WATERLOO CAMPAIGN, 1815. On Feb. 27, 1815, Napoleon set sail from Elba with a force of i,000 men and 4 guns, determined to reconquer the throne of France. On March I he landed near Cannes, and proceeded at once to march on Paris. He deliberately chose the difficult route over the French Alps because he recognized that his opponents would neither ex pect him by this route nor be able to exert combined operations in time to thwart him. Events proved the wisdom of his choice. His advance was a series of triumphs, his power waxing with every league he covered, and when he reached Paris the Bourbons had fled. But he had soon to turn his attention to war. His sudden return far from widening the breaches between the allies had fused them indissolubly together, and the four powers bound them selves to put i5o,000 men apiece under arms and to maintain them in the field until Napoleon had been utterly crushed. To oppose their vast armies, Napoleon only had in March the iso,000 men he had taken over when Louis XVIII. hurriedly quitted the throne. Within ten days the emperor could have concentrated 50,000 men and struck straight at the small allied forces then in Belgium. But he wisely refrained from taking the immediate offensive. Such action could lead to no decisive result ; and Na poleon therefore hastened forward the organization of an army with which to confront the Seventh Coalition. Meanwhile he sought by various means to detach Great Britain and Austria from the alliance.
Napoleon's Preparations and Plans.—By June I Napoleon had got together an army of 360,00o for the defence of France, one half of which was available for field service. In this army was comprised his whole means of defence; for he had no allies. On his return from Elba it is true Murat, the king of Naples, took his side; but recklessly opening an offensive campaign, Murat was beaten at Tolentino (May 2-3), and he found himself compelled to fly in disguise to France, where the emperor refused to give him an audience or employment. Napoleon thus deprived
himself of the most brilliant cavalry soldier of the period. Murat's disaster had left the whole eastern frontier of France open to invasion. The country, too, was weakened by internal dissensions at the very moment when it was necessary to put every man in line to meet the rising tide of invasion.
In Belgium lay an ever-increasing force of Anglo-Dutch and Prussian troops under Wellington and Blucher. The eastern frontier was threatened by Austrian armies, and the Russians were slowly coming up. The allies determined to avoid any risk of defeat in detail. It was arranged that Wellington and Blucher should await in Belgium the arrival of the Austrians and Russians on the Rhine. Then about July I the general invasion of France would be begun. Affording each other mutual support, the allies would press forward on Paris, and, after defeating Napoleon, drive him within its works. This menacing danger forced Napoleon to strike prematurely, for he determined to crush Wellington and Bliicher, whose forces lay dispersed in Belgium, before the Austrians and Russians poured across the eastern frontier.
In the early days of June Wellington and Bliicher were dis posed as follows. (See map.) The Anglo-Dutch Army, 93,000, headquarters at Brussels, were cantoned: I. Corps (Prince of Orange), 30,200, in the area Enghien-Genappe-Mons; II. Corps (Lord Hill), 27,300, in the area Ath-Audenarde-Ghent ; reserve cavalry (Lord Uxbridge), 9,900, in the Dendre valley; whilst the reserve (Wellington), 25,500, lay around Brussels. The front was watched by Dutch-Belgian light cavalry.
Blucher's Prussian Army, II6,000, headquarters at Namur, were quartered : I. Corps (Zieten), 30,800, along the Sambre cover ing Fontaine l'Eveque-Fleurus-Moustier; II. Corps (Pirch), 31,800, in the area Namur-Hannut-Huy ; III. Corps (Thiele mann), 23,900, in the bend of the Meuse from Dinant to Huy; IV. Corps (Billow), 30,300, around Liege. The front was watched by the Prussian outposts.