DUNAJEC-SAN, BATTLES OF THE. The Dunajec and San rivers, which, rising in the Carpathians, flow northwards across Galicia to join the Vistula on the Polish border, mark the first two stages of the great Austro-German offensive of 1915. The Russian pronunciation of the first of these rivers is Dunaietz.
By the end of March 1915 the Aus trian armies in the Carpathians were on the verge of collapse un der pressure of the persistent Russian attacks (see CARPATHIANS, BATTLES IN THE) ; and it became obvious to Falkenhayn, who directed German strategy, that the available reserves of Germany must be used in the East to bolster up her principal ally—using these reserves to deal Russia a blow which would paralyse her offensive power for a time at least. Reviewing the ineffective Franco-British attacks, he decided that troops could safely be withdrawn for the Russian front. He had also arrived at a just appreciation of the seriousness of Russia's shortage of reinforce ments and of munitions. Russia's situation invited attack.
For such an offensive, the choice lay between enveloping opera tions from the flanks or a break-through attack. The poor rail way communications to the Carpathians and the disorganization existing in that region as a consequence of the long winter battle excluded an operation from that flank. An enveloping movement from the northern flank—Ludendorff's favourite project—would be too distant to influence immediately the critical situation in the Carpathians. Accepting Conrad von Hotzendorf's suggestion, Falk enhayn determined on a break-through attack east of Cracow between the Carpathians and the upper Vistula. This point of attack appears well chosen. No great obstacle would be met till the line of the San was reached; the Vistula would afford some protection to the left flank of the advance ; and a success would immediately influence the Carpathian situation. Moreover, the enemy's line on the selected front of attack was weakly held.
The Russian III. Army, which in January held from the Vistula-Dunajec junction to about Gorlice in the Carpathian foothills only, had extended its front during the Carpathians battle. It now reached to about Mezo Laborcz, southeast of the Dukla pass, a total front of over 10o miles. It comprised a fighting wing and a defensive wing. The left wing, which had been engaged in the last great offensive of the Carpa thians battle, consisted of four corps, all somewhat exhausted. The right, the defensive wing, on which the blow was to fall, had been weakened by the withdrawal of one corps to the Bukowina and by the transfer of another corps to the left, the fighting wing; it now contained two corps only, holding a front of 5o to 6o miles. The right corps, the IX., held the lower Dunajec, from its junc tion with the Vistula to south of Tarnow; the other, the X., ex tended between Tuchow and Gorlice. These two corps had been sitting inactive opposite the Austrian IV. Army all winter; and the dispositions they had made were calculated for defence against Austrians, not Germans. Consequently there were neither suffi cient rear lines nor alternative gun emplacements. The Army had only a single corps in reserve, the III. Caucasian. The Russian army commander was Radko-Dimitriev. He had some ability and was a gallant fighter, but seems to have distinguished himself more as a corps commander than as an army commander. The German XI. Army, the spear point of the offensive; consisted of eight German divisions from the western Front, two Austrian divisions and a cavalry division. It was assembled with great secrecy be hind the right of the Austrian IV. Army, opposite the Russian X. Corps. Its commander was Mackensen, who had led the Lodz offensive at the end of 1914 (see Lonz-CRAcow) and was to win further fame by his victories in Serbia and Rumania. The Aus trian IV. Army was placed under him in addition to his own Army. He himself was subordinate to the Austrian High Command.
The preliminary bombardment began on May 1 and was continued during the forenoon of the end. It was carried out by 1,5oo guns of all calibres, and left the Russians powerless. Mackensen's army swept over the shattered trenches of the X. Corps, meeting with little resistance, and pressed for ward in the direction of Rzeszow and Jarostaw. The Austrian IV. Army forced the Russian IX. Corps from its line on the lower Dunajec. The Austrian II. and III. Armies in the Carpathians also began a forward move. There followed five days of hard fighting, but the Russians were unable to stem the tide. Radko Dimitriev's reserve corps attacked gallantly but fruitlessly; his left wing had to yield the Dukla pass and the hard-won gains of the April offensive. An attempt to stand on the line of the Wistok river and the Lupkow pass failed before renewed Austro-German attacks on May 8. Brusilov's VIII. Army was now also involved in the retreat ; and a few days later the left wing of the Russian IV. Army north of the Vistula retired from the line of the Nida.
The Russians now decided to check their foes on the strong line of the river San, with the fortress of Przemy§1 to support their left centre, and the Dniester marshes to protect their left flank. Mackensen's army, however, reached Jarostaw on May 14, stormed the bridge-head next day and established itself east of the San. It extended its gains to Sieniawa on the following days and threatened to jeopardize the whole Russian position on the San. But the impetus of the attack had spent itself for the moment and the Russians were given a breathing space. Strong reinforce ments were being hurried up to them, but their losses had been enormous, over 170,00o in prisoners alone.
The second stage of the fighting began with an attack by Mackensen's forces on May 24, which forced the line of the San at and about Radymno and thrust southeast towards the Przemysl-Lemberg railway. The Austrians simultaneously attacked Przemysl from the south, but made little progress. The Russians now made a counter-stroke on Sieniawa, north of Jarostaw, with the III. Caucasian Corps. This gallant corps stormed the Austrian positions and caused a tempo rary set-back to Mackensen's plans. At the same time heavy attacks were made on the Austrian IV. Army further north.
But the odds against the Russians were too heavy; they had little or no ammunition for their guns and practically no heavy artillery at all. Before combined attacks of the German XI. and Austrian II. and III. Armies, Przemysl fell on June 3 ; and the line here had to be withdrawn to about Grodek. The line of the lower San, north of Sieniawa, was held till June I1, when Mack ensen, who had received reinforcements, attacked again and forced the whole of the San line, the Russians retiring to the last line of defence west of Lemberg. (See LEMBERG, BATTLES OF.) By the middle of June the Russian losses in Galicia since the beginning of Mackensen's offensive included nearly 400,00o pris oners, over 30o guns and much other material. Their losses in killed and wounded had also been exceedingly heavy, for they had counter-attacked repeatedly with little artillery support. The Russians were in fact paying in flesh and blood for their lack of modern equipment. The dominance of his heavy artillery was the chief factor in Mackensen's success ; the Russians had none with which to oppose it. (See WORLD WAR.) BIBLIOGRAPHY.-E. von Falkenhayn, General Headquarters 1914-16, Bibliography.-E. von Falkenhayn, General Headquarters 1914-16, and its Critical Decisions (1919) ; A. Knox, With the Russian Army 1914-77 (1921). E. Ludendorff, Kriegserinnerungen (Berlin, 1919) ; Eng. trans. My War Memories (London, 1919) ; Daniloff, Mirovaya Voina (Berlin, 1924) ; French trans. La Guerre Mondiale (Paris, 1927) ; Hoffmann, Der Krieg der versdumten gelegenheiten (Munich, 1925) ; Eng. trans. War of Lost Opportunities (London, 1925) . (See also WORLD WAR: BIBLIOGRAPHY.) (A. P. W.)
