CHINKIANG, a treaty port of China on the south bank of the Yangtze-kiang, 32° 11' N., 119° 24' E., 160 miles above Shanghai and 43 miles below Nanking. It lies where the north south route of the Grand Canal from Hangchow to Peking crosses the east-west route of the Yangtze river. So long as the Grand Canal, linking the Yangtze Delta with the Imperial capital, re mained an arterial line of communication, Chinkiang retained its significance. But traffic on the Grand Canal is now becoming increasingly local and its function as a north-south link is being usurped by the Tientsin-Pukow (Tsin-Pu) railway, which comes down to the Yangtze opposite Nanking, itself the terminus of a railway from Shanghai.
Chinkiang, although a station on the Shanghai-Nanking railway, has hence given place to Nanking in the command of the Yangtze crossing. Moreover the pore of Chinkiang is experiencing local difficulties through silting. In consequence, while, since the first decade of the 2oth century, the trade of neighbouring ports has continued to increase, that of Chinkiang has been arrested. In 1926, the total trade of the port was Hk. Tls. 29,200,583. The excess of imports over exports has continued to increase : in 1926 they were in the proportion of fifteen to one. The port is there fore functioning almost solely as a distributor of imported goods. The Chinese population is estimated at 150,000.
WAR The causes of this conflict arose out of the immemorial rivalry of China and Japan for influence in Korea. In the i6th century a prolonged war in the peninsula had ended with the failure of Japan to make good her footing on the mainland—a failure brought about largely by lack of naval resources. In more modern times (1875, 1882, 1884) Japan had repeatedly sent expeditions to Korea, and had fostered the growth of a progressive party in Seoul. The difficulties of 1884 were settled between China and Japan by the convention of Tientsin, wherein it was agreed that in the event of future inter vention each should inform the other if it were decided to despatch troops to the peninsula. Nine years later the occasion arose. A serious rebellion induced the Korean Government to apply for military assistance from China. Early in June 1894 a small force of Chinese troops was sent to Asan, and Japan, duly informed of this action, replied by furnishing her minister at Seoul with an escort, rapidly following up this step by the despatch of about 5,000 troops under Maj.-Gen. Oshima. A complicated situation thus arose. Chinese troops were present in Korea by the request of the Government to put down rebellion. The Japanese con trolled the capital, and declined to recognize Korea as a tributary of China. But they proposed that the two Powers should unite to suppress the disturbance and to inaugurate certain specified reforms. China considered that the measures of reform must be left to Korea herself. The reply was that Japan considered the Government of Korea "lacking in some of the elements which are essential to responsible independence." By the middle of July war had become inevitable unless the Peking Government were willing to abandon all claims over Korea, and as Chinese troops were already in the country by invitation, it was not to be expected that the shadowy suzerainty would be abandoned.
At Seoul the issue was forced by the Japanese minister, who delivered an ultimatum to the Korean Government on July 20. On the 23rd the palace was forcibly occupied. Meanwhile China had despatched about 8,000 troops to the Yalu river. The out break of war thus found the Japanese in possession of Seoul and ready to send large forces to Korea, while the Chinese occupied Asan (about 4om. south of the capital) and had a considerable body of troops in Manchuria in addition to those despatched to the Yalu river. To Japan the command of the sea was essential for the secure transport and supply of her troops. Without it the experience of the war of the i6th century would be repeated. China, too, could only utilize overland routes to Korea by submit ting to the difficulties and delays entailed.
By the time war was finally declared (August I), hostilities had already begun. On July 25 Oshima set out from Seoul to attack the Chinese at Asan. On the 29th he won a victory at Songhwan, but the Chinese commander escaped with a considerable part of his forces by a detour to Ping-Yang (Phyong-Yang). Meanwhile a portion of the Japanese fleet had encountered some Chinese war ships and transports off Phung-Tao, and scored an important suc cess, sinking, amongst other vessels, the transport "Kowshing" (July 25). The loss of more than i,000 Chinese soldiers in this vessel materially lightened Oshima's task. The intention of the Chinese to crush their enemies between their forces at Asan and Ping-Yang was completely frustrated, and the Japanese obtained control of all southern Korea.
Reinforcements from Japan were now pouring into Korea, and Gen. Nozu, the senior Japanese officer present, soon found him self in a position to move on Ping-Yang. Three columns converged upon the place on Sept. 15 and carried it after severe fighting.
Nearly all the troops on either side had been conveyed to the scene of war by sea, though the decisive contest for sea supremacy was still to be fought. The Chinese admiral Ting with the Northern squadron (which alone took part in the war) had hitherto remained inactive in Wei-hai-wei, and on the other side Vice-Admiral Ito's fleet had not directly interfered with the hostile transports which were reinforcing the troops on the Yalu. But two days after the battle of Ping-Yang, Ting, who had con veyed a large body of troops to the mouth of the Yalu, encoun tered the Japanese fleet on his return journey off Hai-Yang-Tao on Sept 17. The heavy battleships "Chen-Yuen" and "Ting-Yuen" constituted the strongest element of the Chinese squadron, for the Japanese, superior as they were in every other factor of suc cess, had no vessels which could compare with these in the matter of protection. Ting advanced in a long irregular line abreast ; the battleships in the centre, the lighter vessels on the wings. Ito's fast cruisers steamed in line ahead against the Chinese right wing, crushing their weaker opponents with their fire. In the end the Chinese fleet was defeated and scattered, but the two heavy battle ships drew off without serious injury. This battle of the Yalu gave Japan command of the sea, but Ito continued to act with great caution. The remnants of the vanquished fleet took refuge in Port Arthur, whence after repairs Ting proceeded to Wei-hai-wei.
The victory of Ping-Yang had cleared Korea of the Chinese troops, but on the lower Yalu—their own frontier—large forces threatened a second advance. Marshal Yamagata therefore took the offensive with his I. Army, and on Oct. 24 and 25, under great difficulties—though without serious opposition from the enemy— f orced the passage of the river and occupied Chiu-lien-cheng. Part of the Chinese force retired to the north-east, part to Feng hwang-cheng and Hsiu-yuen. The Japanese I. Army advanced several columns towards the mountains of Manchuria to secure its conquests and prepare for a future advance. Gen. Tachimi's brigade, skirmishing with the enemy on the Moukden and Liao Yang roads, found the Chinese in force. A simultaneous f orward move by both sides led to the action of Tsao-ho-ku (Nov. 3o), after which both sides withdrew—the Chinese to the line of the mountains covering Hai-cheng, Liao-Yang and Moukden, with the Tatar general Ikotenga's force 14,000 strong, on the Japanese right north-east of Feng-hwang-cheng ; and the Japanese to Chiu-lien cheng, Takushan and Hsiu-yuen. The difficulties of supply in the hills were almost insurmountable, and no serious advance was in tended by the Japanese until Jan. 1895, when it was to be made in co-operation with the II. Army. This army, under Marshal Oyama, had been formed in September and at first sent to Chemul pho as a support to the forces under Yamagata ; but its chief task was the siege and capture of the Chinese fortress, dockyard and arsenal of Port Arthur.
The Liao-Tong peninsula was guarded by the walled city of Kin-chow and the forts of Ta-lien-wan (Dalny under the Russian regime, and Dairen under the Japanese) as well as the fortifications around Port Arthur itself. On Oct. 24 the disembarkation of the II. Army began near Pi-tse-wo, and the successive columns of the Japanese gradually moved towards Kin-chow, which was carried without difficulty. Even less resistance was offered by the modern forts of Ta-lien-wan. The Japanese now held a good harbour within a few miles of the main fortress. Here they landed siege artillery, and on Nov. 17 the advance was resumed. The attack was made on the 19th at dawn. Yamaji's division (Nogi's and Nishi's brigades), after a trying night march, assaulted and car ried the western defences and moved upon the town. Hasegawa in the centre, as soon as Yamaji began to appear in rear of his opponents in the northern forts, pushed home his attack with equal success, and by 3 P.M. practically all resistance was at an end. The Japanese paid for this important success with but 423 casualties. Meanwhile the Chinese general Sung, who had marched from Hai-cheng to engage the II. Army, appeared before Kin chow, where he received on the 22nd a severe repulse at the hands of the Japanese garrison. Soon after this overtures of peace were made by China; but her envoy, a foreigner unfurnished with credentials, was not received by the Tokyo Government.
The Japanese I. Army (now under Gen. Nozu) prepared, in spite of the season, to move across the mountains, and on Dec. 3 Gen. Katsura left Antung for Hai-cheng, which was safely occupied on Dec. 13. In the meantime Tachimi had moved north ward from Feng-hwang-cheng in order to distract the attention of the Chinese from Hai-cheng, and there were some small engage ments between this force and that of Ikotenga, who ultimately retired beyond the mountains to Liao-Yang. Sung had already left Kai-ping to secure Hai-cheng when he heard of the fall of that place; his communications with Ikotenga being now severed, he swerved to the north-west and established a new base at Niu chwang. Once on his new line Sung moved upon Hai-cheng. As it was essential that he should be prevented from joining forces with Ikotenga, Gen. Katsura marched out of Hai-cheng to fight him. At Kang-wang-tsai (Dec. 19) the Chinese displayed unusual steadiness, and it cost the Japanese some 343 casualties to dis lodge the enemy. The victors returned to Hai-cheng exhausted with their efforts, but secure from attack for some time to come.
The advanced troops of the II. Army (Nogi's brigade) were now ready to advance, and only the Kai-ping garrison barred their junction with Katsura. At Kai-ping (Jan. 1o) the resistance of the Chinese was almost as steady as at Kang-wang-tsai, and the Jap anese lost 30o killed and wounded in their successful attack. In neither of these actions was the defeated force routed, nor did it retire very far. On Jan. 17 and again on the 22nd Ikotenga attacked Hai-cheng from the north, but was repulsed.
Meanwhile the II. Army, still under Oyama, had undertaken operations against Wei-hai-wei, the second great fortress and dock yard of northern China ; and it was hoped that both armies would accomplish their present tasks in time to advance in the summer against Peking itself. On Jan. 18 a naval demonstration was made at Teng-chow-f u, Tom. west of Wei-hai-wei, and on the i 9th the Japanese began their disembarkation at Yung-cheng Bay, about 12m. from Wei-hai-wei. The landing was scarcely opposed, and on the 26th the Japanese advance was begun. The south-eastern defences of Wei-hai-wei harbour were carried by the 6th Division, whilst the 2nd Division reached the inner waters of the bay, driving the Chinese before them. The fleet under Ito co-operated effectively. On the night of Feb. 4-5 the Chinese squadron in harbour was attacked by ten torpedo boats. Two boats were lost, but the armour-clad "Ting-Yuen" was sunk. On the following night a second attack was made, and three more vessels were sunk. On the 9th the "Chen-Yuen" was sunk by the guns in one of the captured forts. On the 12th Admiral Ting wrote to Admiral Ito offering to surrender, and then took poison, other officers follow ing his example. Wei-hai-wei was then dismantled by the Japanese, and the II. Army concentrated at Port Arthur for the advance on Peking.
While this campaign was in progress the Chinese despatched a second peace mission, also with defective credentials. The Jap anese declined to treat, and the mission returned to China. In February the Chinese made further unsuccessful attacks on Hai cheng. Yamaji near Kai-ping fought a severe action on Feb. 21, 22 and 23, at Taping-shan against a part of Sung's army under Gen. Ma-yu-kun. This action was fought with 2f t. of snow on the ground, the thermometer registering zero F, and no less than 1,500 cases of frost-bite were reported. It was the intention of Gen. Nozu, after freeing the Hai-cheng garrison from Ikotenga, to seize Niu-chwang port. Two divisions converged on An-shan chan, and the Chinese, threatened in front and flank, retired to Liao-Yang. The Japanese then moved on Niu-chwang, and Yamaji's 1st Division at Kai-ping joined in the advance. The column from An-shan-chan stormed Niu-chwang, which was obsti nately defended, and cost the stormers nearly 400 men. All three divisions converged on Niu-chwang port (Ying-kow), and the final engagement took place at Tien-chwang-tai, which was captured on March 9. The Chinese forces in Manchuria being thoroughly broken and dispersed, there was nothing to prevent the Japanese from proceeding to the occupation of Peking, since they could, after the break-up of the ice, land and supply large forces at Shan-hai-kwan, within i 7om. of the capital. Seven divisions were at Port Arthur ready to embark when negotiations were reopened. Li Hung-Chang proceeded to Shimonoseki, where the treaty was signed on April 17, 1895. An expedition was sent towards the end of March to the Pescadores, and later the Imperial Guard Division was sent to Formosa.
It is impossible to estimate the Chinese losses in the war. The Japanese lost 4,177 men by death in action or by sickness, and 56,862 were wounded or disabled by sickness, exclusive of the losses in the Formosa and Pescadores expeditions. Nearly two thirds of these losses were incurred by the I. Army in the trying winter campaign in Manchuria.