ATLANTA, BATTLES ROUND. The fighting round Atlanta (July 20-Sept. 2, 1864), the last phase of the Atlanta campaign (May-Sept.), ended with Sherman, the Federal general, forcing his opponent Hood to evacuate "the Gate City of the South." Having manoeuvred Hood's predecessor, J. E. Johnston, across the Chattahoochee (July 9), Sherman had before him a twofold objective, the capture of Atlanta and the destruction of the Confederate army. If the two ends could be compassed by a single stroke, so much the better; but Sherman had already de cided that, if to take Atlanta he must let the enemy army escape, the capture of the city was the more important task. He believed that the fall of Atlanta would sound the death-knell of the Confederacy and to attain that he "was willing to meet the enemy in the open field but not behind well-constructed parapets" (Sher man). If Atlanta was, as Johnston wrote, "too strong to be taken by assault and too extensive to be invested," still the Confederate army could be forced to evacuate it by cutting off its sources of supply. Three railways fed Atlanta, viz., the Augusta, Mont gomery and Macon lines. Sherman was warned by Grant that Lee might send reinforcements from Virginia, and these troops would probably follow the Augusta route, as Longstreet had done the previous year. Therefore Sherman decided to destroy the Augusta railway east of Decatur, hoping to put it out of action long enough to complete his operations against Atlanta and to close in upon the city from the north and east. His left wing, McPherson's Army of the Tennessee (XV., XVI. and XVII. Corps) was ordered to advance from Roswell and strike the railway between Decatur and Stone mountain, Schofield's Army of the Ohio (XXIII. Corps) to march straight upon Decatur, where it would be joined by McPherson, and Thomas with the Army of the Cumberland (IV., XIV. and XX. Corps) to advance upon Atlanta. Johnston meant to fight for Atlanta. He had pre pared a line of defence behind Peach-tree Creek forming a semi circle round the north of the city, with its flanks resting on the Chattanooga and Augusta railways. The forces of the two com batants were now more nearly equal than they had ever been. For Sherman had to leave strong detachments north of the Chattahoochee to protect his communications against cavalry raids, and Johnston hoped to hold his fortified lines with the Georgia militia, which the State Governor was sending to Atlanta, and with his three corps attack the Federals in flank. But John ston was superseded by Hood, one of his corps commanders (July 17). This step, generally regarded as one of Davis's worst mis takes, was forced upon the President by certain influential Georgians, who represented that Johnston was intending to aban don Atlanta without a battle. The Government could get no definite statement of his plans from Johnston, whose relations with the President had been strained since the autumn of 1861.
It was decided that a more aggressive policy must be adopted, and Hood, who had won a well-deserved reputation as a fighting general under Lee, was appointed in Johnston's place. Johnston on turning over the command had explained to his suc cessor his plans for an offensive, and Hood decided to execute them forthwith. But he could only use two corps for his offensive, as only 2,500 militia had arrived. The disposition of Sherman's armies invited attack. The two flanks were tom. apart and there was a big gap between Thomas's left and Schofield's right. Hardee was ordered with his own and Stewart's corps to attack Thomas's army, when crossing Peach-tree creek, and drive it down into the pocket between the creek and the river. But the Federals held their ground and beat off all the Confederate on slaughts (July 2o). On the night of the 21st Hood withdrew his troops into an inner line of entrenchments and sent Hardee's corps round the east of Atlanta to fall upon the exposed flank and rear of McPherson's army, which seemed to be threatening a move ment against the Macon railway. Hood intended, as soon as Hardee's attack threw the Federal left into confusion, to move out his other two corps from their entrenchments in succession and hoped to roll up the Federal line from left to right. After a i5m. night march Hardee reached a position in the thick woods where his right overlapped McPherson's left, which had just occupied the entrenchments vacated by the Confederates. The Federals were taken by surprise, as their cavalry was away tearing up the Augusta railway and Sherman himself imagined Hood to be evacuating Atlanta. But the unexpected appearance of the XVI. Corps in rear of McPherson's left prevented the Con federates from falling upon the enemy rear, and the onslaughts of Hardee on their left and of Cheatham's corps, which advancing from its lines took up the attack against the Federal front, were finally repulsed by the Army of the Tennessee. which fought this battle, known as the battle of Atlanta (July 22), the bloodiest of the whole campaign, practically unaided. It lost its commander, McPherson, who was killed at the outset. Logan took over the temporary command, but Howard was formally appointed Mc Pherson's successor (July 27). The railway bridge over the Chat tahoochee was rebuilt (July 25), and for the greater security of his communications Sherman decided to advance against the Macon railway by his right flank instead of continuing the move ment round the east of Atlanta. The Macon and Montgomery railways ran over the same line as far as Eastpoint, 5m. south of Atlanta. It was impossible for an army holding Atlanta to protect the latter railway, which crossed the Chattahoochee into Alabama. The safety of Atlanta therefore depended upon Hood's ability to keep the Macon railway intact. Sherman now transferred the Army of the Tennessee to the extreme right and sent his cavalry round both sides of Atlanta against this railway. As Howard was moving into position south-west of Atlanta (July 28) S. D. Lee, who had replaced Cheatham in command of Hood's old corps, at tacked his right at Ezra Church with his own and part of Stewart's corps. Hood's third attempt to strike a heavy blow was repulsed with comparative ease, and Davis, alarmed at these costly failures, urged upon Hood a more cautious policy. Sherman continued to extend his lines to the right, moving Schofield (Aug. 1) with the XXIII. and XIV. Corps beyond Howard's army in the hope of capturing the railway above Eastpoint. But the insubordination of the XIV. Corps commander frustrated this attempt. Sherman now decided that he had stretched his lines as far as he could with safety. His cavalry raids failed to do any permanent damage to the railway. He therefore determined to cut loose from his base and throw his whole force (less one corps) against the Macon railway several miles south of Atlanta. He began the withdrawal of Thomas's and Howard's armies from their lines (Aug. 25), sending back the XX. Corps to entrench a position in front of the Chattahoochee railway bridge and leaving Schofield in his lines facing Eastpoint, where he kept up a series of demonstrations. By the night of the 27th the Federal forces were echeloned along the Atlanta-Sandtown road and next day commenced a left wheel pivoting upon Schofield. Thomas struck the Dontgomery railway at Red Oak, 7m. below Eastpoint, and Howard at Fairburn, 5m. farther south-west. The 29th was devoted to a thorough destruc tion of the railway track. On the 3oth Howard reached the Flint river and pushed the XV. Corps across. Schofield had come up into line on Thomas's left the previous day and now moved up from Red Oak towards Eastpoint to cover the passage of the army trains, which carried 15 days' rations for the troops. Hood meanwhile was completely mystified by Sherman's withdrawal from before Atlanta. He had despatched Wheeler with over half his cavalry (Aug. to) on an extensive raid against Sherman's communications, and on Aug. 27 he jumped to the conclusion that in consequence of Wheeler's raid Sherman was retreating across the Chattahoochee. On the 3oth his cavalry brought him news that part of the Federal army was south of Atlanta, and he despatched Hardee's and Lee's corps under the former's command to Jonesboro to drive back the advancing enemy. Hardee attacked Howard (Aug. 31) but failed to drive him across the Flint river. Schofield and Thomas reached the Macon railway at and below Rough and Ready station and marched down towards Jonesboro, tearing up the track as they advanced.
Hood, when he learned that the enemy had reached the rail way, ordered the return of Lee's corps to Atlanta. He inferred from his information that only the right wing of Sherman's army was on the railway and that a general attack upon Atlanta from the south was threatened. Hardee was left (Sept. 1) to defend Jonesboro. Sherman devoted his attention to the thorough de struction of the railway down to Jonesboro, until learning of Lee's departure he endeavoured too late to envelop Hardee's corps. Lee had been stopped half way on his return to Atlanta and ordered to cover the withdrawal of the remainder of Hood's army during the night from Atlanta. The XX. Corps occupied the city (Sept. 2). Hood marching round east of the railway effected a junction with Hardee at Lovejoy's station to interpose between Sherman and Andersonville, where 34,000 Federal prisoners were confined. Sherman did not push his advance farther south but rested content with the capture of Atlanta. (See AMERICAN CIVIL WAR.) (W. B. Wo.)