Ecclesiastes

ECCLESIASTES, one of the Wisdom Books of the Old Testament (see WISDOM LITERATURE). The book, as it stands, is a rnllPrtinn of rdicennrcPc nhcervatinng and anhnricmc ThP precise meaning of the Hebrew title is not certain. The Greek ecclesiastes means one who takes part in the deliberations of an assembly (ecclesia), a debater or speaker in an assembly (Plato, Gorgias, 452 E), and this is the general sense of the Hebrew word. Koheleth is employed in the book as the name of a sage. It is intended to represent him as a member of an assembly (Kahal) —not the Jewish congregation, but a body of students or in quirers, such as is referred to in xii. 9–I1, a sort of collegium, of which he was the head ; and as instructor of this body he gives his criticism of life. The author begins, indeed, by identifying his sage with King Solomon (i. 12, ii. I I2b) ; but he soon aban dons this literary device, and speaks in his own name. The ren dering "preacher" has a misleading connotation.

Contents.

In the book as we have it there is no orderly ex position of a theory; it rather has the appearance of a collection of extracts from a sage's notebook. It is, however, characterized throughout (except in some later additions) by a definite thought, and pervaded by a definite tone of feeling. The keynote is given in the classic phrase with which the discussion opens and with which it closes: "Vanity of vanities (i.e., absolute vanity), all is vanity!" Life, says the author, has nothing of permanent value to offer. His attitude is not one of bitterness but of calm hope lessness, with an occasional tinge of disgust or contempt. He fancies that he has tried or observed everything in human ex perience, and his deliberate conclusion is that nothing is worth doing. He believes in an all-powerful but indifferent God, and is himself an observer of society, standing aloof from its passions and ambitions, and interested only in pointing out their emptiness.

This general view is set forth in a number of particular ob servations.

I. His fundamental proposition is that there is a fixed, un changeable order in the world, a reign of inflexible law (i. 4–II, iii. I–I I, 14, 15, vii. 13, viii. 5-9) ; natural phenomena, such as sunrise and sunset, recur regularly; for everything in human ex perience a time has been set ; all its phenomena are to be regarded not as utterances of a living, self-directing world, but as incidents in the work of a vast machine that rolls on for ever; there is an endless repetition—nothing is new, nothing is lost ; God, the author of all, seeks out the past in order to make it once more present ; it is impossible to add to or take from the contents of the world, impossible to change the nature of things; the result is unspeakable weariness—a depressing series of sights and sounds. No goal or purpose is discoverable in this eternal round. To what end was the world created ? It is impossible to say. Such is Koheleth's view of life, and it is obvious that such a conception of an aimless cosmos is thoroughly non-Jewish, if we may judge Jewish thought by the great body of the extant literature.

2. Further, says Koheleth, man is impelled to study the world, but under the condition that he shall never comprehend it (iii. II, vii. 23, 24, viii. 16, 17). God has made the world an object of man's thought, yet so that man can never find out the work that God has done (iii. I I). The reference seems to be not so much to the variety and complexity of phenomena as to the impossi bility of construing them rationally or in such a way that man may foresee and provide for his future. Man is in the clutches of fate (ix. I I, 12) ; there is no observable relation between exertion and result in life ; the race is not to the swift nor the battle to the strong.

3. Human life, Koheleth declares, is unsatisfying. He inquired, he says, into everything that is done by men under the sun (i. 12-16) ; God has inflicted on men a restless desire for movement and work, yet life is but a catalogue of fruitless struggles. He gives a number of illustrations. In his character of king he tried all the bodily pleasures of life (ii. I–I I) ; all these he set himself to enjoy in a rational way, but, when all was done, he surveyed it only to see that it was weary and unprofitable. Dropping the role of Solomon and speaking as an observer of life, the author declares (iv. 4) that the struggle for success is the result of rivalry among men, which has no worthy outcome. The securing of riches is a fallacious achievement—naked man comes into the world. naked he goes out.

If wealth be thus a vain thing, yet a sage might be supposed to find satisfaction in wisdom, that is, practical good sense and sagacity; but this also the author puts aside as bringing no lasting advantage, since a wise man must finally give up the fruit of his wisdom to someone else, who may be a fool, and in any case the final result for both fools and wise men is the same-both are forgotten (ii. 12-23) . The whole constitution of society, in fact, seems to the sage a lamentable thing; the poor are oppressed, the earth is full of their cries, and there is no helper (iv. I) ; strange social upheavals may be seen ; the poor set in high places, the rich cast down, slaves on horseback, princes on foot (x. 5-7) . He permits himself a sweeping generalization (vii. 25-28) ; human beings as a rule are bad ; one may occasionally find a good man, never a good woman-woman is a snare and a curse.

4. The natural Outcome of these experiences of the author is that he cannot recognize a moral government of the world. He finds, like Job, that there are good men who die prematurely not withstanding their goodness, and bad men who live long not withstanding their badness (vii. ; and in general there is no moral discrimination in the fortunes of men (viii. 14, ix. 2) .

5. There is no sacredness or dignity in man or in human life; man has no pre-eminence over beasts, seeing that he and they have the same final fate, die and pass into the dust, and no one knows what becomes of the spirit, whether in man's case it goes up to heaven, and in the case of beasts goes down into Sheol death is practically the end-all; and so poor a thing is life that the dead are to be considered more fortunate than the living, and more to be envied than either class is he who never came into existence (iv. 2, 3). It is a special grievance that the wicked when they die are buried with pomp and ceremony, while men who have acted well are forgotten in the city (viii. io).

6. That the author does not believe in a happy or active future life appears in the passage (iv. 2, 3) quoted above. The old Hebrew view of the future excluded from Sheol the common activities of life and also the worship of the national god (Isa. xxxviii. 18) ; he goes even beyond this in his conception of the blankness of existence in the underworld. The living, he says, at least know that they shall die, but the dead know nothing the memory of them, their love, hate, envy, perishes, they have no reward, no part in earthly life (ix. 5, 6) ; there is absolutely no knowledge and no work in Sheol (ix. 1o). His conclusion is that men should do now with all their might what they have to do; the future of man's vital part, the spirit, is wholly uncertain.

7. His conception of God is in accord with these views. God for him is the creator and ruler of the world, but hardly more; he is the master of a vast machine that grinds out human destinies without sympathy with man and without visible regard for what man deems justice-a being to be acknowledged as lord, not one to be loved. There can thus be no social contact between man and God, no communion of soul, no enthusiasm of service. Moral conduct is to be regulated not by divine law (of this nothing is said) but by human experience. The author's theism is cold, spiritless, without influence on life.

If now the question be asked what purpose or aim a man can have, seeing that there is nothing of permanent value in human work, an answer is given which recurs, like a refrain, from the beginning to the end of the book, and appears to be from the hand of the original author; after every description of the vanity of things comes the injunction to enjoy such pleasures as may fall to one's lot (ii. 24, 25, iii. 12, 13, 22, V. 18, 19, vlll. 15, ix. 7-10, xi. 7, xii. 7). The opportunity and the power to enjoy are represented as being the gift of God ; but this statement is not out of accord with the author's general position, which is dis tinctly theistic.

There are many sayings in the book that appear to be at vari ance with its fundamental thought. For example, wisdom is praised in a number of passages (iv. 13, vii. 5, II, 12, 19, viii. 1, ix. 16 17, x. 2, 3), though it is elsewhere denounced as worthless. It may be said that the author, while denying that wisdom (prac tical sagacity and level headedness) can give permanent satis faction, yet admits its practical value in the conduct of life. This may be so ; but it would be strange if a writer who could say "in much wisdom is much grief" should deliberately laud wisdom. It may be added that there are in the book a number of aphorisms about fools (v. 3 [a], vii. 5, 6, x. 1-3, 12-15) quite in the style of the book of Proverbs, some of them contrasting the wise man and the fool ; these appear to be the insertions of an editor. Further, it may be concluded with reasonable certainty that the passages that affirm a moral government of the world are addi tions by pious editors who wished to bring the book into harmony with the orthodox thought of the time.

Many practical admonitions and homely aphorisms are scat tered through the book: iv. 5, quiet is a blessing; iv. 9-12, two are better than one; iv. 17 (Eng. v. I), be reverent in visiting the house of God (the temple and the connected buildings)-to listen (to the service of song or the reading of Scripture) is better than to offer a foolish (thoughtless) sacrifice; v. I (2), be sparing of words in addressing God; v. 1-5 (2-6), pay your vows-do not say to the priest's messenger that you made a mistake ; vii. 2-4, sorrow is better than mirth; vii. 16-18, be not over-righteous (over-attentive to details of ritual and convention) or over wicked (flagrantly neglectful of established beliefs and customs) ; here "righteous" and "wicked" appear to be technical terms des ignating two parties in the Jewish world of the 2nd and 1st cen turies B.C., the observers and the non-observers of the Jewish ritual law; these parties represent in a general way the Pharisees and the Sadducees; viii. 2-4, x. 20, it is well to obey kings and to be cautious in speaking about them, for there are talebearers everywhere; vii. 20, no man is free from sin; vii. 21, do not listen to all that you may overhear, lest you hear yourself ill spoken of ; ix. 4, a living dog is better than a dead lion; xi. 1-6, show prudence, and decision in business; do not sell all your goods on one venture ; act promptly and hope for the best.

Composition of the Book.-If

the analysis given above is correct, the book is not a unit; it contains passages mutually contradictory and not harmonizable. Various attempts have been made to establish its unity. Other of the biblical Wisdom books (Job, Proverbs) are compilations-why not this? It is not neces sary to multiply authors, as is done, for example, by Siegfried, who supposes four principal writers (a pessimistic philosopher, an Epicurean glossator, a sage who upholds the value of wisdom, and an orthodox editor) besides a number of annotators. Nor is it worth while to attempt a logical or symmetrical arrangement of the material.

A simple and adequate view of the growth of the book has been formulated by A. H. McNeile and followed by Barton. Its essence may be briefly stated. The original Koheleth, as has been indicated, was a very heretical work, nevertheless it was so brilliant and so in keeping with the mind of the Greek period that it obtained a firm hold upon the intelligence of the age. Orthodoxy, however, could not allow it to continue unchallenged or unopposed. Two sets of additions, therefore, were attached to it. One of them consists of a series of conventional aphorisms of the sages inserted to give the work a more Hebraic tone and colouring. Examples of this sort are seen in iv. 5b, 6, vii. 1-14. The second series is more positively and directly orthodox. It is in flat contradiction to the cold lifeless scepticism of Koheleth. It sets forth the traditional, positive and constructive view of life. It may he seen in such passages, for example, as iii. 17; iv. 17; xi. 9d, xii. 1 a, 13. Had it not been for the mollifying effect of such additions, it is hardly conceivable that Koheleth would ever have entered the Canon, or held its place there long if it had found entry.

Date.-As

to the date of the book, there is a gradual approach to a consensus of opinion. The Solomonic authorship has long since been given up; the historical setting of the work and its atmosphere-the silent assumption of monotheism and monog amy, the non-national tone, the attitude towards kings and people, the picture of a complicated social life, the strain of philosophic reflection-are wholly at variance with what is known of the loth century B.C. and with the Hebrew literature down to the 5th or 4th century B.C. The introduction of Solomon, the ideal of wisdom, is a literary device of the later time and probably deceived nobody. The decisive considerations for the determina tion of the date are the language, the historical background and the thought. The language belongs to the post-classical period of Hebrew. More than this, there are many resemblances be tween the dialect of Koheleth and that of the Mishna. Not only are new words employed, and old words in new significations, but the grammatical structure has a modern stamp—some phrases have the appearance of having been translated out of Aramaic into Hebrew. It is improbable that such Hebrew as that of Koheleth would have been written earlier than the 2nd century B.C. (for details see Driver's Introduction). The general his torical situation, also, presupposed or referred to, is that of the period from the year 200 B.C. to the beginning of our era; in particular the familiar references to kings as a part of the social system, and to social dislocations (servants and princes changing places, x. 7), suggest the troublous times of the later Greek and Maccabean rulers, of which the history of Josephus gives a good picture.

The conception of the world and of human life as controlled by natural law, a naturalistic cosmos, is alien not only to the prophetic and liturgical Hebrew literature but also to Hebrew thought in general. Whether borrowed or not, it must be late; and its resemblance to Greek ideas suggests Greek influence. The general air of Greek reflection seems unmistakable. The scep ticism of Koheleth differs from that of Job in quality and scope; it is deliberate and calm, not wrung out by personal suffering; and it relates to the whole course and constitution of nature, not merely to the injustice of fortune. Such a conception has a Greek tinge, and would be found in Jewish circles, probably, not before the 2nd century B.C.

A precise indication of date has been sought in certain supposed references or allusions to historical facts. The mention of persons who do not sacrifice or take oaths (ix. 2) is held by some to point to the Essenes; if this be so, it is not chronologically precise, since we have not the means of determining the beginning of the movement of thought that issued in Essenism. So also the co incidences of thought with Ben-Sira (Ecclesiasticus) are not de cisive : cf. iii. 14 with B.S. xviii. 6; 2-6 (3-7) with B.S. xxxiv. vii. 19 with B.S. xxxvii. 14; x. 8 with B.S. xxvii. 26a; xi. I o with B.S. xxx. 2I ; xii. 10, I I with B.S. xxxix. 2 ff., xii. 13 with B.S. xliii. 27 ; if there be borrowing in these passages it is not clear on which side it lies, and it is not certain that there is borrowing— the thoughts may have been taken independently by the two authors from the same source. In any case since Ben-Sira belongs to about 180 B.C., the date of Koheleth, so far as these coinci dences indicate it, would not be far from 200 B.C. The contrast made in x. 16 f. between a king who is a boy and one who is of noble birth may allude to historical persons. Such identifications as have been proposed, however, do not fix the date of the book precisely; the author may have referred to events that happened before his time. The reign of Herod, a period of despotism and terror, and of strife between Jewish religious parties, is preferred by some scholars (Graetz, Cheyne and others) as best answering to the social situation depicted in the book, while still others (as Renan) decide for the reign of Alexander Jannaeus (1o4-78 B.C.) . The data are not numerous and distinct enough to settle the question beyond determining general limits ; for reasons given above the book can hardly have been composed before 200 B.C., and if, as is probable, a Septuagint text shows the influence of Aquila, it is to be put earlier than 5o B.C. Probably also, its different parts are of different dates.

Of the author nothing is known beyond the obvious fact that he was a man of wide observation and philosophic thought, of the Sadducean type in religion, but non-Jewish in his attitude toward life. He was, doubtless, a man of high standing, but neither a king nor a high priest, certainly not the apostate priest Alcimus (I Macc. vii. ix.) ; nor was he necessarily a physician— there are no details in ch. xii. or elsewhere that any man of good intelligence might not know. The book is a mixture of prose and poetry, in about equal proportions.

The fortunes of the book are not known in detail, but it is clear that its merciless criticism of life and its literary charm made it popular, while its scepticism excited the apprehensions of pious conservatives. Possibly the Wisdom of Solomon (c. 5o B.C.) was written partly as a reply to it. The claim of sacredness made for it was warmly contested by some Jewish scholars. In spite of the relief afforded by orthodox additions, it was urged that its Epicurean sentiments contradicted the Torah and fa voured heresy. Finally, by some process of reasoning not fully recorded, the difficulties were set aside and the book was received into the sacred canon ; but not until the synod of Jabneh in A.D. 90 was its right to remain in the canon officially and finally al lowed. Jerome (on Eccl. xii. 13, 14) declares that the decisive fact was the orthodox statement at the end of the book; the one important thing is to fear God and keep His commandments. It is not certain that it is quoted in the New Testament, but it ap pears to be included in Josephus' list of sacred books.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.-Besides the general books on the Old Testament Bibliography.-Besides the general books on the Old Testament and the Biblical Encyclopaedias, see in particular A. Lods, L'eccltisiaste et la philosophic grecque (1891) ; A. H. McNeile, Introduction to Ecclesiastes (1904) ; G. A. Barton in the Internal Crit. Comm. (19o8). M. Jastrow, A Gentle Cynic (1919) ; H. Ranston, Ecclesiastes and the Early Greek Wisdom Literature (1925). (C. H. T.; J. M. P. S.)