BUSSACO, BATTLE OF. Compelled by circumstancet (see PENINSULAR WAR) to adopt a defensive policy in 1810, Wellington had spent the winter in creating the "lines of Torres Vedras" (q.v.). Before retiring behind them, however, he decided that, for the sake of the moral of the newly-formed Portuguese army, as well as of the Government at home, it was desirable to fight one defensive battle under the most favourable conditions. By a process of elimination he had concluded that the French vasion of Portugal, which he knew to be imminent, must follow the line of the river Mondego. He therefore disposed his army, sisting of 26,000 British and 25,00o Portuguese, along the Bussaco ridge, astride the Vizeu-Mealhada road which Massena, the French commander, was following. This ridge, I o m. in length and about 1,50o ft. high, ran from the Mondego on the south to the almost impassable Sierra de Caramullo in the north. Crossed by only three roads, it was itself so steep and rugged as to constitute a formidable natural obstacle. Wellington now crowned it with guns and soldiers; Hill's division, recalled at the last moment from watching the Tagus, held the extreme right ; next to him Leith covered the road from San Paulo ; Picton that from San Antonio ; whilst the main Vizeu-Mealhada road was watched by Spencer on its south side and Craufurd on its north ; on the treme left, just below the slopes of the Sierra de Caramullo, lay Cole. Portuguese brigades were interspersed among the British units, and the walled convent of Bussaco on the main road was garrisoned by Pack's Portuguese brigade. Wellington was dent that any attempt to assault the position must fail, but there was one road over the Sierra de Caramullo to Sardao by which it might be turned; this road he ordered Trant, with a force of Portuguese irregulars, to block. Massena, however, "the spoilt child of victory," was contemptuous of opposition; he ered the Portuguese troops to be valueless, and believed, too, that Hill was still 7o m. away at Abrantes. After a very inadequate reconnaissance, therefore, he ordered a frontal attack. Reynier's corps, on the left, was to advance on to the ridge by the San Antonio road, and having gained the summit, to sweep northward along its crest. Contingent upon this success, Ney's corps was to advance up the main Vizeu-Mealhada road, whilst Junot was to remain in reserve in rear of Ney. The whole French force numbered some 8o,000 men. In the early morning of Sept. 27, Reynier advanced, having Merle's division in column on the right, Heudelet's on the left, with Foy in reserve. So arduous was the climb that when they reached the crest the French troops were utterly exhausted; they were struck by a storm of grape in front, by musketry on each flank; finally, a vigorous bayonet charge swept Merle's column headlong down the hill, while Heudelet's fell back in scarcely better order. Reynier now ordered Foy to try where Merle and Heudelet had failed, but Wellington had by this time ordered up Leith and Hill from the right, and Foy's column in its turn was driven off with heavy loss. In spite of Reynier's failure Ney advanced to the attack, having Loisson's division on the right of the main road, Marchand's on the left. Once again the superiority of British tactics was parent ; the overlapping fire of Craufurd's line withered the head and flanks of the solid French column, which could make no quate reply. It needed but a vigorous bayonet charge to hurl Loisson's men down the hill. Marchand, meanwhile, had made no headway against Pack's Portuguese and, seeing Loisson's fate, withdrew. Though he still had Junot in reserve, Massena realized that a frontal assault against such a position and such soldiers could not succeed. He therefore broke off the battle, having lost 5,00o men, against an Allied loss of barely 1,300. Wellington's object, moreover, had been fully achieved; the Portuguese had seen their redoubtable enemies wither before their fire, melt away before their charge. The following day Massena found his way through the Caramullos, Trant having been too late to block the pass; but Wellington had already begun his retreat, which took him safely behind the impregnable lines of Torres Vedras.