BISMARCK, OTTO, PRINCE VON (1815-1898), was born on April I, 1815, at Schonhausen, an estate belonging to his father, Ferdinand von Bismarck, a retired captain of the Prussian army. The family had been established in the Mark of Brandenburg for many centuries, and Bismarck's own appearance, habits and methods of thought always betrayed his origin from the country gentry. His mother belonged to a middle-class family of the name of Mencken, which had given the world a number of men of learning in the 17th and 18th centuries, and had more recently entered the higher classes of Prussian officialdom.
The most important development was, however, the revolution in his whole philosophy of life that took place during these years. Under the influence of his masters, and partly also, no doubt, of his mother, he had wholly lost his belief in the doctrines of Christianity, but his attempts to gain a new philosophy of life by study of the philosophers of the day, Hegel, Strauss and Feuer bach, had been fruitless. The mutual contradictions of philosophy confused his mind, the bent of which was positive and pragmat ical ; he required firm principles which should serve him as a guide for his actions. His studies finally convinced him that the mind of man is not able to reach positive conclusions on the ultimate (and supreme) problems of human life. While in this mood he became one of a circle of deeply religious country gentlemen, which centred round the person and the house of von Thadden at Trieglaff. Puritans at heart, they attempted to base their lives on the principles of Christianity, held divine service for themselves in their own homes, and looked on the official Church as far too lukewarm and indifferent. Although at first inclined to mock at the tone current in this circle, Bismarck soon came to feel that these men had something which he himself lacked—inner peace and a profound sense of communion with eternal truth—and could, with their eyes fixed on eternity, endure with a light heart the changes and chances of this life. Bismarck was most deeply struck by this attitude of mind on the sudden death of von Thadden's daughter, who had married his best friend, Moritz von Blankenburg, and had also exercised a powerful in fluence over himself. The almost cheerful resignation with which her relations bore what they felt to be only a brief separation from the deceased filled him with admiration, and almost with envy. Gradually he began to adapt himself to their ideas, espe cially as he had himself conceived a warm affection for a young lady of this circle, Johanna von Puttkamer, and could not hope to win her hand unless her father and relations became convinced of his adherence to their views. It is certain that Bismarck was at heart never altogether one with these Pomeranian pietists. Re ligion was never so wholly a determining force for all his actions and thoughts as it was for them. It is certain, however, that what led him back to the fundamental principles of Christianity was not merely interest, but inner conviction. Christianity hencef or ward seemed to him the only stable and certain thing in the welter of human opinions. This fact had its importance for his career, since it was only this change that brought him into complete spiritual contact with the social class to which he belonged by birth, and with which he certainly felt the fullest sympathy at heart.
Meanwhile Bismarck's father had died, and he had moved to his birthplace, Schonhausen, near Stendal. Here in 1847 he married Johanna von Puttkamer, and here he came for the first time into close contact with that political life which was to absorb him more and more.
In the summer of 1847 the Vereinigte Landtag, the first general parliamentary assembly ever known in Prussia, sat in Berlin. Bismarck attended its sittings as deputy for the representative of his district, who was ill. In his speeches before this body he championed. the Christian character of the State and monarchy by divine right, and thus attracted the attention of King Frederick William IV. and his confidential advisers, the so-called "Cama rilla," the most important members of which were the two brothers von Gerlach. When the revolution which was destined to end absolutism in Prussia as elsewhere broke out in the spring of 1848, Bismarck hurried back to Berlin and in vain endeavoured to urge the king to vigorous counter-measures. It is easy to understand why Bismarck with his strong Conservative views, was not elected either for the Prussian national assembly or for the German parliament at Frankfurt-am-Main. He threw himself with the more energy into founding a well-organized Conserva tive party, and was one of the most indefatigable contributors to its first organ in the press, the Kreuzzeitung. It was only after the dissolution of the Prussian national assembly and the grant of a constitution and a new franchise by the king that Bismarck was elected to the Prussian second chamber. Here he again advo cated the Christian State, corporate organization of industry and the maintenance of the patrimonial rights of the nobles in the rural districts. His most influential speech was in the debate of April 1849 on the acceptance or rejection of the German imperial crown, which had been offered by the Frankfurt parliament to the Prussian king. To accept would have seemed to him a capitula tion before the revolution, and at the same time a subordination of Prussia to an outside power; he opposed it on both grounds, and was delighted when Frederick William refused the crown. On later occasions, he again championed the independence of Prussia, arguing that the Prussian eagle would only be able to cover Germany with its pinions from Memel to the Donnersberg if it had free and unhampered use of them. When von Radwitz's attempt to unite the German states, excluding Austria, into a federation under Prussian leadership led to the verge of war with Austria, Bismarck, in his famous "Olmutz speech" of Dec.
185o, pleaded for the preservation of peace, because he believed that such a struggle would strengthen Liberalism, and because he did not think it would, at any rate at the moment, advance the interests of Prussia. The king, who at the bottom of his heart agreed with Bismarck, now resolved to offer him a post where he could give his abilities full scope in the service of the State, and appointed him Prussian envoy at the Federal diet in Frankfurt-am-Main (1851).
Bismarck had formerly been opposed to parliamentary institu tions in any form. Gradually, however, he became convinced that a modern state could no longer exist without them. In the in terests of foreign policy also it seemed to him important that a channel should exist through which popular feeling could express itself, as this would afford a firmer support, abroad as well as at home, to a sensible policy adapted to the real interests of the country. He recommended to his Government strict observance of the constitution, a more liberal treatment of the press, and the maintenance of contact with popular opinion, especially in eco nomic questions.
Most characteristic of all was Bismarck's rupture with the ideas of the romantic politicians who had controlled affairs under Frederick William IV. The king himself and the brothers Gerlach saw in the world only the great conflict between belief and un belief, between monarchical authority by divine right and liberal and democratic demands based on human caprice and presumption. They were convinced that those powers whose form of state was based on similar principles should also hold together in foreign politics. They looked on Russia, Austria and Prussia as the main champions of authority, on France as the champion of revolution, while on England they hesitated to pronounce judgment. They therefore held that Russia and Austria were Prussia's natural allies, France her natural enemy. Bismarck preached with in creasing emphasis the contrary principle that no state should be swayed by anything but its considered interest, and that its friend ship with or hostility to another state must be judged by the sole consideration whether it would be advantageous or disadvan tageous to itself. "In politics," he said, "no one does anything for his neighbour unless he finds it to his own interest." These years in Frankfurt were of extraordinary value for Bis marck's political development. He did not, of course, acquire here the qualities which made him a great statesman ; they were innate in him; but here he harvested the experience which is as necessary to a statesman as to a man of any other profession. It was here that he first freed himself from the political dogmatism that naturally clung to him so long as he remained simply a Conservative party man, and learned to judge facts without prej udice and solely with an eye to the interest of the State. The inner transformation which took place in him here was known, indeed, to few, and the wider public still saw in him only a convinced supporter of the extreme Conservative party, of the Kreuzzeitung group.
Ambassador in St. Petersburg (Leningrad) and Paris.— In 1858 the health of Frederick William IV. was so seriously affected as to prohibit him from further conduct of affairs and his brother William took his place as prince regent, and in 1861 as king. In both domestic and foreign policy his principles differed widely from his brother's ; in particular he wished to establish good relations with the Liberals, who were in the majority in the Prussian House of Deputies, and to govern impartially. Sharing the general view of Bismarck as a Conservative party man, he thought it better to remove him from Frankfurt and replace him by someone of more liberal tendencies. He therefore sent him to St. Petersburg as Prussian ambassador. Bismarck himself relished this turn in his fortunes but little. He looked on it as a sign of mistrust, and declared that he had been sent into exile on the Neva. Yet this was a most important stage in his develop ment. He left the confined circle of German conditions and came to one of the great European courts, in which he could observe the policy of the great Powers much more closely and directly than had been possible in Frankfurt. His new experience did not alter his political convictions. During the war of 1859 between Austria, Sardinia and France, Bismarck again urged most strongly that no support should be given to Austria without a return. He remained in St. Petersburg for more than three years ; then events occurred which brought about his translation into a wider sphere of action.
King William had become involved in a violent conflict with parliament. It had arisen out of the proposed expansion and re organization of the army. The king had proposed to remove the limitations on the general three-years' service and to link the Landwehr (q.v.) more closely with the standing army. The Liberal majority of the House of Deputies opposed this vigor ously, not only on the score of the heavy cost, but also from fear that the democratic character of the Landwehr might be impaired. In the course of the conflict the deputies called on the king to take men who possessed the confidence of the house into his ministry, and on his refusing, proceeded to throw out the budget. The struggle grew ever more acute. The army question developed into a constitutional one, and the king saw himself faced with the alternatives of giving in to the demands of the House of Deputies, or of carrying on the government without a budget passed by the peoples' representatives. A dissolution of the house only resulted in increasing the Liberal majority, and the decision could no longer be delayed. The king's conscience was acutely tormented ; against the oath which he had sworn to the constitution, stood his con viction of the sovereign's right to choose his ministers himself, and of the necessity of the proposed reforms. For a time he even thought of abdicating in favour of his son. The minister of war, von Roon, was chiefly responsible for persuading him to abandon this idea and carry the struggle with the parliament through to the end. It was Roon again who repeatedly urged on the king that Bismarck was the man who could give him the best support in this struggle. As early as the spring of 1862 the idea of making Bismarck head of the ministry was mooted. The king could not, however, make up his mind to this, and appointed him ambassador in Paris.
During his stay in Paris in the summer of 1862 Bismarck made himself better acquainted with conditions in France, and in par ticular with the personality of the emperor Napoleon III.—a matter of great importance for his later judgments on French policy. In September Roon at last won the king's consent to the appointment of Bismarck as Minister-President. In his de cisive conversation with the king on Sept. 22, Bismarck declared himself prepared to carry through the struggle with parliament, but refused to lay down a definite programme, on the ground that events could not be foreseen.
Character and Intentions on Assumption of Office.— Bismarck was now 47 years of age, and in the prime of his power and faculties. His tall, imposing figure, his piercing light-grey eyes, his easy and cultivated bearing revealed an extraordinary personality. His sure gift of observation, his swiftness to seize a situation and his unfailing decision were exceptional qualifications for politics. His cultivated mind, his mastery of language, his ready wit and dry humour were characteristics which raised him, as a man, far above the level of the ordinary professional politi cian. The broad lines of his political programme had already been determined. The basic idea of his creed was his unquenchable belief in Prussia's destiny to unite Germany under her leadership. Foreign diplomats said at this time that this was his fixed idea. Bismarck had always felt himself a German; but his inspiration derived neither from the sentimental idealism of the Romantics, nor the Liberals' and the Democrats' desire for a common domestic political life and a more powerful common representation of the people. He was first and foremost determined that Germany, by achieving a closer political consolidation, should once more be come mistress of her own destinies, free herself from the foreign political influences which had played so great a part in her history ever since the Thirty Years' War, and secure for herself a re spected and equal position beside the other great nations of the world. He was convinced that the starting-point of such an organization of the national forces of Germany must be Prussia, and that every increase in the power of Prussia must benefit the whole of Germany.
Like the Liberals, he considered a measure of internal unifica tion necessary for united Germany, but thought it should be less extensive than they demanded. He proposed to leave to the indi vidual German States, as they had been moulded by the course of history, as much independence as was compatible with the indis pensable unified control. He too, indeed, desired a national rep resentative body ; but only as a legislative and advisory organ, while the real conduct of policy was to remain in the hands of the Government. He knew that his object could only be attained through a conflict with Austria, and wished to maintain good rela tions with France and Russia, to ensure their not attacking Prus sia in the rear during this necessarily severe struggle. At first he also considered whether the desired union of Germany without Austria could not be achieved by successive stages, beginning with the formation of closer ties between Prussia and the northern States of Germany, and only bringing the southern States into the federation at a later date. He never considered the restoration of the absolutist system, but was determined to defend the inde pendence of the crown, particularly in the conduct of foreign policy, by all means in his power, and not to shrink from a tem porary dictatorship, should this prove necessary.
In all his decisions the supreme criterion was the interest of the State ; he took no account of political theories and convictions except to consider how numerous were their adherents and conse quently, how far they had to be reckoned with in the attainment of particular ends. He was no cold calculator or mere brain machine, like Cardinal Richelieu; often enough his impulsive character led him to make statements which he would not have made in cold blood. He was a man of strong passions and emo tions; he clung with deep love and devotion to his wife, his family, his home, his State and his sovereign's dynasty ; but towards man kind as such he felt no profound obligation. He has often been accused of despising humanity ; he did so no more and no less than every great statesman or general prepared to use human forces and sacrifice human lives for the attainment of great ends.
His contemporaries at first were completely puzzled by his policy, because the habit of the day was to judge political facts from the standpoint of theories which were held to be immutable truths, while Bismarck cared nothing for the sanctity of theory and only employed theoretical catchwords as weapons for achiev ing certain ends. His respect for public opinion, and indeed for any opinion but his own, was always small ; for he was aware that actions, and not beliefs or speeches, are what count in controlling a great state. It was easy, he thought, for journalists and poli ticians to write and make speeches on the sensible and necessary course; they had not to take the consequences if their advice led to unfortunate results, not being responsible for the actions or omissions of the Government.
Now Bismarck's supreme political quality was precisely his readiness to take responsibility. If he thought a policy right, he staked his public and private reputation on it without reservation, and never considered the possible consequences to himself of a failure. At any moment he would have been prepared to exchange the brilliant position of a minister-president for the modest but independent life of a country gentleman, if he had not been con scious that as minister he could accomplish something for his fatherland of which others were incapable, and that his true des tiny lay in accomplishing it.
First Measures.—The first months of his work as minister president were occupied in domestic politics, with the struggle against parliament—the real cause of his appointment to his post. Bismarck declared that if the House of Deputies rejected the budget, the Government had the right to continue collecting exist ing taxation, and to carry on the Government without a budget in legally sanctioned form ; for the constitution contained no provi sion in the case of disagreement on the budget between the three factors (King, Upper House and House of Deputies) whose united consent was necessary for a bill to become law. He even raised the question whether an assembly elected on the three-class suf frage could be considered truly representative of the people, in view of the predominant influence exercised on its composition by the richer classes. He attempted to cow his opponents by restrict ing the freedom of the press and influencing elections. He was, however, unable to do away with the Liberal majority in the House of Deputies; and the conflict between the crown and parliament continued unabated for some years.
Bismarck directed his attention, however, mainly to foreign policy. If he could achieve great successes in this field, and satisfy the deepest ambition of every German patriot by uniting Germany under Prussian leadership, the position of his Government would certainly be greatly strengthened. It was even probable that popu lar opinion would veer round in favour of a Government which could point to such successes, and that such a change in public opinion would bring a different majority into parliament, and one which would be more amenable to compromise than the present one.
Bismarck was faced with his first important decision in Aug. 1863. The Austrian emperor had invited all German princes to assemble at Frankfurt-am-Alain to debate and approve proposals of his own for a reform of the German Bund. The court at Vienna hoped to utilize the conflict between the Prussian Govern ment and the representatives of the people and the consequent ill-feeling in Germany, where Liberal opinion was dominant, to remodel arrangements in Germany to the advantage of Austria. Austria proposed, while making apparent concessions to the Liber als, to invest the real Government of Germany in a "Directory" of five members, in which Austria, with the help of the small states with which she was closely allied, would always have commanded the majority. The plan was inacceptable to Prussia, and would not, indeed, have permanently satisfied the national requirements of the German people; for what was here proposed—an assemblage of delegates from the diets of individual states—could never have taken the place of a real German parliament, particularly if it had only an advisory character.
Bismarck prevailed on his sovereign to return a polite refusal to the invitation, on the ground that a personal conversation be tween the princes would be pointless unless the Governments had come to previous agreement in principle on the reforms to be effected. Bismarck knew that no resolutions of importance could be taken in Frankfurt without the co-operation of Prussia. The princes assembled in Frankfurt were equally aware of this, and sent King John of Saxony to King William to urge him not to refuse his collaboration in the work of reform. The king hesitated; it looked as though his profound sense of the community of dynas tic interests would prevail. Then Bismarck threw the whole weight of his personality into the other scale ; he threatened to re sign if the king insisted against his advice in attending the diet of princes. After a hard struggle he carried his point, and William refused the king of Saxony's request.
This was the first time that Bismarck had been engaged in a violent personal conflict with his king, whom he genuinely loved and respected. Victory in this instance was the necessary prelim inary for his later successes. Some months before, he had ex plained his own ambitions for Germany to the German Govern ments and to all the world : a closer German federation under Prussian leadership, with a parliament representative of the whole nation, parallel with the individual governments. If Austria were prevented by her close connection with Hungary, Bohemia, and other non-Germanic lands, from participating in so close a federation, she must remain outside it, and not be permitted to prevent the closer union of the rest of Germany. By thwarting the Viennese plan of reform, Bismarck cleared the way for the realiza tion of his own proposal. Before he could set about it seriously, however, unforeseen events intervened, which proved unmistak ably to what a great extent the German question was also a Euro pean question. The scene was Schleswig-Holstein, on the northern frontier of Germany.
The Schleswig-Holstein Question; War with Denmark (1864) .—The preceding generation had striven in vain to solve the Schleswig-Holstein question. During the revolution of 1848 the German inhabitants of Schleswig-Holstein had attempted to free themselves from the close bond with Denmark created by the common dynasty. At the time they had been unsuccessful. By the London Protocol of 1852 the European Powers had recog nized the attribution of these provinces to the Danish State. On extinction of the branch of the Oldenburg dynasty then regnant in Denmark, the Holstein-Gliicksburg line, to which the succession passed under Danish law, was also to retain the government of the duchies; but Schleswig and Holstein were to be left their own administration and their own diets within the framework of the Danish State. In 1855 the king gave Denmark a constitution incompatible with these provisions; thereupon the estates of Hol stein (Holstein being a member of the German Bund) appealed to the Bund for help. The king of Denmark was forced to retract the constitution as respecting Holstein, under threat of a Federal Execution; it remained, however, in force for Schleswig, which was not a member of the German Bund. The Bund, however, called on the king to issue a wholly new general constitution and one in accordance with the London Protocol. On his refusal a Federal Execution was decreed against him, in his capacity of duke of Holstein, and preparations for its enforcement were made.
At this juncture Frederick VII. of Denmark died (Nov. 15, 1863), and the regnant branch of his house became extinct in the male line. The prince of Glucksburg now assumed the government of Denmark and the duchies as Christian IX., but the inhabitants of Schleswig and Holstein maintained that the succession should pass, by old local usage, to another branch of the Oldenburg fam ily, the Augustenburg line. Prince Frederick of Augustenburg ap peared in the country and proclaimed himself duke of Schleswig Holstein, under the title of Frederick VIII.
The situation thus created was extraordinarily difficult. Public opinion in Germany pronounced strongly in favour of the prince of Augustenburg and the complete separation of the German duchies from Denmark, but the two great German Powers were pledged by their signatures to the London Protocol to recognize the succession of Christian IX. Bismarck aimed from the first at utilizing this opportunity to liberate Schleswig-Holstein from Danish rule. He had no intention, however, of allowing the forma tion of a fresh small state under the prince of Augustenburg. He wished to unite this territory, whose geographical situation be tween the North sea and the Baltic gave it great importance, with Prussia. He often said afterwards that the diplomatic campaign which he had to carry out here had been the hardest of his whole life.
At the beginning he stood quite alone. The majority of the population of Schleswig-Holstein wished to form a new state under the prince of Augustenburg; King William, and even more, his son, the Crown Prince Frederick William, who was a close per sonal friend of the prince of Augustenburg, also favoured this so lution, which was mainly supported by the medium and smaller German States, the Liberal parties of every German parliament, and public opinion in Germany as a whole. Austria and the non German Great Powers stood for the maintenance of the London Protocol with the grant of a certain measure of independence to the duchies. Russia and England, in view of their own interests in the Baltic and the North sea, were particularly anxious to pre vent union between Schleswig-Holstein and Germany, while Aus tria desired to prevent any increase of Prussian power. The one circumstance which favoured Bismarck was the lack of unanimity among the Powers themselves.
Only one Great Power offered Bismarck its support from the first. This was France. Napoleon III. was prepared to allow Prussia to acquire Holstein and Southern Schleswig, provided that Northern Schleswig were left in entirety to Denmark. His main object was to create permanent hostility between Prussia and Austria in order to leave Prussia wholly dependent on his good will. Bismarck was, however, much too cautious to become party to such a pact ; he knew that King William regarded Napoleon with the greatest suspicion, and that the emperor's hostility towards German unity was the greatest obstacle in the way of his national plans. He therefore refused this offer and determined to take another course.
To avoid having to face three adversaries simultaneously, he first sought a rapprochement with Austria, with which State he concluded a treaty to solve the Schleswig-Holstein question by joint action, beginning with an attempt to put pressure on Den mark to carry out the London Protocol in good faith. Denmark, trusting in the support of the other Great Powers, refused to make any concession. Prussia and Austria thereupon declared war on Denmark (1864). Bismarck succeeded in keeping Austria Prus sia's ally until the campaign, which was no very difficult one, was ended and the danger of intervention by the European Powers was past. As soon as Denmark's defeat was assured, the allies granted her an armistice, and a European conference met in London to discuss the termination of the conflict. On Denmark's repeating her refusal to grant the duchies a wholly independent constitution and administration, the German Powers proposed the complete separation from Denmark and the establishment of an independ ent duchy. This suggestion, again, Denmark refused ; the confer ence broke down and the campaign proceeded. Receiving no foreign assistance, Denmark was finally obliged to cede Schleswig Holstein unconditionally to Austria and Prussia. The decision on the future of the duchies now lay with the two principal Germanic Powers. (See also SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN. ) Relations with Austria; War of 1866.—The treaty con cluded between them prior to the campaign contained a clause pro viding that neither contracting party should take any decision on the further destinies of the duchies, if taken from Denmark, with out consulting the other. Bismarck knew of course that agreement in the question would prove very difficult; but by this provision he had made certain that the question could not be settled against Prussia's wishes and interests. At first the two Powers assumed the joint administration of the duchies; but this arrange ment soon gave rise to very serious difficulties. Austria had now changed her attitude, and wished to recognize the prince of Augustenburg as sovereign of Schleswig-Holstein. Bismarck, how ever, was determined not to allow the creation of a new small state unless the new duke entered into the closest union with Prussia, left the army, posts and telegraphs entirely in Prussian hands and allowed Prussia to construct and garrison a canal be tween the North sea and the Baltic. As soon as he was convinced that Prince Frederick would not agree unconditionally to these terms, Bismarck definitely opposed his candidature. He had never recognized its validity in law. Austria's refusal to expel the prince of Augustenburg from Schleswig-Holstein and to repress the agitation which was being conducted in his favour gave rise to grave differences between herself and Prussia, which nearly led to war as early as the summer of 1865. King William's urgent desire to avoid such a war, and the uncertainty as to the attitude which Napoleon III. would adopt in such a case, led Bismarck to con sent to the conclusion of the Treaty of Gastein with Austria (Aug. 14, 1865), by which, to avoid further friction, Prussia took over the sole administration of Schleswig and Austria of Holstein. As an expression of his delight that war had been avoided, the king conferred on Bismarck the rank of count.
Bismarck was well aware that the solution afforded by this agreement was only apparent. He was more firmly convinced than ever that no permanent solution could be reached either of the Schleswig-Holstein or of the German question without an armed conflict with Austria. Believing it to be inevitable, he used his utmost endeavours to ensure that the conflict should take place under the most favourable conditions for Prussia. He had to overcome his king's desire for peace, the sympathies entertained by all the Conservative elements in Prussia for Austria, the aver sion of all parties from a fratricidal war between Germans ; and at the same time to avoid the danger which threatened from France. Napoleon wished to utilize the coming war to establish himself in the position of mediator in Germany and if possible to advance the frontier of France to the Rhine. Bismarck knew this, and boldly decided to restrain the French emperor if possible by hold ing out prospects that his wishes would be fulfilled in the event of a Prussian victory, while making no definite promise ; he did this in the confident expectation that if Napoleon could be kept from intervening before a decision had been reached, it would be possible, when victory was won, to adopt a very different tone towards him. The details of his policy cannot be given here. The decisive impulse in all important decisions taken in these years came not from the old king, but from Bismarck. The treaty with Italy of April 8, 1866, the object of which was to hold part of Austria's fighting forces in the south, was his work, as was the Federal reform plan which he laid before the Federal diet during the critical days, which envisaged a German parliament based on general and equal suffrage.
On Austria's attempting to convoke the Holstein diet and secure through it the recognition of the prince of Augustenburg as duke, Bismarck declared this to be a breach of the Treaty of Gastein, which provided only for a division of the administration of the duchies, and not of their sovereignty. The convocation of the diet was a sovereign prerogative which could only be exercised by Austria and Prussia jointly. This action had annulled the Treaty of Gastein; and Prussia therefore claimed that her right to have a voice in the administration of Holstein, and to station troops there was restored. Prussian troops actually entered Holstein. Austria declared this action a breach of peace of the Bund, and demanded that the diet should undertake a Federal execution against Prussia. Bismarck let the assembly know that any vote cast in favour of the Austrian motion would be regarded by him as a declaration of war against Prussia. The diet, nevertheless, accepted the Austrian resolution, in a somewhat attenuated form, by a small majority. Bismarck then declared the treaties on which the German Bund was based to be broken and the Bund dissolved. At the same time he called on the other German States to con clude a fresh treaty with Prussia on the basis of the plan of reform mentioned above.
Napoleon's Intervention. Peace of Nikolsburg (1866).— These events made war inevitable. Although the South German States, with Hanover, Hesse and Nassau, stood by Austria, the war ended, after a short campaign, in the complete defeat of Austria at the battle of Koniggratz (July 13, 1866). Napoleon now intervened. however, with an offer couched almost as a command, to the two belligerent States to mediate for the restora tion of peace. All Bismarck's diplomatic skill was required to save the fruits of his victory in this difficult hour. By accepting the offer of mediation, but consenting to an armistice only on condi tion that the main conditions of peace were laid down in advance, he enabled the advance of the Prussian troops on Vienna to pro ceed despite the French intervention. Napoleon, whose army was not ready for armed intervention, was in danger of becoming a laughing-stock bef ore the whole world by his futile offer of media tion. To escape this situation, he agreed to Bismarck's proposal that Austria should secede from the German Bund, and that the North German States should form a North German federation under Prussian leadership, while the South German States (Bavaria, Wurttemberg, Baden and Southern Hesse) should remain inde pendent. He also allowed Prussia to incorporate Schleswig-Hol stein, and the chief North German States, which had taken Austria's side in the war, in her territory. The only condition he made was that the kingdom of Saxony should suffer no diminution.
This plan for a provisional reorganization of Germany did not wholly harmonize with Bismarck's ideas; yet it meant a first step on the road to their realization. He therefore carried it through in the teeth of the legitimist scruples of the king and the Conserva tives, who saw in the removal of legitimate sovereign dynasties an offence against the principles of their political creed. King William wished to take only a part of each conquered state, with out extinguishing any of them. The injured princes would then, however, have been members of the new federation, and would have formed, as Bismarck saw, a grave danger for its inner har mony. After a heated struggle with the king he carried through his plan for the complete incorporation of Hanover, Kurhessen, Nassau and the free city of Frankfurt, all the other States being left intact. Thus he ensured to the Prussian State a compact, unbroken territory, and prepared the way for an honest under standing and a later alliance with the surviving States. He was far-sighted enough to insist that no cession of territory should be demanded from Austria ; he wished to leave open the possibility of a later reconciliation with the opponent of to-day.
Af ter the signature of the Peace of Nikolsburg with Austria (July 26, 1866), Napoleon suddenly demanded a reward for his good offices. At first he asked for the whole of the Bavarian Palatinate and the Hessian territory on the left bank of the Rhine, including the fortress of Mainz. When Bismarck refused this demand, Napoleon asked to have at least Landau and the Saar district, with the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg; Prussia to compensate the king of the Netherlands, the actual ruler of the province, for its loss. With these demands again Bismarck could not and would not agree, since any cession of German territory to France would have been imputed to Prussia as treachery to the German cause, and would have made his task of assuming the leading role in the union of Germany extraordinarily difficult. Napoleon was obliged to content himself finally with Prussia's renouncing the right to keep a garrison in the fortress of Luxem bourg—a right which in any case had no longer any justification in law, since the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg had seceded from the German Bund in 1866. The French demands created for a while some danger of a war with France. Bismarck utilized the occasion to persuade the South German States to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with the North German federa tion, and thus to lay the foundations for the future union of North and South Germany.
The extraordinary interplay of boldness and forethought, of broad calculation and wise regard for the needs and circumstances of the moment, which characterizes Bismarck's whole political career, is nowhere so evident as in his policy during 1866. If Germany emerged from this war, not indeed wholly united, but yet a nation which already held within it the nucleus of a new political form and the potentiality of further development, this is due to Bismarck's intervention at the critical moments. The work of German unity, or Bismarck's vision of it, was, however, not yet complete. The Zollverein (q.v.) was, indeed, extended and renewed, and a close economic bond thus at once created between the south German States and the north. A common Customs parliament sat in Berlin, and offered the deputies from the various parts of Germany, for the first time since the days of the Frankfurt parliament, a fresh opportunity of promoting, through their common labours, the community of their interests. The competence of this assembly, was, however, strictly confined to economic questions. Even the offensive and defensive alliances, the conclusion of which has been noted above, afforded no absolute guarantee that all Germany would unite in arms in case of danger from an outside power, since the contract ing States could raise the question whether the casus foederis had really arisen. Even during the Luxembourg crisis some of the South German statesmen had sought to weaken the inter pretation of the treaties. The completion of the constitution of the North German federation in the summer of 1867, giving a preponderant influence in the government of the new federal State to its most powerful member, the king of Prussia, strength ened the opposition widely felt in the south against adherence to the federation. Added to this, Bismarck had differences of opinion and conflicts with his old party associates, the Con servatives, who could not forgive him for dethroning German princely houses and for the Indemnity Act, while he was equally at variance in many important points with his new parliamentary allies, the National Liberals. It often seemed likely that the old bitter parliamentary conflicts would be renewed in the new State. These were anxious and gloomy years for Bismarck; his work made no progress; for there was a danger that the division of Germany by the line of the Main might be permanently es tablished and that the last result of all these battles and labour might be a sundered Germany, instead of a Germany for ever united.
Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870. The Ems Telegram.—This situation was terminated only by the great Franco-German War of 1870. It has often been said that Bis marck provoked this war of set purpose. This, however, was not the case. The real cause of the war was Napoleon's anger at the humiliation which he had undergone in the preceding years; his fear that the existence of a unified Germany, powerful both as a military and an economic factor, would make it impossible for France to gain the left bank of the Rhine and to maintain her hegemony on the continent ; and finally, his fear that his own rule in France might end abruptly if he failed to achieve some solid success in foreign policy. Since 1867 he had been negotiat ing with Austria and Italy for an alliance against Prussia. He had not, indeed, been successful; but these endeavours are clear enough indications of the final objects of the emperor's policy. It would have been easy for Bismarck to provoke war with France as early as 1867, in connection with the Luxembourg crisis. At the time, however, he declared unequivocally that he wished to avoid it if possible. The necessary condition was, indeed, that France should abandon all further interference in German affairs, and reconcile herself to the union of Germany. As Bis marck always thought it doubtful whether the emperor would, or whether, indeed, in the state of public opinion in France, he could pursue such a policy, he was obliged always to be prepared for war with France. When he learned of Napoleon's endeavours to bring about an alliance against Prussia, it was his duty to take advantage of every opportunity to strengthen Prussia's position against France.
Such an opportunity arose when the Spaniards, after expelling Queen Isabella, offered the crown of their country to a German prince of the Catholic cadet line of the Prussian royal house, Leopold von Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen. Bismarck knew that it would be disagreeable to Napoleon should this offer be accepted, because close understanding between Spain and Germany would force him to keep troops on the Pyrenean frontier in case of war. Yet he could not admit that Napoleon had any right to interfere in this question, and persuaded Prince Leopold to accept the Spanish offer. When this became known, before the election took place, Napoleon attempted to persuade King William to forbid the prince to accept the crown. The old king, who wished to avoid a war if possible, went to the extreme limit of possible concessions. He refused to influence the prince officially in any way, but informed him privately that he would like him to re nounce his candidature. France was not, however, satisfied. She thought the moment had come to humiliate the Prussian king publicly and thus damage his position in Germany. She de manded that King William should address a letter of apology to Napoleon, and forbid the prince to renew his candidature at any later date, should he be elected by the Spaniards after all. The king, who was at that time taking a cure at Ems, rejected this demand and communicated the facts to Bismarck, who had hur ried back to Berlin from his estates at Varzin, in Pomerania, on receipt of the news, at the same time empowering him to com municate his refusal to the other Powers and to the general public. Bismarck made use of this permission. He immediately published the king's telegram, omitting certain details which were unsuitable for publication. These are the facts on the strength of which he has often been accused of falsifying the famous "Ems telegram." The accusation is entirely unfounded. He was never ordered to publish the unabridged text of this telegram; the king simply authorized him to make public the facts reported therein (Napoleon's demand and his own refusal). He was left entirely free to do this in whatever form he wished, and in his published version he did not add one detail which was not in the telegram. His only intention was to show the world as clearly and definitely as possible the humiliation which Napoleon had tried to inflict on the King of Prussia, and the fact that this demand had met with a refusal. The emperor Napoleon and his advisers were thus placed in a disagreeable situation. Instead of scoring a diplo matic success, it was they who had incurred a rebuff. They thought it impossible, in the interests of French prestige, to ac cept this quietly, and declared war on Prussia. It is probable that Bismarck anticipated and expected this result of his action; but having reached a stage when things must end with a humilia tion either for France or for Prussia, he thought it his duty to stand firm and let France make this a casus belli if she really de sired. The French statesmen were to blame for causing such a situation to arise; had they contented themselves with Prince Leopold's withdrawal of his candidature, the affair would have ended without war, with a minor success for France. By refusing to be satisfied with this, and attempting to force King William to a step humiliating for himself, they created the situation which led to war.
Conclusion of Peace and Foundation of the German Empire (1871) .—Af ter the war had ended in victory for Ger many, the French empire had collapsed and the German troops were outside Paris. Bismarck approached the difficult task of bringing about a favourable peace for Germany and at the same time ensuring that the German States, which had waged this war jointly, should now be welded together permanently in a solid political union.
The South German States had all admitted the casus foederis after the French declaration of war, and had placed their troops, in compliance with the treaties, under the supreme command of the king of Prussia. At that time, however, none of them, except Baden, had any intention of joining the North German confederation. Only the overwhelming enthusiasm manifested by the entire people after the great victories of the war made the kings of Bavaria and Wiirttemberg conscious that it would hardly be possible for them to preserve the old relationship after the end of the war. It was hard enough, for all that, to find a form of adherence satisfying to all parties. Bismarck scrupulously avoided putting any sort of pressure on the South German Governments, not wishing to expose himself to the reproach of having exploited the moment when those sovereigns had loyally placed their troops under Prussian command to rob them of their independence. He , waited until the force of public opinion drove them to approach him. After the negotiations had once begun, however, he made it quite clear from the first that he could not conceive of any other possible form of union but their entry into the existing confederation. He showed himself ready, however, to allow Ba varia and Wiirttemberg certain special privileges, particularly in matters of taxation and of a certain independent status for their troops within the imperial army. He refused Bavaria's more far-reaching demands for a share in the direction of im perial policy, but allowed the establishment of a diplomatic committee under Bavarian presidency in the imperial council. This institution, however, always remained a purely decorative one. Bismarck's guiding principle was to secure the necessary unity in political and military control, while leaving the individual States all possible liberty in other matters. After difficult nego tiations, he succeeded in bringing the treaties with the South German States, which were to form the basis of the German empire, to their conclusion at Versailles, on Nov. 20, 1870. It was at his instance, too, that King Louis II. of Bavaria decided, in agreement with the other princes, to ask King William to assume the title, hallowed by old German tradition, of German Emperor; the letter in which the king of Bavaria set forth this request was draf ted by Bismarck. When the proclamation of the new German empire was effected in the Hall of Mirrors at Ver sailles on Jan. 18, 187i, and the banners of all the German States were lowered to salute the new emperor, Bismarck could truthfully say that the great object to which he had devoted the whole force of his extraordinary personality was now fully attained.
Peace had not yet been concluded with France. After the great victories of 187o, public opinion in Germany had declared with increasing insistence that the time had now come to recover Alsace and Lorraine, two provinces which had been forcibly separated from Germany in the hour of the old empire's greatest weakness. Bismarck regarded their recovery as essential in the interest of the military security of Germany's south-western frontier. He therefore insisted at the peace negotiations that France, besides paying a war indemnity of 5,000,000,000 francs, must also cede these territories. A much contested point was the cession of the f ortress of Belfort, on which Bismarck finally gave way, although he could probably have gained this also. It has often been suggested that Bismarck was mistaken in requiring these territorial concessions from France, and that friendly relations between France and Germany could have been re-established more easily had the French frontiers been left intact. But setting aside the fact that these were old German districts, it seems safe to say that France's embitterment against Germany would hardly have been less had she been left in possession of them. The strongest incentive to revenge was anger at the military defeats she had incurred and the loss of her hegemony on the Continent ; and this idea did not first appear after 187o; it began to show itself active in French public opinion after the events of 1866. At that time the cry was for revenge for Sadowa ; later it became revenge for Sedan and Alsace-Lor raine.
The future destiny of Alsace-Lorraine also demanded fateful decisions. Bismarck rejected all suggestions for a partition of these territories among the different German states, because he feared that such a scheme might awaken the jealousy of those states which received no part of them. His idea was to keep Alsace-Lorraine the common property of all Germany, thus forg ing them into a fresh link of unity. They were accordingly made a "Reichsland" (imperial province), and placed under the gov ernment of an imperial viceroy.
The recently published documents of the German foreign office have shown beyond cavil that Bismarck's principal aim in for eign policy during the next decades was the maintenance of peace. The peace of Europe was liable to be threatened from two direc tions; from the East or from the West. In the West France's desire to be revenged for 187o and to recover Alsace-Lorraine might prove a danger; in the East the Balkan problems were a constant potential source of war between Turkey and the Chris tian States of the Balkans, or between Russia and Austria. To avoid both dangers Bismarck wished to isolate France as far as possible, knowing that for a long time she would be unable, with out powerful allies, to resume the struggle against Germany. In the East he wished, at least, to reconcile the interests of Russia and Austria, and thus to prevent war. When France began to entertain plans for colonial expansion in Africa and East Asia, Bismarck gave all possible encouragement to her endeavours, hoping that France, diverted from her single pursuit of the idea of revenge, would be compensated by the acquisition of a colonial empire for the loss of prestige which she had suffered in Europe.
In Eastern Europe Bismarck first sought to establish a close understanding between Germany, Russia and Austria, and thus to secure the possibility of intervention and mediation should disputes arise. For some time he seemed successful, but the Eastern crisis which broke out in consequence of the rising of Bosnia and the Hercegovina against Turkey in 1875 made the continuance of this policy impossible for the time. He refused an offer of alliance from Russia in 1876 in order not to desert Austria-Hungary and leave the Tsar the dominant figure in all South-Eastern Europe. Throughout the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-8 he continually exerted his offices to prevent the inter vention of Austria or England in the conflict. At the Congress of Berlin, over which he presided, he pursued the same policy, and it was largely due to his endeavours that a compromise between the conflicting interests was found.
Russia was not satisfied with the result of these negotiations. She had been forced to renounce the establishment of a Great Bulgaria and leave Bosnia to Austria, and principally to the sup port which Bismarck had given to Austria she attributed her failure to harvest all the fruits of her victories. When Germany again supported Austria in the questions of frontier regulation, the Tsar Alexander II. assumed a directly threatening tone in a letter which he addressed to the emperor William. This led Bis marck to seek closer relations with Austria. He opened up conversations with Count Andrassy, the leading statesman of the Danube monarchy, and agreed with him on the draft of a de fensive alliance against possible attack from Russia. The old emperor was very reluctant to give his consent to this draft, partly out of traditional respect for Russia, partly because he considered that such an alliance, which chiefly benefited Austria Hungary, would be inacceptable to Germany unless it contained an assurance of help from Austria in case of an attack by France. Austria, however, refused to extend the treaty along these lines. Bismarck was so convinced of the necessity of this alliance that he threatened to resign unless the emperor approved it. Unable to face the loss of his great adviser, William I. ended by giving way, although unwillingly.
It was not, however, Bismarck's intention to commit himself wholly to Austria by this treaty, and to remain on permanently unfriendly terms with Russia. On the contrary, he desired to re-establish good relations with St. Petersburg at the earliest possi ble opportunity, and in 188i he succeeded in bringing about the Three Emperors' Alliance, which seemed to restore the old re lations between the three Powers of Eastern Europe. It was renewed in 1884, at his instance, for a further three years. At the same time Bismarck yielded to Italy's wish to enter upon closer relations with Germany. He made the condition that Austria must be a party to this alliance. Italy consented, al though unwillingly, the result being the conclusion of the Triple Alliance Treaty of 1882. By this move Bismarck not only pre vented a possible alliance between France and Italy, but also ensured the possibility of mediating between Austria and Italy; and since Serbia and Rumania, by means of separate treaties, had also thrown in their lot with the Triple Alliance, the result was a great Central European defensive alliance against any attempt to alter the status quo in Europe. In the drafting of these treaties, Bismarck took care to limit their application solely to defence against attack by another power, and to make it quite impossible for any of the contracting parties to use them for aggressive purposes. He was also opposed to any further ex pansion of Austria in the Balkans, and for this reason, when the Triple Alliance was renewed in 1887, he advocated the insertion of a clause giving Italy a right to compensation if Austria came into permanent or temporary possession of further territory in the Balkan Peninsula. Bismarck's whole system of alliances, • as expressed in these various treaties, aimed at preventing any of the participating States from taking individual action in regard to the extension of their existing territories, and at making it possible for Germany to intervene and mediate should disputes arise between them.
His policy aimed at the maintenance of peace; but it was put to a severe test when grave complications arose once more in the Balkans consequent on Russia's intervention in Bulgaria, the fall of Prince Alexander of Battenberg and the election of Ferdinand of Coburg to the Bulgarian throne. The tension between Austria and Russia again reached such a point that when the Three Em perors' Treaty expired in 1887, renewal of it was impossible. To preserve the basic principle of his policy, and to avoid breaking the thread with St. Petersburg, Bismarck now concluded the so called "Reinsurance Treaty" with Russia, its purpose being the same as that of the earlier treaties, only its methods being differ ent, and adapted to the new situation. Russia promised to remain neutral should France attack Germany, while Germany recognized Bulgaria as lying within the Russian sphere of influence, and even promised her diplomatic and moral support should Russia find her self compelled to undertake a temporary occupation of Constanti nople. No permanent alteration of the territorial status quo in the Balkans might, however, be effected without previous arrange ment with Germany. In concluding this treaty Bismarck did not in any way infringe the provisions of the German-Austrian treaty, which only guaranteed Austria's existing frontier, without allowing her any claim to extend her influence over Bulgaria. Bismarck had always taken the view that Russia and Austria should come to an understanding on the Balkan question, the former taking Bul garia, the latter Serbia into her sphere of influence; and the Aus trian statesmen had long been aware that this was his opinion. His purpose in concluding this treaty was not to encourage Russia to take military action, but to keep in close touch with the Russian court and thus to retain the possibility of affecting the Tsar's deci sions in the direction of moderation. He was fully agreeable to Austria's concluding an agreement at the same time with England and Italy for the maintenance of the status quo in the Mediter ranean and the Balkans, such a treaty being intended to safeguard the Danube monarchy against any Russian aggression. In these difficult circumstances, Bismarck thought that the only way to maintain peace was to keep in close touch with all the mutually mistrustful Powers, and, if possible, prevent collisions between them by Germany's conciliating influence. He did indeed succeed in preventing the outbreak of a European war in the critical years 1887 and 1888. Every detail of his policy was regulated by con sideration for the general European situation. He knew that Ger many's danger lay in the formation of an over-powerful hostile coalition, and considered it the first object of German policy to prevent such an eventuality.
Bismarck remained true to the leading principles of his foreign policy to the end of his public career. He would have liked to ex tend the system of alliances which he had created to include Eng land, and made repeated efforts to this end. His wishes, however, were received with marked reserve by English statesmen—first Lord Beaconsfield and later Lord Salisbury. They had scruples against promising their assistance in case of a French attack on Germany, while Bismarck considered this to be the essential point.
Bismarck's Domestic Policy: the "Kulturkampf."—Al though Bismarck did not achieve all his ambitions in foreign policy, yet during the two decades in which he governed the new German empire, he was on the whole successful in this field, and at the end of his life was considered the leading statesman of Europe. His success in domestic policy during the same period was not so great. From the first the situation was difficult because the Gov ernment had not a safe majority. Apart from the opponents on principle of the new empire (the Poles, Danes and Guelfs), the Catholic party of the Centre, which disliked the rule of the Prot estant dynasty of Hohenzollern, was hostile to the Government, as were the representatives of middle-class democracy, a compara tively weak group, most strongly represented in South Germany. Part, at least, of the Conservatives mistrusted Bismarck for the reasons discussed above. His chief supporters were the Liberal groups, the strongest of which was that of the National Liberals; but they never commanded a majority unsupported (in 1871 they had 125 deputies out of 382), and disagreed with Bismarck over many points of domestic policy. Bismarck desired to form a coali tion (the so-called Cartel) between the National Liberals, after splitting off the left wing, which was too democratic for his views, and the Conservatives, and thus ensure himself a secure majority. But these parties themselves were not at present prepared for this step. For every separate legislative measure he was therefore obliged to conduct preliminary negotiations with the parties to se cure a majority, which was never composed twice in the same way. Being unable in any case to do without the support of the National Liberals, he was forced to make extensive concessions to their wishes. At their desire, he extended the competence of the im perial legislature to the whole field of civil law, while the constitu tion had only proposed unification of the law of debentures and real property. The laws on copyright, limited companies and the press were also liberal in conception ; full liberty for trade and press was now introduced for the first time. In return the Liberals allowed the Chancellor to fix the period of service with the colours of the standing army at seven years (the so-called Septennat), despite their reluctance to consent to this limitation of the budgetary powers of parliament.
Bismarck was also in agreement with the Liberals when his great struggle against the claims of the Catholic Church, commonly known as the "Kulturkampf," began. It originated in action taken by the ecclesiastical authorities against those Catholics who re fused to recognize the decisions of the Vatican Council of 187o, and their demand that the State should dismiss all such "Old Catholics" from teachers' posts in the State schools. Bismarck in troduced a number of measures directed against interference by the ecclesiastical authorities in questions of state. The clergy were forbidden to discuss state questions in the pulpit. The regulation and supervision of education and of marriage were declared to be purely civil matters and withdrawn from the influence of the Church. The teaching of the monastic orders was placed under State supervision and the Jesuits expelled. In face of the opposi tion of the Catholic priests, the State not only instituted special tribunals, but also attempted to regulate the future preliminary training of priests on its own lines. When the pope forbade obedi ence to these laws, salaries were suspended and recalcitrant clergy dismissed. It is perhaps doubtful how far Bismarck was personally responsible for these measures. It is possible that he would not have done more on his own initiative than was necessary to prevent ecclesiastical interference in State affairs. In any case, however, he ended by approving the further measures, and supporting them in parliament, at first, indeed, with the intention of revoking part of them later when peace with the Church should prove possible. These measures excited very great bitterness throughout the Cath olic population of Germany, and brought the Centre party many adherents.
The social question had long occupied his thoughts. The enor mous increase of the class of factory workers attendant on the rapid development of Germany into an industrial state, and the growth of socialistic and radical doctrines among their ranks, filled him with concern. Fresh problems had been raised, and he saw that new measures would be necessary. These were to be two fold. On the one hand, he wished to offer the workmen permanent economic advantages through state-guaranteed insurance against sickness, accidents, old age and disability, and show them that they too might expect substantial advantages from the existing form of the State. At the same time he proposed to introduce stricter penal laws and subject to severe penalties any agitation against the existing form of State, property, marriage and the family. Here again he found the Liberals unsympathetic. They looked on corn pulsory insurance as an infringement of civic liberties, and emer gency penal legislation as an offence against equality before the law. In the spring of 1878, shortly after two attempts, errone ously attributed to Social Democratic agitation, had been made against the life of the aged emperor William, Bismarck, although aware of Liberal opinion, thought the time ripe to introduce emer gency measures against Social Democracy. He dissolved the Reichstag after the second attempted assassination, by this strata gem securing a considerable increase in the strength of the Con servative party at the elections. The National Liberals, who had lost a large number of seats, now showed themselves ready to ac cept Bismarck's plan, to avoid losing all influence over the Gov ernment. The Socialist Act was passed in Oct. 1878 with the help of the National Liberals and the Conservatives. It declared illegal all associations, meetings and printed matter directed towards the overthrow of the existing form of society and State, and empow ered the Government to place under supervision or to expel social ist agitators, and in extreme cases to proclaim a state of siege in whole districts. This law remained in force, with small modifica tions, till 189o.
Being unable to count on the help of the Liberals either for his tariff measures or for the workmen's insurance, Bismarck now de termined at last to make his peace with the Centre party. His in terview of March 31, 1879, with Windthorst, its most important leader, was a turning-point in his domestic policy. He secured the support of this party for the introduction of his tariff bill, which was effected on July 1879, agreeing in return to the revocation of the greater number of measures issued against the Catholic church in the preceding decade. The preliminary training of the clergy was again placed in the hands of the Church. The civil court of justice for ecclesiastical affairs was abolished; there remained only the obligation incumbent on the ecclesiastical authorities to fur nish the State with personal details before filling an ecclesiastical post, in case the civil authorities desired to raise an objection. The revocation of the earlier laws was carried through gradually in the course of the next years, and it was only in 1887 that Leo XIII., in an address to the cardinals, was able to describe the conflict as closed.
Bismarck now returned to the idea of universal workmen's in surance, but was not able to carry it through to the full extent which he had wished. His plan embraced a great imperial insur ance department, in which all factory workers and miners were to be insured, at first against accident. Although Bismarck induced the old emperor to send a special message to the Reichstag recom mending the acceptance of this measure, he could not secure its passage in that form. He had to give up the imperial department ; the contribution and administration of the funds was left to the employers and workers, who were organized for the purpose in trade associations. In this form the bill for insurance against in jury became law in 1884; it was followed by similar acts for the institution of sick funds and insurance against old age and dis ability (1887), the arrangements regarding contribution and ad ministration being somewhat altered.
All this legislation is certainly only patch-work compared to Bismarck's original conception. Instead of a great imperial de partment there were a number of mutually independent funds, the respective competencies of which were ill-defined. In these cir cumstances the workmen could not become imbued with the feel ing that they were receiving the advantages of the new legislation direct from the empire. Their sentiments towards the existing State remained as negative as ever. But the State had abandoned its purely passive attitude towards social problems and had become conscious of its duties and rights in view of the increasing fre quency of social conflicts. Bismarck can claim the personal credit of having established the view, in the face of public opinion and the dominant theories in Germany, that one of the most important positive tasks of the state is the establishment and maintenance of social peace, and that the state shatters the foundations of its power if it neglects this duty. Whether the means which he tried to employ to reach this end were always the right ones is, of course, another question ; in any case the application of emergency measures and force against those currents which he thought too extreme had not the success which he anticipated.
A general survey of Bismarck's domestic policy after the foun dation of the empire reveals, as its chief defect, his failure to indi cate the direction in which national institutions should develop in order to keep pace with the radically altered economic and social conditions in his country. His own views and feelings were too deeply rooted in the old predominantly agricultural era and the feudal class which had been supreme in that era. His intellect and keen political eye showed him the importance of the new prob lems which arose with the transition to an industrial state, and in certain respects he met them. In his heart of hearts, however, he could never sympathize with the institutions of the modern politi cal life of which he was himself the author. He looked on domestic politics as a tactical struggle in which the business of the Govern ment was to get its way in the face of the parties by cleverly ex ploiting their disunion. The people was and remained in his eyes purely a thing to be governed, unfit, in his opinion, to influence the conduct of its own affairs in any large degree.
It is indubitable that during the weeks through which this strug gle lasted, Bismarck endeavoured by all means in his power to retain his office even against the will of the emperor. This was not only from personal ambition, although it was certainly hard for him to renounce the power he had so long wielded, but also from a conviction that a personal regime of William II. would have fate ful consequences for Germany. He attempted to persuade the other ministers to say that they would stand or fall with him; but he had himself always supported the view that a minister must be in the first instance a servant of his sovereign, and this conviction also animated his colleagues. Faced with the choice between obedi ence to their monarch or to their minister-president, they chose the former. When Bismarck revived an old cabinet order forbid ding individual ministers to render account to the sovereign except in the presence of the minister-president, the emperor demanded the revocation of that order. On Bismarck's refusing to obey this command, the emperor let him know that he expected him to re sign. Neither could Bismarck expect public opinion to afford him any strong support. His great services lay in the past, and were already half forgotten by the mass of the people. He had already embittered the Catholics by his ecclesiastical legislation, he had alienated himself from the Liberals, the workmen saw in him only a representative of the class State and class domination ; thus he could not expect that the great mass of the people would unite to support him in this conflict. He was obliged to give way to the emperor's demand, and on March 18, 189o, he offered his resigna tion, which was immediately accepted. The honours which the emperor conferred on him at the same time, particularly his pro motion to be duke of Lauenburg, could not conceal the fact that emperor and chancellor had parted as personal enemies.
The great tragedy in Bismarck's life is that he fell by the appli cation of that very principle the maintenance of which he had urged with all his powers; that the sovereign in the last resort must be the decisive power in the State, the ministers representing only the executive organs of his will.