The World War

THE WORLD WAR 20. Situation in 1914.—The artilleries of the main forces were organized and equipped as follows : (a) Great Britain.—Each divisional artillery comprised 54 i8-pdrs. in three brigades of three batteries, 18 4.5-in. howitzers, in one brigade of three batteries, and four 6o-pdrs. There was also a siege train of six 8-in. howitzer batteries.

(b) France.—Each first line divisional artillery comprised guns in three "groupes" of three batteries. There were also 20 regiments of corps artillery each consisting of four "groupes" of 75-mm. guns, five regiments of heavy artillery, foot regiments and some mountain artillery.

(c) Germany.—Each first line divisional artillery comprised 54 77-mm. guns and 18 10.5-cm. howitzers in two regiments which were subdivided into three "groupes" of three batteries of guns and one "groupe" of three batteries of howitzers. In addition there was in each corps a battalion of 12 howitzers and in each army a number of 21-cm. howitzers.

The types of equipment in use by the three Powers did not vary to any marked degree. All proved deficient in range, the British equipment being initially at a particular disadvantage in this re spect. The French lack of a field howitzer was due to their be lief, later proved erroneous, in the efficacy of the curved trajectory of the 75-mm. gun. It will be seen that there were, however, im portant differences in the allotment of the artillery as between divisions, corps and armies and in the aggregate proportions of the various types of equipment. The Germans had a marked ad vantage in the possession of a large number of howitzers capable of assisting in both field and siege operations. Both Britain and Germany had 6-gun batteries whilst the French batteries were of four guns. All three countries had divisional artillery commanders, but France alone had an artillery commander at corps head quarters. Viewed in the light of subsequent experience, it would seem that both the British and French tactical doctrines of 1914 unduly emphasized the importance of mobility to the detriment of fire power. The German doctrine appears to have been better balanced in this respect and the Germans also realized more fully the necessity for co-ordination of combined action of the artillery with that of the other arms. All three countries had grossly under-estimated the quantities of ammunition which would be required. The British reserve was calculated upon a basis of a probable expenditure of seven rounds per i8-pdr. per day, but in the World War the expenditure per gun often rose to Soo rounds or more per day. No country had fully appreciated the effect upon artillery power of the development of railways, motor traction, aircraft, telegraphs, telephones, wireless and survey.

21.

Evolution of Equipment, 1914-1918.—The British field artillery stood the test of the war well and the minor defects which appeared were easily remedied. The proportion of medium and heavy artillery was vastly increased, the equipments adopted being 6o-pdr. and 6-in. guns and 6-in., 8-in., and 9.2-in. howitzers. Super-heavy howitzers, of 12-in. and upwards, and guns on rail way mountings of 9.2-in. and upwards, were brought into use. Mortars, which had long been discarded, made their re-appearance for the war of position. The ranges of all weapons were increased, field artillery ranges rising to some I o,000 yd. and even more in the case of French and German equipments; the greatest range viz., 76 miles, was attained by the German 21-cm. guns used to shell Paris. The British field guns, which had started the war with shrapnel ammunition only, were supplied with high explos ive shell in addition before the battle of Loos. Shrapnel was abolished for 4.5-in. howitzers, and in the heavier natures high explosive was almost exclusively used. Smoke shells were intro duced for the lighter natures of guns and howitzers in 1916. In July, 1915, the Germans first employed gas shells, and this type of shell came into general use in steadily increasing numbers. It is noteworthy that the supply of gas ammunition never equalled the demand and that the use of gas was still in its infancy at the end of the war. An advance in the control of fire was effected by the development of observation from aircraft. Inter-communica tion was improved by the more extended use of the field telephone and of wireless. Survey, sound ranging and flash spotting units were provided for co-operation with artillery. The lighter natures of artillery were still generally horse-drawn in 1918 although lorries or trucks were used, especially by the French, to transport a proportion of their field artillery. The heavier natures were drawn by motor tractors of various designs ranging from the four-wheel-drive lorry to the "caterpillar." 22. Evolution of Organization and Command, 1914 1918.—A comparison of the development of artillery organization and command in the British, French and German armies shows that, notwithstanding their initial differences and the separate lines of evolution which were followed, all three arrived at similar solutions of fundamental problems. The changes introduced may be summarized as Artillery command was central ized as much as was consistent with effective control. This proved the best means of co-ordinating action, of economizing force and of concentrating fire at the right time and at the right place. Centralization of control was often carried to excess, however, in the Western theatre. This change in the system of ar tillery command entailed an increase of artillery headquarter staffs. (b) The necessity for a strong reserve, in the hands of the higher command, of both field and heavier natures of artillery led to the creation of large numbers of artillery units outside the organization of formations. In 1914 the proportion of field artil lery to infantry in an army was about six guns to i,000 rifles. By the end of the World War the proportion of all natures was about 10 guns and howitzers per 1,000 rifles, roughly 6 field, 2 medium, 1 heavy and 4 super-heavy. (c) The allocation of equipments to formations was based upon their ranging powers and their degrees of mobility. Thus field artillery (in the United States light ar tillery) was seldom allotted to formations higher than the divi sion ; medium and heavy artillery were normally allotted to corps, while super-heavy guns were directly under armies. (d) The corps was recognized as the most suitable formation for the control of counter battery work and special staffs were provided for this task. Numerous minor changes also took place. For example, British field artillery brigade ammunition columns were replaced by divisional ammunition columns; one 4•5-in. howitzer battery was included in each field artillery brigade, field howitzer brigades being abolished ; Lewis guns were supplied to batteries for anti aircraft and local ground defence.

23. Evolution of Tactics, 1914-1918.

The evolution of equipment and organization and the evolution of tactics were, of course, interdependent. It was naturally on the Western front that artillery tactics were most fully developed. During the first op erations in 1914 sharp lessons were learnt. It was soon evident that owing to the hitherto unrealized power of small-arms fire in defence, attacks must be well prepared by artillery. Tactical mobility had, in fact, become dependent upon fire power, but neither side had the artillery or the ammunition to provide fire power in adequate measure. At Le Cateau the British learnt the disastrous results of attempting close support of infantry with guns disposed too close to the foremost troops. The early en gagements also demonstrated the necessity for distributing guns in depth in defence and for concealing them if they were to avoid destruction. The need for increased quantities of medium and heavy artillery was soon apparent, the Allies being at a grave disadvantage in this respect.

During the trench warfare of the winter of 1914-15 new de velopments began to take shape. Attempts were made to engage targets by night and to provide defensive barrages, and observa tion of fire from aircraft rapidly found favour. The employment of barbed wire entanglements introduced a new task for artillery in the preparation of infantry attacks.

The battle of Neuve Chapelle (19i 5) forms a landmark in the evolution of artillery tactics. The attack was prepared by an intense hurricane bombardment of 45 minutes and it was sup ported by subsequent "lifts" of fire in front of the infantry. The lessons of this operation were misapplied to some extent; in the subsequent attacks at Festubert, Givenchy and Loos, surprise was thrown to the winds and lengthy preparatory bombardments of small intensity were undertaken with the object of destroying hostile defences rather than of temporarily neutralizing and par alysing the defenders. Loos marked a development towards the "rolling" barrage which became the usual accompaniment of later attacks. The French fell into the same error as the British in their disregard of surprise in their attacks in Champagne and Artois.

The operations of 1916 and 1917 were based upon the fact that given sufficient artillery and ammunition, limited advances of two or three thousand yards at a time could be almost guaranteed. Enormous concentrations of artillery supported every attack.' Thousands of tons of ammunition were fired daily during an oper ation on a front of a few miles. Surprise continued to be sacri ficed, for the artillery carried out preliminary bombardments often lasting four or five days. Rolling barrages of great depth and heavy counter battery fire were the unvarying accompaniment of the actual advances. Such were the methods of artillery ac tion adopted in the battle of the Somme (1916), the French at tack at Verdun (1916), at Arras (1917), in Nivelle's attack on the Aisne (1917), at Messines and in the third battle of Ypres. The Germans, in their attack at Verdun in 1916, had endeavoured to obtain some measure of surprise by reducing the preliminary bombardment to ten hours and, in Allenby's attack at Gaza, meas ures were successfully taken to deceive the Turks who might otherwise have been warned of the British plan by the five days' preliminary bombardment. But none of the commanders had as yet appreciated the paralysing effect of the brief and intense hurricane bombardment of short duration which was adopted in 1918. It became apparent, however, that a drastic change in tac tical methods must be made if decisive success was to be obtained. The defender could, in great measure, counter the form of artil lery support then in vogue, heavy as it was, by suitable adjust ment of his infantry tactics; the ammunition expenditure en tailed proved too great a strain on industrial resources ; and the effect of the fire on the ground was such as to create new ob stacles for the attackers. In the defence, artillery action had taken the form of "counter preparation" to break up impending attacks of neutralization of hostile artillery and of stationary barrages close to the foremost trenches to repel assaults once they were launched.

The advent of tanks had an important bearing on artillery tac tics. At the battle of Cambrai it was demonstrated that tanks could carry out tasks which had previously fallen to the artillery. They had a very great demoralizing effect, they could create gaps in barbed wire and they could neutralize small-arm fire. The em ployment of tanks had a considerable influence in bringing about the abolition of lengthy preliminary bombardments and the consequent simplification of the problem of ammunition supply. The battle of Cambrai further proved that effective artillery support could be given, by means of survey methods, without previous registration.

The German successes on the Western front in 1918 were largely due to skilful artillery tactics, for the development of 'At the battle of the Somme—July I, 1916—there was approxi mately a gun or howitzer to every 20 yards of front assaulted, the proportion of heavy or medium pieces being one in every three.

At the battle of the Scarpe—April 4, 1917—there was a gun or howitzer to every io yards of front, the proportion of heavy and medium pieces being rather more than one in three.

In the British attack at Amiens—Aug. 8, 1918—the proportion was again approximately a gun or howitzer to every io yards, the heavy and medium artillery being in the proportion of seven to 12.

In the German attack in April 19,8, 9,500 pieces were employed on a front of 5o miles, i.e., rather more than one piece to every io yards of front. On the decisive sectors of the front the artillery was con centrated to one gun to every five yards of front.

which Colonel Bruchmuller was chiefly responsible, the element of surprise being thus safeguarded. Their new tactics had first been employed, and with marked success, at the battle of Riga in Sep tember, 1917. Secrecy was observed in the preliminary concentra tion and other arrangements, each attack was preceded by a short hurricane bombardment of a few hours' duration designed to pro duce moral rather than material effects and containing an element of surprise in the repeated withdrawal of fire to the forward de fences after it had apparently passed en, gas and smoke shell were extensively used, counter battery fire was heavy. The advances were supported in their initial stages by a form of rolling bar rage and the infantry were boldly followed up by field artillery.

A counter to the German artillery tactics was eventually de vised by the French in Champagne. Careful artillery counter-prep aration was carried out for some time before the German attack which the enemy had not been able to keep secret. Troops were thinned out in the forward zone, in which the first shock of the attack was to be absorbed, and the main line of defence was or ganized in rear, the artillery fire being adjusted to correspond with these arrangements. It must be remembered however, that the Germans were in this operation already showing signs of weariness and of decreasing efficiency.

A "hurricane" bombardment of 15 minutes, followed by a rolling barrage, was adopted with complete success by Allenby in his final break through the Turkish lines in September, 1918.

No striking changes in artillery tactics occurred during the Allied offensive in 1918. This was doubtless due to the rapid deterioration of the hostile forces. There was, however, an in creasing tendency to reduce the wastage of shell-power which is inseparable from the barrage. The number of guns employed to fire it was restricted to the minimum required for the protection of the assaulting troops, and as many field, medium and heavy pieces as could be rendered available were employed on accurate fire against important targets in and behind the enemy's defences and against the hostile artillery. The system of artillery command at last admitted of centralization or decentralization according to the varying situation. A return was made to a long preliminary bombardment when the British Fourth Army attacked the Hinden burg Line in September; surprise had then ceased, however, to have great value owing to the extent of the Allied offensive and the disappearance of the enemy's reserves: When operations ceased the art of tactics was on the threshold of a new era of develop ment which had been ushered in by the renewal of mobility, by the introduction of tanks and by the mechanization of transport.

(J. N. K.)