Ligny.—On the other flank there had meanwhile been waged the very bitterly f ought battle of Ligny. As Bliicher's dis positions gradually became clearer the emperor realized that the first decisive day of the campaign had actually come and promptly made arrangements for defeating the Prussian army in his front. Blucher, to cover the Namur road, held with the I. Corps the villages of Brye, St. Amand, and Ligny, whilst behind his centre was massed the II. Corps, and on his left was placed the III. Corps. Wellington and Billow on arrival would act as general reserve. Blucher's army was quite visible to Napoleon on the bare open slopes, the II. Corps being especially exposed. The emperor decided to bear down Blucher's centre and right with the corps of Vandamme and Gerard and with Girard's division which he had drawn into his containing the Prussian left meanwhile with the squadrons of Pajol and Exelmans, assisted by a few infantry. The Guard and Milhaud were in hand at Fleurus. Further, he could order up Lobau, and direct Ney to move his rearward corps across and form it up behind Blucher's right. When the battle was ripe, he would crush the Prussian centre and right between the Guard and D'Erlon's corps. It was a somewhat complicated manoeuvre ; for he was attempting to outflank his enemy with a corps that he had subordinated to Marshal Ney. Much depended on whether Ney would grasp the full purport of his orders. The usual Napoleonic simplicity was wanting at Ligny, and he paid in full for the want.
The Prussians numbered about 83,00o to Napoleon's 71,000 (including Lobau). About 2 :30 P.M. the sound of Ney's guns to the westward proved that Wellington was attacked and Napoleon then opened the battle. A fierce fight soon raged for the villages of Ligny and St. Amand. By 3:15 P.M. the battle was in full swing and Napoleon wrote to Ney, saying, "The fate of France is in your hands," and ordering the marshal to master Quatre Bras and move eastwards to assist at Ligny. Directly afterwards, hearing that Ney had 20,000 men in front of him, he sent the "pencil-note" by General La Bedoyere, directing Ney to detach D'Erlon's corps to Ligny. This the A.D.C., in a fit of mistaken zeal, took upon himself to do. Hence the corps appeared too soon and in the wrong direction. It is clear that Ney's essential duty was to co-operate at Ligny, provided that Wellington was held fast at Quatre Bras. Unfortunately, in the heat of action, Ney misread his instructions. Meanwhile the emperor had ordered Lobau to move up to Fleurus. The fight for the villages raged fiercely and incessantly, and the places were captured and recaptured. Generally the French had the better of the fighting, and Blucher was compelled to use up more and more of his re serves. The fighting grew so furious that the troops literally melted away. Even the emperor had to call on his reserves. Just as the Young and Middle Guard moved to reinforce Gerard and Vandamme, the latter reported that a hostile column, 30,000 strong, was threatening his left (in reality it was D'Erlon). This
sight unnerved Vandamme's exhausted troops, and guns had to be turned on them to quell a panic. It was nearing 6 P.M. Na poleon concluded that this could not be D'Erlon, as he had arrived too soon and was marching in the wrong direction.
Napoleon sent an officer to reconnoitre. As the French attacks slackened the Prussians rallied and counter-attacked, but they were beaten back by the Young Guard. By 6:3o P.M. Napoleon learned that the force was D'Erlon's, and that it had withdrawn westwards. Thus there was no direct co-operation from the Left Wing on this decisive day. The emperor had perforce to finish the battle single-handed.
Blucher now launched a general counter-stroke against Van damme, but the chasseurs of the Guard drove back the Prussians in disorder and Napoleon's chance had come at last. As Lobau formed up near Fleurus, the guns of the Guard opened on Ligny to prepare Blucher's centre for assault. At 7 :45 P.M. a crashing salvo from 6o guns heralded a combined onslaught by Gerard, the Guard, and Milhaud. This tremendous impact of picked troops pierced and broke the Prussian centre. Blucher promptly launched his cavalry reserve to stem the French advance. Lead ing a charge in person he was dismounted and ridden over, before he was rescued and borne from the field. Blucher had taken an unjustifiable personal risk, for at this crisis it was essential for the Prussians to be commanded by a chief who would keep loyally in touch and act in concert with his colleague. By 9 P.M. the battle was over and the French pressed resistlessly onwards. The beaten Prussians retired to the north of the Namur road. But in the failing light and in the uncertainty as to events on the left wing, immediate pursuit was out of the question.
The execution had again fallen short of the conception ; Blucher though beaten was not destroyed, nor was his line with Welling ton cut. If the Prussians now retired northwards, parallel to the direction which Wellington would follow perforce on the morrow, the chance of co-operating in a decisive battle would still remain to the allies ; and Gneisenau's order issued by moonlight, directing the retreat on Tilly and Wavre, went far to ensuring the possibility of such combined action. However, Gneisenau was very remiss in not immediately reporting this vital move and the necessity for it to the duke, as it left the Anglo-Dutch inner flank quite exposed. Gneisenau apparently selected Wavre, not with the intention of assisting his ally, but rather to re-establish his own line of com munication, and the presence of the Prussians on the field of battle of Waterloo must be put down to the immortal credit of Blucher and Grolmann, his quarterma§ter-general.