CARTAGENA or CARTHAGENA, a city of south-east ern Spain, in the province of Murcia, on the Mediterranean sea, and terminus of a branch railway from Murcia. Pop. (1930) 102,518. Cartagena stands at the head of a splendid natural har bour whose easy defence has made it the chief naval base of Spain, with arsenal and dockyards ranking with those of Ferrol and San Fernando near Cadiz. The city occupies a small lowland at the north end of the bay; is fairly modern and uninteresting ex cept for remnants of old walls and castle overlooking the harbour. It is an episcopal see. On the north-east a fertile valley gives access to the interior but on the west, south-west and south-east the port is surrounded by high mountains. The harbour, the larg est in Spain after that of Vigo, and the finest on the east coast, is a deep spacious bay, dominated, on the seaward side, by f our hills, crowned with forts, and approached by a narrow entrance guarded by batteries and a torpedo station. The outer bay is sheltered by the island of La Escombrera, the ancient Scombraria (i.e., "mackerel fishery") 21m. S., and the harbour by a break water on its eastern side. On the north-west lies the Arsenal basin, often regarded as the original harbour of the Carthaginians and Romans, and the naval shipbuilding yards, with a dry and a float ing dock. There are valuable mines near the town, producing lead, silver-lead, zinc, iron, copper and sulphur, and a mineral railway from Los Blancos, passing through the chief mining and smelting district of La Union, 6m. E. of the town, runs on to the quay in Cartagena harbour. The city exports the ores, but also has important smelting works, chiefly located in the Santa Lucia suburb east of the bay. Glass and esparto fabrics are other manufactures. The industrial and commercial progress of Car tagena was much hindered, during the first half of the 19th cen tury, by the prevalence of epidemic diseases, the abandonment of the arsenal, and rivalry with the neighbouring port of Alicante. Its sanitary condition, though still defective, was improved by the drainage of the adjacent Almajar marsh, and after 1870 Cartagena advanced rapidly in size and wealth. The opening of the rail way enabled it to compete for a time with Alicante, and revived the mining and metallurgical in dustries, while the coast and land defences were modernized and new quays, docks and other harbour works were added. As a naval station, Cartagena suf fered severely in 1898 from the maritime disasters of the Span ish-American War, but since the decree of 1908 for bringing the Spanish navy up to date considerable naval construction has gone on in the port. As a gen eral commercial port Cartagena has been adversely affected since the beginning of the loth cen tury by the increasing importance of Barcelona, Malaga and Alicante on the same coast. It exports some olive oil, dried fruits and esparto grass, and imports coal, coke and machinery from Great Britain, timber from the United States and dried cod-fish from Norway and Newfoundland, but it is above all a mineral port. Even this activity has been somewhat reduced since the establishment in 1898 of Portman, a mining village on a sheltered bay I'm. E., an independent port which, connected by rail with La Union, imports coke and coal, and exports iron ore and lead.
Cartagena was founded about the year 243 B.C. by the Cartha ginian, Hasdrubal, probably on the site of a much older town, and was called Carthago Nova or New Carthage, to distinguish it from the African city of Carthage. It was conveniently situated opposite to the Carthaginian territory in Africa, and was early noted for its harbour. Its silver and gold mines were the source of great wealth both to the Carthaginians and to the Romans. In 210 B.C. this important place, the headquarters and treasure city of the Punic army, was taken with great slaughter by P. Scipio (see below). The city continued to flourish under the Romans, who made it a colony, with the name Colonia Victrix Iulia Nova Carthago. In A.D. 425 it was pillaged and nearly de stroyed by the Goths. Cartagena was a bishopric from about 400 to 1289, when the see was removed to Murcia. Under the Moors it became an independent principality, which was destroyed by Ferdinand II. of Castile in 1243, restored by the Moors, and finally conquered by James I. of Aragon in 1269. It was rebuilt and fortified by Philip II. of Spain (1527-98) for the sake of its harbour. In the War of the Spanish Succession it was occu pied by Sir John Leake in 5706 and by the duke of Berwick in 1707. On Nov. 5, 1823, it capitulated to the French. Cartagena took part in the revolutionary movement of 1844 and in 1873 was bombarded by the Spanish fleet under Admiral Lobos. The city was occupied by Government troops on Jan. 12, 1874. It was the Loyalist naval base during the civil war of See G. Vicent y Portillo, Biblioteca hist6rica de Cartagena (1889, etc.) ; I. Martinez Rito, Fechos y fechas de Cartagena (Cartagena, 1894) ; P. Diaz Casson, Serie de los obispos de Cartagena (1895) ; I. M. Ibanez Garcia, Biblioteca de la Santa Iglesia Catedral de Cartagena en Murcia (Cartagena, 1924).
He had learned that New Carthage itself was weakly garrisoned —both because of its supposed impregnability and because "no one dreamt that while the Carthaginians were masters of nearly the whole of Spain it would enter any one's head to besiege the city" (Polybius). The main Carthaginian forces were distributed in three armies, one in central Spain, one near Gibraltar, one near modern Lisbon, and none of them within less than ten days' march of New Carthage, while the Romans, as the event proved, were within seven days' forced marches of it, and had an additional interval of grace in the time that news would take to reach them.
On the seventh day from the start of the march Scipio arrived before the city and encamped, the fleet arriving simultaneously in the harbour, thus cutting off communication on all sides. This harbour formed a circular bottle, its mouth almost corked by an island, while Cartagena itself was like a candle stuck in the bottom of the bottle, the city standing on a narrow rocky spit of land pro truding from the mainland. This small peninsula bore a distinct resemblance to Gibraltar, and the isthmus joining it to the main land was only about 400 yd. across. The city was guarded on two sides by the sea, and on the west by a lagoon. Here was a hard nut to crack, seemingly impregnable to any action save a blockade, and of this time did not permit. The Carthaginian commander, Mago, armed 2,000 of the sturdiest citizens and posted them by the landward gate for a sortie. The rest he distributed to defend the walls to the best of their power, while of his own regulars he disposed 500 in the citadel on the top of the peninsula, and 500 on the eastern hill.
Next day Scipio encircled the city with ships, throwing a con stant stream of missiles, and about the third hour—the Roman day began at sunrise—sent forward along the isthmus 2,000 picked men with ladder bearers, for its narrowness prevented a stronger force being deployed. Appreciating the handicap of their cramped position if counter-attacked by the yet unshaken defenders, he astutely designed to turn this handicap to his own advantage. The expected sortie came as soon as Scipio sounded the bugle for assault, and a close-matched struggle ensued. "But as the assist ance sent to either side was not equal, the Carthaginians arriving through a single gate and from a longer distance, the Romans from close by and from several points, the battle for this reason was an unequal one. For Scipio had purposely posted his men close to the camp itself in order to entice the enemy as far out as pos sible"—Livy says the Roman advanced troops retired, according to orders, on the reserves—"well knowing that if he destroyed those who were, so to speak, the steel edge of the population he would cause universal dejection, and none of those inside would venture out of the gate" (Polybius). The Carthaginian sortie was driven back, the pursuit being pressed so promptly that the Romans nearly succeeded in forcing an entrance on the heels of the fugitives. Even as it was, the scaling-ladders were put up in full security, but the great height of the walls hampered the escaladers, and the assault was beaten off. Polybius gives a picture of the Roman commander during this phase which reveals how he combined personal influence and control with the duty of avoid ing rash exposure : "Scipio took part in the battle, but studied his safety as far as possible, for he had with him three men carrying large shields, who, holding these close, covered the surface exposed to the wall, and thus afforded him protection." ". . . thus he could both see what was going on, and being seen by all his men he inspired the combatants with great spirit." Scipio had achieved his first object of wearing down the de fenders and checking the likelihood of further interference with his plans from Carthaginian sorties. The way was thus paved for his next and decisive move. While at Tarraco, from enquiries among fishermen who knew Cartagena, he had learnt that at certain times the lagoon was fordable. For this project he as sembled 500 men with ladders on the shore of the lagoon, and meanwhile reinforced his contingent in the isthmus with both men and ladders, enough to ensure that in the next direct assault "the whole extent of the walls should be covered with escaladers"—an early example of the modern tactical axiom that a "fixing" attack should be on the broadest possible front in order to occupy the enemy's attention. He launched this assault simultaneously with a landing attack by the fleet, and when it was at its height "the water gradually receded from the edge of the lagoon, a strong and deep current setting in through the channel to the adjoining sea, so that to those who were not prepared for the sight the thing ap peared incredible. But Scipio had his guides ready, and bade all the men told off for this service enter the water and have no fear. He possessed a particular talent for inspiring confidence and sym pathy in his troops when he called upon them. "Now when they obeyed and raced through the shallow water, it struck the whole army that it was the work of some god . . . and their courage was redoubled" (Polybius). Of this episode Livy says : "Scipio, credit ing this discovery, due to his own diligence and penetration, to the gods and to miracle . . . ordered them to follow Neptune as their guide" ; but it is interesting to see that, while exploiting the moral effect of this idea, he made practical use of less divine guides. The soo passed without difficulty through the lagoon, reached the wall, and mounted it without opposition, because all the defenders "were engaged in bringing succour to that quarter in which the danger appeared." "The Romans having once taken the wall, at first marched along it, sweeping the enemy off it." They were clearly imbued with the principle that a penetration must be promptly widened before it is deepened. Next they converged on the landward gate, already assailed in front, and, taking the de fenders in rear and by surprise, overpowered the resistance and opened the way for the main body of the attackers. The walls thus captured, Scipio at once exploited his success. For while the mass of those who had by now scaled the walls set about the cus tomary massacre of the townsmen, Scipio took care to keep in regular formation those who entered by the gate, and led them against the citadel. Here Mago, once he "saw that the city had undoubtedly been captured," surrendered.
Leaving New Carthage strongly garrisoned, Scipio himself fell back on Tarraco, allowing the moral influence of his success to sink into the minds of the Spanish and thus gain their support be fore taking the offensive anew.
For ancient authorities see Polybius x. 2-2o; Livy xxvi. 42. Modern Works: B. H. Liddell Hart, A Greater than Napoleon— Scipio Africanus (1926) ; Kromayer Veith, Schlachtenatlas (1922) for topography.