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Chilean Civil War

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CHILEAN CIVIL WAR (1891). The Chilean civil war grew out of political dissensions between the president of Chile, J. M. Balmaceda, and his congress (see CHILE : History), and began in Jan. 1891. On the 6th, at Valparaiso, the political leaders of the Congressional Party went on board the ironclad "Blanco Encalada," and Capt. Jorge Montt of that vessel hoisted a broad pennant as commodore of the Congressional fleet. Preparations had long been made for the naval pronunciamento, and in the end but few vessels of the Chilean navy adhered to the cause of the "dictator" Balmaceda. But amongst these were two new and fast torpedo gunboats, "Almirante Condell" and "Almirante Lynch," and in European dockyards (incomplete) lay the most powerful vessel of the navy, the "Arturo Prat" and two fast cruisers. If these were secured by the Balmacedists the naval supremacy of the congress would be seriously challenged. The rank and file of the army remained faithful to the executive, and thus in the early part of the war the "Gobernistas," speaking broadly, possessed an army without a fleet, the congress a fleet without an army. Bal maceda hoped to create a navy; the congress took steps to recruit an army by taking its sympathizers on board the fleet. The first shot was fired, on Jan. 16, by the "Blanco" at the Valparaiso batteries, and landing parties from the warships engaged small parties of Government troops at various places during January and February. The dictator's principal forces were stationed in and about Iquique, Coquimbo, Valparaiso, Santiago and Con cepcion. The troops at Iquique and Coquimbo were necessarily isolated from the rest and from each other, and military opera tions began, as in the campaign of 1879 in this quarter, with a naval descent upon Pisagua followed by an advance inland to Dolores. The Congressional forces failed at first to make good their footing ( Jan. 16-23), but, though defeated in two or three actions, they brought off many recruits and a quantity of muni tions of war. On the 26th they retook Pisagua, and on Feb. 15, the Balmacedist commander, Eulogio Robles, who offered battle in the expectation of receiving reinforcements from Tacna, was completely defeated on the old battle-field of San Francisco. Robles fell back along the railway, called up troops from Iquique, and beat the invaders at Haura on the 17th, but Iquique in the meanwhile fell to the Congressional fleet on the 16th. The Pisagua line of operations was at once abandoned, and the military forces of the congress were moved by sea to Iquique, whence, under the command of Col. Estanislao Del Canto, they started inland. The battle of Pozo Almonte, fought on March 7, was desperately contested, but Del Canto was superior in number, and Robles was himself killed and his army dispersed. After this the other Balma cedist troops in the north gave up the struggle. Some were driven into Peru, others into Bolivia, and one column made a laborious retreat from Calama to Santiago, in the course of which it twice crossed the main chain of the Andes.

The Congressional Junta de Gobierno now established in Iquique prosecuted the war vigorously, and by the end of April the whole country, from the Peruvian border to the outposts of the Balma cedists at Coquimbo and La Serena, was in the hands of the "rebels." The Junta now began the formation of a properly organized army for the next campaign, which, it was believed universally on both sides, would be directed against Coquimbo. But in a few months the arrival of the new ships from Europe would reopen the struggle for command of the sea. The Con gressional Party could no longer aim at a methodical conquest of successive provinces, but was compelled to attempt to crush the dictator at a blow. Where this blow was to fall was not decided up to the last moment, but the instrument which was to deliver it was prepared with all the care possible under the circum stances. Del Canto was made commander-in-chief, and an ex Prussian officer, Emil Korner, chief of staff. Balmaceda could only wait upon events, but he prepared his forces as best he was able, and his torpederas constantly harried the Congressional navy. By the end of July Del Canto and Korner had done their work as well as time permitted, and early in August the troops prepared to embark, not for Coquimbo, but for Valparaiso itself.

The expedition by sea was admirably managed, and Quinteros, north of Valparaiso and not many miles out of range of its batteries was occupied on Aug. 20, 1891. Balmaceda was sur prised, but acted promptly. The first battle was fought on the Aconcagua at Concon on the 21st. The eager infantry of the Congressional army forced the passage of the river and stormed the heights held by the Gobernistas. The killed and wounded of the Balmacedists numbered 1,600, and nearly all the prisoners, about 1,5oo men, enrolled themselves in the rebel army, which thus more than made good its loss of I,000 killed and wounded. The victors pressed on towards Valparaiso, but were soon brought up by the strong fortified position of the Balmacedist Gen. Barbosa at Villa del Mar, whither Balmaceda hurried up all available troops from Valparaiso and Santiago, and even from Concepcion. Del Canto and Korner now resolved on a daring step. Supplies of all kinds were brought up from Quinteros to the front, and on Aug. 24, the army abandoned its line of communications and marched in land. The flank march was conducted with great skill, little opposi tion was encountered, and the rebels finally appeared to the south east of Valparaiso. Here, on the 28th, took place the decisive battle of La Placilla. The splendid fighting qualities of the Con gressional troops and the superior generalship of their leaders prevailed in the end over every obstacle. The Government army was practically annihilated. Valparaiso was occupied the same evening and Santiago soon afterwards. There was no further fighting, for so great was the effect of the battles of Concon and La Placilla that even the Coquimbo troops surrendered without firing a shot.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Lieut. Sears and Ensign Wells, U.S.N., The Chilean Bibliography.—Lieut. Sears and Ensign Wells, U.S.N., The Chilean Revolution of 189r (Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington, 1893) The Capture of Valparaiso, 1891 (Intelligence Department, War Office, London, 1892) ; H. Kunz, Taktische Beispiele aus den Kriegen der neuesten Zeit; der Bihrgerkrieg in Chile (19o1) ; Revista Militar de Chile (Feb.—March 1892) ; Sir W. Laird Clowes, Four Modern Naval Campaigns (1902) ; M. H. Hervey, Dark Days in Chile; an Account of the Revolution of 1891 (1892) ; F. Velasco, La Revoluci6n de 189r (1914) ; and C. Mondiola Gana, Paginas de la Guerra Civil de 189r (1915).

W

AR (1879-82). The proximate cause of this war was the seizure, by the authorities of Bolivia, of the effects of the Chilean Nitrate Company at Antofagasta, then part of the Bolivian Province of Atacama. The first act of hostility was the despatch of 500 soldiers to protect Chilean in terests at Antofagasta. This force, under Col. Sotomayor, landed and marched inland ; the only resistance encountered was at Calama on the river Loa, where a handful of newly raised militia was routed (March 23, 1879). About the same time Chilean war ships occupied Cobija and Tocapilla, and Sotomayor, after his victory at Calama, marched to the latter port. Bolivia had de clared war on March 1, but Peru not till April 5: this delay gave the Chileans time to occupy every port on the Bolivian coast. Thus the Chilean admiral was able to proceed at once to the blockade of the southern ports of Peru, and in particular Iquique, where there took place the first naval action of the war. On April 21, the Chilean sloop "Esmeralda" and the gunboat "Cova donga"—both small and weak ships—engaged the Peruvian heavy ironclads "Huascar" and "Independencia." After a hot fight the "Huascar" sank the "Esmeralda," but Carlos Condell in the "Covadonga" manoeuvred the "Independencia" aground and shelled her into a complete wreck. The Chileans now gave up the blockade and concentrated all their efforts on the destruction of the "Huascar," while the allies organized a field army in the neigh bourhood of Tacna and a large Chilean force assembled at Anto fagasta.

On Oct. 8, 1879, the "Huascar" was brought to action off An gamos by the "Blanco Encalada," and the "Almirante Cochrane." Although hopelessly outmatched the "Huascar" made a brave fight. When she finally surrendered she had but one gun left in action, her fourth commander and three-quarters of her crew were killed and wounded, and the steering-gear had been shot away. The Peruvian navy had now ceased to exist. The Chileans resumed the blockade, and more active operations were soon undertaken. The whole force of the allies was about 20,000 men, scattered along the seaboard of Peru. The Chileans on the other hand had a striking force of 16,000 men in the neighbourhood of An tofagasta, and of this nearly half was embarked for Pisagua on Oct. 26. The expeditionary force landed, in the face of con siderable opposition, on Nov. 2, and captured Pisagua. From Pisagua the Peruvians and Bolivians fell back along the railway to their reinforcements, and when some io,000 men had been collected they moved forward to attack the Chilean position of San Francisco near Dolores station (Nov. 19). In the end the Chileans were victorious, but their only material gain was the possession of Iquique and the retreat of the allies, who fell back inland towards Tarapaca. The tardy pursuit of the Chileans ended in the battle of Tarapaca on the 27th, in which more men were killed than were wounded, the Chileans suffering a complete defeat. For some inexplicable reason the allies made no use of their victory, continued to retreat and left the Chileans in com plete possession of the Tarapaca region. With this the campaign of 1879 ended. Chile had taken possession of the Bolivian sea board and of the Peruvian province of Tarapaca, and had destroyed the hostile navy.

The objective of the Chileans in the second campaign was the Province of Tacna and the field force of the allies at Tacna and Arica. The invasion was again carried out by sea, and 12,000 Chileans were landed at Pacocha (Ylo), far to the north of Arica. Careful preparations were made for a desert march, and on March 12, 188o, the advanced corps started inland for Moquegua, which was occupied on the loth. Near Moquegua the Peruvians, some 2,000 strong, took up an unusually strong position in the defile of Cuesta de los Angeles. But the great numerical superiority of the assailants enabled them to turn the flanks and press the front of the Peruvian position, and after a severe struggle the defence collapsed (March 22). In April the army began its advance south ward from Moquegua to Tacna. Arica was also watched, and the blockade was extended north of Lima. The land campaign had in the meanwhile culminated in the battle of Tacna (May 26), in which the Chileans attacked at fist in several disconnected bodies, and suffered severely until all their forces came on the field. Then a combined advance carried all before it. The allies engaged under Gen. Narciso Campero, the new president of Bo livia, lost nearly 3,00o men, and the Chileans, commanded by Manuel Baquedano, lost 2,000 out of 8,500 on the field. The de feated army was completely dissolved, and it only remained for the Chileans to march on Arica from the land side. The navy co-operated with its long-range guns, on June 7 a general assault was made, and before nightfall the whole of the defences were in the hands of the Chileans. Their second campaign had given them entire possession of another strip of Peru (from Pisagua to Ylo), and they had shown themselves greatly superior, both in courage and leadership, to their opponents.

The Chilean army was reorganized during the summer, and pre pared for its next operation, this time against Lima itself. Gen. Baquedano was in command. The leading troops disembarked at Pisco on Nov. i8, 188o, and the whole army was ready to move against the defences of Lima six weeks later. These defences consisted of two distinct positions, Chorrillos and Miraflores, the latter being about 4,000 yd. outside Lima. The first line of de fence was attacked by Baquedano on Jan. 13, 1881. The de fenders had 22,000 men in the lines, the Chileans engaged about 24,000. The battle of Chorrillos ended in the complete defeat of the Peruvians, less than a quarter of whose army rallied behind the Miraflores defences. Two days later took place the battle of Miraflores. Here the defences were very strong and the action began with a daring counter-attack by some Peruvians. Neither party had intended to fight a battle, for negotiations were in progress, but the action quickly became general. Its result was, as before, the complete dissolution of the defending army. Lima, incapable of defence, was occupied by the invaders on the i 7th, and on the 18th Callao surrendered. The resistance of the Peru vians was so far broken that Chile left only a small army of occu pation to deal with the remnants of their army. The last engage ment took place at Caxacamara in Sept. 1882, when the Peruvians won an unimportant success.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

T. B. M. Mason, The War on the Pacific Coast, Bibliography.—T. B. M. Mason, The War on the Pacific Coast, 1879-1881 (U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, 1883) ; Capt. Chateau minois (trans.), Memoire du Ministre de la Guerre du Chili sur la guerre Chilo-Peruvienne (1882) ; Barros Arana, Hist. de la guerre du Pacifique (1884) ; Sir W. Laird Clowes, Four Modern Naval Cam paigns (5902) ; R. Markham, The War between Peru and Chile (2883) Pascual Ahumada y Moreno, Guerra del Pacifico, Recopilacion Corn pieta de Todos los Documentos Oficiales, Correspondencia, etc. (1884 89) ; I. Santa Maria, Guerra del Pacifico (1919) ; C. V. C. Varigny, La Guerra del Pacifico (192 2) ; Gonzalo Bulnes, Chile and Peru; the Causes of the War of 1879 (1920).

army, chileans, valparaiso, troops, battle, chile and march