CHAMPAGNE, BATTLES IN. This was the name com monly if vaguely given to a number of long drawn-out offensives on the western front in the World War. Among the principal ones the first was the French attack east of Reims on Sept. 25, 1915, an outline of which will be found in the article on the WORLD WAR. The simultaneous British offensive at Loos (q.v.), north of Lens, was intended to be subsidiary to this, as was also a lesser French offensive south of Lens. Still more important in scale and design was the French offensive west of Reims in April 1917, frequently called the Nivelle offensive. The failure of this ambi tious plan for a swift and decisive break-through culminated in mutinies which seriously endangered the fighting efficiency of the French army ; only after some months was its morale restored by the sympathetic and prudent leadership of Gen. Petain.
The Autumn Offensive, 1915.—During the summer of 1915 local attacks had been carried out in the Vosges and Argonne, while preparations were being made for operations on a large scale in Champagne and for a powerful diversion in Artois. The objective in Champagne was the rupture of the German front from Bazancourt to Challerange, so as to outflank their positions to the north of Reims and in the Argonne. It was hoped thus to roll up the eastern part of the German front. Under the direction of Gen. de Castelnau the attack was made by the II. Army (Petain) with the right of the IV. Army (de Langle de Cary) and the left of the III. Army (Humbert), a total of 35 divisions, or at least 420 battalions, against the German III. Army (Einem), which had at first only 7o battalions, later reinforced to 192. However, the secret of the future offensive was so badly kept that as early as Aug. 15 a German order had foreseen it. The artillery preparation began on Sept. 22, and at 9:15 A.M. on Sept. 25 the assault was launched and penetrated along almost the whole front to a depth of from 2,000 to 4,000yd. reaching even the second position in one sector. But the German command, foreshadowing the method of elastic defence which became famous in 1918, had withdrawn the guns and allowed the lightly held first position to act as a shock-absorber. Progress then became slow and costly.
On Sept. 28 and 29 a part of the second position was carried to the west of Le Mesnil and Navarin farm and a break through was made in a narrow section, but the Germans quickly closed the gap. The French cavalry corps had to retire on the 28th to the rear lines without having been engaged. On the 30th a general order announced the end of the operations with the capture of 25,000 prisoners and 15o guns. Nevertheless, abortive attacks continued until Oct. 8. The Champagne offensive cost the French 8o,000 killed and missing and 100,00o sick and wounded. The results were not in due proportion to this sacrifice, mainly because the attacks had lacked the characteristics of surprise, rapidity and continuity, and had been continued too long.
French Offensive on the Aisne, 1917.—The strategical and political controversies which preceded the opening of the allies' offensive campaign of 1917 are dealt with in the article on the WORLD WAR. On the Aisne, the French offensive was to extend from Vailly to Reims. Gen. Petain, consulted by Nivelle on the proposed action, criticized it freely and refused the leadership, which was entrusted to Gen. Michelet. The V. Army (Masel), which had held this front since 1914, closed on its right to make room for the VI. Army (Mangin), while the X. Army (Duchene) was in reserve. Nivelle had decided on a rapid attack which aimed at carrying the positions and all the artillery zone at the first assault. This resembled the method twice employed at Verdun. No one raised any serious objection, but Nivelle foretold an im mediate exploitation of the success by the X. Army, which should carry it as far to the north as possible. Michelet estimated that the whole operation might be accomplished the first day, or at latest on the morning of the second. He indicated as objectives the foot of the heights to the north of the Ailette, the plain of Laon, and the east of Brimont fort. The only objection was raised by Mangin, who called attention particularly to the importance of good atmospheric conditions. This did not modify Nivelle's wishes, and Michelet exaggerated them by giving such detailed orders that no initiative was left to the army commanders.
The preparation for the offensive was in full swing when the German retreat to the Hindenburg line began. Nivelle's plan had to be modified, the Oise-Somme attack lost all interest and that upon the Aisne alone remained. Mangin called attention to the fact that the retirement had left a right-angled salient about the Laffaux mill and that an attack to the north would be able to take the Chemin des Dames in reverse. The commander-in-chief admitted this and two divisions were devoted to this local opera tion. In addition it was decided that the IV. Army (Anthoine) should attack the Massif de Moronvilliers, east of Reims. On top of this a political incident led to the retirement of Gen. Lyautey, Minister of War. He was replaced by M. Painleve, who was hostile to Nivelle's plans. This weakened the confidence of the commander-in-chief's subordinates, and Nivelle went so far as to offer his resignation, which was refused.
The British share of the offensive began on April 9 before Arras. The operations on the Aisne should have begun on April 1 2, but were put off, first to the 14th, then to the 16th on account of the bad weather. The front of attack measured 25 miles. The VI. Army (Mangin) operated on nearly rom. with 17 divisions plus a cavalry division and a territorial division, 1,669 guns, of which 823 were heavy or large; the V. Army (Masel) had a nearly similar strength but with 1,967 guns (1,107 heavy or large). The artillery preparation commenced on April 5 and continued until the s 5th on account of the postponement of the attack. It sufficed, but its duration permitted the Germans to make suitable dispositions and there was no surprise. On the morning of April 16 the Allies carried the first German line on the whole front. The right and centre of the V. Army gained a depth of 12 to am., but on the left a tank attack, badly con ducted, failed with heavy losses and the infantry rapidly came to a standstill on the plateau of Craonne. The right of the VI. Army took the position of Hurtebise and pushed as far as the Ailette, but further east the fighting was desperate and the gain insig nificant. In the centre progress was more satisfactory, though difficult. On the left, the commencement was good, but the ad vance quickly became wild, and at certain points it was practically negligible.
To sum up, although some good results had been obtained the hoped for success had not been won. Badly informed, Nivelle imagined that on the 17th he ought to stop the northern advance of the VI. Army and push the V. Army towards the north-east. This order became delayed, so on the 17th Mangin continued his attacks, notably in the centre, where he made a marked advance on the front Braye en Laonnois-Ostel. The situation having changed Mangin ordered a vigorous pursuit, in spite of the stopping order. Slow progress was made towards the Chemin des Dames. On the same date the IV. Army (Anthoine) had made good progress in the Massif de Moronvilliers. Between the i6th and 20th the French captured 21,000 prisoners and 183 guns, and advanced some 5m. on the Aisne front of 7-1-m. width. Of the 52 German divisions in reserve available on April I only 16 remained unengaged. This result was less than had been hoped, but it was nevertheless appreciable and certainly superior to those of preceding offensives.
Unhappily the morale behind the front line was rapidly declin ing, the losses being greatly exaggerated. Nevertheless, Nivelle continued his operations. The X. Army took up its position on the plateau de Craonne, between the V. and VI. Armies, but on April 27 Michelet wrote that he had not strength enough for a general offensive toward the north and that he proposed to limit himself to local attacks. Nivelle accepted this solution. These operations, rendered more difficult by the unfortunate intervention of politicians, produced very poor results. The IV. Army on May 4 captured the Craonne plateau, and Laffaux mill was carried on the 5th. For several months, however, the X. Army could only with difficulty hold on to the crest of the Chemin des Dames. The French had lost from April 16 to 25, 15,00o dead, 6o,000 wounded and 20,500 missing. Nevertheless, all the 52 reserve German divisions of April I had been employed by May 4, and quiet sectors had been robbed to reinforce the Aisne line. Up to May 99 German divisions had already appeared on the front attacked, of which I I had appeared twice. This expenditure was triple that before Verdun in ten months.
(B. E. P.; C. M. E. M.)