COUNT (1693-1768), grand chancellor of Russia, the second son of Count Peter Bestuzhev, the early favourite of the empress Anne, was born at Moscow and educated abroad, with his elder brother Mikhail, at Copenhagen and Berlin. He served his ap prenticeship to diplomacy by Peter the Great's orders, at the Congress of Utrecht (1712) under Prince Kurakin, and in the service of the elector of Hanover, whom he followed to London when he became George I. of England. After a short service at the court of Anne, duchess of Courland, he was sent to Copen hagen in 1721 as Russian minister. The death of Peter the Great in 1725 prevented his advancement, and it was only in 1739, at 46 years of age, that he was recalled to Russia by the favour of Biren. After Biren's fall, he was for a short time imprisoned at Schliisselburg.
His chance came when the empress Elizabeth, immediately after her accession, appointed him vice-chancellor. For the next 20 years, during a period of exceptional difficulty, he practically controlled the foreign policy of Russia. Bestuzhev rightly recog nized that the interests of France and Russia in Turkey, Poland and Sweden were diametrically opposed, and Russia could never hope to be safe from the intrigues of France in these three borderlands. It was, therefore, the basic policy of Bestuzhev to bring about a quadruple alliance between Russia, Austria, Great Britain and Saxony, to counterpoise the Franco-Prussian league. But he was on dangerous ground. The empress herself was averse from an alliance with Great Britain and Austria, whose representatives had striven to prevent her accession ; and many of her personal friends, in the pay of France and Prussia, took part in innumerable conspiracies to overthrow Bestuzhev. Nevertheless, step by step, Bestuzhev, aided by his elder brother Mikhail, carried out his policy. On Dec. I 1, 1742, a defensive alliance was concluded between Great Britain and Russia. Bes tuzhev had previously rejected with scorn the proposals of the French government to mediate between Russia and Sweden on the basis of a territorial surrender on the part of the former, and he conducted the war so vigorously that by the end of 1742 Sweden lay at the mercy of the empress. At the peace congress of Abo (Jan.—Aug. ) he insisted that the whole of Finland should be ceded to Russia, by way of completing the testament of Peter the Great. But the French party contrived to get better terms for Sweden, by appealing to the empress's fondness for the house of Holstein. The Swedes, at the desire of Elizabeth, accepted Adolphus Frederick, duke of Holstein, as their future king, and, in return, received back part of the duchy of Finland. Nor could Bestuzhev prevent the signing of a Russo-Prussian defensive alliance (March 1743) ; but he deprived it of all political significance by excluding from it the proposed guarantee of Frederick's Silesian conquests. Moreover, through Bestuzhev's efforts, the credit of the Prussian king (whom he rightly regarded as more dangerous than France) at the Russian court fell steadily, and the vice-chancellor prepared the way for an alliance with Austria by acceding to the treaty of Breslau (Nov. 1, 1743). A bogus conspiracy, however, got up by the Holstein faction, aided by France and Prussia, who persuaded Elizabeth that the Austrian ambassador was intriguing to replace Ivan VI. on the throne, alienated the empress from Austria for a time ; and Bestuzhev's ruin was regarded as certain when, in 1743, the French agent, the marquis de La Chetardie, arrived to reinforce his other enemies. But he found a friend in need in M. L. Vorontsov, the empress's confidant, who shared his political views. Still his position was most delicate, especially when the betrothal between the grand-duke Peter and Sophia of Anhalt-Zerbst (afterwards Catherine II.) was carried through against his will, and Elizabeth of Holstein, the mother of the bride, arrived in the Prussian interest to spy upon him. Frederick II., conscious of the instabil ity of his French ally, was now eager to contract an offensive overthrow of Bestuzhev. But Bestuzhev at last convinced the empress that Chetardie was an impudent intriguer, and on June 6, 1744, Chetardie was ordered to quit Russia within 24 hours. Five weeks later Bestuzhev was made grand chancellor (July 15) . Before the end of the year Elizabeth of Holstein was also expelled from Russia, and Bestuzhev was supreme.
The attention of European diplomacy at this time was concen trated upon the king of Prussia, whose insatiable acquisitiveness disturbed all his neighbours. Bestuzhev's offer to attack Prussia if Great Britain would guarantee subsidies was rejected in Then he turned as a last resort to Austria, and on May 22, 1746, an offensive and defensive alliance was concluded between the two powers manifestly directed against Prussia. In 1747 alliances were also concluded with Denmark and the Porte, and a closer agreement was reached with England by the Treaty of St. Peters burg (Dec. 9, Bestuzhev's triumph coincided with the peace congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, which altered the whole situation of European politics and introduced fresh combinations, the breaking away of Prussia from France and a rapprochement between England and Prussia, with the inevitable corollary of an alliance between France and the enemies of Prussia. Bestuzhev's violent political prejudices at first prevented him from properly recognizing this change. His Anglomania also misled him. His enemies, headed by his elder brother Mikhail and the vice-chancellor Vorontsov, powerless while his diplomacy was faultless, quickly took ad vantage of his mistakes. When, on Jan. 16, 1756, the Anglo Prussian, and on May 2 the Franco-Austrian alliances were con cluded, Vorontsov advocated the accession of Russia to the latter league, whereas Bestuzhev insisted on a subsidy treaty with Great Britain, which was ratified, against the empress's real wishes, on Feb. 1, 1756. But his influence was now on the wane. The totally unexpected Anglo-Prussian alliance had justified the arguments of his enemies that England was impossible, while his hatred of France prevented him from adopting the only alternative of an alliance with her. To prevent underground intrigues, Bestuzhev now proposed the erection of a council of ministers, to settle ali important affairs, and at its first session (March 14-30) an alliance with Austria, France and Poland against Frederick II. was proposed though Bestuzhev opposed any composition with France. Elizabeth maintained that the conclusion of the Anglo Prussian treaty nullified Russian engagements with England. He endeavoured to support his failing credit by a secret alliance with the grand-duchess Catherine, whom he hoped after the Empress's death to make regent for her son, passing over Peter, from whom Bestuzhev expected nothing good either for himself or for Russia. The negotiations were conducted through the Pole Stanislaus Poniatowski. The accession of Russia (Dec. 31, 1756) to the anti-Prussian coalition was made over his head and the cowardice and incapacity of Bestuzhev's friend, the Russian commander in-chief, Stephen Apraksin, after the battle of Gross-Jagersdorf (1757), was made the pretext for overthrowing the chancellor. His unwillingness to agree to the coalition was magnified into a determination to defeat it. He was deprived of the chancellor ship and condemned to death, which was commuted to banishment to his estate at Gorstovo (April 1759), where he remained till the accession of Catherine II., who recalled him to court and created him a field-marshal. But he took no leading part in affairs and died on April 21, 1768, the last of his race.
See The Sbornik of the Russian Historical Society, vols., 1, 3, 5, 7, 12, 22, 26, 66, 79, 8o, 81, 85-86, 91-92, 96, 99, 100, io3 (187o, etc.) ; Politische Correspondenz Friedrichs des Grossen, vols. 1-21 0879 1904) ; R. Nisbet Bain, The Daughter of Peter the Great (1899).