BELIEF is acquiescence in the reality of an object or assent to the truth of a proposition. The meaning of the term varies somewhat in different contexts. It is sometimes applied to the content of a belief, but more usually to the act or experience of believing. Somewhat more serious are the differences in the mean ing of the term belief which arise from different contrasts. The principal contrasts are those (a) between belief and knowledge, (b) between belief and disbelief, (c) between belief and doubt, (d) between belief and mere apprehension. An explanation of these antitheses will help to clear up the nature of belief.
If anyone is asked whether he knows that man is immortal, he may reply, "I don't know but I be lieve that he is." Or again, if asked whether he believes that he has to pay income tax, he may reply, "I don't believe it, I know it." In these and similar cases the term belief is used for the act of assenting to something, accepting it as real or true, when the grounds of our assent are not strong enough to justify our calling it knowledge. It may be a more or less probable surmise, it may be prompted by "reasons of the heart," but it is not knowledge. It is rather like an act of faith—it is believed merely. To confine "belief" to this meaning is unsatisfactory. It may be said with ob vious truth that if one can believe even what he does not know, he certainly believes what he does know. It is therefore better to use the expression "mere (or bare) belief" for what has just been called "belief" when contrasted with knowledge. Strictly speaking all knowledge is belief, though not all belief is knowledge.
It clearly makes a difference whether the reality of something or the truth of a proposition is believed or disbelieved. The difference, however, is essentially a difference in the content or object of the belief, not a difference in the attitude or experience of believing. He who disbelieves that man is immortal really believes that man is mortal. And so gener ally to disbelieve a given proposition is to believe its contradictory. So that qud experiences or attitudes belief and disbelief are essen tially similar experiences directed towards contradictory contents or propositions, or simply to affirmative and negative propositions respectively.
The difference between the assurance, conviction, mental rest or equilibrium characteristic of belief, and the unrest and vacillation characteristic of doubt, is palpable. Doubt in its extreme form becomes doubting mania and ends in the asylum. As a matter of mental economy people naturally tend toward belief. In the early stages of life, the stage of innocence or inexperience, every appearance is accepted as real and every suggestion as true. Doubt is the fruit of disappointment and of conflict of rival beliefs or suggestions. When practised reasonably it is an important factor in the make-up of a man of science, as Huxley rightly insisted. Such reasonable doubt is what is meant by a critical attitude of mind. But unreasonable doubt is as fruit less in science as is unreasonable belief, that is, credulity.
Psychologically this is the most important distinction. Merely to imagine something, or to understand a suggestion, is one thing; to accept it as real or true is quite another thing. The former is mere apprehension, the lat ter is belief. One cannot, of course, believe (or disbelieve) what one does not apprehend (though some people seem to suppose that they can believe what they do not understand), yet one may ap prehend something without believing or disbelieving it. In this re spect belief may be compared with desire. It is one thing to think of something or apprehend it, and another to desire it (or even to have an aversion for it). Of course, one cannot desire what one does not apprehend (though one may experience a restless craving without knowing what he wants), but one can apprehend a thing without feeling either a desire or an aversion for it. Thoughts that are apprehended without being either believed or disbelieved are sometimes described as "floating ideas." Except perhaps in daydreaming, in reading avowed fiction, and in aes thetic enjoyment "floating ideas" are probably uncommon. The suspension of judgment is a form of self-control or self-denial that most people find irksome—it is so much easier to have a definite belief or disbelief about everything between heaven and earth. This seems borne out partly by the popular identification of "not believing" something (which may denote merely a suspension of judgment) with "disbelieving." Belief in the sense just explained is really equivalent to judg ment—belief corresponding usually to positive judgments, disbe lief to negative judgments. It was F. Brentano who gave vogue to the distinction between judgment and mere apprehension, on the ground that judgment involves what Stout has called the "yes-no consciousness" over and above bare apprehension. This moment of belief or "yes-no-consciousness" seems to be something ultimate and unanalysable. But it is clearly variable in degree or fixity. There are many different (though hardly measurable) degrees of assurance with which a proposition is assented to or rejected.
It may just be noted in conclusion that some psychologists have identified belief with a certain feeling of vividness in the ideas or thoughts assented to (Hume) ; while others have treated it as a matter of will (Descartes, W. James, etc.).
Brentano, Psychologie (1874) ; W. James, Bibliography.-F. Brentano, Psychologie (1874) ; W. James, Principles of Psychology (1899), and Will to Believe (1897) ; G. F. Stout, Analytic Psychology (1896) ; A. J. Balfour, Foundations of Belief (1895) ; H. Newman, Grammar of Assent (187o) . (A. Wo.)
