Campaign in the Caucasus

CAUCASUS, CAMPAIGN IN THE. Though both Rus sian and Turk spoke of a "Caucasus front" and gave to their armies engaged on this front the designation "Caucasian," in the World War, the operations actually took place at a considerable distance from the Caucasus.

The Terrain Described.

The main theatre of these opera tions may be defined as lying within the following limits ; on the east, Batum (on the Black sea)-Kars-Mount Ararat; on the south, Lake Van-Mush-Kharput ; on the west, Kemath-Erzin jan Kiresiin ; and on the north, the south coast of the Black sea. The whole of this region is covered by the historical term Armenia— not merely the present republic of that name, but, in the wider sense of the term, the country which was inhabited in 1914 largely by the ill-starred Armenian nation. Outside this main theatre of operations, a somewhat desultory warfare was carried on by de tachments from the main forces up and down the western parts of Persia. Though some of the valleys are fertile, the area as a whole is bleak, sparsely populated and almost undeveloped.

The poverty of the communications and the severity of the climate render military operations on a large scale difficult and arduous. In 1914, on the Russian side, railway communication ended at Sari Qamish, some 40m. southwest of Kars and 15 from the frontier; on the Turkish side, 600m. of indifferent roads and tracks 'separated their armies operating in the Erzerum area from the nearest railhead at Angora or Ulu Qishla, on the Baghdad rail way northwest of Adana. Thus the advantage in land communi cations lay, at the outset, very decidedly with the Russians, who had also, except for a short period after the outbreak of War, command of the Black sea. On neither side, however, could the communication be considered in any way adequate for operations on the grand scale.

Few commanders would welcome a campaign in such extreme conditions of climate and difficulties of movement and supply. Neither army was up-to-date in its technical organization. The higher leading and staff work in both armies was rough and ready rather than scientific, though there were a number of German staff officers with the Turk and many highly educated and intel ligent men in the Russian General Staff. Given the characteristics of the two armies and the restrictions to manoeuvre which the terrain imposed, it was sufficiently obvious that the campaigns were likely to be marked by hard, straightforward fighting rather than any striking display of military art. Only the hardiest of soldiers could have come to grips with each other at all in that waste of snow-clad hills, in the depths of winter when the cam paign opened. It was at the end of October 1914, that Turkey definitely entered the World War on the side of the Central Powers, and opened hostilities by naval bombardment of Russian ports in the Black sea.

The strategy of the Central Powers would have naturally dic tated as the most useful contribution of her new ally to the common effort a diversion likely to withdraw most Russian troops from the hard-pressed Austrians; and Liman von Sanders, the chief of the German Military Mission in Turkey, is known to have proposed a scheme for the landing of a Turkish force at Odessa with this object. But this scheme, even apart from doubts whether command of the Black sea could be effectively secured, was, perhaps not unnaturally, viewed with disfavour by the Turks, who preferred the hope of reconquest of some of the territory, notably the fortress of Kars, lost to Russia in previous wars. The III. Turkish Army had been assembling during Sept. and Oct. in the neighbourhood of Erzerum. It consisted of the IX. and XI. Corps, the and Cay. Div. and some mounted irregulars. During Nov. the X. Corps was added, bringing the fighting strength of the army up to approximately ioo,000 men. All three corps were composed mainly of Anatolians, the best fighting material in Turkey.

The Turkish Plan of Campaign.—The plan evolved by En ver, whose megalomaniac mind seems to have dreamed of cam paigns rivalling those of Alexander and extending even up to India, was a wide enveloping movement with Kars as the objective. The XI. Corps was to attack frontally toward the Russian rail head at Sari Qamish, while the IX. and X. Corps moved north from Erzerum, swept by difficult hill passes through Olti, on toward Kars and Sari Qamish. Still further north, a detachment which had landed at Trebizond was to advance on Ardahan. This grandiose plan wholly ignored the absence of communica tions and the climatic conditions. The Russian attitude was, at the outset, purely defensive ; their main preoccupation was on their Western Front, which had absorbed nearly all the available forces ; two of the three regular corps, stationed in the Caucasus in peace, had been sent on mobilization to defend the Western Front against Austria and Germany. Only two complete corps, the I. Caucasian and II. Turkestan, were at first available for the de fence of the Caucasus. Yet the Russians made the first advance, moving a force across the frontier in Kopri Koi on the road to Erzerum. This advance was made to secure room for manoeuvre in front of the important base at Sari Qamish. The Turks promptly attacked, and some fierce fighting took place between Nov. 8 and 20, which ended in the withdrawal of the Turks.

Enver now arrived from Constantinople and assumed personal command of the III. Army. He insisted, against the views of his German advisers, on putting into execution the ambitious plan he had conceived. The routes by which the turning movement was made were mere mountain tracks deep in snow ; the greater part of the artillery and transport had to be left behind, and the at tempt seemed madness. Yet such fortitude and endurance did the poorly equipped and ill-fed Turkish troops display that they almost achieved the impossible. While the main Russian body was engaged with the XI. Corps, the IX. Corps appeared, in the last days of Dec., on the heights above Sari Qamish, and the X. Corps on its left approached the railway between Kars and Sari Qamish ; the detachment from Trebizond had already driven the Russians out of Ardahan.

The Russian commander's nerve failed him at the crisis; and the situation was saved only by his chief of the staff, Gen. Yudenich, a man of considerable ability and imperturbable resolution. He col lected forces for a counter attack, which resulted in the complete defeat and practical annihilation of the two Turkish turning corps, worn out and disorganized by their formidable approach march ; the XI. Corps was then in its turn driven back. The total losses of the Turkish III. Army are said to have approximated to 85%. En ver at once handed over the command to Hawis Hakki Pasha and returned to Constantinople. Hawis Hakki died shortly of ter, and the command was given to Mahmoud Kiamil. The alarm caused in Russia by the Turkish incursion was such that an appeal was made to Great Britain for a diversion against the Turks. This led to the first suggestion for the Gallipoli expedition.

During the whole of 1915 the fighting on the Caucasus front was of minor importance only. The main preoccupation of the Rus sians lay on their Western Front, of the Turks in Gallipoli. The shattered III. Army was gradually reconstituted, and the Russians raised fresh units to increase their strength. But neither side was yet in shape for a serious offensive. The detachment of Turks which in the previous winter had advanced to Ardahan and then had been driven back to Artvin, attempted in April a coup de main against Batum, but without success. On the other flank the Russians advanced their left wing into Armenia during May and June, occupied Van and threatened Bitlis. The Armenian rising which assisted the Russians led to bloody reprisals on their com patriots still in Turkish power. In Sept. 1915 the Grand Duke Nicholas took over command of the Caucasus front, an event which was to produce a marked enlargement of the Russian effort in this theatre. Grand Dukes in Imperial Russia could still obtain reinforcements in men and material denied to ordinary command ers. Nor did the character of the Grand Duke make it likely that he would adopt a passive role. Though not a great strategist, he was shrewd and energetic, as he had already shown while in com mand on the Western Front, a most loyal and unselfish supporter of the Allied cause. He found an able executive commander in Gen. Yudenich, already mentioned.

The Taking of Erzerum.—Once again an offensive on a large scale was made in the depth of winter. The Grand Duke wished to anticipate the arrival of Turkish reinforcements released by the British evacuation of Gallipoli. This enterprise was com pletely successful. The Russian capture of Erzerum was one of the finest feats of arms of the whole War. Its assault did not form part of the original plan, but the attacks up the Araxes valley, begun on Jan. I1, 1916, so completely surprised the Turk that it was decided to attempt it. The famous fortress, though many of the works and much of the armament were not modern, occu pies a position of great natural strength, which the Turks under German supervision had improved with field works in addition to the existing forts. Its capture on Feb. 16 was mainly the result of a turning movement from the north, made by the II. Turkestan Corps under Przjevalski, the ablest of the Russian Corps com manders on the Caucasus front, who had an intimate knowledge of Erzerum, where he had spent 15 years as military attache. The Turks retired in considerable disorder with heavy losses in men and material.

The next Russian objective was Trebizond; its capture in April considerably simplified the supply problem. Meanwhile, the Turk ish Higher Command, alarmed at the fall of Erzerum and contin ued advance of the Russians, had decided on a counterstroke. They ordered the assembly of a new army, the II., under Izzet Pasha, in the Mush-Kharput region, to attack the Russian flank and rear and recapture Erzerum. The plan was sound enough, had the communications allowed of a speedy concentration and swift advance. But the assembly of the II. Army, begun in April, was not complete in July. The Grand Duke became aware of the Turkish intentions and anticipated their attack by a heavy blow at the III. Army, which eventually broke in complete rout. The Russians occupied Erzinjan in July. So heavy were the losses of the III. Army that it had subsequently to be completely reor ganized. To do this divisions were formed out of army corps, regiments out of divisions, battalions out of regiments.

The defeat of the III. Army delayed and weakened the coun terstroke of the II. Army, which did not take place till August, giving the Russians time to transfer troops from their right wing to meet it. After some heavy fighting on the Oghnat-Kighi front the II. Army's effort was definitely held. It had gained little ground at a considerable sacrifice in men. Both armies then took up defensive positions for the winter. The line now ran approxi mately from Tireboli on the Black Sea, west of Gumushkane to Kemakh, then south-east by Kighi, Oghnat, Mush and Bitlis to Lake Van. Further east, on the Turko-Persian border and in Per sia, both armies had detachments to protect their flank, and fight ing took place with varying fortune during 1915-16.

During the winter of 1916-17 no movements took place. The Turkish II. and III. Armies (Mustapha Kemal and Wahib Pasha respectively), now combined under Izzet Pasha, suffered terrible privations from lack of supplies and the weather. Nor were the Russians very much better off. A light line was being built from Sari Qamish to Erzerum, but progress was very slow and railhead was still some miles short of Erzerum in March 1917. Their command of the sea enabled them to feed their right wing from Trebizond ; but from Erzerum and Trebizond to the front, supply was dependent on horse transport over indifferent tracks, sometimes closed for days by blizzards of snow. The Russians, too, suffered severely from poor rations and typhus.

Attempted Russo-British Co-operation.

In Dec. 1916 the British Army in Mesopotamia, under Gen. Maude, commenced the attacks on the Turks at Kut, which were eventually to lead to the capture of Baghdad in March. Unsuccessful efforts had previously been made to concert the operations of the British in Mesopotamia and the Russians in the Caucasus; and now, with the approach of Maude's forces to Baghdad, an opportunity for effective combination seemed to have arrived. It was agreed that the Cavalry Corps of Baratov from Persia and of Chernozubov from between lakes Urmia and Van (both these corps, though composed mainly of cavalry, had a strong backing of infantry and artillery) should advance on Mosul; and thus, it was hoped, in co-operation with Maude, finally liquidate the Mesopotamian cam paign. However, it was not to be. The Grand Duke adopted the plan wholeheartedly, and the Turk would not have been in a posi tion to offer effective resistance. But, first of all, the weather con ditions and the difficulty of organizing a line of supply through the mountains of the Persian border caused delay; then, before the movement had well begun, the Russian revolution broke out. With the recall of the Grand Duke toward the end of March— only to be described as an incredible blunder on the part of Keren ski—the best hope of energetic action had gone.

Collapse of the Russian Army.

Throughout the summer the Russian Army lay inactive, gradually disintegrating ; by the early autumn it was sufficiently obvious that the troops would make no further forward movement, and could only be relied on to hold their positions so long as they were not attacked. Yude nich, who had succeeded the Grand Duke, gave up the command in August and was succeeded by Przjevalski. But the end was near. In December an armistice was concluded on the Caucasus front, and in Jan. 1918, after the peace of Brest-Litovsk, the Rus sian troops still remaining retired. The condition of the Turkish armies had been too wretched to allow them up till now to take advantage of the Russian collapse ; but when the Russians finally retired, the Turks were once more fired with hopes of territorial gains; and advanced on the Caucasus with troops which from the military point of view would have been more profitably employed in strengthening their front in Palestine. They occupied Batum on April 14 and Kars on the 26th. All Russian regular troops had disappeared, and their only opponents were Georgian and Arme nian bands defending their homes.

The British Expedition to Baku.

The British General Staff, alarmed at the prospect of a Caucasus under Turkish control being used as a base of propaganda and even operations against India, had meanwhile organized a group of British officers and non commissioned officers under Gen. Dunsterville to be sent to the Caucasus to rally the local Armenian and Georgian populations against the Turk. But this force, dispatched through Persia from Mesopotamia, was delayed by the anarchic conditions which fol lowed the collapse of the Russian forces in Persia, and arrived too late. When it reached Baku in August, things had gone too far; and after a short but gallant defence it was compelled to withdraw. But the Turkish control of Trans-Caucasia was short lived, for Allenby's crushing victory in Palestine a month later spelt the loss of the war for the Turks.

Criticisms of the Campaign.

The operations of the so called "Caucasus Front" described above thus led to no decisive results on either side. In view of the poor means of communica tion in the theatre of operations it is difficult to see how decisive results could have been expected. The lure of territorial conquest and false strategical conceptions led the Turks to attach an undue importance to this front, which had disastrous consequences for them from a military point of view. The unnecessarily heavy losses in their best troops caused by the offensives of the III. Army at the end of 1914 and of the II. Army in 1916 caused the weakness which proved their undoing on the Palestine and Meso potamian fronts. Had the Turks been content with a defensive attitude on the Caucasus Front, British difficulties in these theatres might have been greatly increased.

The purely defensive attitude which the Russians took up at the outset was strategically correct; they had no other objective than the protection of their Transcaucasian provinces from inva sion; the state of the communications would obviously never allow them to penetrate far enough into Asia Minor to produce any de cisive effect on Turkey. That they advanced as far as they did— farther, perhaps, than was strategically wise—was due to the in fluence and energy of the Grand Duke. From the military point of view these campaigns are likely to be remembered only for one great feat of arms—the boldness and endurance displayed in the capture of Erzerum—and as affording to soldiers one more example of the dependence of strategy on communications.

(A. P. W.)