ANTWERP, SIEGE OF, Sept.– Oct. 1914. This was the preliminary move of the Germans' second bid for victory in the World War, after their opening sweep through Belgium and Northern France had been foiled in the Battle of the Marne. In rear of the Meuse the natural line of defence for the Belgian Army against an adversary from the east is the Schelde and the entrenched camp of Antwerp. As a commercial metropolis Ant werp was an obvious centre for arsenals, hospitals and stores of munitions and provisions, and it became the army's base of operations. By reason of its situation the fortress was also a refuge, if only a temporary one ; and it was an excellent flank position for use against the lines of communication of the Ger man Armies operating in the north of France. Through Ostend and Zeebrugge, Antwerp had easy means of communication with England. Under the shelter of Antwerp and the Schelde, British troops could safely land in Flanders, operate in liaison with the Belgian Army, protect the Pas-de-Calais coast with its sea traffic, vital to England, and prevent the Allied left wing from being turned and enveloped.
The Defences Described.—The entrenched camp of Antwerp, as it was in 1914, was the result of two distinct undertakings, the first carried out between 1859 and 1870 under the direction of Brialmont, and comprising a line of detached forts placed about two to three miles from the agglomeration of buildings, and a polygonal enceinte on the outskirts of the city; the second, after 1906, which provided a principal line of defence, at a distance of 5 to 11m. from the city proper, composed of 17 forts about 3m. apart, with permanent redoubts in the intervals. Forts and redoubts were constructed entirely of ordinary concrete, with vaults 2.5o metres thick at the crown and surrounded by wet ditches, 33f t. wide. The old fort line was about to be transformed into an enceinte de surete, the forts being organized for small weapons and connected by concrete redoubts and a grille.
These extensive works had necessarily to be spread over sev eral years and on the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, not one of the forts planned in 1906 was completed. No equipment for fire observation and no observation posts existed and the necessary survey work for firing by the map was incomplete. The sub structures and the armouring, constructed to resist the 21-cm. mortar, were not calculated to face 30.5- or 42-cm. projectiles. The total perimeter was born. of which 6m. were protected by inundations. The defence force numbered only 40,000 men, most of whom had seen no military service for ten years. The staff was entirely inadequate for the duties.
On Sept. 27 the Belgian Field Army was distributed as fol lows: The 1st and 2nd Divs. between the Senne and the Nethe, from Willebroeck to Lierre, with the 5th Div. in reserve north of the Nethe ; the 6th and 3rd Divs. between the Senne and the Schelde; the 4th Div. at Termonde and the Cavalry Div. about Alost-Wetteren to cover the communications between Antwerp and the sea.
The bombardment was continued for four days with clocklike regularity. It was directed against four forts (Waelhem, Wavre Ste. Catherine, Koningshoycht and Lierre) and the spaces between them. The concrete was inferior in quality to that of Liege and Namur, and galleries were pierced, men's quarters destroyed, cupolas razed, jammed or made inaccessible; powder maga zines blew up, fires broke out and the air in the shelters became unbreathable. Forts and trenches had been reduced to rubbish heaps by the time that the enemy, on Oct. 1 at 5 P.M., delivered his assault. Resistance was offered everywhere except at Wavre Ste. Catherine, where the garrison had been driven away by the flames.
The bombardment recommenced on Oct. 2, increasing in pre cision, and the inevitable happened. The Dorpveld redoubt and Fort Waelhem, which had been reduced to the last extremity, now surrendered. The Tallaert redoubt blew up; the Koning shoycht and Lierre forts, which had been ruined, were evacuated. On the night of Oct. 2-3, and on Oct. 4, all the defence troops were transferred to the north of the Nethe from Waelhem to Lierre. The Belgian troops now began seriously to be disheart ened. For a fortnight past the race to the sea had been in progress in France, the battle front had reached Arras and Bethune and fresh German masses were traversing Belgium in a westerly direction. The question was, would the Allies win the race in time to join hands with the Belgians on the Schelde? This junction was essential, even if it entailed the abandonment of the fortress. The king was strongly in favour of holding the fortress until the last extremity, in order to keep occupied the !, German troops and material now concentrated before it, and also to gain time for the formation of a Franco-British-Belgian front on the Dendre or on the Schelde, leaning on the Dutch frontier.
The immediate result of Mr. Churchill's intervention was the arrival at Antwerp on the evening of Oct. 3 of a brigade of 2,000 men of the British Royal Naval Division. The appearance of these, the first Allies the Belgian soldiers had set eyes on during the two months of the War, roused enthusiasm, but unfortunately this assistance could be no more than a moral stimulus. Mean time, von Beseler was bringing up his heavy batteries to crush Fort Kessel, while his infantry was making its way slowly into Lierre, being held up on the northern boundary of that town by the fire of the marine brigade on the 5th. To the south of the town four German battalions crossed the Nethe under cover of the bombardment and on the night of Oct. 5-6 the 5th Belgian Division made what, in the circumstances, was a gallant attempt to push them back into the river.
This counter-attack, with bayonets fixed and unloaded rifles, reached the Nethe at one point and caused the enemy serious alarm for a moment, but the fatigue of the attacking troops and the superiority of the German artillery rendered any permanent success impossible. It was essential to save the Belgian Army from being surrounded, and the king decided that the field troops should cross the Schelde on the night of Oct. 6-7 and march to join the British 7th and 3rd Cavalry Divs. then landing at Zee brugge and Ostend, which were to move to Ghent in conjunction with a brigade of French marines. The decision came just in time, for on Oct. 7 the Germans forced the Schelde at Schoon aerde and pushed on toward Lokeren.