THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE A conviction was spreading that escape from the isolation of Italy lay in agreement with Austria and Germany. Depretis tardily recognized the need for such agreement, but he was opposed to any f ormal alliance, lest it might arouse French resent ment, while the new Franco-Italian treaty was still unconcluded, and the foreign loan for the abolition of the forced currency had still to be floated. The Centre, a small group led by Sidney Son nino, a young politician of unusual fibre, believed that the only sound basis for Italian policy would be a close alliance with the Central Powers and a friendly understanding with Great Britain upon Mediterranean affairs. The principal Italian public men were divided in opinion on the subject of the alliance. Peruzzi, Lanza and Bonghi pleaded for equal friendship with all powers, and especially with France ; Crispi, Minghetti, Cadorna and others favoured Germany and Austria. Austria and Germany, however, scarcely reciprocated these dispositions. The Irredentist agitation had left profound traces at Berlin as well as at Vienna, and had given rise to a distrust of Depretis which nothing had yet occurred to allay. Nor, in view of the comparative weakness of Italian armaments, could eagerness to find an ally be deemed conclusive proof of the value of Italian friendship. Mancini, foreign minister, limited his efforts to the maintenance of correct diplomatic rela tions with the Central Powers. Danger of foreign interference in the relations between Italy and the papacy had never been so great since the Italian occupation of Rome, as when, in the summer of 1881, the disorders during the transfer of the remains of Pius IX. had lent an unwonted ring of plausibility to the papal com plaint concerning the "miserable" position of the Holy See. Bis marck at that moment was anxious to obtain from the Vatican the support of German Catholics, and might well have taken the initiative of making papal independence the subject of an inter national conference. Friendship and alliance with Catholic Austria and powerful Germany could alone lay this spectre. The political conditions of Europe favoured the realization of Italian desires, and it was tacitly understood between Bismarck and Austria that the latter should profit by Italian resentment against France to draw Italy into the orbit of the Austro-German alliance.
A visit of King Humbert and Queen Margherita to Vienna was then arranged and took place in due state, in Oct. 1881. The recep tion was marked by great cordiality, and both in Germany and Austria the visit was construed as a preliminary to the adhesion of Italy to the Austro-German alliance. Count Hatzfeldt, on behalf of the German Foreign Office, informed the Italian ambas sador in Berlin that whatever was done at Vienna would be regarded as having been done in the German capital. Nor did nascent irritation in France prevent the conclusion of the Franco Italian commercial treaty which was signed at Paris on Nov. 3.
The advent to power in France of Gambetta (Nov. 9, 1881) who was believed to favour a policy of revanche against Germany, and of more friendly relations with Italy, convinced Bismarck of the necessity of securing Italy's adhesion to the Austro-German alliance. As usual, when dealing with weaker nations, the German chancellor resorted to intimidation. He referred to Italy as a country tottering on the verge of revolution, and opened in the German semi-official press a campaign in favour of an inter national guarantee for the independence of the papacy. These manoeuvres produced their effect upon Italian public opinion. At the new year's reception of deputies King Humbert aroused enthusiasm by a significant remark that Italy intended to remain "mistress in her own house"; while Mancini, in a despatch to Count de Launay, Italian ambassador in Berlin, repudiated the supposition that closer relations between Italy and Germany could be made in any way contingent upon a modification of Italian freedom of action in regard to home affairs.
The sudden fall of Gambetta (Jan. 26, 1882) having removed the fear of immediate European complications, the cabinets of Berlin and Vienna again displayed diffidence towards Italy. But the bitterness aroused by the French action in Tunisia induced Mancini to open negotiations for an Italo-Austrian alliance. The first exchange of ideas between the two Governments proved fruit less. There were difficulties owing to Kalnoky's clerical views, and the polemics in the Italian press over the failure of the Austrian emperor to return King Humbert's visit, because the pope declared that he would not receive the emperor if he came to Rome on a visit to the Quirinal. Mancini was, on the other hand, unwilling to guarantee Austria's permanent possession of Trento and Trieste. Meanwhile (May 11, 1882) the Italian parliament adopted the new Army Bill, with a special credit of 127,500,00o lire for the creation of two new army corps, and increasing the ordinary military estimates to 200,000,000 lire yearly. Garibaldi, since the French occupation of Tunis, had ardently worked for the increase of the army, and so had the satisfaction of seeing his desire realized before his death at Caprera on June 2, 1882. Before his death, and almost contemporaneously with the passing of the Army Bill, negotiations for the alliance were renewed. Encouraged from Berlin, Kalnoky agreed to the reciprocal territorial guar antee, but declined reciprocity in support of social interests. The treaty of triple alliance was signed on May 20, 1882, five days after the promulgation of the Franco-Italian commercial treaty in Paris. It pledged the contracting parties for a period of five years to join in resisting attack upon the territory of any one of them, within the limits of its own interests; if one of the con tracting Powers were menaced by a single great Power and forced to declare war on it, the others would preserve a friendly neutral ity, but if the menace came from two or more Powers the casus foederis would arise for all. Austria and Italy also undertook to maintain the status quo in the East, but if this should become impossible neither of the two Powers was to occupy territories permanently or temporarily without previous agreement and ade quate compensation. Kalnoky desired that both the terms of the treaty and the fact of its conclusion should remain secret, but Bismarck and Mancini hastened to hint at its existence. A revival of Irredentism after the execution of an Italian subject of Austria named Oberdan, who was alleged to have intended to murder Francis Joseph, and the cordial references to France made by Depretis at Stradella (Oct. 8, 1882), prevented the French Gov ernment from suspecting the existence of the alliance. Suspicion was not aroused until March, 1883, when Mancini practically admitted the existence of the treaty. In Italy generally this revelation was hailed with satisfaction except by the Clericals, who were enraged at the blow thus struck at the restoration of the pope's temporal power, and by the Radicals, who feared both the inevitable breach with republican France and the reinforce ment of the Italian constitutional parties by intimacy with strong monarchical states such as Germany and Austria.
Nevertheless, during its first period (1882-87), the triple alliance failed to ensure cordiality between the contracting Powers. Man cini exerted himself in a hundred ways to soothe French resent ment. He not only refused to join Great Britain in the Egyptian expedition, but agreed to suspend Italian consular jurisdiction in Tunis ; but his efforts were worse than futile. France remained cold, while Bismarck and Kalnoky, distrustful of the radicalism of Depretis and Mancini, assumed towards their ally an attitude almost hostile. Possibly Germany and Austria may have been influenced by the secret treaty signed between Austria, Germany and Russia on March 21, 1884, whereby Italy became in the eyes of the Central Powers a negligible quantity, and was treated accordingly. Meanwhile France provided Italy with fresh cause for uneasiness by abating her hostility to Germany. Italy in con sequence drew nearer to Great Britain, and at the London con ference on the Egyptian financial question sided with Great Britain against Austria and Germany. On Feb. 5, 1885, Massawa was occupied. The importance of this event was not appreciated at the time, and it aroused considerable opposition in the Chamber. On June 16 the cabinet obtained so small a majority that Depretis resigned. He was asked by the king to form a new ministry, which he did, but without Mancini who was replaced by Count Robilant. Robilant followed a firmly independent policy through out the Bulgarian crisis of 1885-86. Italy, indeed, came out of the Eastern crisis with enhanced prestige and with her relations to Austria greatly improved. As, in the spring of 1886, the moment for the renewal of the triple alliance drew near, he profited by the development of the Bulgarian crisis and the threatened Franco Russian understanding to secure from the Central Powers "some thing more" than the bare territorial guarantee of the original treaty. This "something more" consisted, at least in part, of the arrangement of an Anglo-Italian naval understanding providing for common action by the British and Italian fleets in the Medi terranean in case of war. A vote of the Italian Chamber on Feb. 4, 1887 in connection with the disaster to Italian troops at Dogali, in Abyssinia, brought about the resignation of the Depretis Robilant cabinet. The crisis dragged for three months, and bef or( its definite solution by the formation of a Depretis-Crispi min. istry, Robilant succeeded (March 17, 1887) in renewing the tripl( alliance on terms more favourable to Italy than those obtainec in 1882. Not only did he secure concessions from Austria one Germany corresponding in some degree to the improved state of the Italian army and navy, but, in virtue of the Anglo-Italiar, understanding, assured the practical adhesion of Great Britain tc the European policy of the Central Powers.
The period 1881-87 was marked by political and economic problems, and by the parliamentary phenomena known as trasfor. mismo. On June 20, 1881, the Chamber adopted a Franchise Reform Bill, which increased the electorate from 600,000 to 2,000,• 000. On April 12, 1883, the forced currency was formally abol ished by the resumption of Treasury payments in gold with funds obtained through a loan of £14,500,000 issued in London on May 5, 1882. On March 6, 1885, parliament finally sanctioned the conventions by which State railways were farmed out to three private companies—the Mediterranean, Adriatic and Sicilian. The conventions, concluded for a period of 6o years, but termin able by either party after 20 or 4o years, retained for the State the possession of the lines. Unfortunately, the calculation of probable railway revenue on which the conventions had been based, proved to be enormously exaggerated, and the Govern ment's position remained so unsatisfactory as to render the resumption of the whole system by the State on the expiration of the first period of 20 years in 5905 inevitable.
Intimately bound up with the forced currency, the railway conventions and public works was the financial question in general. From 1876, when equilibrium between expenditure and revenue had first been attained, taxation yielded steady annual surpluses, in 1881 reaching the satisfactory level of 53,000,000 lire. The repeal of the grist tax on wheat, which took effect on Jan. 1, the increase of military and naval expenditure, the lack of firm financial administration, and the constant drain of not always necessary public works, opened a new and disastrous period of deficit. In their anxiety to remain in office Depretis and the finance minister, Magliani, never hesitated to mortgage the finan cial future of their country. No concession could be denied to deputies, or groups of deputies, whose support was indispensable to the life of the cabinet, nor, under such conditions, was it possible to place any effective check upon administrative abuses in which politicians or their electors were interested. Thus the deficit of 23,500,00o lire for the financial year 1885-86 rose to nearly 73,000,00o lire in 1887-88, and in 1888-89 attained the ter rible level of 250,000,000 lire.
Nevertheless, in spite of many and serious shortcomings, the long series of Depretis administrations was marked by the adop tion of some useful measures. The foundation of land tax re-as sessment was laid by the introduction of a new cadastral survey. The Agricultural Inquiry brought to light vast quantities of information valuable for future agrarian legislation. In 1885 a measure embodying the principle of employers' liability for acci dents to workmen was enacted. An effort to encourage the devel opment of the mercantile marine was made in the same year. Sanitation and public hygiene received a potent impulse from the cholera epidemic of 1884, many of the unhealthiest quarters in Naples and other cities being demolished and rebuilt. The move ment was strongly supported by King Humbert, whose intrepidity in visiting the most dangerous spots at Busca and Naples while the epidemic was at its height, reassuring the panic-stricken inhab itants by his presence, excited the enthusiasm of his people and the admiration of Europe.
During the accomplishment of these and other reforms the condition of parliament underwent profound change. By degrees the administrations of the Left had ceased to rely solely upon the Liberal sections of the Chamber, and had carried their most important bills with the help of the Right. This process of trans formation was not exclusively the work of Depretis, but had been initiated as early as 1873, when a portion of the Right under Minghetti had, by joining the Left, overturned the Lanza-Sella cabinet. The practical annihilation of the old Right in the elections of 1876 opened a new parliamentary era. Reduced in number to less than 'co, and radically changed in spirit and composition, the Right gave way, if not to despair, at least to a despondency unsuited to an opposition party. Gradually it lost its conservative character and approached the various cabinets of the Left. When in course of time, the extended suffrage increased the Republican and Extreme Radical elements in the Chamber, and the Liberal "Pentarchy" (composed of Crispi, Cairoli, Nicotera, Zanardelli and Baccarini) assumed an attitude of bitter hostility to Depretis, the Right, obeying the impulse of Minghetti, rallied openly to Depretis, lending him aid without which his prolonged term of office would have been impossible. The result was parliamentary chaos, baptized trasformismo. Depretis thus established a par liamentary system destined largely to sterilize and vitiate the political life of Italy.
The occupation of Massawa (Feb. 5, 1885) was carried out with the approval of Great Britain. Partly to satisfy public opinion, whose resentment had been aroused by the massacre of some Italian explorers in that part of Africa, partly in order to profit by the favourable disposition of the British Government, and partly in the hope of remedying the error committed in 1882 by refusal to co-operate with Great Britain in Egypt, the Italian Govern ment in Jan. 1885 despatched an expedition to occupy Massawa and Beilul, subsequently extending their zone of occupation. The extension of the Italian zone excited the suspicions of John, negus of Abyssinia, whose apprehensions were assiduously fomented by Alula, ras of Tigre, and by French and Greek adventurers. Meas ures, apparently successful, were taken to reassure the negus, but shortly afterwards protection accorded by Italy to enemies of Ras Alula, induced the Abyssinians to enter upon hostilities. Ras Alula took prisoners and held as hostages the members of the Salimbeni expedition, whereupon Gen. Gene pushed forward a detachment to Saati. On Jan. 25, 1887, Ras Alula attacked Saati, but was repulsed with loss. On the following day, however, the Abyssin ians, 20,000 strong, succeeded in surprising, near the village of Dogali, an Italian force of 524 officers and men under Col. De Cristoforis, and overwhelmed them. The Italians, after exhausting their ammunition, were destroyed where they stood. One man only escaped; 407 men and 23 officers were killed outright, and one officer and 81 men wounded. Dead and wounded alike were hor ribly mutilated by order of Alula.
In Italy the disaster of Dogali produced consternation, and caused the fall of the Depretis-Robilant cabinet. The Chamber sanctioned the despatch of reinforcements. Meanwhile Crispi who, though averse from colonial adventure, desired to vindicate Italian honour, entered the Depretis cabinet as minister of the interior. In Nov. 1887, a strong expedition under Gen. di San Marzano raised the strength of the Massawa garrison to nearly 20,000 men. The British Government, desirous of preventing an Italo-Abyssinian conflict, which could but strengthen the position of the Mandists, despatched Mr. (afterwards Sir) Gerald Portal from Massawa on Oct. 29 to mediate with the negus. The mission proved fruitless. On March 28, 1888, the negus descended from the Abyssinian high plateau in the direction of Saati, but, on April 3, sickness among his men compelled him to withdraw the Abys sinian army. He was killed on March 1 o, 1889, while in an ex pedition against the Mandists. His death gave rise to an Abys sinian war of succession between Mangasha, natural son of John, and Menelek, king of Shoa and grandson of the Negus Sella Selasie. Menelek, by means of Count Antonelli, resident in the Shoa country, requested Italy to execute a diversion in his favour by occupying Asmara. Antonelli obtained Menelek's signature to a treaty fixing the frontiers of the Italian colony and defining Italo-Abyssinian relations. The treaty, signed at Uccialli on May 2, 1889, arranged for regular intercourse between Italy and Abys sinia and conceded to Italy a portion of the high plateau, with the positions of Halai, Saganeiti and Asmara. The main point of the treaty, however, lay in clause i7:— His Majesty the king of kings of Ethiopia consents to make use of the Government of His Majesty the king of Italy for the treatment of all questions concerning other Powers and Governments.
Upon this clause Italy founded her claim to a protectorate over Abyssinia. In Sept. 1889 the Treaty of Uccialli was ratified, Italy recognizing Menelek as emperor of Ethiopia, and Menelek recog nizing the Italian colony. On Jan. 1, 189o, a royal decree con ferred upon the colony the name of "Eritrea." In the colony itself Gen. Baldissera, who had replaced Gen. Saletta, prepared himself to take the offensive against Mangasha and Ras Alula. The latter retreated, and Mangasha, seeing further resistance to be useless, submitted to Menelek, who conformed to article 17 of the Treaty of Uccialli by requesting Italy to repre sent Abyssinia at the Brussels anti-slavery conference, an act which strengthened Italian illusions as to Menelek's readiness to submit to their protectorate But he afterwards protested against the Italian text of article 17 and to contend that the Amharic text contained no equivalent for the word "consent," but merely stipu lated that Abyssinia "might" make use of Italy in her relations with foreign powers. On Oct. 28, 189o, Count Antonelli was despatched to settle the controversy, but found agreement impos sible either with regard to the frontier or the protectorate. Mean while the marquis di Rudini, who had succeeded Crispi as the Italian premier, had authorized the abandonment of article 17, but was able to conclude two protocols with Great Britain (March and April, 1891) whereby the British government definitely recognized Abyssinia as within the Italian sphere of influence in return for an Italian recognition of British rights in the Upper Nile.