Victoria

Gladstone and Disraeli.

The queen felt a strong repugnance towards Gladstone's policy of disestablishing and partially dis endowing the Irish Protestant Church. She regarded it as a dimi nution of her own prerogatives and as a concession to popery, nor were her feelings assuaged by the document which Gladstone presented to her as an exposition of the measure, for she found it entirely incomprehensible. None the less she recognized that the electorate had spoken decisively, and that the bill must be passed. Her attention turned to the House of Lords. Gladstone's policy threatened to produce, for the first time since the "Great" Reform Bill, a serious conflict between the two Houses, and such a con flict she regarded as endangering the whole fabric of the consti tution, and opening the way to "democracy" and republicanism; that the monarchy could survive in a completely democratized State Victoria never believed. Her chosen instrument in securing a compromise between the Houses was Archbishop Tait, and Gladstone seconded her efforts by timely concessions on the dis endowment clauses.

Equally distasteful to the queen were the Army reforms of Cardwell, but here again, realizing that the reforms could not be resisted, she worked hard for their smooth passage, exerting a moderating influence on her cousin, the duke of Cambridge, who was commander-in-chief. The abolition of the system of purchase of commissions, rejected by the House of Lords, was achieved over their heads by royal warrant.

Disraeli's accession to office in 1874 opened what was for the queen a far happier period. There had been a time, in the far off days of Corn Law Repeal, when Victoria and Albert had regarded Disraeli as the most detestable of all politicians, but as soon as Disraeli became leader of the House of Commons, in 1852, he began to obliterate those memories. "Mr. Disraeli," she had written to her uncle Leopold, "writes very curious reports to me of the proceedings of the House of Commons—much in the style of his books." It was a style that the queen came rapidly to appreciate. Disraeli's brief prime ministership in 1868 had greatly advanced him in royal favour. Never, since the death of Prince Albert, had her political duties been made so easy and so interesting. None of her prime ministers realized as Disraeli realized that, wren a queen is on the throne, the successful prime minister must be a perfect courtier. No one could have surpassed Gladstone in his reverence for the throne, but that reverence expressed' itself in a solemn and pompous abasement : Disraeli's homage to the throne was expressed as personal devotion to the lonely and essentially simple-minded woman who was its occupant. The new prime minister's vigorous imperial and foreign policy was entirely congenial to the queen, who warmly applauded the acquisition of the Suez Canal shares, and welcomed the measure which conferred upon her the title of empress of India (1876), but she was by no means inclined to relax the vigilance of her control over ministerial policy. The prolonged Balkan crisis and

the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78 excited her passionate interest, and though she trusted Lord Beaconsfield (as he had now become), she had the very lowest opinion of his foreign secretary, Lord Derby (son of the former prime minister). "The Queen writes every day and telegraphs every hour," wrote Beaconsfield to his confidant, Lady Bradford. If Victoria had had her way in 1877, Great Britain would probably have undertaken another war with Russia, as unprofitable as the Crimean War.

The election of 188o brought Gladstone back to power and ushered in what were to be the most harassing years, from a political standpoint, of the queen's reign. Her antipathy to Glad stone had been deepened by his conduct in opposition. Gladstone had denounced Beaconsfield's reckless imperial ventures in Af ghanistan and South Africa and his support of blood-stained Turk against Russia as something worse than mere errors of policy. He had held them up to reprobation as iniquitous, and the queen, identifying herself with Beaconsfield's policy, regarded Gladstone's speeches as something like personal insults to herself. Gladstone had nominally resigned the leadership of the Liberal party in 1874, and Victoria tried to avail herself of this fact to construct a Liberal administration under Granville or Hartington, from which Gladstone should be excluded; but it was impossible.

The Liberal Government of 188o-85 was one of the most unfortunate in British history; it was the Government of Majuba, the Phoenix Park murders, and the fall of Khartoum. Space does not allow us to examine the complicated and tragic record, nor is it here appropriate either to condemn or to acquit the Government on the various charges that have been brought against it. The queen's letters during these years make extremely distressing reading. She distrusted her prime minister and found little that was good in many of his colleagues. Lord Granville at the foreign office was "as weak as water"; Chamberlain was constantly uttering sentiments which, the queen held, should have excluded him from any cabinet. The "right to warn" was lavishly employed, yet it would seem, did not influence ministers. Almost inevitably a tone of peevishness and, as one might say, of "nag ging" becomes more and more apparent. Even on the rare occasions when the ministers gained the queen's approval, her commendation is seasoned by the taunt that what they are now doing might well have been done before. The role of a consti tutional monarch as Victoria understood it becomes well-nigh impossible, when the gulf between the monarch's and the minis try's policy is of more than a very moderate width, and the result is bad for all concerned; for the sovereign becomes one of the ministry's principal embarrassments, and a hypothetically bad ministry is more likely to be made worse than better by con tinuous royal badgering.