BELGIAN COAST OPERATIONS. The operations on the Belgian coast carried out during the World War by British naval forces, with the assistance of local French torpedo and auxil iary craft, deserve a special place in history, in view of their im portant bearing on the Allied effort in general and the British situation throughout that period in particular. The functions of these forces may be summarized as follows : (1) They safeguarded the left flank of the whole Allied line on the Western Front. (2) They materially assisted to prevent the German occupation of the Channel ports to the westward of Nieuport. (3) They formed the outer rampart of the defences of the Dover straits, thereby assist ing to protect Channel shipping and to safeguard communication between England and France. Their protection also extended, in some degree, to the examination service and shipping anchored in the Downs. (4) They made possible the laying and maintenance of barrages off the Belgian coast and in the Dover straits, without the latter of which Britain must have succumbed to the sub marine attacks on shipping. (5) In conjunction with the left flank of the Allied army, they enabled Franco-British aerodromes to be established in an advanced position, where Allied aircraft could counter German air bases used as jumping off places for air attacks on England and French coast ports. (6) They constituted a constant challenge and reproach to the German navy through out the war.
The course of the operations may be traced from Oct. 17, when large German forces, released by the fall of Antwerp, pushed westward towards the coast. Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace Hood, who was then in command of the Dover patrol, left at once for Nieuport in the small cruiser "Attentive," followed by three shallow-draught monitors, the "Severn," "Mersey," and "Humber," purchased from the Brazilian Government while they were being completed in England.
By the following day the Belgian army had been forced back to a line on the left bank of the river Yser from Nieuport to Dixmude, but still had advance posts in Lombardsyde, Rattevalle and Mannenskevere.
From now onwards the British flotilla was actively engaged and effectively prevented German troops being landed behind this line, while it embarrassed the enemy considerably during the time he was establishing himself on the coast. Middelkerke and West ende were bombarded frequently, as were the coastal roads and such inshore positions as were within range of the ships' guns. Within a week the flotilla was augmented by the arrival of three old sloops of the "Wildfire" class, the old gunboats "Excellent" and "Bustard," the scout "Foresight," the torpedo-gunboat "Haz ard" and two or three French destroyers.
Oct. 21 (Trafalgar day), 1914, was a particularly critical one and the naval forces were engaged almost continually throughout the hours of daylight, directing their fire against German troops in movement and in covering the ground over which the enemy was attempting to advance. From time to time ships fell out, with injuries sustained from shore batteries, which engaged them from the cover of the sand dunes. By Oct. 25 the Allied position had become stabilized to a certain extent. The battleship "Vener able" and the old cruisers "Syrius" and "Brilliant" now joined Admiral Hood's forces for a brief period, but, owing to their deep draught, were not found to be very suitable. On Oct. 28 the fierce fighting between Ypres and Armentieres was felt right up to the coast, and the British naval forces were very heavily engaged. The destroyer, "Falcon," the "Mersey," "Brilliant" and "Wildfire" were all hit.
At this time the Belgian army was so hard pressed that, in all probability, only the support and encouragement given by the ships enabled them to hold out. The enemy was continually bringing up more and heavier guns and mounting them under cover of the shore where the ships' guns could not reach them. Nevertheless, the flotilla continued in action during the daylight hours, with little intermission, until Nov. 4. After a short spell of rest, on the 7th of that month it renewed its activity at the request of the French, who proposed making an advance along the coast, but this project did not materialize and the following day the ships were ordered to return to England.
In the early part of Dec. 1914, a scheme was afoot to retake the occupied part of the coast. Amongst other naval preparations the old battleship "Revenge" (afterwards renamed "Redoubt able") was fitted up for bombarding purposes, and made a short appearance, only to retire damaged on Dec. 16 through an 8in. shell from an enemy shore battery. Meanwhile, the position on the extreme flank of the Allied line had been stabilized and a French division had moved up and relieved the much-battered Belgian forces.
A system of observation of fire for the ships from positions ashore was organized in readiness for further naval bombard ments. Some naval armed barges on the inland waterways and naval armoured trains also co-operated with the shore forces, while the early part of 1915 saw the beginning of the establishment of a number of heavy British naval guns ashore, to make good, in some measure, the serious lack of heavy, long-range artillery.
Early in April of that year, Vice-Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon relieved Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace Hood in command of the Dover patrol, as this command was designated. Capt. C. B. Johnson was appointed commodore at Dunkirk. The arrangement whereby the chief command centered in an admiral at Dover and the local, but subordinate, command of the Belgian coast forces in a commodore on the other side of the channel, was not entirely a happy one, particularly for the latter, who was often tethered to a telephone, when it would have been better if he could have exercised his own discretion over matters of immediate importance and in dealing with the situation on the coast. The Dover command had to embrace such varied matters as the patrolling of the straits, the routing of merchant ships and cross channel traffic within the command area, the safeguarding of shipping in the Downs, the netting and mining of enemy sub marines, the local defence of the approaches to Dover and Folke stone harbours, mine-sweeping and mine-laying and local air work, as well as the direction of major operations off the Belgian coast.
In the course of the year 1915 the Dover command was being continually augmented by various classes of ships. Those more particularly engaged in the Belgian coast operations included two monitors—"Marshal Ney" and "Marshal Soult," each armed with a pair of 15in. guns—six monitors of the "General Craufurd" class, each armed with a pair of 12in. guns—a number of smaller monitors armed with 9.2in. guns—and an array of auxiliary craft, mine-sweepers, trawlers, drifters, coastal motor-boats and motor launches. The majority of the monitors were based on Dun kirk; the lesser craft, except a squadron of mine-sweepers which also worked from Dunkirk were based mainly on Dover and crossed the Channel for service on the coast as required.
At a later period, in 1916, the monitor squadron was augmented by the arrival of two new ships, the "Erebus" and the "Terror." These were of an improved type armed, like the "Marshal Soult," with i5in. guns, but capable of steaming about 12 knots as against approximately half that speed, which was all that the older monitors, armed with 15in. or I2in. guns, could claim. The propelling machinery of the "Marshal Ney" on the other hand was so unsatisfactory that she was deprived of her main arm ament and relegated to the duty of a semi-mobile fort at the north end of the Downs.
It is of interest to note that although the German torpedo flotillas made an occasional raid on the light craft patrolling the Dover straits, and in one instance on vessels anchored in the roadstead off Dunkirk, no serious attempt was ever made by the enemy naval forces against the British flotillas, which were constantly patrolling and frequently attacking the German posi tions on the Belgian coast. So completely did the French and Belgian military commands rely on the presence of the British navy in those waters that only the most meagre coast defences existed behind the left flank of their armies, whereas behind the opposing right flank the Germans created an intensive system of batteries, including an array of over 30o guns of 6in. calibre and above, between Westende and the Dutch frontier. It was a striking example of the value of sea power and of naval co operation in support of land forces with a flank resting on the sea.
From 1915 onwards many technical improvements were made in naval bombarding and the salient points at Zeebrugge and Os tend were attacked from the sea on several occasions. One of the most important of these developments was the system of observing and signalling the result of the ships' fire from the air, evolved as the result of experiments carried out by the monitor, "General Craufurd," and a seaplane carrier, the "Riviera." This system changed the whole character of the ships' bombardments and converted what was practically blind shooting into scientific gunnery.
From time to time during the ensuing years schemes were moot ed for a general advance along the coast, or for landings from sea ward in the occupied territory, but it was generally recognized that the coast was not the place for a main attack, but rather that any efforts there should be made in conjunction with a serious advance by the Allied armies further inland. The most important of the various projects for a landing in force was that prepared by Admiral Bacon early in 1917, preparations for the execution of which were brought to a high state of readiness in the sump er of that year. The scheme included the landing of a division of three brigades over huge pontoons, each of the three pontoons being secured to and pushed ahead of two monitors lashed alongside of each other, thereby providing a system for bridging the shallow water between the beach and the ships. At the head of each brigade and carried at the extreme foremost end of the pontoons, were to have been three tanks, specially fitted to climb the sea wall.
An elaborate scheme of smoke screens, navigational devices and covering fire was worked out to aid the landing, but the suc cess of the undertaking was dependent on adequate progress be ing made by the Allied armies on the main front, and as the lat ter did not materialize before the season of the year became too far advanced for the landing project to be practicable, it was abandoned, and no later occasion arose for it to be revived.
As the submarine menace grew, so increasing efforts were called for in the Dover command to waylay enemy under-water craft passing the straits and emerging from and returning to their bases at ,Zeebrugge and Ostend. The work of sinking submarines in the straits was distinct from the operations on the Belgian coast and is dealt with under SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN, but it was very largely due to the naval forces based on Dunkirk that it was possible for the array of light craft working in the narrow waters of the channel to remain so immune from attack.
In the early part of 1916 an elaborate barrage of mine and mine nets was started off the Belgian coast. From then onwards to the latter part of the war this was developed, the work being mostly carried on just outside the range of the heavy batter ies, while the small craft engaged in working on the barrage were protected by the guns of the monitors and presence of the attend ant destroyers. Day by day a regular procession, consisting of one or more large monitors, sometimes a couple of small ones, half a dozen destroyers and two pairs of mine-sweepers would patrol just to seaward of this barrage, in clear weather well within sight of the whole of the German coast defences. As a challenge to a sea Power of the importance and strength of Ger many, this daily patrol must have been almost unique—certainly in modern times.
In practice it is very doubtful whether this barrage was effec tive in sinking submarines, for weather and other conditions made a continuous patrol impossible and the enemy therefore had fre quent opportunities for clearing a passage through it. Much more successful were the joint efforts of the monitors and bombing aircraft to render the bases at Zeebrugge and Ostend untenable as resting places for submarines, and eventually the latter re treated up the canal, some of them as far as Bruges, heavy con crete shelters being provided to safeguard them from air attack. On the other hand, efforts to destroy the lock gates at Zeebrugge by bombing and gun fire were never successful, the target proving too small.
In Jan. 1918 Vice-Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon was relieved in command of the Dover Patrol by Vice-Admiral Roger Keyes. Commodore Johnson had already been relieved at Dunkirk by Commodore Hubert Lynes in June of the previous year.
Zeebrugge and Ostend Operations.—Early in 1918 it was decided to take still more drastic measures to try and counter the submarine menace, and an elaborate operation was planned, with the object of blocking the canal entrances at Zeebrugge and Ostend and so completely closing the Bruges canal to the Flanders flotilla of submarines. Both these entrances were formed by piers projecting seawards with a deep water channel, about 3ooft. wide, between them. At Zeebrugge a formidable stone mole, extending over a quarter-circle, embraced the western approach to the canal entrance. This mole was connected to the mainland by a viaduct mounted on piles. It was defended by a battery of three 5.9in. and six 4in. guns. The attacking force was organized in two squad rons—one to operate against Zeebrugge, and the other against Ostend. The attacks were to be launched simultaneously.
The Zeebrugge force consisted of three block-ships, the old cruisers "Thetis" (Com. R. S. Sneyd), `;Intrepid" (Lieut. S. Bon ham-Carter) and "Iphigenia" (Lieut. E. W. Billyard-Leake), another old and larger cruiser, the "Vindictive" (Capt. A. B. Carpenter) and two specially fitted Liverpool ferry-boats, the "Iris II" (Com. V. Gibbs) and "Daffodil" (Lieut. H. G. Camp bell). Attached to this inshore squadron were 18 coastal motor boats under Lieut. A. Welman, and 33 motor launches for mak ing smoke screens and for rescue work; also submarine C3 (Lieut. R. Sandford) . Behind this force were 13 destroyers under Capt. W. Tomkinson, and the two big monitors "Terror" (Capt. C. W. Bruton) and "Erebus" (Capt. C. S. Wills), while, in general command, was Vice-Admiral Roger Keyes, with his flag in the destroyer "Warwick." The Ostend force consisted of the two old cruisers "Brilliant" (Corn. A. E. Godsal) and "Syrius" (Lieut.-Com. H. N. Hardy), supported by 18 motor launches under Corn. I. Hamilton Benn, ten British and seven French destroyers, four large monitors, the "Marshal Soult" (Capt. G. R. B. Blount), "Lord Clive" (Corn. R. J. M. Watson), "Prince Eugene" (Capt. E. Wigram), "Gen eral Craufurd" (Com. E. Altham) and four small ones, the whole under the command of Commodore H. Lynes.
The block-ships and "Vindictive" were kept out of sight in the Thames estuary until the moment was propitious for launch ing the attack. Two false starts were made and on one occasion the operation was so far advanced that the monitors' bombard ment had already begun ; but the wind changed, thereby driving the smoke screen in the wrong direction. Admiral Keyes made the bold decision to withdraw the whole mass of ships rather than commit them to so desperate a project under unfavourable conditions ; owing to the admirable organization and communi cations, this was effected without difficulty.
Attack on Zeebrugge.—On the night of April 22-23, the at tack was duly launched. At 11.2o P.M. a long-range bombardment was opened by the monitors and continued for over half an hour. It was found afterwards that this had been most effective in mak ing a large proportion of the garrison take cover, which must have facilitated in no small degree the subsequent work of the inshore squadrons. At 11.4o P.M. the smoke screen was started and at midnight the "Vindictive" reached her assigned position on the seaward side of the Mole. Her mission was to land a storming party, with the object of destroying or capturing the batteries on the Mole and diverting fire from the block-ships.
Owing to the strong current and the swell, accentuated by the moving ships, the "Vindictive" had the greatest difficulty in getting close enough to land her men, but the little "Daffodil" came up and saved the situation by "butting" the cruiser amidships, and thereby pressing her against the sea-wall. The storming party, drawn up ready to rush ashore, suffered heavily meanwhile, and lost both its leaders—Com. H. C. Halahan, R. N., and Lt.-Col. B. H. Eliot, R.M.L.I. Eventually, however, the majority got ashore, only to find many difficulties in locating their objectives, including a mass of barbed wire. Severe fighting took place on the Mole during the time the block-ships were passing into the inner harbour. Meanwhile, Lieut. Sandford had rammed his submarine, "C3" between the piles of the viaduct. The vessel was filled with 71 tons of amatol, which he successfully exploded, the small crew escaping in a collapsible boat, from which they were rescued by Sandford's brother commanding a naval steam launch.
The three blocking ships, running the gauntlet of a hail of shellfire, made for the canal entrance. The "Thetis" fouled a net and ran aground just clear of the piers, but was able to do useful service in guiding her consorts by signal. The "Intrepid" ran into the canal entrance, and Lieut. Bonham-Carter, having swung his ship across the channel, blew out her bottom with ex plosive charges, and then, with six others, escaped in a Carley raft, from which they were picked up by a motor launch (M.L. 282, Lieut. Percy Dean). The "Iphigenia" followed soon after and endeavoured to fill the gap left by the "Intrepid" near the eastern bank. She, too, was effectively sunk, her crew being saved by the motor launches.
By 12.50 P.M. the blocking ships were in position and the "Daffodil's" siren gave the order for the storming party to retire on board the "Vindictive." This they did, in good order, bringing some of their wounded with them. Others were unable to return and the casualties were high. Amongst these was Capt. T. M. Palmers, R. M., who waited for missing mien and refused to leave the shore.
By 1.30 A.M. the attack was all over; the "Vindictive" and her small consorts had cleared the Mole and had withdrawn, sorely battered, into the night, reaching Dover safely in the early morn ing. The destroyer "Morning Star" came under a heavy fire and had to be abandoned and sunk. The remainder of Admiral Keyes' gallant command returned safely to their bases after many nar row escapes and thrilling experiences.
So bitterly did they and their officers feel the failure of their enterprise, that a large proportion begged to be given another chance, and on the night of May 9–I o the "Vindictive," with Com. Godsal in charge, ran in under a very heavy fire and sighted the harbour. The captain was killed, but Lieut. Victor Crutchly was just able to make the entrance to the canal, where the ship grounded and was sunk. The crew were most gallantly saved by two motor launches, commanded by Lieut. G. Drummond and Lieut. R. Bourke, R.N.V.R. The casualties in these two attempts were heavy, amounting in all to 637, including 197 killed, 413 wounded and 27 missing.
Zeebrugge was partially closed for a time and the operations of the Flanders submarines were appreciably hampered thereby. The daring of the achievement had a most disconcerting effect on the German morale, while the continued activities of the naval forces on the coast under the new regime, resulted in the enemy keeping a large number of troops on that flank which might other wise have been used against the Allies in another and more critical sphere of action. No further attempts were, however, made at raiding the coast, whilst the efforts against submarines centred more and more in making the Dover–Gris Nez mine barrage effective.
With the general collapse of the German army, the Belgian coast was eventually evacuated. On Oct. 16, 1918, Ostend fell to the Allies. During the morning of that day, destroyers and aircraft had reconnoitred close inshore, but at 11.30 A.M. the remnants of some German forces were still manning a light bat tery, and Vice-Admiral Keyes withdrew for fear that the presence of the ships would result in casualties to the friendly crowd wait ing to welcome them. By 5.3o that evening, however, the king and queen of the Belgians had visited the town. This was the beginning of a general retreat by the enemy from the coast, during which the unruly German forces did much damage to the interiors of the houses. The guns and works generally were dis abled or destroyed as far as possible before the evacuation. By the aoth of the month the Belgian coast was completely cleared up to the Dutch frontier, and the active work of the naval forces was therefore virtually at an end.