BELGIUM, INVASION OF. The military role of Belgium in 1914 was determined by two considerations of fundamental importance: the geographical situation of the country, which, seated astride the direct road from Berlin to Paris and Calais, had become the cockpit of Europe, and her international political situation as defined by the guarantee of perpetual neutrality.
In Article 7 of the treaty with Holland of 1839 it is laid down that "Belgium, within its territorial limits, shall form an inde pendent and permanently neutral state, and is required to observe this same neutrality with regard to all other states." Of this treaty "all articles are drawn up under the guarantee of Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia." This neutrality clearly implied that Belgium was under an obligation to use her military forces, not to repulse an aggressor at all costs—a task beyond her means and one for which there could be no justification—but in such a manner as to prevent that aggressor from obtaining any anticipated advantage in his operations against a third party, i.e., to suspend for an adequate period free passage along the great international strategic highway of which the axis is defined by the Meuse, the Sambre and the Oise. The mission of the Bel gian army was to gain time and delay the enemy.
To this end the foremost and best position to occupy, supposing the enemy to come from the east, was the Meuse, with its steep scarped slopes and its two road and railway junctions, Namur and Liege. These two towns had been encircled by a ring of detached forts by Brialmont in Leopold II.'s reign so that they might act both as bridgeheads and as "points d'appui" from which, with the support of their guns, the field army could easily hold up enemy forces of equal strength. If the enemy brought up very superior forces facing the Meuse the Belgian army would avoid being engaged in a battle which it was foredoomed to lose. It would retire fighting, step by step on Antwerp—its base of operations and the national citadel—holding itself in readiness to move out again for the counter-offensive in co-operation with any relief force the Powers guaranteeing Belgium's neutrality should send to its assistance.
Such was the plan of campaign drawn up by King Albert ; but unfortunately Belgium was in the throes of military reorganization when the World War broke out. The country had been slow in realizing that the rivalry between its powerful neighbours con stituted a menace to itself. In 1913 parliament had voted a compulsory military service system which was to produce 340,00o men in ten years' time. Actually, on mobilization, only I I 7,00o men were available for the field army and 6o,000 for the fortress troops. The field army, grouped in six army divisions and one cavalry division, was without any reserve drafts what ever; the fortress troops, composed of men aged 28-35 years were weak in cadres and poor in quality. The plan of concen tration had been revised, but there had not been time to make out the time-table for rail transport.
Belgian Preparations.—On the evening of July 31 mobiliza tion was ordered. On Aug. 2 it became known that the Germans had invaded the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, and at 7 P.M. the ultimatum was presented to the Belgian minister of foreign affairs by the German ambassador in Brussels. "If Belgium behaves in a hostile manner to German troops, and particularly if she impedes their march forward by resistance on the part of the Meuse fortifications, or by the destruction of roads, railways, tunnels or other works, then Germany will be compelled to regard Belgium as an enemy." Belgium's reply to this injunction was the categorical refusal which her sense of honour and of her duties toward Europe demanded.
As it was definitely from the east that danger threatened, and as France had officially declared that she would respect the in tegrity of Belgian soil, the place of concentration indicated for the army was on the Meuse between Maastricht and Namur. But, as has been said, transport arrangements were still incomplete and a modification had to be adopted. The king ordered that the 3rd and 4th Divisions mobilized at Liege and Namur should remain in those fortresses with instructions to defend them to the last man. The remaining four divisions and the cavalry division were concentrated—the former by rail, the latter by road—in the zone Tirlemont-Perwez-Louvain, whence they were to proceed toward the Meuse with all possible speed.
As already stated, Liege and Namur were not designed to with stand a regular siege, but consisted of a ring of forts (52 at Liege, nine at Namur) which controlled the free use of the Meuse bridges and marked a favourable line of battle. Constructed about 589o, these forts, of triangular or rectangular design, had vaulted casemates of 2m. 50-cm. concrete and were completely out of date; they were armed with two 15-cm. guns in cupolas, two 12-cm. guns and two 21-cm. howitzers, besides some pompons in "eclipse" cupolas, all firing black powder.
The importance of the fortress lay in the fact that it controlled the lines of march of the German 1st and 2nd Armies. Now the success of the plan of campaign conceived by the general staff in Berlin depended upon the rapid crossing of the Belgian plains by these armies, and Gen. von Moltke, to avoid being held up in any way by Liege, had planned to carry the position during the concentration period (while troops were being carried up by rail) with a special army composed of six brigades at peace strength and the three divisions of Gen. von der Marwitz's cavalry corps. Accordingly, Gen. von Emmich, with his "Army of the Meuse" (consisting of 25,00o riflemen, io,000 cavalrymen and 124 guns) was ordered to carry the place by a coup de main. The forts were to be masked by a few companies and their artillery neutral ized by his batteries while six brigade columns would penetrate the intervals. This assault was to take place by night, and the columns were to make their way independently toward the town and storm this at daybreak. The aim of the whole enterprise was to secure the bridges before they could be destroyed. As regards the temerity of this scheme, it is only fair to say that von Moltke expected to find merely the normal garrison of 6,000 men in Liege.
The battle opened to the fitting natural accompaniment of heavy thunder showers. Of the five brigades which attacked on the right bank, f our were completely repulsed. In the south the 38th and 43rd in particular suffered severe losses round about Boncelles; they retreated over five miles the next day. The 34th Brigade, which attacked alone on the left bank after crossing the Meuse near to the Dutch frontier, was held up for several hours near the northern outskirts of Liege by street fighting, and left 400 prisoners in the hands of the Belgians at the end of the encounter.
By a strange chance a half-company of Jagers, detached as a flank guard, made their way quite unopposed into the town, reach ing the Rue Sainte Foi about 7 A.M., where the garrison head quarters were situated. An aide-de-camp of Leman and the captain of the company killed each other on the spot, and the escort, snatching up their rifles, put the Jagers to flight. This extraordinary incident led the commander of the defence to be lieve that the enemy had brought over considerable forces to the left bank. Fearing that the troops defending the right bank might be cut off, he at once sent them an order to recross the river, a decision by which the last of the German brigades was to benefit considerably. This brigade, the 14th, marching from east to west, was entrusted with the attack between Forts Fleron and Evegnee, but had been stopped short by rifle and gun fire in the intervening village, its advanced guard being decimated, its general and one colonel killed. It would probably have come to a definite standstill but for the arrival at this critical moment, by another stroke of fortune, of Gen. Ludendorff, who as von Emmich's deputy chief of the staff was watching the operations on behalf of the German 2nd Army and, as head of the operations section of the German general staff, had been the author of the plan of attack.
Thus Ludendorff was able to enter the town of Liege without further opposition on the morning of Aug. 8. Most of the bridges had been destroyed. The forts, all of which were still intact, kept watching roads and railways, their guns making the use of either impossible. Urged by Ludendorff's energetic representations, the German general staff now formed a new siege army, under Gen. von Eimen, which comprised, in addition to von Emmich's group, all the troops of the 7th, 9th and loth Corps—taken as they de trained—and some powerful heavy artillery, including several battalions of 21-cm. mortars and four 42-cm. howitzers. A new mode of attack was tried. One by one the forts were isolated, closely invested and bombarded with concentrated fire, which destroyed their gun emplacements and magazines and at the same time threatened to asphyxiate the garrisons.
Fall of the Forts.—The defenders came through their ordeal with honour, and would certainly have held out longer but for the irresistible effect of the 42-cm. shells. Pontisse, Fleron and Chaudfontaine only gave in when they had reached the limit of human endurance. On Aug. 15 at 5 P.M., the fort of Loncin blew up through the explosion of a powder magazine hit by a 42-cm. shell, 35o men being buried under the debris. By a stroke of luck Leman was picked up, unconscious, on the rim of this enor mous crater by the Germans, who were themselves horrified by the spectacle. The last of the forts surrendered on the i 6th, leaving the way clear, at last, for the Germans to whom the pas sage meant so much.
While these events were taking place at Liege, the 1st and 2nd, 3rd and 6th Divisions, and the Cavalry Division were assembling in the region Tirlemont-Perwez-Louvain. The plan of marching towards the Meuse was perforce abandoned on the information that the Liege position was broken and the 3rd Division in retreat.
Belgian Position Outlined.—On the morning of Aug. 4, when the crossing of the frontier by German troops had become an established fact, King Albert had sent a note to the British, French and Russian Governments announcing the violation of Belgian neutrality, and proposing "a concerted and common ac tion by the guaranteeing powers in order to resist Germany." In reply Gen. Joffre sent one of his staff officers to say that the French troops, amounting to four army corps, could not reach the region of Namur before about the 15th. Help from England would necessarily take still longer to come. Under these condi tions the king decided that the army should remain in its posi tions, which were: (I) the forts of Liege, acting as isolated works, under Leman; (2) the fortress of Namur, reinforced by the 4th Division; (3) the entrenched camp of Antwerp, guarded by about 40,000 fortress troops; and (4) the field army, 90,000 strong, entrenched behind the river Gette, forming a link be tween Antwerp and Namur, covering Brussels and excellent rail way lines which could be used by any French or British troops that came to the rescue.
Unfortunately, the Allies were not to profit by these arrange ments. The French would not think of anything except their at tack in Lorraine and the Ardennes; the British did not arrive at Mons before Aug. 22. As fast as the Liege forts fell to the super guns the Germans commenced to push their troops across the Meuse wit:lout intermittence. As early as Aug. 10 Marwitz's cavalry corps had thrown itself on the Belgium front at Tirle mont. On the 12th he tried to turn that front through Haelen, near Diest. Here he met the small Belgian cavalry division, sup ported by four battalions, and was completely routed, leaving Soo killed and wounded and i,000 horses on the field. On the evening of Aug. 17, the German ist and 2nd Armies having reached the front Hasselt-St. Trond-Huy, the kaiser ordered the general ad vance. The next day, at 9 o'clock, Gen. von Kluck attacked the Belgians on the Gette between Tirlemont and Diest with seven divisions of the gth, 4th, 3rd and 2nd Corps, while one division of the 2nd Corps and the 2nd Cay. Div. turned the left flank on the north to cut off the retreat on Antwerp.
Retreat to Antwerp.—This attack was no surprise to the king. For several days reports had been coming through that greatly superior forces of at least 200,000 men were approaching. Gen. Lanrezac's French troops had got only as far as Philippe ville and the British Expeditionary Force as far as Le Cateau. To avoid useless and complete destruction, the Belgian army be gan to retire slowly on Antwerp, fighting rearguard actions at Tirlemont on the 18th and at Aerschot on the 19th, and taking up its position on the line of the Antwerp forts on the loth. On this day the Germans entered Brussels.