CAMBRAI, BATTLE OF. In the history of the World War of 1914-18 this battle, fought in Nov.–Dec. 1917, stands out as a landmark in the history of warfare. On Nov. 20, 1917, the British 3rd Army launched an attack, based on a new method, with an initial success so striking that on the morrow the bells of London were rung in joyous acclaim of the "victory." Little more than a week later, on Nov. 3o, after the hopes of exploiting the success had already faded, there came a German retort so full of menace that the public thereafter showed a strong distaste for premature celebrations. Yet if the battle in itself was a tragedy of error and missed opportunities, its eventual effect on the for tunes of the Allies was beneficent—it pointed the way to the vic torious method of 1913.
On Aug. 3, 1917, an alternative proposal was drawn up at Tank Corps headquarters by the chief general staff officer, Col. Fuller. The preface to it contained this significant example of prevision: " . . . from a tank point of view the third battle of Ypres may be considered dead. To go on using tanks in the present con dition will not only lead to good machines and better personnel being thrown away, but also to a loss of morale in the infantry and tank crews through constant failure. From an infantry point of view the third battle of Ypres may be considered comatose. It can only be continued at colossal loss and little gain. . ." Then came the alternative proposal, to restore British prestige, before the winter set in, by a tank blow against St. Quentin, as a strategical prelude to an advance towards Valenciennes the fol lowing spring. Discussion of this project brought out the objec tion that it required a combined British and French operation, which might lack the simplicity and smooth working essential to a novel method. Therefore, on Aug. 4, a second project was framed, for a great tank raid south of Cambrai. The word raid should be stressed, for, as originally conceived, the object was to destroy the enemy's personnel and guns, to demoralize and disorganize him, and not to capture ground." As the preliminary notes stated, "the duration of the raid must be short—eight to 12 hours—so that little or no concentration of the enemy may be effected for counter-attacks." Had this plan been followed there would have been no need to lament Nov. 3o. For the raid a force of six tank battalions, sup ported by "one, or better two," divisions with extra artillery, was suggested, operating on an 8,000yd. front. The object, as pro posed, was "to raid the re-entrant formed by the L'Escaut canal between Ribecourt-Crevecoeur-Banteux." The raiding force was to be divided into three groups, the main one to scour this canal enclosed pocket, while the smaller groups formed offensive flanks on each side to protect the main operation.
The detailed project, from which the foregoing are extracts, was taken to Gen. Byng, commander of the 3rd Army, on Aug. 5. On Aug. 6 Byng went to G.H.Q., saw the commander-in-chief, and suggested an attack with tanks on Sept. 20. Sir Douglas Haig is understood to have been favourable to the idea, but counter arguments, for concentrating every possible man in the Ypres area delayed its adoption. However, the continued lack of def inite success at Ypres lent emphasis to an alternative, and on Sept. 7, as a result of a consultation at 3rd Army headquarters, a letter was addressed by Tanks Corps headquarters to G.H.Q. asking that the tanks might be withdrawn from the Ypres area, and suggesting two operations, one on the 1st Army front and one on the 3rd.
On Sept I I G.H.Q. approved the withdrawal of the bulk of the tanks and gave instructions to the Tank Corps to reconnoitre the Lens front (1st Army) . After a report and project had been submitted to G.H.Q. the area was changed back to Cambrai, and on Oct. 25 the first general conference on the Cambrai operation was held. The date had been fixed for Nov. 20. Among the fac tors which induced the British command to approve the Cambrai scheme were the need of disarranging the enemy's plans of with drawing troops from France to strengthen the Austro-German thrust against Italy, and the urgency of striking any such blow before the stream of German reinforcements released by the Rus sian revolution could swell to its full strength. Despite the heavy drain on British resources, caused by the Ypres offensive, these arguments prevailed.
The 3rd Army plan was (a) to break the German defensive system, the famous Hindenburg line, in the neck of land between the Canal de L'Escaut and the Canal du Nord; (b) to seize Cambrai, Bourlon wood and the passages over the river Sensee; (c) to cut off the Germans in the area south of the Sensee and west of the Canal du Nord; and (d) to exploit the success to wards Valenciennes. The force allotted for this ambitious plan was the 3rd and 4th Army Corps, comprising six divisions and part of another, the Cavalry Corps of two divisions, 381 fighting tanks and approximately i ,000 guns. They were to be employed on a front extending from Gonnelieu to Havrincourt wood. The Ger man defences opposing them consisted of the Hindenburg line system, and behind this the Hindenburg reserve line and the un finished Beaurevoir-Masnieres line. Thus of the original project there remained only the fundamental idea—the massed tank sur prise, the tank method and the locality.
In the alterations to the original plan lay the germ of disaster. The raid had been transformed into a large-scale offensive, with far-reaching aims. Instead of scouring a pocket and withdraw ing, an organized advance was to be made up a narrow lane bounded by two canals. As protection to a raid, these became a danger to such an attack, circumscribing the action of the tanks and preventing the formation of tank offensive flanks. Otherwise the ground was good, and ideally chosen indeed for the original purpose, being mostly rolling downland, excellent for tank move ment. It was marked by two features, the Flesquieres-Havrin court ridge and Bourlon hill.
The fundamental weakness of the plan was not topographical, but the almost complete lack of reserves. To undertake such an important operation in such a condition was surely a violation of one of the cardinal axioms of war. There were local reserves, naturally, in most divisions, but there was no general reserve, un less the two cavalry divisions can be considered such—and, apart from their limited strength, the futility of so regarding them was amply shown in their fresh inability, in face of modern weapons, to influence the action.
The six divisions employed in the initial attack were all that the 3rd Army commander had at his disposal, for a plan that visualized a penetration beyond Cambrai towards Valenciennes. It is difficult to understand what was in mind as to the future, for without reserves complete success could only mean the crea tion of an excessively deep and narrow salient, requiring many divisions to hold it. It is true that the Guards and one or two other divisions could be made available, and were ultimately brought to the scene, but they were too far away for prompt intervention. The situation, indeed, had some reminder of Loos. The French also moved a special force forward in readiness to co-operate, but their aid was not called upon.
If the excuse be that the third battle of Ypres had drained the British of reserves, then it surely reflects on the choice of that swamp-like area and the failure to try earlier the method that at Cambrai unlocked the doors to decisive success. On the other hand, it may be urged that G.H.Q. put an initial time-limit of 48 hours on the operation. To this the reply is that if the lack of resources was appreciated, the objectives were excessively am bitious, and that the powerful raid originally proposed was far more in accordance with the principle of security than an offen sive involving occupation of newly consolidated positions.
Turning now to the tank plan, the problems were to gain sur prise, to cross the wide and deep obstacle of the Hindenburg line and to ensure co-operation between the infantry and tanks for their common security. Careful organization and the absence of a preliminary bombardment contributed to the accomplishment of the first object. The difficulty presented by the Hindenburg line was overcome by devising super-fascine, huge bundles of brush wood, which were carried on the nose of each tank and released on reaching the edge of the Hindenburg trenches; the tanks, working in sections of three, had thus the power to cross three successive obstacles. Thirdly, a strictly drill attack was worked out and practised, by which in each section an advanced guard tank moved about i ooyd. ahead of the two main body tanks, keeping down the enemy's fire and protecting the main body as they led the infantry forward. The infantry, moving in flexible file formations, followed immediately behind the main body tanks. While the tanks cleared a way for them through the deep belts of enemy wire and subdued the hostile machine-gun fire, the infantry acted as "moppers-up" to the tanks and were also ready to protect them from the enemy's guns at close quarters. The one fault of the tank plan was that, against expert advice, the tanks attacked on the whole frontage instead of against se lected tactical points, with the result that no tank reserve was kept for use in the later stages.
The Battle.—The preparations for the battle were made with great skill and secrecy, while to mislead the enemy as to the scale and frontage of the attack, gas and smoke attacks, dummy attacks with dummy tanks, raids and feints, were carried out on a wide front both north and south of the real sector of attack. At 6.2o A.M. on Nov. 20 the tanks and infantry moved forward to the attack on roughly a six-mile front, achieving complete sur prise and a demoralizing initial success at all points, save in the left centre in front of Flesquieres. The cause of this one serious check appears to have been that the 51st Division here adopted forma tions of its own instead of conforming to those devised by the Tank Corps and adopted in all the other divisions. Whatever the reason, the result was that the infantry fell too far behind the tanks, lost the gaps in the wire and were stopped by machine. gun fire. This loss of touch lay also at the root of the losses which befell the tanks when they came over the ridge and under the close fire of several German batteries, for infantry accompany ing them could have picked off the gunners.
But the effect of this battlefield incident has been unduly mag nified. On the right the 12th, 2oth and 6th Divisions secured their objectives rapidly, though the i 2th had severe fighting at Lateau wood. The 29th Division passed through and captured Masnieres and Marcoing, securing the passage of the canal at both and even the bridge intact at the latter. On the left the 51st and 62nd Divisions made a brilliant advance, advancing by night fall as far as Anneux, over 2m. in the rear of Flesquieres. The Flesquieres resistance was thus only an islet, cut off and over lapped by the waves which swept round its flanks and on to Mar coing, Anneux and even to the edge of Bourlon wood. A pene tration of 5m. had been made—the equivalent of months of heavy fighting and heavier losses on the Somme and at the third battle at Ypres. Decisive success was within the grasp of the British forces, the enemy's main defence systems had been over run, only a half-finished line and the open country lay beyond. But the original divisions and the tank crews were exhausted, and apart from one squadron of the Canadian Fort Garry Horse the two cavalry divisions could contribute nothing toward fulfilling their role of exploitation.
On Nov. 21 local reserves made some further progress. The village of Flesquieres fell at 8 A.M., and the 5ist and 62nd Di visions pressed rapidly on, clearing the German salient formed by this resistance on the first day and carrying the tide of the Brit ish advance as far as Fontaine-Notre-Dame, ism. beyond the high-water mark of Nov. 20. But on the right, little ground was gained—a relieving German division had arrived just in time to occupy the rear defence. The High Command's time-limit of 48 hours had expired, but owing to the menace of the uncaptured Bourlon hill, to the new British position, as well as to the hope of an enemy withdrawal and the desire to relieve the enemy pressure on Italy, the commander-in-chief decided to continue the offensive, placing a few fresh divisions at the disposal of the 3rd Army. But the Tank Corps, the essential cause of the early suc cess, was tired out, men and machines—all had been staked on the first throw. The fresh attacks met with more failure than success against an enemy now braced to meet the danger.
The German Counter-Attq.ck.—On Nov. 22 the Germans re captured Fontaine-Notre-Dame; on the 23rd, the 4oth Division with tanks captured the whole of Bourlon wood, but the attempts on Bourlon village and Fontaine-Notre-Dame failed. Bitter and fluctuating fighting followed ; Bourlon and Fontaine-Notre Dame were won and lost again, and meanwhile there were signs of a strong German counter-thrust against the already over-strained attackers, most of whom had been kept in action unrelieved since Nov. 20. Unfortunately, moreover, warnings of the storm were received with scepticism in some of the higher commands. In the early morning of Nov. 3o the blow fell, the German army commander, von der Marwitz, making a convergent attack against the northern and southern flanks of the salient which the British advance had created. In the north, round Bourlon wood, the at tack was stopped of ter bitter fighting, but in the south, where the blow fell on the joint of the salient and also on the weakly held front to the south, it broke right through. This was a finely planned surprise assault, unheralded by any preliminary bom bardment, and made more effective by the cloud of gas and smoke shells. Villers Guislain and Gonnelieu soon f ell, and the thrust penetrated deeply behind the old British front line as far as Gou zeaucourt, overrunning gun positions and headquarters. Disaster was only averted by the superb counter-attack of the Guards Division, which recaptured Gouzeaucourt, and later, of the 2nd Tank Brigade, which brought out the value of this arm for defence.
Fresh attacks on Bourlon and Masnieres f ailed, but further German progress was made towards Villers Plouich. The British position in the Masnieres-Bourlon salient was thus rendered so precarious that on the night of Dec. 4-5 most of the salient was evacuated and the line drawn back roughly to the Flesquieres ridge. Although the result left the British with a slight gain of ground on balance, and better still had a helpful influence on the Italian campaign, Cambrai would be remembered mainly as a tragedy of mistaken aims and lost opportunities, were it not for its revelation of a new key to victory, turned to effect in 1918.