ARMIES SINCE THE WORLD WAR 49. General Tendencies.—Since the World War, 1914-18, eight factors have influenced the organization and size of armies: First, the series of peace treaties definitely limiting the size of the armies of the defeated Central Powers and their Allies; sec ond, the Russian Army; third, the insistence of the victorious peoples in universal service countries that the length of peace time service be reduced; fourth, the refusal of the United States and Great Britain to substitute universal service for volunteering in times of peace; fifth, the development of motorization for military transport purposes and mechanization for movement of men and weapons in battle; sixth, the United States National Defense Act of 1920; seventh, the growth of air power; eighth, the necessity for drastic economy.
The relatively small size of the armies of the defeated powers served to accentuate the demand for reduction in armaments which sprang up in most countries after the war. However, within these defeated countries the fear grew that with such small forces neither internal order could be maintained nor protection from possible outside aggression secured. The result was the organiza tion in most of them of semi-military bodies distinguished as a rule by shirts of different colours. Similarly war veterans were organized. Ultimately in Germany and Austria practically every political body, right, centre and left had such an extra legal semi military organization.
In cases of internal disorders, attempted or successful coup d'etat, these bodies appeared under arms and fought to establish or maintain the political principle which they supported. Only in Italy did the movement attain prominence amongst the victorious powers.
The spirted and veteran forces in Germany meant that her mili tary power was not simply the Ioo,000 Regulars (Reichswehr) al lowed her by treaty but that force plus these extra-legal ones. More than by this increase in numbers the victorious powers be came increasingly worried because the i 2-year enlistment period in the Reichswehr meant Germany was producing soldiers whose efficiency was far beyond what they could obtain with their short terms of service.
The war had shown that small numbers of highly trained, well led troops were worth several times their number of "run-of-the mill" troops.
Therefore the question arose and is still being debated whether it would not be better to have a small long service highly trained army than a large one made up of short service men. This is of particular interest to the countries whose large industries enable them to supply and keep supplied a small regular army with a numerous and up to date armament and mechanical equipment. Countries denied such armament and equipment by treaty and those lacking industry on a large scale would find themselves hopelessly outclassed. Also such armies, being smaller and much more mobile than the large armies of the World War, probably could avoid the stabilization of that war by making use of their motorization and mechanization.
In the United States immediately after the war a large peace time regular army was vigorously advocated and opposed. The re sult was a compromise which since studied by Germany, Italy and Japan has been copied with modifications. The new principles incorporated are two: the first is different types of service for boys and young men which directly prepare them for and lead them into service in the active army; the second is the recognition of the fact that the armed forces instead of being a class apart, must be intertwined with civilian life in peace as well as war time if the maximum benefit is to be derived from the growth of intelli gence due to widespread education available to all and the need to make the maximum use of the industry of its homeland. The necessity to prepare industry in time of peace for war has also been copied by other countries.
The rapid growth and development of aviation has brought into existence a school which claims it can by means of bombing cities and other civilian centres so break the will of a nation as to make armies and navies unnecessary.
5o. Military Forces in 1936.—Existing armies are the re sult of three factors. The first consists of the tendencies which have been in operation since the World War. The second is the break-down of the provisions of the Peace Treaties which strictly limited the armies of the defeated powers. The third is diminish ing faith in the possibility of disarmament as a practical proposi tion in the present state of the world.
The infantry is still the backbone of all armies. One reason is that it is still the most easily and inexpensively raised and trained. Another is that with the increase in range and inten sity of fire of modern weapons the smallest size target is es sential to survival on the battlefield. To date the effort to find an armoured vehicle which will protect men in battle has not succeeded because just as is true at sea, the race between armour and armour piercing projectiles is generally won by the latter.
Infantry is no longer considered as "cannon fodder" because of the adverse moral effect on both the army and the nation of heavy losses. Also well-trained infantrymen are valuable as a small number can accomplish many times the results of a larger number of poorly trained ones.
Therefore, all armies are engaged in research work in order to carry the infantrymen as far forward as possible instead of march ing them; to give them the maximum assistance from the other arms in attack and defense; and to have the army as a whole understand that only through successful action on the part of the infantry can decisive victory be had.
Motorization and mechanization and all improvements in arms of all types in their ultimate analysis are based on this principle. In general armies of today can be divided into those raised by universal service; those depending upon voluntary enlistment and a combination of the two types. All armies today except those of the United States, Great Britain and Italy belong to the first, in so far as their home armies are concerned. France has in ad dition a volunteer army for service in the colonies. The armies of the United States, Britain and her colonies are raised from volunteers.
The Italian army until the rise of Fascism was a universal serv ice army. The Fascists or Black Shirt Troops are They are gradually being merged with the National Army so tha t today that army is a combination of universal service and volun teer units. In Germany the voluntary service units made up of black shirts are to disappear with the exception of approximately fifty thousand. The Swiss army while a universal service one, "differs from the others of this type in that the service is not continuous but consists of short periods which do not necessitate the individual retiring entirely from his civilian activities.
In all armies the proportion to infantry of automatic rifles, machine guns, accompanying artillery within the infantry units, anti-tank, and anti-aircraft, artillery and field artillery in general to the infantry has greatly increased. As a consequence of this and the necessity for greater deployment in both breadth and depth if infantry is to survive modern fire the number of men in each unit and the number of units in each echelon of the infantry organization has been reduced in most armies.
In the United States, Japan, Poland and a number of small countries the army has its own air force arid therefore is not de pendent upon assignments from an independent air force. In practically all other countries the air force is independent of both the army and navy.
51. The Future of Armies.—Since the World War the indica tions have steadily increased that armies are going through an evo lution which will result in a different type from the strictly uni versal service one. One change is due to the realization that a universal service army trains the citizens who are enemies of the existing form of government as well as its friends. This has resulted in the Italian fascist troops, the special communist Rus sian troops. The increase in the number of countries which give military training to youths and young men prior to the age of military service, shows that this will be a marked characteristic of future armies.
Just as the railway produced profound modifications in the application of strategical principles so will the increasing use of motor transportation. Similarly, the use of armed and ar moured motor vehicles cross country will increasingly change tactical methods. The use of gas and smoke will undoubtedly in crease. However, the indications to date are that wholesale de struction by the use of gas will be impractical for technical reasons for some time to come.
The wholesale destruction by aviation of cities such that a nation will surrender without waiting for its army and its navy to fight appears far in the future because of present-day limita tions of aviation and any increase in its powers which can be reasonably forecast. Also professional military people are con vinced from the results of attacks on unarmed civilians in the past that such method of waging war cannot bring decisive re sults while certain to provoke savage retaliation.
The rearmament of Germany is the key to land disarmament in the immediate future. This because the armies maintained in Europe from the time the various peace treaties were signed were based upon the force needed to maintain the political situation set up by these treaties. This situation included a German army so small that it could not be a factor of primary importance. The new German army is a military factor of primary importance. An other factor is the new Russian army. As its power is not defi nitely known it remains an uncertain quantity. (H. J. RE.) BIBLIOGRAPHY.—A large proportion of the works mentioned below are concerned mainly with the development of strategy and tactics. I. For the past constitution, organization and evolution of armies: F. C. von Lossau, Ideale der Kriegfiihrung (1836-43) ; Desclaisons, Precis des Histoires d'Alexandre-le-Grand et Jules Cesar, 2 vol. (1784) ; F. C. Liskenne and J. B. B. Sauvan, Bibliotheque Historique et Militaire, 7 vol. (1851-53 ; with atlas, etc., 2 pt., 1862) ; Napoleon III., Histoire de Jules Cesar (1865-66, Eng. trans. by T. Wright 1865 66) ; H. A. T. Kochly and F. W. Rustow, Einleitung zu C. Julius Caesars Commentarien (Gotha, 1857) ; F. Guillaume de Vauduncourt, Histoire des campagnes d'Annibal en Italie, 3 vol. (Milan, 1812) ; J. L. A. Colin, Annibal en Gavle (1904) ; B. H. Liddell Hart, A Greater than Napoleon—Scipio Africanus (1926) ; C. Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages (1924) ; Machiavelli, Libro dell' Arte di Guerra (Florence, 1521 ; Eng. trans. by P. Whitehorn, 156o-62) ; J. de Beaurain, Histoire des dernieres Campagnes du Marechal Turenne en 1672-75 (1782) ; C. A. Neuber, Turenne als Kriegstheoretiker and Feldherr (Vienna, 1869) ; Marechal Turenne, Collection des lettres et memoires (ed. P. H. de Grimoard, 1782), and Memoires publ. de la Societe de l'Histoire de France (1909); T. Longueville, Marechal Turenne (London, 1907) ; Eugene Francis, Prince of Savoy, Memoires (181o; Eng. trans. by W. Mudford, 1811), and Militarische Korres pondenz (ed. F. Heller, 1848) ; T. S. Baldork, Cromwell as a Soldier (1899) ; F. Hoenig, Oliver Cromwell, 3 vols. (1887-89) ; J. A. H. de Guibert, Oeuvres Militaires: Essai general de tactique (Liege, 1733; Eng. trans. by Lieut. Douglas, T 781) ; A. F. Fuchs, Briefe an den Feld marscha.11 Gra f en Mont ecuccolli, Gesellscha f t fur neuere Geschichte Oxterreichs Veroffentlichungen, vol. ii. (Vienna, 1910) ; J. M. P.
Chastenet, Viscount de Puysegur, Les Memoires de Messire J. de C. (169o) and Art de la Guerre (1748) ; Maurice de Saxe, Les Reveries, ou Memoires sur l'Art de la Guerre (La Haye, 1756-59; Eng. trans. by Sir W. Fawcett, ; J. L. A. Colin, Les Campagnes du Marechal de Saxe, 2 pt. (19o1–o4) ; Frederick the Great, Des Konigs von Preussen Majestdt Unterricht von der Kriegskunst an seine Generalen (Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1761 ; Fr. trans. by M. Faesch as Instruction Militaire, Frankfurt and Leipzig, I 761) ; Die Kriege Friedrichs des Grossen, Official Publication (Berlin, 1890-1920) ; Thomas Carlyle, Frederick the Great (1858-65) ; D. A. Milyutin, History of the War of (St. Petersburg, 1852-57) ; A. T. Petrushefsky, Generalissimus K. Suvoroff (St. Petersburg, 1884) ; G. J. D. von Scharnhorst, Taschen buch zum Gebrauch im Felde (Hanover,, 1794 ; Fr. trans. by M. A. Fourcy as Traite sur l'Artillerie, 1840-43), and Scharnhorsts Briefe (ed. K. Linnebach, Munich and Leipzig, 1914) ; Charles, Archduke of Austria, Grundsatze der Kriegskunst (1814) , and Militarische Werke (Vienna, 1862 ; reprinted 1893) ; A. H. de Jomini, Traite der grandes Operations Militaires, 3 vols. (18o6; Eng. trans. by S. B. Holabird, New York, 1865), and Precis de la Guerre (1837-56; Eng. trans. by W. P. Craighill, Philadelphia, 1868) ; C. von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (1832-33 ; Eng. trans. rev. by J. J. Graham, as On War, 3 vols., ed. F. N. Maude, 5908) ; W. von Willisen, Theorie des Grassen Krieges, 4 vols. (184o-68) ; E. Bonnal, Carnot d'apres les Archives Nationales (1888) ; L. H. Carnot, Memoires sur Lazare Carnot, 1753-1824, 2 vols. (1907) ; C. Mathiot, Vie, Opinions et Pensees (1916) ; L. N. M. Carnot, De la Defense des places fortes (1812) ; H. C. B. von Moltke, Franco German War (London, 1891) , Schri f ten, 3 vols. (1895-190o), and Military Correspondence, First Section (Oxford, 1923) ; B. E. Palat, La Strategic de Moltke (1907) ; V. B. Derrecagaix, La Guerre Moderne, 3 pt. (1885 ; Eng. trans. by C. W. Foster as Modern War, 2 pt., Wash ington, 1888) ; L. A. F. von Falkenhausen, Der grosse Krieg der Jetzt zeit (19o9) ; H. L. D. Yorck von Wartenburg, Napoleon als Feldherr, 2 vols. (1885-86; Eng. trans. as Napoleon as General in The Wolseley Series, ed. W. H. James, 1902) ; E. Hamley, Operations of War (1866, new ed. 1923) ; J. F. Canonge, Histoire et art militaire (Brussels, 1904 07) ; C. J. J. Ardant du Picq, Etudes de Combat (19o3 ; Eng. trans. by J. N. Greeley and R. C. Cotton as Battle Studies, New York, 1921) ; J. L. A. Colin, L'Education Militaire de Napoleon (i9oo), and Trans formations de la Guerre (1911 ; Eng. trans. by L. H. R. Pope-Hennes sey, 1912) ; L. Maillard, Elements de la Guerre (1891) ; C. W. H. von Blume, Strategie (1882) , and Die Grundlagen unserer W ehrkra f t (1899) ; W. von Scherff, Von der Krieg f uhrung (1883) ; A. von Bogus lawski, Betrachtung fiber Heerwesen and Kriegsf uhrung (1897) ; Kraft Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, Strategische Briefe (1887 ; Eng. trans. in The Wolseley Series, ed. W. H. James, 2 vols., 1897-98) ; Von Schlichting, Taktische and Strategische Grundsatze der Gegenwart, 3 vols. (1897 99) ; J. L. Lewal, Strategie de Marche (1893), Strategie de Combat (1895) , and Plan de Combat (19o1) ; A. A. Grouard, Maximes de Guerre de Napoleon (1897, new ed. 1898), and Les Batailles de Napoleon (1900) ; C. von der Goltz, Das Volk in Waffen (1883 ; Eng. trans. by P. A. Ashworth as The Nation in Arms, new ed. 1907), Kriegsf iihrung (1895 ; Eng. trans. by G. F. Leverson as The Conduct of War, 1899) , Von Jena bis Pr. Eylau (19o7; Eng. trans. by C. F. Atkinson as From Jena to Pr. Eylau in The Wolseley Series, ed. W. H. James, 1913), and Rossbach and Jena (1883) ; A. Leer, Strategy (in Russian, St. Petersburg, 1869 ; German trans. by E. Opacic as Positive Strategie, 1871) ; G. A. B. Bonnal, L'Esprit de la guerre moderne (19o3, 3rd ed. 19o5) ; F. Foch, Des Principes de la guerre (19o3 ; Eng. trans. by Hilaire Belloc, 1918), and Conduite de la Guerre (19o4, 3rd ed. 1915) . See also works of Xenophon; Polybius; Aelian; Arrian, Vegetius ; Caesar ; Plutarch ; Le Prestre de Vauban ; Anton de Pas, Marquis de Feuquieres ; J. C. de Folard; C. T. Guischardt ; P. G. Joly de Maizeroy ; Prince de Ligne ; Napoleon.
II. For the present state and problems of armies: C. von der Goltz, The Nation in Arms (Eng. trans. by P. A. Ashworth, new ed. 1907) ; H. Foster, Organization (191I) ; W. Balck, Development of Tactics, World War (Eng. trans. by H. Bell, 1922).
The following have a more general appeal and a more original out look: J. F. C. Fuller, The Reformation of War (1923) ; J. B. S. Haldane, Callinicus: a defence of Chemical Warfare (1925) ; B. H. Liddell Hart, Paris: or the future of War (1925), and The Remaking of Modern Armies (1927) ; League of Nations Armaments Year Book (Geneva, 1924, etc.) .
The principal general military periodicals are: English, Royal United Service Institution, Journal (1857, etc.) and The Army Quarterly 1920, etc.) ; American, Infantry Journal; Belgian, Bulletin Beige des Sciences 16filitaires: French, Revue Militaire Francaise; German, Militiir Wochenblatt; Austrian, Streffleurs, with which was amal gamated the Organ des Militar Wissenschaft. Vereins.
See also biographical headings and articles dealing with the separate arms, etc. See further the section Defence under different countries for an account of their armies. (X.)