CAVALRY. Throughout the history of war, cavalry have been surrounded by a glamour possessed by no other arm, and though to-day their tactical value is small their prestige endures, and rightly ; for without a mobile arm tactics as an art must cease to be. In the World War of 1914-18 the limitations which the bullet placed on cavalry movement begot the trench ; for had cavalry been able to move, the construction of entrenched fronts would have been all but impossible. This fact presents the student of war with a tactical clue to the revival of cavalry in the future, and to follow up this clue it is necessary to understand the past history of the mounted arm.
Cavalry Tactics.—The two most primitive types of soldier are the foot-soldier and the horse-soldier, the first being charac teristic of early European warfare, and the second of early Asiatic, since in southern Europe, that is, in the countries south and west of the Danube and the Rhine, few suitable breeds of war horses existed. Hence the poverty of Roman cavalry and of early Grecian cavalry. When infantry met infantry battles were decided by numbers, or armament, or discipline ; and when cavalry met cavalry, as in Scythia, battles were seldom decided at all, de generating as they normally did into skirmishes, forays and scat tered pursuits. In hilly country, such as most of Greece, cavalry were normally impotent to attack infantry, as is exemplified in the Graeco-Persian Wars (490-479 B.c.) ; whilst in open plain land, so frequently found in Asia Minor, they could destroy infantry by besieging them in the field, as happened to Crassus, at Carrhae in 53 B.C. The truth of the matter is that the two arms are complementary, each providing the other with powers not inherent in either separately. Infantry in an advance are use less unless their rear services are protected, and so also are cav alry in the advance, unless the positions won by them can be held so that their forward movement may not be interrupted. The art of an advance through a hostile country has always pivoted on the power of pushing forward a secure and movable base in order to develop from it offensive power. Once infantry and cavalry are combined, the first form the movable base, and the second provide the offensive power. The first may be compared to a can non, and the second to a shell. The shell is fired from the cannon, but if the area to be crossed is extensive, the cannon must con stantly be moved forward. In itself the cannon possesses blast ing effect, and in itself the shell possesses local explosive effect; it is only when the two are combined that the full power of the shell is developed. So also with the short range power of infantry and the long range power of cavalry, they are interdependent.
When the advance merges into the attack, three targets present themselves, namely, the enemy's infantry, his cavalry and his baggage train. If the third can be seized and held, the severest possible blow is dealt the enemy's organization, consequently the supply services are well protected by the battle front. Infantry can oppose infantry frontally, but if attacked in flank, or rear, by infantry or cavalry, they are taken at a tremendous disadvantage. Throughout history flank protection has been furnished by cav alry. The infantry front may then be pictured as a slowly moving wall behind which are assembled the supply services, and on the flanks of which are hinged two cavalry wings, which, like doors, can swing forwards and backwards, "flapping" away any hostile force which may attempt to raid the baggage train, or attack the infantry in rear. In battle, the first problem is, therefore, the destruction of one or both of the hostile cavalry wings, for when once the opposing infantry wall is bereft of itstwinging doors, not only do its flanks become attackable, but also its rear. If, mean while, its front can be so firmly held that it is unable to change front, a cavalry attack on its flanks, or rear, is likely to prove decisive. In brief, the object of infantry is to provide a base of operations for cavalry, and the power of cavalry is to be sought, first in ability to overcome their like, and secondly in being able to develop a sufficiency of speed so as tb circumvent an infantry front, and attack it in rear before it can face about, which, in the case of an organized army, is an extremely difficult and dangerous operation; impossible if the front is firmly held. The student of military history will consequently find that only when organiza tion, tactics and leadership were such as to allow of the mobility of cavalry being rapidly developed from the stability of infantry has war flourished as an art, and that when this has not been possible it has degenerated into a dog-fight. We will now consider the history of the cavalry arm.
The Classical Age, 490 B.C.–A.D. 378.—During the early classical age tactical organization was based on the nature of the country rather than on any idea of weapon co-operation, or com bination between the arms. Thus, in Sparta we find practically no cavalry, whilst in Scythia mounted bowmen alone exist. Never theless, immediately the Asiatic horsemen came into contact with European foot-soldiers, as took place in the 5th century B.C., the problem of tactical co-operation, namely, how to equip, arm and manoeuvre a body of men so that offensive power may be de veloped from a protective base was thrust to the fore. This prob lem was solved by Philip of Macedon, and proved out by his son Alexander the Great.
From the days of Alexander onwards, cavalry, on account of their mobility, became the decisive arm. Hannibal's use of cavalry was superb, as the battles of the Trebbia (2 18 B.c.) and of Cannae (216 B.c.) testify. In both of these the Carthaginian cavalry com pletely dislocated the Roman legions by a rear attack. In the Roman armies the lack of good cavalry proved their ruin, and it was not until such sa, force was raised and trained by Scipio Afri canus that the Carthaginians were eventually defeated at the bat tle of Ilipa (205 B.c.), and annihilated at that of Zama (202 B.c.). At Ilipa Scipio beat Hasdrubal by a double envelopment carried out by infantry and cavalry, and at Zama he smashed Hannibal by holding him in front with infantry and striking him in rear with cavalry.
During the days of Julius Caesar, the most serious defeat sus tained by the Romans was that of Crassus at the hands of Surena, the Parthian general, whose entire force was composed of mounted archers and heavy cavalry. The Parthians, adopting an improved form of Scythian tactics, won a decisive victory; of the 40,000 Romans who crossed the Euphrates 20,000 were killed and 10,000 made prisoners. The Parthian success was due to the inability of the Romans to develop offensive power from a moving base. Their organization did not enable them to ward off shock and envelopment, whilst that of their enemy did permit of them en veloping and charging; for in this battle their heavy cavalry provided the necessary stability for the attack of their mounted bowmen and the distraction effected by this attack enabled the heavy cavalry of the Parthians to dislocate and disrupt the Roman legions.
From the battle of Pharsalus (48 B.c.) the legion learnt for a space how to hold its own against cavalry, mainly by employing cavalry. Under Diocletian (A.D. 245-313) cavalry rose from one tenth to one-third of the infantry, and numbered some 160,000; but this great mass of horse was withdrawn from the infantry, and by being formed into a frontier guard it lost its offensive spirit. Meanwhile a decline took place in the infantry, mercenaries were enlisted, discipline was relaxed, pay increased and armour discarded because of its weight. Vegetius, who prob ably wrote in the days of Valentinian II. (375-392) urged its restoration ; he says : "Those who find the old arms so burdensome must either receive wounds upon their naked bodies and die, or, what is worse still, run the risk of being made prisoners, or of betraying their country by flight. Thus, to avoid fatigue, they allow themselves to be butchered shamefully like cattle." This separation of infantry and cavalry was the main tactical cause of the decline of Rome's military power. The unsupported Roman cavalry, trained as frontier police and for protective duties, were no match for the fierce barbarian horsemen who were now dis tracting the empire. From the first irruption of the Goths, in the year 248, the Roman cavalry were steadily increased until by the reign of Constantine (288-337) cavalry composed the prin cipal part of the Roman armies; but all in vain. A few years later, Attila, king of the Huns, united Germany and Scythia, and at the head of a vast horde of barbarian hoi semen he humiliated Rome. At the battle of Chalons, in 451, he was defeated by Aetius and Theodoric. This was the last victory won by Imperial Rome in the West, the dark ages now descended upon western Europe, and as far as war is concerned we enter the epoch of the iron-clad lancer.
From the days of Justinian (483-565) to those of the fourth Crusade, which resulted in the sack of Constantinople (1204), highly organized armies comprising well-equipped heavy and light cavalry were maintained by the Eastern empire. In the West, however, military art virtually disappeared, and as principalities took form and feudalism was established the common folk were virtually prohibited from taking part in the "noble" trade of war, which was carried on by raiding and pillaging barons. As the mili tary caste of this period was based on wealth, and as western Europe was largely roadless, cavalry remained the predominant arm, and sought perfection not through improved tactics, or or ganization, but through armour. By the opening of the 9th cen tury the old military organization of Rome had been replaced by comparatively small bands of mailed knights followed by a mob of retainers who pillaged the countryside and so acted as "administrative units." In England, in the Low Countries and in Switzerland, infantry were still maintained, but were so ill equipped that when confronted by cavalry in open, or even semi open, country they were forced to seek protection behind palisades as was the case with the Saxons at Hastings (i066). Under Charlemagne the mail-clad knight was reaching his zenith, and, as is always the case when the peak of supremacy is topped, decline follows. To the knight of the middle ages the protective base of his offensive power was no longer afforded by the infantry mass, but by the armour he wore, his mobility being provided by his horse. As long as he was not met by equally well mounted and armoured antagonists this combination of mobility and protection proved tactically irresistible, yet seldom did it lead to profitable strategical results. But as soon as he was, it became neutralized, and with neutralization tactics as an art utterly deteriorated and were replaced by mob fighting.
This self-contained protective power of cavalry is most no ticeable during the Crusades, for in spite of the low discipline of the Christian knights and their very rudimentary knowledge of tactics, normally their casualties were remarkably small. At the battle of Hazarth (1125), Baldwin lost only 24 men, whilst the Turkish losses amounted to 2,00o; at Jaffa (1191) two Crusaders were killed on one side and 700 Turks on the other. The Cru saders, however, lost large numbers of horses, and as the rabble of beggars and vagrants who accompanied them were useless as infantry (further, the code of chivalry did not sanction their use), at times it became necessary for knights to fight on foot, or to abstain from fighting altogether. This involuntary change in tactics led to the Crusaders rediscovering the value of the pro tective infantry base as a mobile fortress from which the mounted knights could sally forth. In 1248, we find St. Louis of France adopting this change intentionally. Near Damietta he landed his knights and drew them up on foot in order of battle to cover his disembarkation. The interesting point to note in these opera tions is that the action of these knights foreshadowed the ap proaching revival of infantry : "They formed up in serried ranks, placed their bucklers upright in the sand before them, and rest ing their long lances on the top of their shields, presented an im penetrable array of steel points, before which the Muslim horse fell back in confusion." One of the military influences of the Crusades was the weakening of feudalism through the rise of a commercial class made rich by buying up the knights' lands. This class was concentrated in the cities, and as early as 1057 we find Pavia and Milan raising armies of their own, largely composed of infantry.
Another result of increasing prosperity was the reintroduc tion of plate armour, which though it rendered the knight on foot practically invulnerable to infantry attack, when mounted, more and more did it sacrifice his mobility to protection. This seriously influenced the value of the dismounted base, for armour had become so heavy that the dismounted knight was unable to move far on foot. At the battle of Tagliacozzo (1268), Conradin's Ghibelline knights were so heavily armoured that Charles of Anjou's cavalry, after having exhausted them by repeated charges, rolled them out of their saddles by seizing them by their shoulders.
The progress in the construction of the bow and the crossbow was another reason for increasing the thickness of armour. At the siege of Abergavenny, in 1182, it is recorded that the Welsh arrows could penetrate an oak door four inches thick. No chain mail could withstand such a blow, consequently plate armour was worn over the mail shirt. As armour increased in weight natural obstacles began to play a decisive part on the battlefield. At Bannockburn (1314), Bruce took up his position behind a stream, and Edward II.'s knights got "bogged" just as tanks were "ditched" 6o3 years later in Flanders. When ground could not be crossed on horseback it had to be crossed on foot, and the knight deprived of his horse lost much of his tactical value, consequently an able enemy sought every means in his power to compel him to dismount. One of these means was choice of ground, another, archery ; for horse armour never proved satisfactory.
At the battle of Dupplin Muir (1332), Baliol and Beaumont did not beat the earl of Mar by reckless charges, but by skilful weapon co-operation. The majority of their knights were dis mounted and formed into a phalanx, the flanks of which were pro tected by archers, whilst 4o mounted knights were kept in reserve. The earl of Mar charged the phalanx which remained unshaken; his knights, immobilized by the archers on the flanks, were routed by Baliol's mounted squadron. This battle is the birth of a new era in tactics—the tactics of bow, pike and lance combined. It formed the mould in which all the English operations of the Hun dred Years' War were cast, a war which proved disastrous to the gallant but insubordinate French chivalry, as the battles of Crecy (1346) , Poitiers (1356), and Agincourt (1415) testify. The cavalry difficulty throughout was the armouring of the horse. At Crecy the horse proved the weak link in the French organiza tion, for of the next great battle, namely Poitiers, we find John le Bel writing of the French knights : "Tous se combattoient a pye, pour doubtance des archers qui tuoient leurs chevaulx, comme a la bataille de Crecy" (All fought on foot, through fear that, as at the battle of Crecy, the archers would kill their horses.) Mean while in Switzerland infantry armed with pike and halberd, and fighting in phalangial order, were taking toll of German and Aus trian chivalry; and in Bohemia, Ziska by employing wagons in laager created movable fortresses known as the Wagenburg (wagon fort) against which his enemy's cavalry shattered themselves in vain. As wealth increased, mercenaries once again came to the fore, and being professional soldiers whose pay as well as whose lives depended on their art, tactics once again began to assume a coherent form, especially under the English commander-in-chief of Pope Urban V., Sir John Hawkwood, who may be considered as the first great general of modern times. When cavalry met cav alry, on account of the protective power of armour, losses were ridiculously small. Such battles as those of Zagonara ( 1423) and Castracaro (1467) are comparable to the engagement of the Mer rimac and the Monitor in 1862. Of the first Machiavelli writes: "In the great defeat famous throughout all Italy no deaths oc curred, except those of Ludovico degli Obizi, and two of his people, who having fallen from their horses were drowned in the morass." The second of these two battles was even more bloodless, for he tells us : "Some horses were wounded and prisoners taken, but no death occurred." From the battle of Poitiers onwards cavalry fell into a rapid decline ; the French knights learnt nothing, and as the bow and pike destroyed them a new weapon arose in the crude bombards of the 14th century, which were destined to revolutionize the whole art of war, to reduce cavalry to the position they held in the days of the Scythians, and to advance infantry to the heyday of the Spartan phalanx. At the battle of Formigny (145o), three small culverins threw the English archers into disorder, and at Morat (1476) Charles the Bold of Burgundy was defeated by the Swiss who made good use of 6,000 hand guns.
Supported by artillery, Gustavus Adolphus's cavalry rode for ward, fired their pistols and charged home with the sword. At Breitenfeld (1631) and at Lutzen (1632) his cavalry played the decisive part. In England he was emulated by Cromwell—the bat tle of Grantham (1643) was decided by the sword, so was Marston Moor (1644) , and so was Naseby (1645) . In France the rever sion to shock tactics was no whit behind-hand : Turenne favoured the acme blanche, and issued instructions to his cavalry to use the sword alone. The impetuous Conde did likewise, and so also Mar shal Luxembourg at Leuze, in 1691. In Germany, however, Montecuculi still favoured fire-arms for cavalry; he considered the lance useless, and looked upon the horses of his Dragoons solely as a means of conveyance.
This change is truly astonishing, and cannot alone be attributed to the genius of such cavalry leaders as Pappenheim and Gustavus. The underlying reason for it is probably to be found in the uni versal adoption of the matchlock, and the consequent reduction of the pikemen. The matchlock was a slow-loading and unreliable weapon, especially in rainy weather when infantry are apt to be surprised in mist or fog. It was on such occasions as these that cavalry frequently proved themselves the decisive arm, up to the adoption of the percussion cap in 1839. A notable instance of this was the battle of Eylau (1807) . During the 18th century the idea of the shock continued to grow. Marlborough used cavalry in mass. Blenheim (17o4) was decided by cavalry, and so was Malplaquet (1708) . In these battles are to be discovered the germ of the superb cavalry actions of Ziethen and Seydlitz, which character ized the Seven Years' War (1756-63). Charles III. of Sweden carried the shock to its extreme. He prohibited the use of armour, raced over Europe, rode to death two horses whilst reviewing a regiment, and met an impetuous end at Pultowa (1709) . Marshal Saxe, in a reasoned degree, emulated him.
Under Frederick the Great, cavalry once again reached its zenith, and out of 22 of his battles at least 15 were won by the cavalry arm working in close co-operation with gun and musket. In his regulations for cavalry Frederick wrote : "They will move off at a fast trot and charge at the gallop, being careful to be well closed together. His Majesty will guarantee that the enemy will be beaten every time they are charged in this way." The exploits of Seydlitz and Ziethen proved that Frederick was not wrong. Rosbach (1757) was a great cavalry victory, and so, in a lesser degree, was Zorndorf (1758) . The secret of Frederick's success lay not only in the artillery preparation which heralded the charge, nor in his system of attack, but in the training of his troopers. He says himself : "Every horse and trooper has been finished with the same care that a watchmaker bestows upon each wheel of the watch mechanism." And be it remembered that shortly after he ascended the Prussian throne his cavalry were so indifferent that he wrote: "Die Cavallerie ist nicht einmal werth dass sie der Teufel weck holet." (The cavalry is not even worth the devil com ing to fetch it away.) The Decline of Cavalry, 1763-1871.—Af ter the close of the Seven Years' War a decline set in. The war of American Revolu tion (1775-81) provides no example of outstanding cavalry work, nor do the French Revolutionary Wars, except for the brilliant charge of the English 15th Hussars at Villers-en-Couchti where some 30o British and Austrian cavalry charged and routed French infantry and cavalry, driving them into Cambrai with a loss of 1,200 men. The slowing down of the shock first be came perceptible in Bonaparte's campaign in Egypt, when the world-famed Mameluke cavalry failed to make any real impres sion on his infantry squares. At Mount Tabor (1799) 6,000 French infantry under Kleber gained a decisive victory over 30,00o Turks and Mamelukes. From this battle onwards to the World War of 1914 the declining power of cavalry remains constant.
Napoleon relied on all arms but particularly on fire power, and in spite of the many cavalry charges executed during his wars, his cavalry were pre-eminently a strategic force for observation and protection, and a tactical force for pursuit. It was only after the enemy was shattered by fire that pursuit was attempted, the most noted example being Murat's pursuit of the Prussians after Jena (18°6). Against well trained and unbroken infantry the cavalry charge failed, witness the French charges at Quatre Bras and Waterloo (1815) . The Napoleonic wars were followed by 40 years of profound military coma. In 1823, Capt. John Norton, of the 34th English Regiment, invented the cylindro-conoidal bullet. He received no encouragement, for the duke of Wellington considered that the Brown Bess could not be bettered, yet Norton's bullet was the greatest military invention since the flint-lock. In 1853, Capt. Minie, of the French army, invented a similar projectile. In England, Sir William Napier opposed its adoption as he considered that it would destroy the infantry spirit by turning infantry into "long range assassins." It was, however, adopted ; it had a range of I,000yd., and it sealed the doom of the cavalry charge. The war in the Crimea (1854-55) taught soldiers nothing as regards cav alry except their misuse and their gallantry. On its completion cavalry had fallen into such low repute that suggestions were made in England to abolish this arm altogether. The old feudal spirit was, however, too strong, the cavalry surviving all attacks.
In the next war, the Civil War in America (1861-65), cavalry once again became mounted infantry. Charges were carried out, but with the revolver, cavalry tactics approximating somewhat to those in vogue in the early 17th century. Morgan openly jeered at the sword: "Here, boys," he shouted, "are those fools coming again with their sabres (Federal cavalry) ; give it to them," and the saddles were emptied. Morgan with his mounted riflemen, a force which never exceeded 4,000 all told, killed as many of the enemy and captured 15,000 of them. The Federal sabres accom plished nothing, but the Dragoons much. Stuart waltzed round McClellan at Richmond, and beat the Federals at Brandy Station in 1863. • In spite of the fact that during four years of warfare, Morgan, Stuart, Mosby, Wilson, Forrest and Sheridan had proved the lance and sabre to be as obsolete as the stone axe of neolithic man, the 1866 Austro-Prussian War saw 56,00o cavalrymen armed with these weapons, and this in face of the breech-loading needle-gun and the Minie rifle. At Nachod there was a cavalry skirmish; a little later on Col. Bredow charged an ammunition train; at Konig gratz the Austrians were decisively defeated, and the Prussian cavalry impetuously charged the retreating infantry. "These, though running, still maintained their formation, and turned when the horsemen came too close, to stand and deliver volleys, which drove them back with many a saddle emptied." In spite of Koniggratz, the Franco-German War (187o-71) saw 96,00o cavalry take the field. The French had learnt nothing regarding cavalry tactics since Waterloo, and had forgotten every thing regarding them prior to this date. The Germans were bold and pushful. They used their cavalry strategically with consider able effect, covering their own movements and discovering those of the enemy. The charge all but ceased to take place. Mar gueritte failed, Bredow succeeded, but at what cost? His is the last successful massed cavalry charge in military history. Sheri dan, probably the greatest cavalry soldier of the American Civil War, witnessed the charge of Margueritte's Chasseurs d'Afrique at Sedan. It was in his opinion a most skilful charge, nobly carried out, the ground was most suitable ; the Prussians simply waited until the horsemen were 15o yards away, and then mowed them down with volleys—it was not war, but cold-blooded assassination.
From this point of view of the art of war, cavalry tactics end with the introduction of the single-shot breech-loading rifle. They end by leaving cavalry still an arm of stategic importance, but tactically, except as mounted infantry, useless. Fire power has rendered impossible their tactical mobility in action. Cavalry can no longer charge home, and they cannot carry bullet-proof armour. Except in skirmishes against each other there is no shock action, and thus, in the last quarter of the 19th century they found them selves back in the year 329 B.C., when the Scythian horsemen surged round Alexander at the ford over the Jaxartes, but dared not approach him. Stability in cavalry has now completely dis appeared, and cannot even be provided by infantry, or artillery, save in most exceptional circumstances, and without defensive power cavalry offensives become impossible.
This war was followed by a severe criticism of cavalry, which was interrupted by the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), which unhinged the military equilibrium of Europe by freeing Germany from Russian pressure. In Manchuria cav alry, though assembled in masses, particularly by the Russians, played an altogether insignificant part, and though after this war cavalry was once again severely criticized, the cavalry school of thought carried all before it by means of a most astonishing de fence. It was asserted that in no single campaign since the days of Napoleon had conditions governing cavalry encounters been normal. South Africa and Manchuria were set aside as abnormal countries. In Europe it was declared that conditions would im pose upon armies "a rapid marching campaign in the Napoleonic style, and in such warfare there is neither time nor energy avail able for the erection of extemporized fortresses. Victory must therefore fall to the side that can develop the greatest fire power in the shortest time. The greatest factor of fire power is the long artillery lines, and as cavalry is the one arm which by its mobility can hamper or prevent the formation of such lines, on its success in this task all else must depend. . . . The cavalry which will succeed in this task will be the one in which the spirit of duty burns brightest, and the oath of allegiance, renewed daily on the cross of the sword, is held in the highest esteem." The theory underlying this amazing defence was absolutely sound. If the enemy could be deprived of his guns the war was won and there would be no entrenchments. But as lines of guns would be pro tected by lines of infantry, and as cavalry could not even, as early as 1866, face infantry when on the run, how they were going to face and defeat the magazine rifle and the machine gun in the next war was relegated to that mystical receptacle—the adytum of God-nourished silence. Then came the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, which again were declared to be abnormal operations, and a year later the World War, which soon proved itself, from the point of view of the cavalry school, to be the most abnormal war ever fought.
In 1914 masses of cavalry once again took the field. The Brit ish produced one cavalry division, the French and Germans ten apiece, and the Russians 24. In this war, which was pre-eminently a war of trenches, one of the most perplexing riddles in military history is the abnormal growth of cavalry. In Aug. 1914 the British calvalry and yeomanry numbered 42,000, by July 1916 this figure exceeded 135,00o, and in Nov. 1918 it fell to 74,000. In Russia the original 756 squadrons were raised to 1,277, an equivalent of 54 cavalry divisions, without counting numerous corps and divisional cavalry allotted to all infantry formations. So congested did the Russian railways become with the transport of forage, that it was found impossible to feed the troops. This was one of the main military causes which led to the Revolution.
In 1916, there must have been assembled on all fronts over I,000,000 horsemen, and such an inundation of cavalry, never before seen in history, cannot be explained away by the fact that in most armies cavalry generals were in the ascendent, and carried the greatest weight. The reason was that the tactical idea which underlay each great battle fought was theoretically sound, but on account of conditions impossible practically. This idea was the development of mobility from a protective base. In the British army, throughout the war commanded by cavalry generals, this impracticable theory was rigidly maintained until July 1918. Each great battle, the Somme (1916), Arras (1917), Ypres (1917) and Cambrai (1917) was founded on the idea of cavalry pursuit after the enemy's front had been penetrated by artillery and infantry attack. In fact, all these attacks were to be but preludes to a general cavalry advance on Napoleonic, 1806, lines.
In 1914 the five cavalry divisions allotted to the German right wing utterly failed in their mission, nor would they have succeeded had they been reinforced by the remaining five allotted to the left wing and centre; for had this been done, it would have been impossible to have supplied them with forage, unless whole corps of infantry had been removed. The French cavalry under Sordet, 18 regiments in all, advanced to within a few miles of Liege, ac complished nothing, fell back to the Marne, and then, on Sept. 9, advanced and entered Senlis, but only after it had been "nettoye d'Allemands" (cleared of Germans). In 1918, Ludendorff at tributed his failure on the Western Front to lack of cavalry. He said: "Without cavalry it is impossible to reap the fruits of vic tory"—it was the nightmare of a Murat dreamt in a machine-gun factory. At last, in September, 1918, the goal was gained, for cavalry conditions became normal in Palestine. There, they had little to do with the ground, or the theatre of war, the old bug bears of the cavalry school, but everything with the state of the enemy. The Turks were virtually down and out, demoralized, half-fed, short of ammunition, guns and shells, and without aero planes. They were confronted by Gen. Allenby who concentrated against their right flank, held by 8,000 rifles and 13o guns, a force of 35,00o rifles, 383 guns and three cavalry divisions. Though the numerical superiority of the British was formidable, and their moral superiority overwhelming, the importance of this battle lies in its idea, and this idea can never be belittled by any comparison of numbers or virtues. It was to hold the Turkish front, smash the Turkish right, and pass the cavalry through the gap created with the object, not of attacking the Turks in flank, but in rear. The cavalry attack, freed from all air attack, was not made against the body of the enemy's army but against his headquarters, supply centres, railways and lines of communication. Once these were seized, the whole of the Turkish forces were completely dis located, total disruption and destruction following; for, within 14 days of the attack being launched, the enemy, having lost prisoners and Soo guns, ceased to exist. In the tactics of this remarkable battle the secret of the future of cavalry lies imbedded.
If conditions cannot be changed, then the instrument must be modified ; for it is the instrumekt which has to overcome condi tions, and till it can overcome them tactics cannot flourish as an art. Since the World War, cavalry soldiers have not grasped this fundamental necessity for change. In place of seeking a solution to the eternal problem of movement, they have attempted to justify their existence, not on tactical grounds but on traditional predilections. In place of modernizing the Palestine campaign they have crystallized it and apotheosized it, until the worship of the horse has obliterated the reality of war which pivots on the bullet—the horse and man-killer. The result is that though in all armies cavalry has been drastically cut down, no replacement worth considering of this essential arm by some modernized coun terpart has been attempted.
The answer to the bullet is obviously armour. To-day, prac tically all armies possess armoured cars to co-operate with cav alry, who are to discover the enemy so that the infantry may at tack him. There would, however, appear, at present, to be no idea of using them decisively, that is of attacking with infantry, not in order to destroy the enemy by such an attack, a most costly method of waging war, but of holding the enemy in order to develop from this operation an armoured car, that is mecha nized cavalry, attack on the enemy's rear. Obviously, for such tactics, the armoured car, even if a multi-wheeled machine, suf fers from certain definite limitations. It will normally be tied to road attack, and it will not be able to cross really difficult ground. Nevertheless, a study of the astonishing operations car ried out by the 17th British Armoured Car Battalion (Tank Corps) during the World War, ought to convince the most scep tical of the feasibility of attacking an enemy's rear with these weapons. Should an enemy be held, then, if a swarm of armoured cars is launched on his rear; with these modernized Parthians shall we see battles, like the battle of Carrhae, repeat themselves? Once mechanized cavalry realize this, we shall gradually see the old cavalry idea replace the existing infantry idea as the tac tical pivot of battle. Further still, as mechanization becomes gen eral, the modern Parthians will be confronted by their like, and to overcome their like they will demand not only more and more powerful machines, but machines which are freed entirely from road movements. This will mean that to light mechanized cav alry, those equipped with armoured cars, will be added heavy mechanized cavalry, those equipped with a very fast tank—a ma chine which freed of roads can move and manoeuvre across coun try, and attack the enemy's combatants themselves in flank or rear. When this becomes possible, then the present tactical pivot will be entirely replaced by the old cavalry one. It will be with mechanized cavalry that all arms will co-operate. The mobility of the historic arm will be revived and to it will be added the offensive power of artillery. Fast moving armoured machines, equipped with guns, will operate from a more strongly armoured and less fast moving base, a mobile fortress which can engage the enemy and hold him, and through holding him enable the mecha nized cavalry to sally forth and attack the enemy at the decisive point—his rear. The art of war will be rehabilitated ; it will once again become an art in the full meaning of the word, and cease to be a dog-fight. The instruments of war, the arms themselves, being artistically designed and artistically set together, great ar tists of war will once again appear, for it is environment which liberates genius. In the World War, had all the Great Captains of the past, in turn, tried their hand at it, the result must have been the same, namely, battles of brute-force and of attrition, because none with the clumsy instruments existing could have solved that fundamental cavalry problem—the development of mobility from a protective base.