The Union of Italy

THE UNION OF ITALY While Mazzini's influence declined, a new movement for the union of Italy under Victor Emmanuel gathered strength. The propaganda was organized by the Sicilian La Farina, by means of the Societa Nazionale, and found many adherents, including not a few ex-republicans such as Manin, then an exile in Paris. Cavour gave secret encouragement to the movement, and ended by prac tically directing its activity through La Farina.

Napoleon III. and the War of 1859.

Both the king and his minister realized that Piedmont alone could not expel Austria from Italy without foreign assistance. Cavour now set himself to the task of isolating Austria and securing an alliance for her expulsion. The emperor Napoleon, almost alone amongst Frenchmen, had genuine Italian sympathies. But were he to intervene in Italy, the intervention would have to bring tangible advantages to France. Hence his hesitations and vacillations, which Cavour steadily worked to overcome. The attempt by the Mazzinian, Felice Orsini, to murder Napoleon (Jan. 14, 1858), although it failed, greatly impressed the emperor, as did Orsini's letter from prison exhorting him to intervene in Italy. Consequently negotia tions with Cavour were resumed, and a meeting with him was arranged to take place at Plombieres (July 20 and 21, 1858). There it was agreed that France should supply 200,000 men and Piedmont ioo,000 for the expulsion of the Austrians from Italy, that Piedmont should be expanded into a kingdom of North Italy, that central Italy should form a separate kingdom, on the throne of which the emperor perhaps would place one of his own rela tives, and Naples another, possibly under Lucien Murat; the pope, while retaining only the "Patrimony of St. Peter" (the Roman province), would be president of the Italian confedera tion. In exchange for French assistance Piedmont would cede Savoy and perhaps Nice to France; and a marriage between Victor Emmanuel's daughter Clothilde and Napoleon's nephew Prince Bonaparte, to which the emperor attached great importance, although not made a definite condition, was also discussed.

On Jan. I, 1859, Napoleon astounded the diplomatic world by remarking to Baron Hubner, the Austrian ambassador, that he regretted that relations between France and Austria were "not so good as they had been"; and at the opening of the Piedmontese parliament on the loth Victor Emmanuel pronounced the memo rable words that he could not be insensible to the cry of pain (il grido di dolore) which reached him from all parts of Italy. Yet after these warlike declarations and after the signing of a military convention at Turin, Napoleon suddenly adopted the Russian sug gestion of a congress to settle Italian affairs. The scheme was strongly opposed by Cavour, and Napoleon then insisted on dis armament by both Sardinia and Austria. Cavour saw the neces sity of acceding to this demand of disbanding the volunteers who had flocked to Piedmont from all parts of Italy when war seemed imminent, and of reducing the regular army to a peace footing. But in Austria, where the war party was in the ascendant, the reserves were called out on April 12, and on the 23rd, before Cavour's decision was known, an ultimatum was sent to Turin demanding disarmament within three days. Cavour was delighted at the turn affairs had taken, as Austria now appeared the aggres sor. On the 29th Francis Joseph declared war, and the next day his troops crossed the Ticino, a move which was followed by a French declaration of war. The actions of Montebello (May 2o), Palestro (May 31) and Melegnano ( June 8) and the battles of Magenta (June 4) and Solferino (June 24) all went against the Austrians. Garibaldi's volunteers raised the standard of insurrec tion and held the field in the region of the Italian lakes. After Solferino the allies prepared to besiege the Quadrilateral, but Napoleon drew back, unwilling, for many reasons, to continue the campaign. He saw the defects of his own army organization, and feared intervention by Prussia; he did not wish to create a too powerful Italian state at the foot of the Alps ; and lastly, the war was far from popular in France. Consequently, without con

sulting Victor Emmanuel, Napoleon asked Francis Joseph for an armistice, which was agreed to. The king was informed, and on the 8th an armistice was arranged at Villafranca until Aug. 15. But the king and Cavour were terribly upset by this move, which meant peace without Venetia ; Cavour hurried to the king's headquarters at Monzambano, and in excited, almost disrespectful, language implored him not to agree to peace. On this occasion, however, Victor Emmanuel proved the greater statesman of the two; he saw that, great as was the sacrifice, he must be' content with Lombardy for the present, lest all be lost. On the iith the two emperors met at Villafranca, where they agreed that Lom bardy should be ceded to Piedmont, Venetia retained by Austria, and Italy made into a confederation with the pope as president. Victor Emmanuel regretfully signed the peace preliminaries, add ing, however, pour ce qui me concerne (which meant that he made no undertaking with regard to central Italy), and Cavour resigned office. (See ITALIAN WARS.) The Lombard campaign had produced important effects throughout the rest of Italy. A bloodless revolution in Florence forced the grand duke to depart on April 27, 1859. A provisional government was formed, led by Ubaldino Peruzzi, and was strengthened on May 8 by the inclusion of Baron Bettino Ricasoli, a man of great force of character, who became the real head of the administration, and all through the ensuing critical period aimed unswervingly at Italian unity. The rulers of Parma and Modena and the papal authorities in the legations were likewise expelled, provisional governments being set up, and the dictator ship of Victor Emmanuel invoked. In July the marquis D'Azeglio arrived at Bologna as royal commissioner.

Napoleon was resolutely opposed to the Piedmontese annexa tions in central Italy. But here Cavour intervened, for he was determined to maintain the annexations, at all costs. Although he had resigned, he remained in office until Rattazzi could form a new ministry; and while officially recalling the royal commissioners according to the preliminaries at Villafranca, he privately encour aged them to remain and organize resistance to the return of the despots, if necessary by force (see CAvouR). Farini, who was elected dictator of Parma and Modena, and Ricasoli, who had be come supreme in Tuscany, were now the men who by their energy and determination achieved the annexation of central Italy to Piedmont, in spite of the strenuous opposition of the French emperor and the weakness of many Italian Liberals. In August Marco Minghetti succeeded in forming a military league and a customs union between Tuscany, Romagna and the duchies; and Gen. Manf redo Fanti was sent by the Turin Government to organize the army of the Central League, with Garibaldi under him.

The terms of the treaty of peace signed at Zurich on Nov. io were practically identical with those of the preliminaries of Villa f ranca. Napoleon realized now that it would be impossible, with out running serious risks, to oppose the movement in favour of unity, and he thereupon raised the question of the cession of Nice and Savoy as the price of his consent to the union of the central provinces with the Italian kingdom. In Jan. 186o the Rattazzi ministry fell, and Cavour was again summoned by the king to the head of affairs.

Cavour realized the necessity of the sacrifice of Nice and Savoy if central Italy was to be won. The negotiations were long drawn out ; but at last, on March 24, the treaty was signed whereby the cession was agreed upon. The king having formally accepted the voluntary annexation of the duchies, Tuscany and Romagna, ap pointed the prince of Carignano viceroy with Ricasoli as governor general (March 22), and was immediately afterwards E Kcom municated by the pope. On April 2, 186o, the new Italian parlia ment, including members from central Italy, assembled at 1 urin.