BATTLE OF BAUTZEN, 1813 The town gives its name to a great battle in which, on May 20 and 1813, Napoleon I. defeated an allied army of Russians and Prussians (see NAPOLEONIC CAMPAIGNS). The position chosen by the allies as that in which to receive the attack of Napoleon ran south-west to north-east from Bautzen on the left to the village of Gleina on the right. Bautzen itself was held as an advanced post of the left wing (Russians), the main body of which lay 2m. to the rear (east) near Jenkwitz. On the heights of Burk, N.E. of Bautzen, was Kleist's Prussian corps, with Yorck's in support. On Kleist's right at Pliskowitz (3m. N.E. of Burk) lay Blucher's corps, and on Blucher's right, formed at an angle to him, and refused towards Gleina (7m. N.E. by E. of Bautzen), were the Russians of Barclay de Tolly. The country on which the battle was fought abounded in strong defensive posi tions, some of which were famous as battlegrounds of the Seven Years' War. The whole line was covered by the river Spree, which served as an immediate defence for the left and centre and an obstacle to any force moving to attack the right; moreover the interval between the river and the position on this side was covered with a network of ponds and watercourses. Napoleon's right and centre approached (on a broad front owing to the want of cavalry) from Dresden by Bischofswerda and Kamenz; the left under Ney, which was separated by nearly 4om. from the left of the main body, was ordered to march via Hoyerswerda, Weis sig and Klix on to the allies' right rear. At noon on the loth, Napoleon, after a prolonged reconnaissance, advanced the main army against Bautzen and Burk, leaving the enemy's right to be dealt with by Ney on the morrow. He equally neglected the ex treme left of the allies in the mountains, judging it impossible to move his artillery and cavalry in the broken ground there. Oudi not's corps, the extreme right wing, was to work round by the hilly country to Jenkwitz in rear of Bautzen, Macdonald's corps was to assault Bautzen, and Marmont's corps to cross the Spree and attack the Prussians posted about Burk. These three corps were directed by Soult. Farther to the left, Bertrand's corps was held back to connect with Ney, who had then reached Weissig with the head of his column. The Guard and other reserves were in rear of Macdonald and Marmont. Bautzen was taken without difficulty; Oudinot and Marmont easily passed the Spree on either side, and were formed up on the other bank of the river by about 4 P.M. A heavy and indecisive combat took place in the evening between Oudinot and the Russian left, directed by the tsar in per son, in which Oudinot's men made a little progress towards Jenk witz. Marmont's battle was more serious. The Prussians were not experienced troops, but were full of ardour and hatred of the French. Kleist made a stubborn resistance on the Burk ridge, and Bertrand's corps was called up by Napoleon to join in the battle; but part of Blucher's corps fiercely engaged Bertrand, and Burk was not taken till 7 P.M. The French attack was much impeded by the ground and by want of room to deploy between the river and the enemy. But Napoleon's object in thus forcing the fighting in the centre was achieved. The allies, feeling there the weight of the French attack, gradually drew upon the reserves of their left and right to sustain the shock.
Napoleon cared but little that the French centre was almost fought out ; it had fulfilled its mission, and on the 21 st the decisive point was to be Barclay's position. Soon after daybreak fighting was renewed along the whole line ; but Napoleon lay down to sleep until the time appointed for Ney's attack. To a heavy counter stroke against Oudinot, which completely drove that marshal from the ground won on the loth, the emperor paid no more heed than to order Macdonald to support Oudinot. For in this second position of the allies, which was far more formidable than the original line, the decisive result could be brought about only by Ney. That commander had his own corps, the corps of Victor and of Lauriston and the Saxons under Reynier, a total force of 6o,000 men. Lauriston, at the head of the column, had been sharply engaged on the 19th, but had spent the loth in calculated inaction. Early on the 21st the flank attack opened; Ney and Lauriston moving direct upon Gleina, while Reynier and Victor operated by a wide turning movement against Barclay's right rear. The advance was carried out with precision ; the Russians were quickly dislodged and Ney was now closing upon the rear of Blucher's corps at the village of Preititz. Napoleon at once or dered Soult's four corps to renew their attacks in order to prevent the allies from reinforcing their right. But at the critical moment Ney punctiliously halted ; he had received orders to be in Preititz by II A.M. and he reached that place an hour earlier. The respite of an hour enabled the allies to organize a fierce counter-attack; Ney was checked until the flanking columns of Victor and Reynier could come upon the scene. At 1 P.M., when Ney resumed his ad vance, it was too late to cut off the retreat of the allies. Napoleon now made his final stroke. The Imperial Guard and all other troops in the centre, 8o,000 strong and covered by a great mass of artillery, moved forward to the attack; and shortly the allied centre, depleted of its reserves, which had been sent to oppose Ney, was broken through and driven off the field. Blucher, now almost surrounded, called back the troops opposing Ney to make head against Soult, and Ney's f our corps then carried all before them. Preparations had been made by the allies, ever since Ney's appearance, to break off the engagement, and now the tsar ordered a general retreat eastwards, himself with the utmost skill and bravery directing the rearguard. Thus the allies drew off un harmed, leaving no trophies in the hands of Napoleon, whose success, tactically unquestionable, was, owing to the want of cav alry, and, above all, to Ney's want of intelligent initiative, a coup manqué strategically. The troops engaged were, on the French side 163,00o men, on that of the allies about 100,000 ; and the losses respectively about 20,000 and 13,50o killed and wounded.