Battles of the Carpathians

CARPATHIANS, BATTLES OF THE. Under this heading is recorded the fighting of the first four months of 1915 in the wooded Carpathians, from the Dukla pass, south of Jaslo, to the Rumanian border. The average height of the crest of the main ridge in this section of the range is between 2,50o and 3,000ft. The slopes are steep on the Galician side, gentler on the Hungarian side. The winter climate is extremely severe, the temperature being of ten many degrees below zero ; snowstorms and blizzards are frequent. Why both sides chose these inhospit able highlands for a winter battle—for each side in turn attacked in great strength—invites some examination.

Object of the Operations.

For Austro-Hungary the main motives were the relief of the fortress of Przemysl and the security of the threatened plains of Hungary. But Conrad von Hotzen dorf, Chief of the Austrian General Staff, hoped for more; the attacks, if successful, would develop into a large scale offensive against the southern flank of the whole Russian battle line. On the Russian side, the Grand Duke Nicholas sought during this winter to secure his flanks as the necessary preliminary to a direct advance from the Polish salient aimed at the heart of Germany. The undisputed possession of the Carpathian passes, with freedom to debouch at will into the Hungarian plains below, would go far towards breaking the resistance of Austro-Hungary and so safeguarding the Russian southern flank. The grand duke trusted to the greater endurance of his men under winter conditions to give them the advantage over enemies bred in less rigorous climates. He forgot that the Russian is a plainsman, and that hill fighting requires a special aptitude and training.

By the end of 1914 a continuous front had been established in the Carpathians only as far east as Baligrod. Thence to the Rumanian frontier the conditions were those of open warfare; detachments on either side attacked and defended points of strategic importance, but no solid battle line had been formed.

Disposition of Troops.

The disposition of the opposing forces when the campaign opened in mid-January were approxi mately as follows : The Russian III. Army (Radko-Dimitriev) extended from the Vistula, north-east of Cracow, by Tarnov to about Gorlice; on its left came Brusilov's VIII. Army, which stretched from Gorlice to Baligrod and held the important Dukla pass. Farther east, Webel's Dniester group (second-line infan try divisions and Cossacks) had pushed up the slopes of the Eastern Carpathians, capturing the Uzsok and Wyszkow passes and overrunning the Bukovina. The XI. Army was besieging Przemysl. On the Austrian side, the IV. Army (Grand Duke Joseph Ferdinand) faced Radko-Dimitriev, and Boroevich's III. Army was opposed to Brusilov. Farther east, Linsingen's newly formed Southern German Army (four German and two Austrian divisions and two cavalry divisions) had assembled at Munkacs and was moving forward. Farther east still, beyond the Wyszkow pass, the group of Pflanzer-Baltin extended up to Dorna-Vatra on the Rumanian border.

Austrian Offensive.—The Austrian offensive, which opened the campaign, was made by the right of Boroevich's III. Army, by Linsingen's Southern Army and by Pflanzer-Baltin's group. The offensive began on Jan. 23, 1915. The attack of the III. Army, after an initial success which carried it to the line of the Upper San, soon lost its impetus. The Russians retaliated with a counter-offensive which began on Jan. 26 against the left of Boroevich's Army astride the Mezo Laborcz railway; from now to the end of the battle the Russians maintained the initiative in this part of the field, to which both sides began to transfer forces from other sectors of the front. Linsingen's Southern Army recaptured the Uzsok and Wyszkow passes and pushed slowly forward on Tuchla, but with the III. Army on its left fall ing back before the Russian counter-attacks could accomplish little. Meanwhile, Pflanzer-Baltin, whose group had been rein forced in the last week of January by a fresh corps, drove the Russians out of the Bukovina with his right wing, while his left wing reached in succession Kolomea, Nadworna, and finally, on Feb. 20, Stanislau. He now purposed to wheel to the left, to come in on the flank and rear of the Russian forces facing Lin singen. This move was checked by the assembly to the north and west of Stanislau of Lechitski's IX. Army, which had been transferred from the Russian front in Poland.

Attempt to Relieve Przemysl.—During the first half of February the Austrians transferred the II. Army (Bohm-Ermolli) from the Polish to the Carpathian front, with the intention of making a last attempt to relieve Przemysl. By the end of Febru ary, when this II. Army was ready to advance, the situation of the Austrian forces in the Carpathians seemed critical, in spite of their numerical superiority. The left of Boroevich's III. Army had almost reached breaking point under the continual pressure of Brusilov's forces, which had captured Mezo Laborcz and the Lupkow pass; Linsingen's Army held its ground, but could make no headway; Pflanzer-Baltin's Army was threatened by Lechitski's concentration; and Przemysl was in sore straits. The offensive of the II. Army, if it was to restore the situation, required a rapid and striking success. The principal offensive was made in the direction of Baligrod, astride the shortest road to Przemysl. At no time did the attack meet with any great measure of success; and by the middle of March it was stopped as hopeless, the Austrians being completely exhausted by the weather and their heavy losses. The formations which had borne the brunt of the assaults had lost over 5o% of their strength. Przeniysl was now abandoned to its fate.

Meanwhile, during the first fortnight in March, Lechitski's forces had driven Pflanzer-Baltin some tom. back from Stanislau and had reached the line of the Prut in northern Bukovina. An opportune reinforcement enabled Pflanzer-Baltin to check the Russian advance. There was some further fighting ; but little material change took place in this eastern portion of the battle field up to the end of April.

Russian Offensive.—On March 20 the Russians, now sure of the fortress of Przemysl (it actually fell on March 22) launched a final great offensive against the Austrian III. and II. Armies. The attack was made by the left wing of Radko-Dimitriev's III. Army, which had been extended eastwards, and by Brusi lov's VIII. Army. For a month their effort lasted. Both the Austrian Armies were driven over the crest of the main ridge. But both managed to maintain their positions on the other side of it, though it was only the arrival of fresh German divisions (the Beskiden corps) which saved the III. Army from breaking. Linsingen's Southern Army obstinately withstood all shocks and indeed made some ground forward. It held fast to the important Uzsok pass. By April 20 the Russians paused, breathless. They had appreciably enlarged their gains south of the Dukla pass, but their effort to break through the Austrian front had failed.

Conclusions.—It is a little difficult to arrive at a just balance of profit and loss between the two antagonists in this long drawn out struggle. The Austrians seem to have attached undue im portance to their fortress of Przemysl ; their obstinate efforts to relieve it brought them to the verge of collapse and cost them heavier losses in men than did the eventual surrender of the garrison. The Russians, though they secured a "bridge-head" over the barrier of the Carpathians, did not succeed in forcing the obstacle, and squandered valuable resources in men and munitions by their persistence.

The result showed in fact that both commanders had been ill-advised to embark on this winter battle. On the whole the consequences were more disastrous for the Russians, whose ob session with this Carpathian struggle induced them to withdraw two corps from the right wing of their III. Army, and was thus a direct cause of its crushing defeat by Mackensen at the beginning of May (see DUNAJEC-SAN). No special lessons of tactics can be drawn from the fighting. The conditions of weather and ground were against elaboration of manoeuvre. Hill fighting re quires a degree of individual skill and of tactical leadership which neither side possessed.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

C. Monckeberg, Unter Linsingen in den Karpathen Bibliography.—C. Monckeberg, Unter Linsingen in den Karpathen (1917) ; B. Gourko, Memories and Impressions of War and Revolution in Russia (1918) ; Sir A. Knox, With the Russian Army 1914-17 (1921) ; M. Schwarte, Der Grosse Krieg 1914-18 (1921, etc.) ; J. E. Edmonds, History of the Great War (1922, etc.) ; see also WORLD WAR: Bibliography. (A. P. W.)