THE ITALIAN RETREAT By evening Stein was pouring troops through the breach made by the Silesians, and was making good headway with the Austrian 5oth Division on their right, while the Alpenkorps, Berrer and Scotti had in several places gained the high ridges dominating the head of the Judrio valley. Krauss was still held up at Saga and Polounik, and his Bosnians had gained no more ground. But the break-through between Tolmino and Caporetto had made the Italian positions untenable.
At Cividale, where Capello had his headquarters, and at the Comando Supremo in Udine, the first news that came from the IV. Corps, and the absence of news from the XXVII., made a grave impression. Capello sent up the army reserves by the valley roads and dispatched Montuori to direct the "left wing" (the IV. and VII. Corps). By evening it was clear that the enemy had won a big success, though it was not yet clear to what an extent the whole Italian left was crumbling. There seemed good reason to hope that the advance might be blocked in the narrow valleys west of the Isonzo. But by nightfall both the IV. Corps and the 19th Division were practically broken in pieces. The VII. Corps was beginning to be attacked at Luico, and its right was uncov ered by the destruction of most of the 19th Division. The right wing of the 19th was still holding on Globocak and down to the river, and troops were being brought back from the left bank to strengthen this line. But it was obvious that the positions on the Bainsizza could not be obtained, and orders were given to Caviglia, who hacj taken over Badoglio's troops beyond the river, to prepare for a retreat across the Isonzo.
At the moment the most dangerous point appeared to be the extreme left wing, where it was clear that Krauss would try and push through the val d'Uccea, the shortest way to the Taglia mento. Two Alpine groups had been dispatched to this sector the day before, and Cadorna gave orders that the val d'Uccea must be blocked at all costs. He sent out orders for resistance on three successive lines, all radiating from Monte Maggiore, which was the key position, but at the same time, as a precaution, he directed that plans and orders should be drawn up for a general retreat to the Tagliamento.
The news on the morning of Oct. 25 was increasingly grave. Krauss was pressing upon the Stol, and finding a weak resistance; no stand was being made at Creda; Monte Matajur had fallen, practically undefended. Other positions were seriously threatened, and there was no confidence that they would be held, for it was now known in Cividale and Udine that the behaviour of some of the troops in the line had been very unsatisfactory, and that this unexpected lack of spirit was communicating itself to some of the reserves. These had a difficult task in getting to the scene of action, for as they marched up the narrow mountain roads they were met by ever-increasing masses of fugitives, the bulk of whom belonged to the non-combatant services. This unfor tunate state of affairs undoubtedly hastened the break-up of Capello's whole left wing.
Preparations for Retreat.—On the afternoon of Oct. 25 Capello, who could fight no more against his illness, and had been told by the chief medical officer of the army that he must resign his command, proposed an immediate retreat to the Taglia mento, arguing that it was useless to send more reserves into the chaos among the hills west of the Isonzo. Cadorna felt that unless he could delay the enemy advance down the Natisone and Judrio valleys he ran the risk of having his centre and right cut off. Montuori, who now succeeded Capello in command of the II. Army, thought that he could hold on a line from Monte Maggiore to Monte Carnizza and thence across the valleys to Monte Korada. Cadorna decided to attempt a further stand while warning Tassoni (Carnia force), di Robilant (IV. Army) and the duke of Aosta to hold themselves in readiness for retreat, but at midnight on Oct. 26 he was wakened to hear that Monte Maggiore had fallen. He at once drew up the orders for a general retreat beyond the Tagliamento, and his plans were already ma tured for the longer retreat across the Piave which he foresaw would be necessary in order to get to a shorter line. The retreat began on Oct. 27, and two days later provisional orders and plans were issued for the further retirement to the Piave.
Fortunately for Italy, and for the cause of the Entente, the Germans and Austrians were outrunning their transport. Krauss complained that only he and Krafft von Delmensingen, Below's chief-of-staff, had been inspired by adequate ambitions for the attack. The objective had been Cividale, or at best the Taglia mento. Krafft thought they should have had the Adige in view. Krauss expressed the opinion that the real objective should have been Lyons. It must be remembered, however, that the trans port difficulties were very great. Germany could not spare troops or material for an unlimited effort here, and the unexpectedly weak resistance of the Italian II. Army could hardly have en tered into the calculations of those who were bound not to take too many risks. Krauss admits that if Cavaciocchi had held the Stol in force his own move would have been frustrated.
The critical days for the Italians were Oct. 3o and 31, when the pressure from north and east threatened the flank and rear of the M. Army, whose task had been made more difficult by the premature blowing up, owing to a false alarm, of the perma nent bridges at Casarsa, and by the fact that the Tagliamento had come down in sudden and violent flood. But by the evening of Nov. 1 the last of the duke of Aosta's troops had been suc cessfully withdrawn across the river.
Cadorna's weakest point was the stretch of the river west of Tarcento, for which Krauss and Stein were making with all speed. Two divisions under Di Giorgio had been dispatched to hold this line, but their march athwart the line of the retreat had been very difficult. Stein's troops were repulsed with heavy loss, but on the evening of Nov. 2 Krauss's Bosnians succeeded in crossing at Cornino, and the following morning Di Giorgio was strongly attacked at Pinzana. Two days later his left was pushed back still farther, endangering the line of retreat for the Carnia force and once more threatening the whole Italian line with envelop ment from the north.
On the morning of Nov. 4 Cadorna ordered the retreat to the Piave, and that night the troops holding the line of the Taglia mento resumed their march westward. The IV. Army in Cadore was now in a difficult position, but Di Giorgio and the other cover ing troops of the worn-out II. Army slowed down the enemy's ad vance and gave time for most of di Robilant's troops to get away from Cadore and come into line between the I. and III. Armies. But the greater part of Tassoni's Carnia force was caught be tween Krauss's troops and Krobatin's X. Army.