EBERT, FRIEDRICH (187o-1925), German politician, was born in Heidelberg on Nov. 4, 187o, the son of an impecuni ous tailor. He was an early recruit to the Socialist movement, becoming a fluent speaker and a first-class trade union organizer, suffering persecution and boycott for the cause. He moved to Hanover, and later on to Bremen, where he joined the staff of the local paper of the party, and, having dropped his trade as a saddler, became labour secretary for Bremen. From 1905 Ebert played an important part in the direction of the Socialist Party. He entered the reichstag in 1912. A year later he became chair man of the party, which at that time was torn between the Ortho dox and Revisionists ; his common sense was considered a guar antee for keeping the party together.
At the outbreak of the World War, Ebert, deeply impressed by the danger of Russian victory, led the bulk of the party who voted for war credits. His common sense repudiated the optimistic pacificism of Haase and his followers, who later became the In dependent Socialist Party. He continued to strive, however, at home and abroad, especially at the Stockholm Conference in June 1917, for a just peace. He became leader of the Majority Socialists in 1916 and chairman of the budget commission of the Reichstag in 1918. Though disapproving of the Peace of Brest Litovsk, he opposed strikes to bring about peace. In Feb. 1918 he tried hard and fairly successfully to put an end to the Berlin strike, which threatened to become a national calamity. For the part he played at that time he was attacked later on by the In dependents as well as by the representatives of the old order.
After Ludendorff's collapse in Sept. 1918 Prince Max of Baden formed the first parliamentary cabinet. Ebert induced his party to join at a time when Ludendorff's insistence on an immediate demand for an armistice was already known. The negotiations about the armistice continued over a month. The suffering work ing classes began to be restless. When the plans to force a great naval battle became known, a mutiny took place at Kiel. Acting on Ebert's advice, Prince Max sent Noske to Kiel who succeeded in re-establishing order.
Ebert, knowing the historical attachment of the German people to monarchy, wanted a democratic parliamentary government, on English lines, but no republic. When the organized working men began to follow the Independents, Scheidemann intimated to Prince Max (Nov. 7) that the Socialists must withdraw from the cabinet, and that if the emperor did not abdicate by the 9th one of his sons, not the crown prince, should take his place. The emperor vacillated. By the 9th the masses had got out of hand. The monarchy collapsed, but the knowledge of the abdication had not the desired effect. Scheidemann proclaimed the German republic, and Prince Max offered Ebert the chancellorship, which he accepted. He formed a Provisional Government consisting of three Independents and two Majority Socialists besides himself.
From Nov. 1918 to Feb. 1919 it was touch and go whether Germany would be a democratic country or a soviet republic. The small group of German Bolshevists, the Spartacus Union, led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, insisted that Rus sia's example should be followed, whilst the Independents did lip service to democracy, but wanted to postpone the elections. Ebert insisted on early elections for a constituent assembly, to give Germany a Democratic constitution. For nearly two months the Government had no power. The Spartacists had armed their adherents and repeatedly tried to imprison Ebert and his col leagues. Ebert called Noske to Berlin, who succeeded in quelling the December and the January risings by means of quickly or ganized volunteers. When the struggle was over, the elections to the national assembly took place quietly. Democracy had won the day, thanks to Ebert and the Moderate Socialists. It was but fitting that the assembly elected him the first provisional president of the German republic. Ebert stuck to his post when the Treaty of Versailles had to be signed and later when (March 1920), a military rising, the Kapp Putsch, took place. He left Berlin with his Government to return after the general strike had forced the leaders to surrender.
Ebert's appointment as president was provisional. He wanted to withdraw from office at the appointed time (192 2) and to subject himself to a proper election. He bowed, probably un wisely from his point of view, to the wishes of the majority of the Reichstag, including the People's Party, who asked him to accept office for a second term from their hands until 1925. When that term drew near its end, reactionary and radical forces had gained strength in Germany. This was shown by the result of the general election of May 1924. But by 1925, after stabilization had done its work, the situation had improved considerably ; there appeared to be quite a fair chance that Ebert, if he chose to stand, might be re-elected.
By that time Ebert had dropped the party leadership. He re mained on friendly terms with his party, but he considered him self the representative of the German people as a whole. He wielded the great but rather veiled power of the German presi dent with consummate tact. His attitude when forming cabinets, and when reaching decisions was correct, constitutional and wise. He had gained the confidence of all persons with whom he came in contact. He had made the office of the president influential, though not conspicuous. This artisan who had not had the academic training so greatly valued in Germany succeeded in getting a firm grasp on foreign affairs. He saw a point quickly and he knew how to deal with men. Singularly modest and unas suming, his was the dominant influence, nevertheless, in the many crises the German republic had to pass through in the years that followed the peace.
But the fact that a plain man of the people was the head of the State did not commend itself to the reactionary elements of German society. A campaign of calumny was organized against him, accusing him of having fomented sedition and broken the back of the German army. He was forced to bring an action for libel against Herr Rothard, who had published in the Mittel deutsche Zeitung a letter and footnote accusing Ebert of treason able conduct in connection with the munition workers' strike in Jan. 1918. Rothard was found technically guilty, but the judge's finding was unfavourable to Ebert. As the judge's po litical bias was scarcely denied, the public, including the cabinet sided with Ebert. The central Government and many State Gov ernments passed votes of confidence; the public assured him of their sympathy, but the strain practically killed Ebert, who had been suffering from repeated attacks of appendicitis. He did not wish to be operated upon before the case was over, and then it was too late. He died on Feb. 28, 1925, at Charlottenburg.
Ebert was a very fortunate combination of the light-hearted spirituality and sober shrewdness of the South German. He had faith in ideas and ideals, but he believed in action and in organi zation as well. There was passion in him, but there was common sense; there was strength in him, and there was sober suavity. He was by no means a genius towering head and shoulders above his fellow men. He was rather one of them, sharing their feel ings and their qualities so that they could trust him completely, being just far enough ahead of them to make them follow him, the true leader for an incipient democracy.
BIBLIOGRAPHY.—Richard Berger, Fraktionsspaltung u. Parteikrisis Bibliography.—Richard Berger, Fraktionsspaltung u. Parteikrisis in der deutschen Sozialdemokratie (Munchen-Gladbach, 1916) ; Philipps, Die Ursachen des deutschen Zusammenbrvchs (1918) ; Die deutsche Nationalversammlung i. J. 192o in ihrer Arbeit fur den Au f bau des neuen deutschen V olksstaates, herausg. v. E. Heilfron (192o) ; Gustav Noske, Von Kiel bis Kapp (192o) ; Philipp Scheidemann, Der Zusammenbruch (1921) ; Friedrich Ebert, Entwicklungsgeschichte der grossen politischen Parteien in Deutschland (Bonn, 1922) ; Adolf Koester, Fort mit der Dolchstoss-Legende. Warum wir r918 nicht weiterkampfen konnten (1922) ; Paul Kampfmeyer, Fritz Ebert (1923) ; Eduard Bernstein, Die Berliner Arbeiterbewegung 189o-19o5 (1924) ; Friedrich Lenz, Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie (Stuttgart, 1924) ; Josef Wirth, Unsere politische Lage im deutschen Volksstaat (1924) ; Der Dolchstossprozess (Munich, 1925) ; Friedrich Ebert, Gesammelte Reden u. Schriften, herausg. v. Fritz Ebert jun. (Dresden, 1925) ; Philipps, Die Geschichte einer parlamentarischen Untersuchung 1919-25 (1925) ; Friedrich Ebert, Kemple and Ziele. Aus seinem Nach lass (Dresden, 1927) ; Friedrich Ebert and seine Zeit. Ein Gedenkwerk caber den ersten Prasidenten der Deutschen Republik (Charlottenburg, 1928).