BREST-LITOVSK, TREATIES OF. Two treaties were signed at Brest-Litovsk early in 1918: on Feb. 9 between the Central Powers and the Ukrainian Republic, and on March 3 be tween the Central Powers and the Soviet Government of Russia.
On Nov. 20, 1917, following on a resolution passed by the Con gress of Russian Soviets in favour of immediate peace, the new Bolshevik Government informed the Central Powers of its readi ness to come to terms; on Dec. 1 fighting ceased on the eastern front ; and on Dec. 5, as the result of negotiations at Brest-Lit ovsk, an armistice was arranged for 1 o days (extended on Dec. 15 for 3o days more) with a view to negotiating peace.
The first meeting of the peace delegations was held on Dec. 22 in the fortress of Brest-Litovsk, the headquarters of the German Eastern Army. The principal German delegate was Herr v. Kuhl mann, the principal Austro-Hungarian Count Czernin; Turkey and Bulgaria were also represented. The chief representative of the Soviet Government, until the arrival of Trotsky on Jan. 7, was Dr. Joffe. The Ukrainian Republic, which claimed independence of Russia, sent a separate delegation, composed wholly of youthful idealists. Its chief spokesmen were Sevryuk, a literary man, and M. Holubowiez; among its members was Prof. Valdemaras, after ward prime minister of Lithuania.
The Russians at once laid down as a sine qua non the principle of "peace without annexations and indemnities, and the recogni tion of the right of self-determination for all peoples." This was accepted by the Central Powers, but only on condition that it should be agreed to by all the belligerent powers as the basis of a general peace. In the event of their refusing, the Central Powers reserved a free hand in dealing with Russia alone. On Dec. 28 at the close of the preliminary discussions, the Russians were allowed 10 days in which to secure the adhesion of the Entente Powers.
When the conference reopened on Jan. 7 the situation had changed for the worse. The Entente Powers having refused the Russian proposal, it was now a question of concluding a separate peace. The Russians and Ukrainians were now at open war; the latter insisted on negotiating a separate peace and demanded the recognition of their independence—which was conceded by the Central Powers on Jan. 9. On this same day the negotiations with the Russians on territorial questions reached a deadlock. The Ger mans insisted that Poland, Courland, Lithuania, and parts of Li vonia and Esthonia had already determined to attach themselves to the Central Powers; the Russians demanded that a plebiscite should be taken after the withdrawal of the German troops. All efforts at compromise failed, and on Jan. 18 Trotsky left for Petrograd (Leningrad) .
The threatened breakdown of the negotiations was less alarm ing to Germany than to Austria-Hungary, whose internal condition was now desperate. To relieve this situation a separate peace with the Ukraine was proposed, and to this Germany readily assented since the sacrifices involved would be made by Austria-Hungary alone, while Germany would profit by the opening up of the corn supplies of southern Russia. The conditions demanded by the Ukrainians were severe and humiliating, and in order to avoid them Austria-Hungary renewed her efforts to make peace with Russia. But Trotsky, who returned on the 3oth, was in no mood for compromise. He could sign a peace, he said, in which Russia would be frankly coerced, but could not declare in Art. I. that there were no annexations and then in Art. II. agree to such an nexations. Russia would bow to facts, but would not give "a cer tificate of morality" to the victors. Thus, after eight days of futile debate, the deadlock continued.
The military, who had throughout hampered the work of Kuhl mann and Czernin, were now definitely in the ascendant. On Feb. 18 Germany denounced the armistice and invaded Estonia, her troops reaching the shores of Lake Peipus. On Feb. 19, Petro grad being immediately threatened, Lenin and Trotsky sued for peace, accepting the conditions laid down at Brest-Litovsk. The Germans, however, now delivered an ultimatum embodying fresh demands, including the German occupation of Estonia and Livonia, to which the Russians agreed on Feb. 24. On Feb. 26 the Russian delegation once more appeared at Brest-Litovsk, with Sokolnikov as its chief spokesman.
The proceedings of the conference, which met on March 1, were short. Sokolnikov announced that Russia accepted all the condi tions "dictated to her by Germany sword in hand." In vain the Central Powers protested that the ultimatum had contained the results of weeks of discussion. Sokolnikov declared that there could be no question of discussing the treaties "in this atmosphere of force," and that they would sign the drafts submitted to them "under the eyes of the workmen, soldiers and peasants of all the world, who would judge these treaties." Without further debate the treaty with Russia was signed on March 3.
BIBLIOGRAPHY.—Gustav Gratz and Richard Schuller, Die Aussere Bibliography.—Gustav Gratz and Richard Schuller, Die Aussere Wirtschaftspolitik Osterreiclz-Ungarns. vol. ii. "Die Friedensverhand lungen in Brest-Litovsk" (Carnegie Endowment, 1925) ; Eng. tr. The Economic Policy of Austria-Hungary during the War, with introd., by W. Alison Phillips, Yale University Press, 1927. U.S.A. Dept. of State, Proceedings of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Conference, Nov. 21, 1917-March 3, 1918 (1918) ; H. W. V. Temperley, The Peace Confer ence in Paris, vol. i. pp. 221-235 ; Ottokar Count Czernin, In the World War (Eng. tr. 1919). (W. A. P.)