the Armada

ARMADA, THE. The Spanish or Invincible Armada was the great fleet sent by Philip II. to assist in the attempted in vasion of England in 1588. The idea was not a new one, but so far it had been prevented by the expense of providing an army to sail on board the fleet all the way from the Peninsula, in addition to the expense of maintaining an army in the Spanish Netherlands. The Marquis of Santa Cruz, the original commander-in-chief, having died, Philip II. appointed the Duke of Medina Sidonia, a nobleman who lacked sea experience and was unwilling to lead the expedition. By the new plan of campaign, his instructions were to fight his way up the Channel and to convoy to England the Spanish army already in the Netherlands under the Prince of Parma, at that moment blockaded in Dunkirk and Nieuport by a Dutch squadron under Justinus of Nassau.

During the year 1587, Sir Francis Drake had destroyed a great part of the Spanish shipping at Cadiz and had prevented the concentration of the outlying squadrons ; but in the spring of 1588 the Armada assembled at Lisbon and, after many delays, began to sail on May 18. It consisted of 130 vessels, about half of which were transports and victuallers, and it was drawn from all parts of the Spanish Empire, there being no Spanish royal navy. It was manned by some 7,000 sailors and upwards of 17,00o soldiers. Heavy squalls, bad water, and bad provisions forced most of the fleet on June 9 to run into Coruna, though some maintained their course to the Scilly Isles, which was the first rendezvous. It was not till July 12 that the Armada again set sail, and it was sighted off the Lizard on July 19.

The English defence consisted of the Queen's ships and armed merchantmen, some 90 in all, collected at Plymouth under Drake, who was properly commander-in-chief, assisted by Sir John Hawkins and Sir Martin Frobisher, though Charles Lord Howard of Effingham, who was at the head of the admiralty administration in London, elected on this occasion to go to sea.

There was also a squadron in the Downs, under Lord Henry Seymour and Sir William Wynter, co-operating with the Dutch. A total of 197 English ships took part in the campaign, but many were so small that they were of little use, the fighting being almost entirely between the big ships of both sides. It is difficult to com pare the fighting strength of the opposing fleets; the individual tonnage of the largest ships on each side was about the same, and the Spaniards possessed more of them, though the English were superior in weight, number and distribution of armament.

The Armada was organized more like a land army than a fleet, the sailors and navigators occupying a very low status, while in the English fleet the sailors far outnumbered the soldiers and most of the captains had previous sea experience. The object of the English fleet was to prevent the junction of Medina Sidonia and Parma by getting to windward of the Armada, assuming south westerly winds, and so cutting it off from its base and driving it up the Channel and past Dunkirk.

The Operations.

Owing to bad weather and lack of pro visions, no proper system of reconnaissance was maintained, and when the Armada appeared off Plymouth on July 20 the English were only just able to get to sea and avoid being blockaded. On July 21 the English worked to windward of the Spaniards and engaged them at long range for two hours, capturing Pedro de Valdez, the commander of the Andalusian squadron, whose ship was damaged. A change of wind gave the Spaniards the weather gage and on July 23 another action was fought off Portland, during which Frobisher became isolated in a sudden calm and was in danger of being captured by the Spanish galleasses. Next day the English fleet was re-inforced from the shore by fresh ships and many volunteers, and was re-organized in four distinct squadrons under Howard, Drake, Hawkins, and Frobisher. The chase continued up the Channel, and on July 25 another action took place off the Isle of Wight. So far the Spaniards had kept better order in a military sense than the English, but they were then completely demoralized and had lost several of their best ships. Crossing the Channel, they anchored in Calais roads on July 27. Medina Sidonia then sent a message to Parma vainly asking him to put to sea at once, which was of course impossible owing to the closeness of the blockade. Howard was joined by Seymour and Wynter, and on the night of July 28, after a council of war, fireships were sent against the Spaniards. No Spanish ships were touched, but the panic caused by this dreaded form of attack caused them to cut their cables and put to sea in great confusion, one large ship running aground. On July 2g, while they were straggling up the coast of Gravelines, Drake led the English to the attack and the fiercest battle of the campaign took place, the English doing immense damage by keeping to windward and firing at long range with alternate broadsides. The Spaniards fought with great heroism ; but with their poor gunnery and bad seamanship they were outmatched and were unable to close and board, which was their only possible chance of success. By the afternoon 16 Spanish ships were cut off and should have been made prizes; but a sudden squall drove them to leeward and stopped the action, and at the same time the English am munition became completely exhausted. The sea increased + in fury during the night, and by the morning of July 3o the Spaniards were well past Nieuport and in great danger of being driven on a lee shore, as they were unable to rig any spare anchors. At the most critical moment in the day, with only six fathoms below them and the English to windward, the wind suddenly shifted to the south-west and they were able to run north and so escape destruction. The English followed them as far as the Firth of Forth and then returned—seeing that the enemy were obviously not going back through the Strait of Dover, while they themselves had little food and no ammunition. The Armada be came distressed through lack of fresh water and soon encountered strong westerly winds, which added to its troubles as it at tempted to sail home round Scotland and the west coast of Ireland. Many ships were wrecked, and in Ireland their crews were massacred; many more sank in the open sea. Only half of the ships that left the Tagus returned to Spain or Portugal, and in those death and sickness were appalling.

The complete failure of the invasion project was due to the English plan of keeping to windward and fighting at long range, which was followed throughout ; and but for a fortunate change of wind and the failure of the English ammunition supply the whole Armada would certainly have been driven ashore on the Zealand banks.

Medina Sidonia acted with great courage throughout, but he was unable to control the provincial navies under his command and had neither the personality nor seamanship necessary for such a task. Philip II. foresaw the English methods of gunfire and warned him of what to expect, but at the same time he entirely failed to realize the difficulty which Medina Sidonia would encounter in trying to bring out Parma's army in the face of the Dutch blockading flotilla, which could sail closer inshore amongst the shoals than the great ships of Spain.

Queen Elizabeth had some difficulty in understanding Drake's plan of campaign and was greatly concerned that the English made no attempt to board the Spanish ships, though the accusa tions levelled at her of starving the fleet of ammunition and food can hardly be substantiated. More fighting took place than was foreseen by either side, and consequently supplies of all kinds proved insufficient. Although many of the Spanish commanders had worldwide sea experience, the Armada was greatly handi capped by its military and provincial organization, while the English fleet was naval and national in character and its personnel all spoke a common language. Moreover, the difficulty of con voying Parma's army was so great that the Armada had little chance of success, its whole strategic conception being at fault. Its failure checked the naval growth of Spain and assisted the Dutch to secure their independence.

English side of the Armada campaign can be best studied in Sir Julian Corbett's Drake and the Tudor Navy (1898) and in the State Papers relating to the defeat of the Spanish Armada, ed. by Sir John Laughton for the Navy Records Society (1894) . The Spanish side will be found in La Armada Invencible, by Capt. C. F. Duro (1884) . Froude summarized Duro's work in his Spanish Story of the Armada (1892). A popular account will be found in J. R. Hale, Great Armada (19i3). (G. A. R. C.; W. C. B.