COAL: CONTROL METHODS IN THE WORLD WAR In times of war and national emergency, when industry is par alysed for lack of motive power, the overwhelming importance of coal is emphasized. Coal is not only the prime factor in the manu facture of nearly all war materials, and in the mobilization of shipping, but in the case of Britain, it is a prime article of ex change for the foodstuffs that are imported. The cost of living is further very largely affected by the price of coal. During certain periods of the war the trading value of coal became very pro nounced, for a free exchange in coal did not exist. Certain Govern ments, notably the British and German, held the delivery of coal under control. For instance, Britain supplied coal to Norway and Sweden, at a price subject to those countries giving in ex change return cargoes of pit timber and certain classes of high grade iron ore and steel billets. To Sweden also at one time bitu minous coal and anthracite were supplied subject to the release for transport to Russia of certain medical stores of which the latter country was in great need. Similarly, Switzerland relied al most entirely on German coal for industrial purposes, and Ger many used this weapon as a means to press for "compensatory goods," and also obtained iron ore in like manner from Sweden.
By a systematic development of the policy of granting supplies of coal for bunkering purposes only upon condition that those re ceiving such supplies would render certain services to the British empire and her Allies, or would abstain from giving certain facil ities to their enemies, the firms who controlled the marketing of British coal were gradually able to exert a degree of pressure upon neutral shipowners and manufacturers which formed a valuable contribution towards the economic measures directed against the enemy. But, the immediate effect of the war on the coal trade of Great Britain was also to close several important foreign markets against her. Transport facilities, by reason of the diversion of rolling stock and shipping to military purposes, was also impeded. The result was a temporary glut of coal at the collieries for home consumption.
The Allies, especially France and Italy, became largely depen dent on Britain for their supplies of coal, the latter country en tirely, while France's demands were soon double that of the normal importation. The great expansion in the manufacture of the munitions of war at home greatly augmented the fuel require ments of the iron and steel works, and on top of all this the war requirements made a constant drain on the number of miners. Up to the end of March 1916, no fewer than 282,00o men from the coal mines had voluntarily enlisted in the fighting forces. So that, although the decline in exports of coal and coke during the year 1915 amounted to about 14 million tons, this was more than balanced by decreased output, amounting to nearly 12,500,000 tons, and increased demands for home. consumption. The average pithead price of coal rose from 9s. 11.21d. in 1914 to 12s. 4.8d. per ton in 1915.
The Coal Mining Organization Committee.--This body consisting of representatives of the colliery owners and miners, presided over by the chief inspector of mines, was set up by the Government in Feb. 1915 to organize the industry to the best advantage to meet the exigencies created by the war. It had no plenary powers; it could only investigate, report and arbitrate. It continued in almost constant session until complete financial control of the industry by the State was instituted in 1917, and but for the very strained relations between the colliery owners and workmen in South Wales, which culminated in a complete im passe at the close of 1916, it is probable that the committee could have functioned successfully throughout the war. Two other com mittees dealing with coal problems were established on the advice of this committee, namely, the coal exports committee, under whose control was placed the whole of the export trade of the country in coal, and the coal and coke distribution committee, which dealt with the inland distribution of supplies.
In 1916 the output of coal showed an increase of over 3,000,000 tons on the previous year, and the average pit-head price had risen to 15s. 2.57d. per ton. Exports still further decreased, but this was occasioned by the unavoidable restriction which had to be imposed to meet home requirements, due to the starting of munition factories and the extensions of works. On the advice of the coal mining organization committee, the Government insti tuted the Price of Coal Limitation Act, which became law as from July 29, 1915, and remained in being until the end of March 1921, being repealed when Government control ceased.
The coal trade had reached a purely artificial state which con tinued throughout the war, the natural laws governing supply and demand being largely disturbed by Government control of prices and of export. The limitation of the price of coal, which was in the nature of a self-denying ordinance on the part of colliery owners and the miners, constituted one of the chief events in the history of the coal mining industry of Great Britain. It was almost the first attempt at a statutory limitation of the price of an essential commodity and, on the whole, it achieved a remarkable success. By the act, certain maximum pit-head prices for the sale of coal for inland consumption were fixed, the coal owners being left free to obtain the best possible price for coal for export, with the ex ception of a limitation in the case of coal sold to the Allies. Thus at one time the price of the same coal was for home consumption 16s. 6d. per ton and for export 6os., 62s.6d. and 65s., and after the Armistice actually reached 14os. a ton for export.
Government Control.—Owing to the wage disputes in South Wales terminating in an impasse, the Government took posses sion of the coal mines in Wales and Monmouthshire as from Dec. I, 1916, with the object of eliminating war profits, avoiding in dustrial disputes and securing the best results from labour in the mines during the war. In February of the year following it was succeeded by a more stringent control which was extended to in clude all coal mines, the three advisory committees mentioned above being merged in the control. An agreement arrived at be tween the controller and the coal owners as to the compensation to be paid to the latter under the control was confirmed by act of parliament on Feb. 6, 1918.
The management of the collieries remained with the owners, and a profit standard was fixed in respect of each colliery under taking based on any one of the three years preceding the war which the owner chose to select, such profit being guaranteed to him during the period of control, provided he worked up to a standard output. Eighty per cent of all the profit over and above the guar anteed profit was paid to the inland revenue, as in the case of the excess profits of other concerns. Of the remaining 20% the Gov ernment coal controller took 15%, which went to form a pool from which he met deficiencies that arose in respect of the guar anteed profits of any of the undertakings, the colliery owners re ceiving the remaining 5%.
Perhaps the two most important actions taken by the controller of coal mines were those in respect of the transport and rationing of coal. On Sept. 8, 1917, the Transport of Coal Order was issued, under which Great Britain was divided into 20 areas to which coal produced in each of the production areas might be forwarded by public railway for inland consumption, (1) for steam and manu facturing purposes, (2) for gas and cooking purposes, and (3 ) for domestic purposes. It was estimated that, on the basis of the year 1917, the scheme would effect a saving in transport of rail borne coal of 700,000,00o ton-m. per annum ; though it is doubtful whether the saving effected actually reached this figure. The ra tioning of domestic coal first applied to London under the House hold Coal Distribution Order of Aug. Io, 1917.
The financial decontrol of the mines took place on March 31, 192I. As the temporary scheme was drawing to a conclusion the representatives of the owners and workmen met in order to work out a permanent settlement. Their efforts failed, and on April 1, 1921, another national strike took place; it lasted until July 4, when a settlement was arrived at embodying for the first time the idea of profit-sharing.
(R. R.)