Bernhard Bulow

BULOW, BERNHARD, PRINCE VON (1849-1929), was born at Flottbek on the lower Elbe on May 3, 1849, of a distin guished family. His father, Bernhard Ernst von Billow, had begun his career in the service of Denmark, of which State Holstein at that time still formed part. He represented the king of Denmark in his capacity of duke of Holstein in the Federal Diet at Frank furt. Here he came into close contact with Bismarck, at that time Prussian representative, who formed a high opinion of his colleague's abilities. Later, he became minister president of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, and afterwards plenipotentiary for Meck lenburg in the Federal Diet ; finally he was invited by Bismarck to enter the service of the German empire, and appointed secretary of State for foreign affairs in 1873. He died on Oct. 20, 1879. The prince's mother came of a Hamburg merchant family of the name of Rucker.

Early Years and Upbringing.

Billow passed his early youth at Flottbek and Frankfurt-am-Main, attended the gym nasium there and in Neustrelitz, and completed his school years at Halle, where he passed his final examinations. He then studied law in Leipzig, Berlin and Lausanne. He fought as a volunteer in the Franco-German War of 187o. On his return he graduated at the bar and was then employed for a short time in Metz, at first in the Landgericht and afterwards in an administrative capacity.

In 1874 Billow determined to enter diplomacy. His first ap pointment was as attache to the Embassy in Rome, under Herr von Keudell. After gaining first experience for his future career here and in St. Petersburg, he was transferred in 1877 to Vienna as second secretary. During the great eastern crisis of that year he acted for a time as Charge d'Affaires in Athens and took part in the negotiations at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. In the following year he became second secretary to the Embassy in Paris. Here he remained six years, being transferred to St. Petersburg in 1885 as councillor of Embassy. Here he married a lady of a noble Italian family, a Princess Camporeale by birth, whose mother had contracted a second marriage with the Italian minister, Minghetti. Three years later Billow received his first independent diplomatic post as minister in Bucharest. In 1894 he was transferred from this modest sphere to the Embassy in Rome, one of the most important posts of German diplomacy. His connections with Italy through his wife seemed to fit him particularly well to represent Germany there. He remained, how ever, only three years in this post, being appointed in July 1897 acting head of the Foreign Office in Berlin.

Since Bismarck's dismissal, Freiherr von Marschall had been to charge of the Foreign Office. He was not a professional diplo mat, and was hardly equal to the difficult situation which con fronted him after Bismarck's departure. In 1897 he exchanged his post for that of German Ambassador in Constantinople. A substitute for him had to be found, and Baron von Holstein, at that time the most influential figure in the Foreign Office, drew the attention of the chancellor, Prince Hohenlohe, to Billow. He had been acquainted with him personally for some time and be lieved him to be the man best fitted by his polished manners, his tact, and his brain to cope with the difficult task of handling the emperor. Besides this, he certainly hoped that his own personal relations with Billow would keep his influence predominant dur ing the latter's tenure of office.

Billow's Personality.

In the autumn of 1897, Billow was definitely appointed secretary of state for foreign affairs. Three years later, in 1900, he also became imperial chancellor, and thus assumed the position previously held by Bismarck. He always looked on that great statesman, whom he had known personally and revered from his youth upwards, as his model, and often said so in his speeches and writings. He found the essence of his political theory in the doctrine that a state should be guided only by its own interests, and at times went so far as to deny alto gether the applicability of any ethical standard in politics, e.g., in his judgment of the Boer War. But, however truly he remained Bismarck's pupil in his general ideas, between him and his great predecessor lay a profound difference, which was inherent in the innermost depths of his personality. Billow was undoubtedly an acute and dispassionate observer and a man of extraordinary diplomatic skill in the conduct of negotiations, both with the representatives of foreign Powers and with the party leaders in Germany itself ; he was a brilliant parliamentary speaker, not so powerful and enthralling as Bismarck, but always subtle, culti vated, and witty. What he lacked, however, was the deep political passion which animated Bismarck. He was always, primarily, the cool, imperturbable man of the world, rather sceptical, rather ironical, an artist in treating of the most difficult matters in a light, conversational tone ; but he lacked the strength to stake his whole personality at the critical moment for the course which he saw to be right. If his amiable character and the charm of his cultivated and adaptable nature enabled him to maintain his in fluence over the emperor for a decade, his confidence in the ulti mate effect of these qualities also led him to avoid a definite de cision when he feared that it would go against him, in the hope that by appearing to yield he would be able to get his way after all, gradually and almost imperceptibly. He was an excellent diplomat, but too essentially a diplomat to be a really great states man. In questions of domestic politics, particularly, he always relied on his skill in temporizing and compromising without hold ing a definite and individual attitude towards the great questions of statecraft.

Situations and Problems on Assumption of Office.—The situation as Billow found it on assuming office was as follows : After Bismarck's successor, Caprivi, had refused to renew the "reinsurance treaty" with Russia, the Russo-French treaty had been concluded; this threatened Germany with the potential dan ger of a simultaneous war on two fronts, the east and the west. Caprivi and Marschall had believed the best safeguard against this danger to lie in the expansion and the maintenance at all costs of the Triple Alliance. They had, however, endeavoured at the same time to cultivate good relations between the Triple Alliance and England. In this they had been unsuccessful, since the British Government of that time was averse to making any treaty commitments in their foreign policy. Relations with Eng land had actually grown worse, partly owing to colonial disputes, and at the time of the Jameson raid in the Transvaal and the Kruger telegram there had even been danger of a breach of diplo matic relations. At this period the emperor had become finally convinced that Germany needed a strong battle fleet if she was to keep her colonial empire and defend her coasts and her com merce' in an emergency against England. Admiral von Tirpitz had been appointed head of the imperial naval ministry for this purpose about the same time as Billow took over the Foreign Office. Tirpitz proposed to create so strong a battle fleet as to make war with Germany a very risky matter, even for England, the leading sea power. The emperor embraced this idea with enthusiasm. It became one of the few absolutely unalterable prin ciples of his foreign policy. The great question was whether it would be possible to attain this end without forcing England into the camp of Germany's opponents. If this happened, if England adhered in any form to the Russo-French alliance, then the danger of the international situation must increase enormously for Ger many. Billow himself was never convinced of Germany's need for a strong navy ; he would have preferred to concentrate on improved coast defence and on submarines. But he could not ignore the fact that the emperor thought otherwise, and that he would be unable to prevent the execution of this programme. Under the circumstances, he felt it his duty to carry on the policy of maintaining and strengthening the Triple Alliance and to see that Germany's naval programme did not injure relations with England. He was always convinced that Germany needed peace, in the interests of her economic development, and had nothing to gain from a war. It was the more important to preserve the good relations with England on which the maintenance of peace de pended.

Billow and the Negotiations for a Treaty with England. —In the spring of 1898 an attempt was made by England to reach a closer understanding with Germany. It was prompted by the situation of the British Empire at that time; its principal author was Joseph Chamberlain, the colonial secretary in Lord Salis bury's cabinet. Chamberlain became more and more convinced that England could not remain in her present isolation ; that in view of the increased tension with Russia in the Far East and the absorption for a considerable period of all her own forces by the Boer War, she must seek the support of other Powers. He wished to begin by attempting an understanding with Germany, but from the first envisaged the possibility of a rapprochement with France and Russia even at the cost of some sacrifices should the German alliance prove impracticable. The first tentative suggestions in Berlin crystallized later into a proposal that a defensive alliance should be concluded which should come into force if either Ger many or Great Britain were attacked by two great Powers. Billow was now confronted with a decision of extraordinary difficulty. The whole tendency of his policy would have favoured acceptance of this suggestion, and an attempt, at least, to see whether peace could not be permanently ensured by this method without sacri fice of Germany's interest. The emperor was also at first very much inclined to agree to the English rapprochement. The last decision in this important question was taken by Baron von Hol stein, for whose judgment Billow had the greatest possible respect.

Holstein entertained the strongest mistrust of England's inten tions. He believed that England was only interested in involving Germany in a struggle with Russia, thus to be quit of this danger ous opponent without risk to herself. He also thought that the advantages would be too unequal because Germany would have to help in defending the whole British Empire in all quarters of the globe, while England would only have to cover the much smaller and less threatened area of German possessions. Finally, he thought that England would not feel herself bound to support Germany in virtue of such an alliance if Germany found herself compelled, in virtue of her alliance with Austria-Hungary, to declare war on Russia in the event of a Russian attack against the Danube monarchy. For these reasons he found the proposal unacceptable in its existing form and thought it necessary to de mand that Austria be included in the alliance and that its perma nent validity should be ensured by ratification through the British Parliament. It is impossible to say whether Billow entertained similar doubts from the first, or whether they were only evoked in him by Holstein's representations. It is only certain that he ended by adopting this chain of reasoning completely and basing his policy accordingly. It was probably due again to Holstein's advice that he conceived the plan of taking advantage of Eng land's desire for a rapprochement to extract certain colonial con cessions for Germany. He did not, therefore, reject the English offer unconditionally, but temporized, letting England hope that the plan might come to something after all. The negotiations dragged on for over two years. When, however, the British Gov ernment saw that Germany would not renounce her conditions, in particular the inclusion of Austria, they gave up the plan as hopeless and began to attempt to reach an understanding with Russia and France. The course of these negotiations was of de cisive importance, not only for relations between England and Germany, but for the whole development of international rela tionships during the next decades. For the consequence of the rapprochement of England with France and Russia which now began was the conclusion of the entente between those three States and therewith the genesis of the situation which ended in the World War. Billow and Holstein did not indeed foresee that their attitude would have such results. They believed that an English understanding with France and Russia would be wholly impossible, on account of the profoundly different views on inter national politics entertained by these States; they hoped that when England had seen the impossibility of such an enterprise she would approach Germany afresh and then be ready to accept her conditions. This misapprehension of the actual situation shows that they lacked that eye for the true relative relations of the different Powers which is so absolutely essential for any suc cessful policy.

Billow and the Morocco Question (1905) .

Even of ter the failure of the negotiations for an Anglo-German alliance and the conclusion of the treaty between England and France in the spring of 1904, defining their respective spheres of influence in Africa, the situation for Germany was not so unfavourable as it was ten years later. Relations between England and France were still far from close, and acute differences still existed between England and Russia. It was only Germany's attitude during the first Morocco crisis of 1905 that altered the situation to her dis advantage. Under the above-mentioned Franco-British agree ment, Morocco had been assigned to the French sphere of influ ence and the French began immediately to pave the way for the gradual subjection of Morocco to their suzerainty. As this grew more and more apparent during the first months of 1905 Billow determined to intervene. The decisive advice again came from Baron von Holstein. In his opinion, Germany, in the interests of her international prestige, should not permit the partition of hith erto independent territories between the other colonial Powers without receiving compensation. Billow, who but a short time before had declared that Germany had no political interests of her own in Morocco, let himself be persuaded by Holstein to op pose France's action. The moment seemed propitious; the out break of the Russo-Japanese War in the Far East had wholly en gaged the forces of France's ally, Russia, for a considerable time, and the domestic situation in France at the moment was ex tremely difficult. Billow persuaded the emperor to land in Tan gier in April 1905 in the course of his Mediterranean cruise and there to declare in an address to the representatives of the Sultan of Morocco that he looked on Morocco as an entirely independent country, in which no European power enjoyed special rights of any sort. The emperor only took this step with great reluctance, and afterwards repeatedly declared that he had done so only at Billow's urgent desire.

The first result of this step was that France approached Ger many with a request to formulate her counter-demands in return for leaving Morocco to France. It is doubtful whether an agree ment could have been reached on this basis. Germany, however, was not so much interested in herself acquiring a part of Morocco or compensation in the French colonial area, as in preventing France from effecting this increase of her African possessions. Billow therefore refused to negotiate on this basis and demanded the dismissal of Delcasse, the French foreign minister, who was supposed to be particularly anti-German, and also the convocation of an international conference to regulate the Moroccan question on the basis of political independence for Morocco and complete equality of footing in economic matters for all European Powers. France agreed to these demands with the greatest reluctance and felt herself deeply humiliated. These incidents also further dam aged Germany's relations with England. England felt bound, having expressly recognized Morocco as within the French sphere of influence, to support France should she become involved in a conflict with Germany over this question. Although no definite offer of military assistance was made by England at that time, it can hardly be doubted that England would have taken France's side had war broken out then. And as it was probable that similar conflicts would again arise over the Moroccan question, it was agreed, on the initiative of the French Government, that repre sentatives of the British and French military and naval general staffs should meet and discuss methods of co-operation between the two Powers in the event of a possible conflict with Germany. The result was that, although no treaty change was made, the ties between the two western Powers were drawn much closer than previously.

The conference met in Algeciras at the beginning of 1906 but took quite a different course from that expected by Billow. With the help of England and Russia, France secured the grant to her self of extensive privileges both in the organization of the Moroc can police and in financial and economic respects in the territory in question, although the nominal independence of Morocco was upheld. Germany was obliged to accept these resolutions, unless she were willing to accept the sole blame in the eyes of Europe for a breakdown of the conference, with all the disastrous conse quences to which this might have given rise. The grave failure of the German policy led to the dismissal of Baron Holstein ; he remained, however, in close relations with Billow, who often consulted him.

Billow and the Treaty of B j orko (1905) .

While the Mo rocco negotiations were still in progress, the great war in the Far East had come to an end. Russia had been completely defeated. When the Tsar met Emperor William II. in Finland in July 1905, he was so broken down by this failure that he agreed to a pro posal of the German emperor which he had rejected, on the advice of his ministers, in the previous autumn. The German emperor felt that the victory of the Japanese, who were England's allies, had increased the power of Great Britain to such an extent as to necessitate a coalition of all great Powers on the continent of Europe against her. The idea of such a continental league had been broached by him before and, strangely enough, had been ap proved by Billow. It is hard to see how it could have been ef fected, in view of the existing tension between Germany and France. Starting with this idea, the emperor laid a draft treaty before the Tsar in B jorko which provided as a first step for a close offensive and defensive alliance between Germany and Russia, the Tsar undertaking further to attempt to persuade France to adhere to this alliance. Billow agreed with this move of the emperor's and had even transmitted to him by wire the text of the first proposed draft. After the Tsar had signed the treaty, however, Billow utilized the pretext that the emperor had changed a few words in the text transmitted to him to declare that he could no longer assume responsibility for the conduct of German policy if the emperor took decisions in important questions with out previously consulting him. The emperor, who looked on the fact that he had persuaded the Tsar to sign the treaty of B jorko as a great success and a great personal achievement of his own, was absolutely disconcerted by Billow's totally unex pected threat of resignation. He begged him to remain in office and not to desert him. Billow remained, after exacting from the emperor a promise to take no important political decision in the future without consulting him.

The treaty of Bjorko itself remained without serious conse quences, because the Tsar, when enlightened by his ministers on his return to St. Petersburg as to the extent of the obligations he had undertaken, refused to acknowledge it as binding. Yet this incident had its importance as casting a vivid light on Billow's relations with the emperor. In the first years of his chancellor ship, Billow had often had to temporize; but now he obviously felt that the time was come when he would be able to restrict the emperor's influence in politics within much narrower limits. He took advantage of an incident, unimportant in itself, to raise the question of confidence and demand an assurance from the emperor. The success which he had scored by this action was, however, only temporary. In reality, his position after this incident was less safe than before. The emperor, who had hitherto felt a personal attachment to this always pleasant-mannered and (on the sur face) very accommodating diplomat, now began to look on him as a secret enemy of his imperial authority and to turn away from him in his heart.

After the failure of the continental league, it was no longer possible to prevent Russia from becoming a party to the Anglo French entente. Defeated in Asia, Russia was in any case obliged to give up her hopes of extending her power in North China and Central Asia ; this left the way clear for an understanding with England and a delimitation of the rival spheres of influence in Asia. This was effected by the treaty of Aug. 31, 1907. From this time on the combination of France, England and Russia in a closely-allied group of Powers was complete, while through the Anglo-Japanese alliance the group enjoyed further special support outside Europe.

Billow followed this development with the gravest concern. He saw that this division of Europe into two groups of Powers, the Entente on the one hand, the Triple Alliance on the other, in volved a grave danger for the peace of the world, since any con flict between two members of the group must draw in their allies, and might easily develop into a trial of strength between the rival coalitions. He had already discussed the danger of an encircle ment of Germany in his speech before the Reichstag on Nov. 5, 1906. Events were soon to occur which cast a vivid light on the difficulties of the new situation.

Billow and Russia; Balkan Questions.

Af ter abandoning her policy of expansion in the Far East, Russia again devoted more interest than had been the case for some decades to Balkan prob lems. In particular, she encouraged Serbia's efforts to found a great southern Slav State to embrace Bosnia and the Herzegovina. As these ambitions could not be realized without a conflict with Austria, new and grave complications were to be foreseen here. The outbreak of the conflict was accelerated by the Young Turk revolution in the summer of 1908, which threatened to shatter the whole frame-work of the Ottoman empire. The prince of Bul garia took advantage of this opportunity to repudiate the suzer ainty of Turkey and declare himself independent, and at the same time Austria formally incorporated Bosnia and the Herzegovina into her dominions, these two provinces having previously been legally part of the Ottoman empire, occupied by Austria in vir tue of the decisions of the Congress of Berlin. These two events aroused the most violent excitement in Serbia, and for a time it looked as though it would come to war between Austria and Serbia. As Russia felt that her prestige among the Balkan peo ples obliged her to support the cause of Serbia, the crisis might easily have led to a conflict between Austria and Russia, which would most probably have resulted in war between the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance. If this was averted, it was due solely to the fact that Russia, after her severe defeat in the Far East, combined with the internal unrest which had followed it, was not ready for war at that moment. Billow gave the Russian Government clearly to understand that Germany would throw her whole forces on the side of Austria if such a war broke out, and summoned Russia to recognize without reservation Austria's annexation of Bosnia. Russia was forced to give the required declaration, but felt the humiliation deeply, and was much of fended by the interference of the German Government. It would indeed have been wiser to leave Russia to find out for herself an acceptable form of withdrawal, since in any case she would have had to withdraw. As it was, the Russian Government was able to advance the pretext to the world at large that they had to sub mit to the German group. Thus, although this crisis ended with an apparent victory for Germany and Austria, it made the gen eral situation still more acute and brought grist to the mills of the growing anti-German party in Russia. During this Balkan crisis, when there seemed a danger of a European war, the em peror insisted that at least the points of friction with France should be reduced to a minimum. Largely at his wish, Billow con sented to conclude a new Morocco agreement with France on Feb. 9, 1909, expressly recognizing France's political rights in Morocco. One may, indeed, doubt whether this concession would have kept France from intervention if war had broken out at the time.

Billow and England.

Billow was quite aware that the situa tion would become extremely dangerous as soon as Russia had recovered from the consequences of her defeat and had regained sufficient strength to participate in a war. He therefore consid ered his most important task to be the re-establishment of better relations with England. Meanwhile, however, the expansion of the German navy according to Admiral Tirpitz's programme had begun, and had awakened much concern in England. As England had, in 1906, introduced a new type of battleship far superior in fighting force to any earlier models, all old ships seemed to have lost their value, and the fighting force of a fleet now depended, apparently, solely on its strength in these new great battleships. The superiority of Great Britain's fighting fleet, hitherto unques tioned, thus became doubtful; her lead over the other Powers in the construction of these new battleships being comparatively small. She feared that if Germany expanded her fleet according to Tirpitz's programme she would in a few years have a fleet al most as large as the British, unless Britain made enormous efforts to expand her own fleet much more quickly than had been in tended. These considerations were responsible for several sugges tions from British quarters that Britain and Germany might possibly be able to reach an understanding on the number of battleships to be built by each State during the course of the next few years.

A great difference of opinion soon arose on this question be tween the emperor and Tirpitz on the one hand and Billow on the other. The emperor and Tirpitz held that Germany's naval armaments must be determined exclusively by her own needs and interests, and that any interference by foreign Powers in these questions should be categorically repudiated. Billow, on the other hand, was inclined to accept an arrangement such as that sug gested and in certain circumstances to modify the German navy law, conditional on a political rapprochement between Great Britain and Germany, to be expressed in a treaty guaranteeing to Germany Britain's neutrality in case of a war with France. A very violent dispute took place between Billow and the em peror, who sent word to the chancellor that he must resign office unless he declared openly for the principle that no modification of the German naval programme was admissible in any circum stances. Billow hesitated to insist on his opinion, in view of the possible consequences, preferring to make a declaration satisfac tory to the emperor, but indubitably not in full accordance with his own views. Hereby he put himself in a false position. The desire to extricate himself was perhaps not without its effect in the event which followed immediately afterwards and caused the greatest sensation throughout the world.

Billow and the "Daily Telegraph" Interview (1908).— On Oct. 27, 1908, the Daily Telegraph printed an interview by Col. Stuart Worseley with the emperor, secured during the latter's recent visit to England. According to the paper, the emperor had laid especial stress on his friendly feelings towards England ; and among the various proofs which he adduced, he included the ad vice which he had given during the Boer War. It might appear as though he wished to arouse the impression that it was only by following this advice that Great Britain had carried the war to a successful close. The manuscript of this article was sub mitted by its author before publication to the emperor, and by him to the German foreign office for approval. The chancellor was away at Norderney, and it was forwarded on to him, but by an oversight (as he afterwards declared) he failed it ; consequently no objections were raised, and it was allowed to appear. As its appearance evoked great indignation in England, the question as to the responsibility for allowing the interview to be published was raised in Germany. A question was asked in the Reichstag, and in the ensuing debate violent attacks were made on the emperor for his personal interference in politics. Billow excused his conduct as stated above, but at the same time ten dered his resignation, which he withdrew only after the emperor had repeated his promise not to take any step of political im portance without the chancellor's advice. The emperor always believed that Billow had actually read the article and allowed it to be published with the deliberate intention of exploiting the public excitement, which he foresaw, to put pressure on his master, whom he had attempted by this means to force into submission.

At all events, after this incident Billow felt his position secure enough to join issue with Tirpitz on the naval programme and relations with England. On Nov. 30, 1908, he asked Tirpitz officially whether he considered Germany's defensive prepara tions against possible attack from Great Britain to be sufficient. Tirpitz replied that they were not, and that was his very reason for considering the construction of as strong a navy as possible to be indispensable. He added that he could not take the responsi bility for retarding the programme, and must offer his resigna tion were this attempted. Billow again abandoned the execution of his idea, partly perhaps because the reports from the German ambassador in London had not given him sufficient assurance that Britain would accord the desired political rapprochement in return for a modification of the German naval programme. Neverthe less, he never abandoned the idea of bringing about such a rap prochement so long as he remained chancellor ; it is impossible to say whether he would have come nearer than his successor to its practical realization had he remained longer in office.

Domestic Politics.—In domestic politics Billow was deficient in exact knowledge on economic questions and of the individual branches of the administration. He was mainly interested in for eign policy; domestic questions he generally left to his colleagues.

In this field there was only one broad principle which he attempted to establish. His latter years of office were notable for his effort to bring about a new and permanent grouping of the parties. The steadily increasing hostility between the social demo crats on the one hand and the parties of the right (conservatives and national liberals) on the other, had in recent years resulted in giving increasing influence to the catholic party of the centre. The centre took advantage of this position to sell its consent to the Government's various measures in return for concessions in ecclesiastical or educational questions, or personal advantages. Billow had long chafed under this situation. When the centre de feated the Government's budget for colonial development in the winter of 1906-7, because in its opinion catholic interests were not sufficiently considered in colonial policy, Billow dissolved the Reichstag. The composition of the new Reichstag after the elec tions enabled him to unite all elements outside the centre and the social democrats in a coalition. This "Billow bloc," as it was commonly called, included not only the old cartel parties of Bis marck's day (the conservatives and national liberals) but also the left-wing liberals and democrats united in the progressive peo ple's party. Billow hoped to find in this coalition a firm support for his whole policy. This hope proved, however, delusive. The incompatibility of views between the right and left wings of the bloc was much too great ; this was apparent for example, in the different attitude of the conservatives and the progressives towards the question of the extension of the Prussian franchise. As Billow himself had no definite programme in domestic policy on which to unite the parties of his bloc this loose coalition was in danger of breaking up every moment, and incessant wearisome negotiations were necessary to keep it together after a fashion. It finally broke up over the question of fiscal reform.

Resignation.—The Budget brought in by the Government in 1909 included, besides a number of indirect taxes, an imperial succession duty. The conservatives declared against the latter, while the liberals objected to some of the indirect taxes. Billow informed the conservatives that he would resign if they threw out the budget, and broke up the bloc by rejecting the succession duty. They rejected it none the less, and Billow handed in his resignation, which was accepted by the emperor on July 14, 1909. William II.'s confidence in Billow had long been shaken, and he was not sorry to see him leave office. Billow himself felt it im possible to remain chancellor if he could reckon neither on the monarch's confidence nor on a secure majority in the Reichstag. Billow's public career seemed at an end. He retired altogether into private life, and never expressed an opinion in public re garding current political questions. He departed from this rule only once when the publishers of Deutschland enter Kaiser Wil helm II., a compilation by various hands, to be published in com memoration of the 25th year of William II.'s reign, asked him to write the account of foreign policy for this book. This he did, afterwards reprinting his contribution in book form under the title Deutsche Politik. In it he concerned himself chiefly with justifying his own conduct of foreign policy, but was of course obliged to speak with great reserve, as all diplomatic details of the period under review were still kept strictly secret. His ac count therefore contributes but little to our real knowledge of events.

The War.—Quite unexpectedly, Prince Billow was brought into public life once more on the outbreak of the World War. Italy preserved neutrality in the summer of 1914. Although not recognizing any obligation under the terms of the Triple Alli ance to join Germany and Austria, neither did she immediately make common cause with the Entente. As the German Govern ment was always obliged to reckon with the possibility that she would yet do so, it determined to beg Prince Billow to take over the post of German ambassador in Rome, which he had already held once, and attempt to bring over Italy of ter all to the side of the Central Powers. Billow went to Rome in Dec. 1914. He hoped to persuade Austria to agree to cede the Trentino to Italy, and thus prevent Italy from joining the enemy camp. It took long, however, to persuade the Austrian statesmen to consent to this concession : and when they did so, at last, it was too late.

The impression was prevalent in Rome that Austria, under pres sure from Germany, would in her hour of need give the promise but would make difficulties about fulfilling it after the Central Powers had proved victorious. In spite of all his efforts, Prince Billow was unable to dispel Italy's mistrust of the sincerity of Aus trian policy, or to prevent her entering the ranks of Austria's and Germany's enemies in May 1915. He probably doubted from the first whether anything could be achieved in Rome, but thought it his duty not to refuse his services for the last attempt.

After the War.

Af ter the summer of 1915 Prince Billow lived in quiet retirement, mostly in Klein-Flottbek; his public utter ances were very few indeed. The most interesting of them was his letter to the editor of the Hamburger Fremdenblatt, printed in that journal on Aug. 4, 1919. Here Billow expressed his views on the policy of his successor, Bethmann-Hollweg, and on the events which led up to the World War. He was concerned particularly to defend himself against the statement made by Bethmann Hollweg in his recollections that the international situation in the summer of 1909, when he succeeded Billow, was already so in volved that no issue could be found, and that the World War had thus really been already inevitable. Billow protested, and certainly rightly, against this "theory of fatality," as he called it. It is, however, undeniable that Prince Billow's policy was largely responsible for bringing about the difficult situation in which Ger many found herself in the decade preceding the World War. He died at Rome on Oct. 28, 1929.