THE RECOVERY ON THE PIAVE New Italian Positions.—By Nov. 8 the bulk of the IV. Army was in line. On Nov. 9 and 1 o the last covering troops of the II. and III. Armies crossed the Piave from Pederobba to the sea. The line chosen to defend the fortunes of Italy implied a with drawal of the right wing of the I. Army. Pecori-Giraldi retired from Asiago and Gallio and based his right on the fortified lines of the Meletta group, giving up the XVIII. Corps to di Robilant, who held the line from the Brenta to the Piave and the short stretch of the river as far as the Montello.
Reserves were coming in fast from the depots, including the young class of 1899. French and British divisions were already in Italy and others were on the way. But Diaz, who took over the command from Cadorna on Nov. 9, had to face a situation that seemed almost desperate. The Italian armies had lost some 320,000 men in killed, wounded and missing, the number of pris oners being estimated at 265,00o. The bulk of the II. Army had to be counted out altogether and the total number of troops to be reorganized and refitted was over 300,000. More than 3,000 guns had been lost and over 1,700 trench mortars. It seemed very doubtful whether these greatly weakened forces could resist the renewed attacks of the victorious armies which had followed so closely on their heels. Fortunately, the plans for defence had been well and truly laid by Cadorna in the limited time that was available, and still more fortunately, as a result of the danger in I916, he had caused elaborate preparations to be made in the Grappa sector. It was due to this forethought that resistance on the line now chosen was possible.
Diaz had little breathing space, though some days elapsed before the enemy could prepare for an attack in force on the new line, for Conrad, on the Trentino front, saw a chance and, though he was short of troops, struck at once while calling for reinforce ments. He attacked Pecori's troops on Nov. 10 as they were preparing to come back to the line already indicated and con tinued his attack on the new positions. But ten days' fighting brought heavy losses and no success. Meanwhile, Boroevic had tested the river defences. He got troops across in two places but failed to make further progress, and on Nov. 16 an attack in force failed completely, the Austrians losing some 1,50o killed and nearly as many prisoners.
Conrad and Boroevic were making no headway, but a very dangerous attack was being conducted by Krauss between the Brenta and the Piave. Attempts to break through by the valley roads were quickly frustrated, and persistent efforts to capture the all-important ridge of Monte Tomba-Monfenera, which runs down from the Grappa massif to the Piave, failed to pierce the thin Italian lines. The struggle at this point lasted for five days, Nov. 18-22, and the Italian IX. Corps, under Ruggeri Laderchi, fought a great fight. The critical day was Nov. 22, when Krauss's Bos nians and German Jager made a final effort to break through. The attacking columns reached the crest of Monte Tomba, but their bolt was shot. In the evening Ruggeri Laderchi counter attacked and drove the enemy off the ridge, except at one point. Next day reserves arrived and the line was firmly established on its positions.
Meanwhile, in the Grappa sector, Krauss had attacked on Nov. with his centre and right, but after a week's fighting, in spite of reinforcements drawn from Stein and Krobatin, he had to call a halt. A fresh attack was preparing when the situation was eased by the arrival of the British and French divisions which had hitherto been waiting in reserve. On Dec. 2 three British divi sions, under Gen. the earl of Cavan, took over the Montello sec tor, and a similar French force under Gen. Duchesne relieved the IX. Corps in the Monte Tomba region. It was expected that both these points would be the object of early attack, but as it turned out they were both left unmolested. Conrad and Krauss contin ued their attempts on the mountain front, but Krauss confined his efforts to the Grappa sector. Krauss could not immediately renew his attack, but on Dec. 3 Conrad, reinforced but still com plaining that he was starved for means of attack, opened a heavy bombardment on the curve of the Italian front from Monte Sisemol to east of Monte Badenecche.
Next day he pinched out the Meletta-Badenecche salient and took Monte Fior and Castelgomberto in the rear, and the day following he pushed down towards Foza. The position was critical, but the Italians succeeded in establishing a new line farther south, covering Valstagna and the mouth of the Frenzela valley. On Dec. 23, after careful preparation, Conrad launched a new attack on the lines between Monte Sisemol and the Frenzela valley. He gained a big initial success, taking both Col dell' Orso and Monte Melago and cutting off a large number of prisoners. The next day the Italians counter-attacked and retook both the hills. They es tablished themselves firmly in their reserve lines and repulsed another attack, the last, on Christmas Day.
Krauss's Final Effort.—Meanwhile, between Conrad's two ef forts, Krauss had made a determined attempt to drive the Italians off Monte Grappa. His command had been increased to ten divi sions, six Austro-Hungarian and four German, and he did not spare his troops. He opened his attack on Dec. II by a push on each wing; from the Brenta valley and Monte Pertica against Col della Berretta, and against both sides of the Col dell' Orso Solaro-lo salient. On the left, in spite of repeated attacks that lasted ten days, his German divisions made little headway, but on the right, at the end of four days' hard fighting, he had taken Col Caprile and Col della Berretta. Four days more and he was in possession of Monte Asolone, which looks down the valle di Santa Felicita to the longed-for haven of the plain. This was the term of the Austrian advance. On Dec. 20 the Italians counter attacked and won back a good deal of the lost ground, the last move in the long struggle. Krauss accepted failure for the mo ment, hoping for an early spring offensive farther west. Five days later the snow came, the heavy winter fall that was a month late. The invaders had been favoured by the tardy coming of winter, which greatly prolonged the strain on the sorely-tried armies of Italy. But it gave also to the defending troops the chance to re make at once a shaken reputation. They took the chance and their recovery was a remarkable feat of courage.
Conclusion.—The narrative has indicated briefly the causes which led to the Italian disaster. The defending troops were sub jected to a very severe trial; but it would seem clear that failure and disaster might have been largely averted if the preparations against the Austro-German attack and the actual conduct of the defence had been different. To sum up, there were too many troops in the front lines and too few in the "battle positions." Cadorna had not succeeded in making all his subordinates grasp the principles of defence in depth or of "elastic" defence. And, given the erroneous dispositions of the defensive lines, the re serves were too far back. The Italian armies on the Julian front had been constantly on the offensive. They had had no recent practice in meeting an attack on the grand scale. It was this lack of practice, no doubt, and a false confidence based on obsolete experience, which led to the belief that even if the opening phases of the battle were unfavourable to the defence, there would be ample time to restore the situation.
When retreat became inevitable, the prospects might well have seemed desperate to those who had to organize it. For the army, long used to the war of positions that had been the rule for 28 months, was in no condition to move. The retreat, with all its confusion, its mistakes and its tragedies, remains an astonishing achievement. The resistance which followed it, when the retiring armies turned and stood at bay on the mountains and on the Piave, was the greatest of Italian victories.