The Austro-German Attack

THE AUSTRO-GERMAN ATTACK Disposition of Italian Forces.—Cadorna had received satis factory reports concerning the morale of his troops. He had enough men, though a number of his units were below strength; and he had enough guns, in spite of the withdrawal of the Allied batteries, though he would have been glad of more heavy artillery. Between Monte Rombone and Monte San Gabriele, Capello had some 2,200 guns and nearly Boo trench mortars. North of Tol mino the line on the left bank of the Isonzo was held by Cavacioc chi's IV. Corps, whose left wing held the Plezzo basin and was in contact with the Carnia force on Monte Rombone. Next came Badoglio's XXVII. Corps, whose left wing, the Division, raised to the strength of an army corps, held the lines opposite Tolmino. The other three divisions which completed the XXVII. Corps were across the river south of the Lom plateau. Behind Cavaciocchi's right and the 19th Division, on the mountains west of the Isonzo, lay the VII. Corps, newly reconstituted with units from other corps, and commanded by Gen. Buongiovanni. On the right of the XXVII., holding the line as far as Monte Santo, were Caviglia's XXIV. Corps and Albricci's II. Corps.

The weak point of the Italian line was the Tolmino sector; the weakest part of the sector was at the junction of the XXVII. Corps (19th Division) with the IV. (46th Division), and the weakest position of all was that held by the right of the 46th Division, which was clinging to the slopes of Sleme and Mrzlivrh, completely dominated by the enemy and badly off for communi cations with its neighbours. The Tolmino sector was chosen for the main enemy attack, and here, owing to a complex of circum stances, the Austro-German forces won a success that led to a great Italian disaster. The Italian preparations were much handi capped by the illness of Capello.

The Attack Launched.

The main attack came in the direc tion anticipated, between Monte Rombone and south of Tolmino, and was conducted by a mixed German and Austrian army under Gen. Otto von Below. The army, which was known as the XIV.

Army, consisted of nine Austrian divisions and seven German, in four groups. The northern group of four divisions (three Aus trian and one German Jager) was commanded by Krauss, who had been called back from the Bukovina. Next came a group of three divisions (one Austrian and two German) under the Ger man, von Stein, and a group of two German divisions under the German, von Berrer. South of these two central groups was a mixed group (one Austrian and two German) under the Austrian, von Scotti. East of Tolmino lay four divisions in reserve. Boro evic had 20 divisions in his two Isonzo armies between Auzza and the sea. Below and Henriquez (II. Isonzo Army) had some 2,500 guns and 500 trench mortars.

The bombardment began at 2 o'clock on the morning of Oct. 24, in wild autumn weather. There was a drizzle of snow on the high ridges, rain below, and mist everywhere. Towards dawn the fire died down, and it was thought on some parts of the defend ing front that the bad weather had counselled a delay in the at tack. But the attackers were to make skilful use of the weather conditions, and only on Monte Rombone, on Krauss's extreme right, an attack in conjunction with the left wing of Krobatin's X. Army had to be given up owing to the snow.

Krauss's main attack was a straight drive through the Italian lines in the Plezzo basin, his first objective the Saga defile. But he meant to reach without delay the ridge of the Stol (6,467 ft.), which stood athwart a further direct advance. For this attack he detailed the 22nd Schiitzen Division, followed by a Kaiserjager and a Kaiserschiitzen battalion, which were to go straight for the Stol, and by six battalions of the 3rd (Edelweiss) Division, which were to make for the val Fella by way of the val d'Uccea. Krauss's left wing, the 55th (Bosnian) Division, attacked the Vrsic-Vrata ridge, with the object of breaking through to the Isonzo and Caporetto.

Krauss's drive, after hard fighting, broke through the three front lines held by the Italian loth Division, but the attacking troops were checked at the Saga defile. When evening fell this position was still in the hands of the Italians, but the battle had gone badly for the defenders farther south, and a retreat to the Stol became necessary. Krauss's Bosnians had met with no suc cess against the left wing of the Italian 43rd Division, but Stein's group had carried all before it. Stein opened his attack with his right wing, the Austrian 5oth Division, at 7.3o A.M., attacking the Italian 46th Division between Monte Nero and Vodil. A lit tle later the Bavarian Alpenkorps, advancing from Tolmino, at tacked the ridges east of the Passo di Zogradan, while Berrer and Scotti attacked farther south.

Success of the Silesians.

When both Stein's initial attacks were under way the 12th Silesian Division, under Gen. von Lequis, was sent in between them. Lequis attacked in two col umns, one on each side of the river, making for Caporetto, where it was hoped he would join with Krauss's Bosnians. Both col umns were completely successful. The right-hand column, aided by the strong attacks of the Austrian 5oth Division, pierced the extreme right of the Italian 46th Division and pushed north west with all speed. Across the river, where the Alpenkorps was making good headway on the slopes above the road, Lequis's left-hand column quickly reached the Italian second line, where the valley narrows below the hamlet of Foni. This line had been held until the eve of the battle by a brigade of the IV. Corps, but at the last moment the sector was transferred to the XXVII. Corps, and the Napoli Brigade was given to Badoglio to hold this important point. Only one battalion, however, was placed near the river. The rest of this regiment (the 76th) lay at the Zogra dan pass, high on the ridge to the south-west, and the other regi ment of the brigade (the 75th), together with the brigade com mand, was three miles away, on the western slopes below Zogra dan. The single battalion, of which only a platoon was on the road, seems to have been taken completely by surprise. It was run over by the Silesians, who proceeded on their way up the valley practically unmolested.

Meanwhile, the Alpenkorps, Berrer's two divisions and Scotti's right wing were breaking up Badoglio's left, while the latter's right, across the river, and Caviglia's corps were being strongly attacked by Scotti's left and Henriquez's right. The attack from Tolmino had been carried out with skill, speed and resolution, and by a capital error, which has never been satisfactorily ex plained, the Italian guns remained silent until too late. Definite orders had been given both by Cadorna and by Capello that im mediately upon the opening of the enemy's bombardment the Italian artillery should open fire on the enemy's trenches and zones of concentration, and that they should lay down a heavy barrage as soon as there were signs of movement. These orders were not carried out and, owing to great destruction of telephone wires, when the guns finally began their fire was fitful and uncer tain. Taken by surprise, puzzled by the comparative silence of their own guns and blinded by mist, the troops of the 19th Division opposed a weak resistance to the Austro-German attack.

Henriquez's attack on the Bainsizza plateau, although it met with some initial success, was readily repulsed. Badoglio had hoped to hold the enemy attack from Tolmino and turn the scale by a counter-attack on the Lom plateau with his three divisions on the left bank of the Isonzo. But he was not afforded the chance of attempting any such manoeuvre. It was long before he received any news of how the day was going on the front of the i9th Division, and from the beginning of the action he was unable to communicate with his divisions across the river. In a message sent to Army Headquarters at 4 P.M. he reported the enemy success south of Jeza, but said that he had no news from the commands of the i9th Division and the IV. Corps, and that he was unable to communicate with anyone.

By 4 P.M. Lequis's Silesians were approaching Caporetto. The left-hand column was unmolested on its march. The right-hand column, which had cut in behind the Italian 43rd Division, was making the task of the Austrian 5oth comparatively easy, and brushing aside the spasmodic opposition of such small detach ments as came in its way. Cavaciocchi had filled his front lines too full, and sent practically all his reserves across the river, in immediate support of the 43rd and 46th Divisions.