ARRAS, BATTLE OF. The great battles which opened the campaign of the Allies in 1917 on the Western Front were the direct outcome of two main causes; the first was the strategical position resulting from the battle of the Aisne in 1914, and the second the tactical position resulting from the battle of the Somme in 1916.
The former placed the bulk of the German forces in the West in the huge salient Nieuport–Noyon–Verdun, and the second a considerable portion of these forces in the smaller salient Arras Gommecourt–Morval. The first offered considerable possibilities for the Allies to get in a right and left hand blow on Valenciennes and Mezieres, the main centres of the German lateral communi cations, and the second of similar blows in the direction of Queant against the northern and southern flanks of the German VI. and I. Armies. If it had been possible to bring off this last operation successfully, such a debacle of the German forces would have resulted that not only would the advance of the British armies have threatened Valenciennes, but the rush of German reserves to stop the gap would have withdrawn pressure from before the French about Reims, and would probably have enabled them to advance on Mezieres.
In December General Nivelle, who had recently been appointed to the chief command of the French Armies, objected to the sub sidiary part to be played by the French, and put forward a plan in which the decisive blow was to be delivered from the Aisne. The task of the British, according to this plan, was to deliver an offensive in Artois which would draw in large forces of the enemy, and so reduce opposition on the French front.
From October onwards vast preparations, which were impos sible to disguise, were put in hand. Railways and roads were ex tended, dumps formed, gun emplacements built, aerodromes lev elled and the greater portion of the underground quarries of Arras, St. Sauveur, and Ronville opened up and made ready in every detail to accommodate two divisions which were to rein force the attack by passing underground. This sudden and unex pected reinforcing of the front was to be the surprise of the battle.
The battle front, some i 5m. in width, extended from just north of Croisilles to a little south of Givenchy-en-Gohelle, at the north ern foot of the Vimy ridge. This ridge which rises to a height of 4 7 5f t. above sea level dominated the whole battlefield from the north. From its summit overlooking Lens the ground falls away to the river Scarpe, between which and the Cojeul river it is in nature undulating. In the forward zone of defence the Germans had dug three lines of trenches, each of which was heavily wired. Then four to five miles east of this system was dug the Drocourt Queant line, which at the date of the battle was still unfinished and but lightly wired.
At the beginning of April the German reserves numbered some 600,000 men, and consequently the success of the battle de pended on the time it would take to penetrate the Drocourt Queant line. If this line could be broken within 48 hours of the initial attack, the intervention of these reserves might be avoided and so large a gap created that eventually great numbers would be drawn towards it and away from the French offensive in the south, where the main blow was to fall. This time could only have been gained by the employment of a considerable number of tanks, or by a preliminary bombardment of not more than 24 hours' duration. After denuding the training grounds of both France and England, only 6o tanks could be assembled. Therefore the only alternative was a hurricane bombardment, and though the III. Army for long suggested such an operation, G.H.Q. in sisted on three weeks' systematic wire cutting, culminating in a general bombardment of several days' duration. During this period 2,700,000 shells were fired, and though the wire was de stroyed all chance of surprise vanished.
(b) I. Army (Gen. Horne). The Canadian Corps and the 13th Bde. of the 5th British Div. were to attack the Vimy heights, a position considered one of the strongest in France.
(c) V. Army (Gen. Gough). The Australian Corps and the V. Corps were to operate on the south of the III. Army. The posi tion of this Army was a most difficult one, as the destruction of the roads and the bad weather had rendered it impossible to move forward much artillery, a sine qua non of the battles of this period.
(d) The whole of the above operations was to be considered as a preliminary step to the advance of the Cavalry Corps and the XVIII. Corps south of the Scarpe. These corps were to break through at Monchy-le-Preux and advance eastwards through the Drocourt–Queant line.
Opening of the Attack.—On April 9, at 5.30 A.M., the gen eral attack was launched under cover of a magnificently timed creeping barrage, and within 4o minutes the whole of the German first line system, except a small portion of the Vimy ridge, was captured. About Tilloy-lez-Mofflaines and Telegraph Hill tanks accounted for a good many of the enemy and then proceeded eastwards to assist in the reduction of the Blue line and such parts of the Brown line as they were able to reach during day light. By noon the greater part of the second objective had fallen and a. number of hostile batteries were captured. By the close of the day practically the whole of the objectives north of the Scarpe had been taken, but south of this river the third ob jective had only been penetrated in places, and the fourth objec tive remained untouched.
During the night of the 9th–IOth, the 37th Div., which had been held in reserve, advanced to the northern slopes of Orange Hill; and during the morning of the loth this advance was fol lowed by a general attack on the Brown line which enabled the 37th Div. to reach the outskirts of Monchy-le-Preux, which on the morning of the I ith was captured by this division assisted by tanks. Whilst these operations were in progress the Germans strongly reinforced their front, and so stubborn had become the opposition that to relieve the pressure on the VII. and VI. Corps fronts the V. Army was ordered to attack on the morning of the IIth from the direction of Bullecourt northwards. At 4.3o A.M. I I tanks, followed by the 62nd Div. on the left and the 4th Australian Div. on the right, stormed the Hindenburg line, but on account of the width of the trenches and inadequate artillery support, only two tanks, co-operating with the Australians, were able to cross this line. These led the attack as far as Riencourt lez-Cagnicourt when a strong German counter-attack drove the Australians back; meanwhile the attack of the 62nd Div. had been completely held up on the southern outskirts of the village of Bullecourt.
On the 12th, Heninel and Wancourt were captured by the 21st and 56th Div., and minor operations were carried out on the 13th and 14th when the main offensive of the III. and V. Armies terminated, 13,00o prisoners and 200 guns having been captured. Pressure, however, was not altogether relaxed, as on the 16th the French launched their grand offensive on the Aisne, and to assist in this operation it was considered necessary to hold the enemy. Though this attack proved a complete fiasco, pressure was maintained on the Arras Front, and the line pushed forward to include the villages of Guemappe, Gavrelle, and Arleux-en Gohelle. On May 5 the battle of Arras was brought to a close. From April 14, 6,000 additional prisoners and some 5o guns were taken, but British casualties had been severe, totalling, between April 9 and May 5, no less than 132,000 officers and men killed, wounded, and missing.
Results of the Battle.—The failure of the Allied spring of fensive may be traced to various causes, the most important be ing : The exhaustion of the French due to the battles of Verdun and the Somme in 1916, the total lack of surprise on both the British and French fronts; the distance apart of the two battle fields, and the comparative narrowness of the fronts attacked when compared with the strength of the German reserves.