CARTESIANS, the name by which the followers of the French philosopher, Descartes, and his school are now generally known. The word was taken from the last syllable of the founder's name, and although Spinoza and Leibnitz are sometimes included among Cartesians, their modifications ultimately exclude them. The accomplishments of Descartes' followers cannot be properly understood or estimated apart from a survey of the deficiencies in his philosophy that remained to be made good. These may be reduced to five. (1) Descartes concludes that physical bodies and particular selves or minds form two separate classes of substances. Their existential independence and complete qualitative dissimi larity is guaranteed by the fact that we can have a clear and dis tinct idea of each of them without having to think of the other. But man is, in some sense, "a unity" of the two, an embodied mind. In him, these two independent substances co-exist. So one task Descartes leaves for completion is that of explaining how, if these substances are disparate in existence and nature, their unity is to be conceived. Arnauld questioned the validity of this conclusion, but Geulincx, admitting it, supplies an answer to the problem. (2) Minds and bodies being disparate, it followed, Descartes thought, that there was no causal interaction between them. States of mind could not cause bodily changes, nor could the latter cause the former. Descartes restricts himself to this negative conclusion, offering no account of the causation of mental or physical events. The theory of Occasionalism, in the "restricted" form invented by Geulincx, and in the "complete" form of Malebranche, supple ments this defect by an extension of Cartesian principles. (3) If body and mind are separate substances, what is their relation to God? For God also is a substance, and one that is infinite and complete. But a substance is that which depends on nothing else for its existence, so it should follow that mind and body are inde pendent of God. But Descartes had previously argued that their nature and existence depended on God. The contradiction is not removed by his subsequent distinction between God as genuine substance, and body and mind as "secondary" ones. This verbal emendation is without logical efficacy and simply amounts to a piece of theological etiquette. It is the Occasionalism of Geulincx and Malebranche which removes this difficulty, though only at the cost of introducing a new one. (4) Descartes' statements about the nature of ideas were deficient in detail. Malebranche considers himself to supplement them by his theory of ideas and his "vision in God." This emendation is the subject of a controversy with Ar nauld, which, though violent, had fruitful consequences for all subsequent philosophy. (5) Descartes developed no strictly ethi cal theory, though his Passions of the Soul would have constituted its psychological basis, if he had done so. He writes to Chanut (1646), prior to his unfortunate visit to the Queen of Sweden, that ethics was a province on which he dared not enter, for professors had fallen into a passion even on account of his harmless principles of physics; they would give him no rest if he wrote on ethics. This prediction seems to have been fully borne out in the unhappy and persecuted life of his follower, Geulincx, who completed the Cartesian system with an important treatise on Ethics.
Minor Cartesians.—The new Rationalistic philosophy speedily became a subject of admiration for the best scholars of the time, and a ground of persecution for its ecclesiastical detractors. Des cartes himself stood aloof from the melee of enthusiasm and vitu peration so far as was humanly possible. Regius (Henry le Roy) had introduced Cartesian physiology into his lectures in medicine at the University of Utrecht, but the worth of his zeal is dubious. His text-book on physics (Fundamenta physicae) contained so many unproved assertions and reduced the Cartesian dualism of body and mind to a materialism, that Descartes had publicly to disclaim responsibility for it. More important is Sylvain Regis, whose System de pliilosophie (169o) shows the first definite move towards an Occasionalism. God is the only substance, therefore the only genuine cause. Physical and mental events have only "secondary" causes, bodies and minds are merely instruments which manifest God's causality. The self is not independently active though it does independently determine the character which the communicated activity shall manifest; thus it is a "director" but not a "producer" of changes. Body and mind, however, are still conceived as separate, events in one occurring collaterally with those in the other. Louis de la Forge maintains substantially the same view, but with this significant difference. The self is a genu ine cause of all changes voluntarily and consciously initiated, God causing only those changes that are involuntary and unconsciously brought about. Geraud de Cordemoy reaffirms (Dissertations pliilosopliiques sur le discernement de fame et du corps) the con tention of Regis, that God alone is genuinely causative. Bodies, not being possessed of volition, cannot cause changes either in other bodies or in minds. Movement is not imparted from one body to another, but from God to each. The self can cause its own volitions, though again, their occurrence is only the occasion on which God causes an external change to occur, corresponding to the purpose willed. So the efficient cause of a movement in our body, whether willed by us or not, is never our own self, but God. We neither produce nor "direct" physical changes or events. For this reason, John Clauberg inferred the uniform correspondence between the two orders of events to be a standing miracle. But the self can "direct" (determine the character of) the physical activity resulting in its own body on the occasion of particular volitions, though the body cannot likewise determine the character of mental events occurring in the self it embodies. In this way, Clauberg combines the views of de la Forge and Regis, but deviates from those of Cordemoy. These are brought to their logical completion by Geulincx.
So far then, only hesitant moves towards Occasionalism are traceable. But with Arnold Geulincx of Antwerp (1625-69), the doctrine is for the first time definitely elaborated. It is no longer merely proposed as an hypothesis, but an attempt is made to formulate it strictly and demonstrate it with certainty. His Meta physics falls into three divisions, viz., Autology, or Knowledge of Self ; Somatology or Rational Physics ; and Theology, though it is generally agreed that his finest work lies in moral philosophy, viz., the "TvcoOe aEavrOv, sive Ethica." Like Descartes, Geulincx sets himself methodically to doubt every belief which can be doubted, with the object of discovering one whose truth being self-evident constitutes a piece of certain knowledge. This he too finds in the Cogito, ergo sum; his own existence is the one thing with which he can be directly and indubitably acquainted. Descartes' construc tive use of the Cogito was to infer from it the epistemological principle that any other proposition which is equally clear and distinct is likewise true and certain, though he did not always respect the principle in practice. Geulincx's constructive use of the Cogito is to infer from it the principle that all activity of the self is conscious activity, no unconscious activity can be an activity of the self, and to this he does always strictly adhere. But interroga tion of the self so disclosed to inspection elicits seven clear and dis tinct beliefs, which are true, viz., (i.) that we conceive an external world, (ii.) of which we form a part, (iii.) that our self is related to our body, (iv.) that we did not produce the world, (v.) nor any of the movements in it, (vi.) that we did not produce our own body, (vii.) nor any of the changes in it. They are ordinary beliefs of common sense, except (v.) and (vii.), which follow by the prin ciple inferred from the Cogito, But self-examination further dis closes the presence to mind of very various sorts of thoughts, other than these beliefs, also the occurrence of different kinds of mental events. Hence, two fields of enquiry open out, viz., what is the character of our thoughts, volitions and mental activities generally, and of that which thinks and wills on such occasions? Now the f or mer are of indefinite variety, but the latter is single and simple (i.e., without parts and unchanging). Further examination of the infinite variety of thoughts, volitions and other mental activities shows that though they are all "ours," they are so in two quite dis tinct senses. Some mental activities are "ours," since it is our own self that wills them, or causes their occurrence; hence, they are dependent on our self for their existence. Other mental activities are "ours," in another sense, viz., that they occur "in" us, but are not caused by us. This distinction among our mental activities, according as they are, or are not, caused by us, is vital for Geulincx. We are the cause of all our mental states of which we know, not merely that they occurred, but also how they occurred. "If you do not know the means by which a thing is produced, it is not you who produced it"; i.e., if you are not acquainted with the entire course of events which led up to the occurrence of the state in question, it is a state causally independent of yourself. This fundamental principle of Geulincx is taken along with the Cogito, as being self-evidently true, and therefore a piece of certain knowl edge. Now the mode of production of all activity that is not caused by our self is to be conceived by analogy with that which is so caused. From which it follows that our independent states or activities are caused in us by some other individual who knows and wills them, and this can only be God. But although the causation of independent states can be assigned to God, the diversity of their characteristics cannot be so explained, for God, like the self, is simple, and thus not the ground of diversity. So, since everything which exists is either God or a self, or a body, and neither God nor a self can be the ground of diversity, it must be due to bodies. Hence the diversity of the extended world is the ground of the diversity in my experiences. So God's activity accounts for the fact of the occurrence, and Matter for the character, of our inde pendent states or of external events. Pure thought and volition are the two properties of the self, extension and mobility those of matter or bodies.
But among the many bodies in the world, one I recognize as being "mine." It is "mine" in the sense, not that my self can directly cause changes in it, but that it is through this body, and it alone that I come to have my "independent" experiences. What then is the relation of "my body" to me; what is meant by speak ing of "my" body? Strictly, Geulincx replies, it is meaningless to speak of my mind or self being "united" with my body. Had I no body, I should still have the idea of movement, though I should not experience those sensations that are aroused in me on the occa sion of movement in the outer physical world. A self is related to its body in being active or passive in respect of the changes that occur in it. This relationship between self and body, which consti tutes the two a human individual, is not initiated by any volition of that self. And when that relation ceases to relate its terms, i.e., at death, the self ceases, not from existing, nor from exercising its essential activity of thinking and willing, but only from experienc ing sensations and memories, for these depend on bodily changes. Hence, to be a man is not to be a self united to a body, but to be a self which is active and passive, relatively to some one and the same material body.
Ethics.—My own effective causation is limited to my volition. But it is possible for me to will, not merely changes whose occur rence is not caused by me, but changes which do not occur at all. Of all possible volitions, some only are effectual, and of these again, some only are permissible. And our knowledge of which effectual volitions are permissible depends on discovering the nature of divine thought and will. Hence virtuous conduct is the result of making our volitions conform to the divine reason, which is the expression of perfect rationality. Virtue is therefore de fined as "the unique love of right reason" (c f . Spinoza's "Intel lectual Love of God") . There are three kinds of love, viz., the determination to benefit (r) oneself, or (2) another, and (3) the love of reason. Love of self is the root of all moral evil, and the attainment of virtue involves both of the self's proper activities; reason, to ascertain what is the will of God, and volition, so as to will accordingly. Our volition so conformed will be the good will; we shall will to do what we see to be right simply because we see it to be right. So the source of all virtuous conduct is the good will, which is simply the determination to will only those actions which conform to reason. It is evinced in four classes of action, each of which manifests a specific or cardinal virtue, viz., dili gence, obedience, justice and humility. Diligence consists in with drawing our love from the external things of sense and, by means of self-examination, in becoming attentive to reason, which is conceived as an inward disclosure of which actions are right and which are wrong. These discovered, it remains to act in conform ity with them, and such action expresses the virtue of obedience. Our actions are just in proportion to the exactness with which our volitions conform to the requirements of reason, which sets the standard or mean. Failure to realize this virtue in our conduct shows that we have erred, by excess or defect, through yielding to non-rational motives or impulses. But the sum and complete realisation of all virtues is humility; if this be attained nothing is lacking. Humility in conduct is the manifestation through it of a true recognition and conception of self, and is the outcome of adequate self-examination. To know ourselves as we really are renders self-assertion impossible, for we see the futility of worldly desires which, issuing only from self-love, now cease from tor menting us. We realize our dependence on God. We recognize that the performance of our duty is required of us uncondition ally, and not because it will conduce to happiness or protect us from harm or suit our convenience in any other way or confer any benefit upon us.
The good, which is the end of all action, is defined as that which we rationally love, and evil, as that which we rationally dis like. The useful is only instrumental; the pleasant can only be the aim of self-love, but love of the good is an imperative of reason. Emotions and desires are really neither good nor bad. When we call them so, we mean simply that they are pleasant or painful. They have no ethical significance except in relation to the love of reason, when, as hindrances to its expression, they are bad. Self knowledge, then, brings resignation. He who is good and wise in his life renounces the world, its pleasures, honours and riches, and submits to the rational or divine order of life. So the connection between the nature of self and its place in the world, the relation between the autology and the ethics, becomes clear. Where we can do nothing we ought to will nothing. Now we cannot produce changes in our own body any more than in the world at large. Hence we should desire nothing for our body; our relation to the body is one of knowledge, not one of action. So renunciation of "the world and the flesh" follows : despectio sui is the consequence of inspectio sui.
The first philosophical contribution of worth from Antoine Arnauld (1612-94) is his Objections to the Meditations which Descartes had circulated for criticism prior to publishing. Discus sion centres in the main around the distinction between the human body and the human mind. Descartes had maintained that we can infer with certainty from our direct acquaintance with the self that its essential nature was unlike that of physical bodies. His critic admits this may be so but denies Descartes to have proved it. All that his argument establishes is that some trustworthy knowledge of the self is possible independently of any knowledge of the body. This does not warrant his asserting that the quality of being con scious exhausts the nature of the self, therefore he has no right to conclude that the self is not corporeal as well as conscious. Ar nauld expresses himself satisfied with Descartes' reply, though later he seems to return to a view in all essentials similar to that of his Objections.
But his principal work in philosophy is undoubtedly the treatise Des vraies et fausses ideas (1683), a most detailed and incisive refutation of the doctrine of Representative Ideas contained in Malebranche's De la Recherche de la Verite. Malebranche follows Descartes in dividing all existents into two qualitatively exclusive orders, the mental and the physical, and concludes that neither the senses nor imagination can yield us knowledge of external bodies, since the senses can only acquaint us with states of our own mind that occur collaterally with certain physiological changes in the brain. So when we say that we are aware of certain physical objects before us, what our mind is directly related to, Male branche argues, is not physical objects at all, but certain ideas of them. Physical objects cannot under any conditions cause our minds to know them for four reasons, (i.) because they are inferior in nature to mind, and (ii.) different from our minds in quality. Further, (iii.) causal action between finite existents is in any case impossible (cf. Occasionalism), and (iv.) the "local" difference, or spatial distance of physical objects from minds, renders direct knowledge of the former impossible, for "to know" is "to be inti mately connected with" what is known, and "intimate" connection is impossible at a distance. So whilst Descartes required four ulti mate terms with which to account for our knowledge of the material world (viz., God, selves, external objects and ideas) Malebranche, eliminating external objects, requires only three. Ideas are the only objects we can directly know (though we can be acquainted with our "feelings" and purely subjective states without "ideas") ; "God is the source, the reality and the place of ideas." So whenever we have knowledge, we are "seeing things in God." It is this theory of Ideas that Arnauld attacks with consummate logical skill and acumen in his Treatise on True and False Ideas. He first points out there is no sense in asking why the mind has perceptions, any more than wliy material bodies have shape, for it is just the nature of mind to be perceptive. Explanation of facts cannot reasonably be required ad infinitum. Malebranche, further, has used the term "idea" in varying senses throughout his arguments, to denote indifferently (i.) perception, (ii.) non-repre sentative entities, (iii.) particular existents, numerically distinct from perceptions and thoughts, yet indispensable for our aware ness of material things. So Arnauld first undertakes an analysis of the notion of "idea," and the result is an important distinction for epistemology. The Malebranche-Arnauld controversy then centres around the question whether there are "ideas" in the sense of sep arate mental entities which exist and represent to our minds what is non-mental, or physical in character. The word "idea" is am biguous. As popularly used it denotes a perceptual or cognitive act of some self ; as used by Malebranche, it denotes a representative entity, numerically distinct from cognitive acts and from physical things. In brief, Arnauld decides that the former sense is permis sible, but that the latter is a fiction invented simply on account of the fallacious assumption that mind, being mental, cannot be related by way of knowledge, to what is non-mental.
He next examines the grounds Malebranche adduces for demon strating the indispensability of representative ideas. (I) To the argument that we cannot see an object unless it is present, Arnauld answers that there is a sense in which this is true, and one in which it is false. The "objective presence" and the "physical presence" of an object must be distinguished. To say we perceive, implies that there is something perceived; there must be something pres ent to mind if the mind is to perceive it. But this "objective pres ence" is quite distinct from "local presence," for when I am said to be "thinking of" a person, that person is thereby objectively present to my mind, even though he is "locally" or spatially absent from my vicinity. Whatever I think of or perceive is objectively present by the very fact of my thinking of it, but what is objec tively present is often physically or locally absent. Malebranche's error consists in having supposed that a thing could not be objec tively present to my mind, without thereby being also locally pres ent to it. And one of the functions of the representative idea was precisely to make good, by its presence, this absence of the physi cal body. But imagination and memory furnish countless instances to show the independence of objective presence and local presence. Arnauld does not deny "representation" in every sense. He denies representativeness to ideas in the sense in which, e.g., a photograph "represents" the person whose likeness it is, for such representation, if affirmed of ideas, involves the existence of a separate intermediary between the mind and the physical object represented. But he admits explicitly that there is another sense in which all perceptual activity is representative (or better, "presen tative"), viz., the sense in which external objects become pre sented, when locally near, or "represented" when locally absent, to a mind, by means of that mind's cognitive activity.
(2) Arnauld next deals with the argument that material bodies cannot cause our mind to know them, even when locally present, since, being material, they cannot cause (mental) events in a non material self. This presupposes that our mind can only know what is capable of acting on it. But to be objectively present to a mind is not to be active on it. The relation of presentation must be distinguished from that of causation, which done, the argument falls.
(3) The next argument is that representative ideas are required because, external objects being material, are "too coarse" in na ture to admit of being directly perceived. For this, they would have to be "intimately connected" with the mind, but the mind, being spiritual, could not be connected with anything "coarse" like material particles. Hence the supposed necessity of mental inter mediaries or ideas which could be "intimately connected" with our minds. Arnauld makes short work of this argument. Even suppos ing such "imperfection" in bodies, that would only be a ground for denying that a body could be a percipient, not for denying that it could be perceived.
Now as may be anticipated, Arnauld's view is less explicit and satisfactory where what is in question is our knowledge of uni versals and not of particular bodies. Here he follows the concep tualists, maintaining that universals have significance and reality only in and for our minds: universalia tantum in mente. But he sufficiently answers Malebranche that the conceptual activity by which we represent the notion of infinity, is not itself infinite. Wherever Malebranche departs from Cartesian doctrine, Arnauld is at variance with him, and, proceeding in an empirical way more akin to Reid and the Scottish common-sense school, than to the deductive tendency of Cartesianism, he retains most of Descartes' conclusions, even in respect of the origin of our ideas, until his later period. His specific problems were those of 17th century French philosophy ;. his conclusions, and the spirit in which he worked to them, are more suggestive of 18th century thought in England. Except for his conceptualism, Arnauld may well be regarded as having established some of the basic theses of present day Realism.
(S. V. K.)