeared to feel no mis givings. Danger lay rather in entrusting men schooled in political conspiracy and in unscrupulous parliamentary opposition with the government of a young state still beset by enemies at home and abroad. The programme of Depretis comprised extension of the franchise, strict enforcement of the rights of the State as against the Church, maintenance of the military and naval policy inaugu rated by the Conservatives, acceptance of the railway redemption contracts, consolidation of the financial equilibrium, abolition of the forced currency, and, eventually, fiscal reform.

Nicotera, minister of the interior, found himself obliged to incur the wrath of his supporters by prohibiting Radical meetings likely to endanger public order, and by enunciating administrative prin ciples which would have befitted an inveterate conservative. He instructed the prefects strictly to prevent infraction of the law against religious orders. At the same time the cabinet, as a whole, brought in a Clerical Abuses Bill, threatening with severe punish ment priests guilty of disturbing the peace of families, of opposing the laws of the State, or of fomenting disorder. Depretis, for his part, was compelled to declare impracticable the immediate aboli tion of the grist tax, and to frame a bill for the increase of revenue, acts which caused the secession of many supporters. The first gen eral election under the Left (Nov. 1876) had yielded the cabinet the overwhelming majority of 421 Ministerialists against 87 Con servatives, but the very size of the majority rendered it unman ageable. The Clerical Abuses Bill provoked dissensions : Nicotera was severely affected by revelations concerning his political past, and Zanardelli refused to sanction the construction of a railway in Calabria in which Nicotera was interested. Almost the only respect in which the Left could boast a decided improvement over the administration of the Right was the energy displayed by Nico tera in combating brigandage and the mafia (q.v.) in Calabria and Sicily. Successes achieved in those provinces failed, however, to save Nicotera from the wrath of the Chamber, and on Dec. 14, 1877, a cabinet crisis arose over a question concerning the secrecy of telegraphic correspondence. Depretis thereupon reconstructed his administration, excluding Nicotera, Melegari and Zanardelli, giving Crispi the Ministry of the Interior, entrusting Magliani with finance, and himself assuming the direction of foreign affairs.

Although the Left had for years advocated an Italo-Prussian alliance in opposition to the Francophil tendencies of the Right, Depretis and Melegari, both of whom were imbued with French Liberal doctrines, adopted towards the republic an attitude so deferential as to arouse suspicion in Vienna and Berlin, without, however, securing a more friendly attitude on the part of France. As a precaution against an eventual French attempt to restore the temporal power, orders were hurriedly given to complete the defences of Rome, but in other respects the Italian Government maintained its subservient attitude. In the hope of inducing the European Powers to "compensate" Italy for the increase of Aus trian influence on the Adriatic, Crispi undertook in the autumn of 1877, with the approval of the king, and in spite of the half disguised opposition of Depretis, a semi-official mission to Paris, Berlin, London and Vienna ; but did not achieve any important success for Italian foreign policy.

Accession of Humbert I. and Leo. XIII.

The entry of Crispi into the Depretis cabinet (Dec. 1877) placed at the min istry of the interior a strong hand and sure eye at a moment when they were about to become imperatively necessary. Crispi was the only man of truly statesmanlike calibre in the ranks of the Left. Hardly had he assumed office when the unexpected death of Victor Emmanuel II. (Jan. 9, 1878) stirred national feeling to an unprecedented depth, and placed the continuity of monar chical institutions in Italy upon trial before Europe. His disappear ance snapped the chief link with the heroic period, and removed from the helm of state a ruler of large heart, great experience and civil courage, at a moment when elements of continuity were needed and vital problems of internal reorganization had still to be faced. Crispi adopted the measures necessary to ensure the tranquil accession of King Humbert with a quick energy which precluded any Radical or Republican demonstrations. Before the commotion caused by the death of Victor Emmanuel had passed away, the decease of Pius IX. (Feb. 7, 1878) placed further demands upon Crispi's sagacity and promptitude. Like Victor Emmanuel, Pius IX. had been bound up with the history of the Risorgimento, but, unlike him, had represented and embodied the anti-national, reactionary spirit. Notwithstanding the pon tiff's bestowal of the apostolic benediction in articulo mortis upon Victor Emmanuel, the attitude of the Vatican had remained so inimical as to make it doubtful whether the conclave would be held in Rome. Crispi's energetic action and his outspoken com munications to the Sacred College as to the consequences of hold ing the conclave abroad, induced the cardinals to hold it in Rome, the new pope, Cardinal Pecci, being elected on Feb. 20, 1878. The Italian Government assured the new pope protection during the settlement of his outstanding personal affairs, an as surance of which Leo. XIII. on the evening after his election, took

full advantage. At the same time the duke of Aosta, commander of the Rome Army corps, ordered the troops to render royal honours to the pontiff should he officially appear in the capital. King Humbert addressed to the pope a letter of congratulation upon his election, and received a courteous reply. The Depretis Crispi cabinet did not long survive the opening of the new reign. It was succeeded by that of Cairoli whose premiership was char acterized by the enactment of highly dangerous financial measures, and was cut short by the attempt made upon the king's life during a royal visit to Naples in Nov. 1878, by Passanante. In spite of the courage and presence of mind of Cairoli, who received the dagger thrust intended for the king, public and parliamentary indignation found expression in a vote which compelled the ministry to resign.

Cairoli.

Though brief, Cairoli's term of office was momen tous. Replying on April 9, 1878, to interpellations on the impend ing Congress of Berlin, the foreign minister, Count Corti, appeared free from apprehension lest Italy, isolated, might find herself face to face with a change of the balance of power in the Medi terranean, and declared that in the event of serious complica tions Italy would be "too much sought after rather than too much forgotten." The policy of Italy in the congress, he added, would be to support the interests of the young Balkan nations. Wrapped in this optimism, Count Corti proceeded, as first Italian delegate, to Berlin, where he had to sanction the Austrian occu pation of Bosnia-Hercegovina. On July 8 the revelation of the Anglo-Ottoman treaty for the British occupation of Cyprus took the congress by surprise ; and Corti returned from the German capital with "clean" but empty hands, a plight which found marked disfavour in Italian eyes, and stimulated anti-Austrian Irredentism. Ever since the war of 1866 secret revolutionary committees had been formed in the northern Italian provinces to prepare for the redemption of Trent and Trieste. For 12 years these committees had remained comparatively inactive, but in 1878 the presence of the ex-Garibaldian Cairoli at the head of the Government, and popular dissatisfaction at the spread of Aus trian sway on the Adriatic, encouraged them to begin a series of noisy demonstrations. Nor could Austria ignore the Irredentist agitation, for the equivocal attitude of Cairoli and Zanardelli cast doubt upon the sincerity of their regret.

The fall of Cairoli, and the formation of a second Depretis cabinet in 1878, brought no substantial change in the attitude of the Government towards Irredentism, nor was the position improved by the return of Cairoli to power in the following July. In Bonghi's mordant phrase, the foreign policy of Italy during this period may be said to have been characterized by "enormous intellectual impotence counterbalanced by equal moral feeble ness." Home affairs were scarcely better managed. Parliament had degenerated into a congeries of personal groups, whose members were eager only to overturn cabinets in order to secure power for the leaders and official favours for themselves. Depretis, who had succeeded Cairoli in Dec. 1878, fell in July 1879, after a vote in which Cairoli and Nicotera joined the Con servative opposition. On July 12 Cairoli formed a new adminis tration, only to resign on Nov. 24, and to reconstruct his cabinet with the help of Depretis. The administration of finance was as chaotic as the state of parliament. The 6o,000,000 lire surplus announced by Seismit Doda proved to be a myth. Nevertheless Magliani, who succeeded Seismit Doda, had neither the perspicac ity nor the courage to resist the abolition of the grist tax. While revenue was thus reduced no new taxes were imposed, although Depretis's scheme for building 5,000km. of new, and by no means wholly necessary, railways had been sanctioned. The unsatisfac tory financial condition of the Florence, Rome and Naples munici palities necessitated State help, but the Chamber nevertheless proceeded with a light heart (Feb. 23, 1881) to sanction the issue of a foreign loan for 650,000,000 lire with a view to the abolition of the forced currency.

had declined the suggestions of Germany, Austria and Russia that Italy should seek compensation in Tunisia for the extension of Austrian sway in the Balkans, and neither he nor Count Corti had any inkling of the verbal arrangement made between Lord Salisbury and Waddington at the instance of Bis marck, that, when convenient, France should occupy Tunisia, an agreement afterwards confirmed in writing. Almost up to the moment of the French occupation of Tunisia the Italian Govern ment believed that Great Britain, if only out of gratitude for the bearing of Italy in connection with the Dulcigno demonstration in the autumn of 188o, would prevent French acquisition of the Regency, and was ignorant of the assurance conveyed to France by Lord Granville that the Gladstone cabinet would respect the engagements of the Beaconsfield-Salisbury administration. The French Government in the meanwhile was preparing an expedition ary corps for the occupation of the Regency. In the spring of 1881, with the pretext of an attack by the Kroumir tribe on the Algerian border, the Regency was occupied, and on May 12 the bey signed the treaty of Bardo accepting French protection.

Italian indignation at the French coup de main was the deeper on account of the apparent duplicity of the Government of the republic, the French foreign minister, Barthelemy St. Hilaire, having on May II officially assured the Italian ambassador in Paris that France "had no thought of occupying Tunisia or any part of Tunisian territory, beyond some points of the Kroumir country." The whole Italian nation was filled with deep resent ment at an event which was considered tantamount not only to the destruction of Italian aspirations to Tunisia, but to the ruin of the interests of the numerous Italian colony and to a constant menace against the security of the Sicilian and south Italian coasts. The conclusion of the treaty of Bardo on May 12 com pelled Cairoli to sacrifice himself to popular indignation. Sella was called upon, but the dog-in-the-manger policy of Depretis, Cairoli, Nicotera and Baccarini, in conjunction with the intolerant attitude of some extreme Conservatives, proved fatal to his endeavours. Depretis then succeeded in recomposing the Cairoli cabinet without Cairoli, Mancini being placed at the Foreign Office. Public opinion was further irritated against France by the massacre of some Italian workmen at Marseille on the occasion of the return of the French expedition from Tunisia, and Depretis, in response to public feeling, found himself obliged to mobilize a part of the militia for military exercises ; at the same time dis orders occurred at Rome in connection with the transfer of the remains of Pius IX. from St. Peter's to the basilica of San Lorenzo.