Battles of Brestlitovsk

BRESTLITOVSK, BATTLES OF. Under this heading are related the fortunes of Mackensen's third forward bound in the great offensive of the Central Powers against Russia in 1915. The period covered is from the middle of July to the middle of September. The aim of Mackensen's group of armies, directed between the Bug and Vistula rivers toward Brest-Litovsk—the same direction as that of the first Austrian offensive of the World War—was to force the retirement of the Russians from the Polish salient and, if possible, to cut their line of retreat. His attack was combined with one from the north by Gallwitz's XII. Army against the Narew line. In the upshot, though both attacks were successful, Russian resistance slowed them down sufficiently to enable the forces in the Polish salient to escape.

Mackensen's two previous attacks had carried him from the Dunajec to the San, then, after a pause, to Lemberg (Lwow), which was captured on June 22, and north-east toward the Chelm (Kholm)-Lublin line. Again a short pause was necessary to re organize his forces and prepare a fresh advance.

The Armies Employed.

In the middle of July, when Mackensen resumed his advance, the position of the opposing forces was roughly as follows: The Russian IV. (Swarth), III. (Lesh) and XIII. (Gorbatovski) Armies faced south-west, from the Pilica river near its junction with the Vistula to about Sokal on the Bug (north-east of Lemberg). On the right of this group the II. Army still held the Bzura-Rawa-Ruska positions west of Warsaw ; on the left, the VIII., XI. and IX. Armies stretched south along the Upper Bug to Zloczow and thence to the Ru manian border. The Russian losses had been extremely heavy; in the III. Army, for example, five corps mustered between them only 25,00o bayonets. Their morale had naturally suffered.

Mackensen's group comprised, in that order from north-west to south-east, the Austrian IV. Army, the German XI. Army, the new German Army of the Bug (Linsingen), and the Austrian I. Army (Puhallo). The first three were to carry out the main attack between the Bug and the Vistula, while the I. Army was to cover the right and advance towards Wlodimierz Wolynski. Farther south, the Austrian II. Army and German Southern Army were to cover the offensive counter-attack from the east, the same task that the Austrian II. and III. Armies had failed to perform at the beginning of the war. On the extreme right, the VII. Army (Pflanzer-Baltin) was to push forward and clear the southern portion of East Galicia. West of the Vistula Woyrsch's corps of Landwehr was to advance in conjunction with Macken sen's left and if possible cross the river below Deblin.

The Fighting Begins.

Mackensen's attack began on July 15. From the first, progress was slow. The Russians withdrew a few miles, but in no part of the line was any decisive success achieved. On the 18th, for the first time in history, the Prussian Guard met the Russian Guard on the field of battle ; honours appear to have been even between them. Meanwhile Woyrsch had overcome the right wing of the Russian IV. Army and reached the Vistula; he crossed on July 28, some 20 m. north of Deblin. Mackensen attacked again on the 29th and broke through the Russian front half way between Lublin and Chelm ; the former place was evacu ated on July 31 and the latter on Aug. 1. It had taken Mackensen 17 days to make good the 25 m. to these places.

Gallwitz in the north had also been unable to gain a rapid suc cess and was advancing only slowly. But before the triple threat of the forces of Mackensen, Woyrsch and Gallwitz, the Russians were compelled to evacuate Warsaw and Deblin, the former on Aug. 4, and the latter on Aug. 5. The Russian left wing (IV., III., XIII. Armies) in front of Mackensen was now executing a wheel to the east, to conform with the retreat of the centre from the salient. Positions had been entrenched in anticipation of this movement. Mackensen made a last effort to break through and intercept the Russian centre between Warsaw and Brest-Litovsk. But his attacks at Lubartow between Aug. 5 and 8 only gained ground slowly, and by Aug. 9 it was obvious that the Russians had escaped from the noose which it had been proposed to draw round their centre. The main portion of Mackensen's group moved north-east towards Brest-Litovsk, exercising a purely frontal pressure on the retreating Russians. The only outflanking movement now possible in this part of the field was east of the Bug, directed against the rear of Brest-Litovsk. This was at tempted by the Austrian I. Army and the Army of the Bug. The former now advanced on Kowel, while the Bug army, which had crossed the river at Wlodawa, advanced through the Pinsk Marshes (Polyesie) to cut the Brest-Litovsk-Kobryn-Pinsk rail way line.

The Final Stages.

The remainder of the story can be quickly told. Under increasing pressure from the Austrian IV. Army and the German XI. Army, the Russians evacuated Brest-Litovsk on Aug. 26. But they held off the Bug army from Kobryn sufficiently long to allow of the safe withdrawal of their forces from Brest Litovsk. The Austrian I. Army after reaching Kowel sent a cavalry corps across the Pinsk Marshes to join the Bug army, and itself became involved in battle against the south-western group of Russian armies towards Luck (Lutsk) and Rowne.

At the end of August Mackensen's force was reduced. The Austrian IV. Army was transferred to the right group, south of the marshes; portions of the XI. Army had already been with drawn for the Serbian campaign, to which Mackensen himself was now called. What remained of his forces was placed under Linsingen and pursued the Russians as far as Pinsk, where a line was taken up which remained unaltered to the end of the war.

The poverty of the communications had much hampered Mack ensen. In his previous drives from the Dunajec and from the San he had depended principally on the effect of his heavy artillery. The lack of roads and railways south of Lublin and Chelm made it difficult to advance his guns and to keep them supplied with ammunition. The Russians, too, had shown all their traditional stubbornness in retreat. In this part of the theatre the Pinsk marshes made a wide enveloping movement impossible, and the direction of Mackensen's advance was inevitable. Ludendorff had foreseen the slowness of advance on this line and had persistently counselled that the main blow should be directed by Kovno and Wilno (Vilna) on Minsk. (See also EASTERN EUROPEAN FRONT CAMPAIGNS and map; DUNAJEC-SAN, BATTLES OF THE; LEM BERG, BATTLE OF; NAREW, BATTLES OF THE.) BIBLIOGRAPHY.-E. von Falkenhayn, General Headquarters, 1914-16, Bibliography.-E. von Falkenhayn, General Headquarters, 1914-16, and Its Critical Decisions (1919) ; Sir A. Knox With the Russian Army 1914-17 (1921). See also WORLD WAR, (A. P. W.)