EASTERN QUESTION, THE. The expression used in di plomacy from about the time of the Congress of Verona (18 2 2) to comprehend the international problems involved in the impending dissolution of the Turkish empire. Its use in this narrow sense is due to the conditions in which it was invented. In the early 19th century the Ottoman empire was still the only East with which European diplomatists were collectively brought into contact ; for the questions of the Middle and Far East had not yet arisen. The Eastern Question—though its roots are set far back in his tory : in the ancient contest between the cultures of Europe and Asia, the antagonism of Christian and Muslim, and the perennial rivalry of the Powers for the control of the trade routes to the Orient—dates in its modern sense from the treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji (1774), which marked the establishment of Russia as a Black sea power and formed the basis of her special claim to inter fere in the internal affairs of the Ottoman empire. The actual right conceded was, however, very limited. Art. VII. of the treaty runs : "The Sublime Porte promises to protect firmly both the Christian religion and its churches; and also permits the Minister of the Im perial Court of Russia to make on all occasions representations in favour of the new Church in Constantinople, and of those who carry on its services." In view of later Russian claims, the word ing of this article is important.
The compact between Napoleon and Alexander I. of Russia at Tilsit (1807) marked a new phase, which culminated in the Treaty of Bucharest 0812). By this instrument the Russian frontier was advanced to the Pruth and to the northern or Kilia branch of the Danube, and Russia's claim to intervene between the sultan and his orthodox subjects received a new sanction in Art. V., which confirmed "the contracts and conventions which had been counted among the privileges of Moldavia," and in Art. VIII., which stipu lated for certain concessions to the insurgent Serbs.
The attitude of the various Powers in the Eastern Question was now defined. Russia, apart from her interest in the orthodox sub jects of Turkey, aimed at owning or controlling the straits which were her only outlet to the Mediterranean and the ocean beyond. Austria, once the champion of Europe against the Turk, saw in Russia's advance a greater danger than any to be feared from the moribund Ottoman Power, and made the maintenance of Turkey's integrity a prime object of her policy; thus agreeing with Great Britain, whose traditional friendship with Turkey was strength ened by the rise of a new Power whose rapid advance threatened her communications with India and the stability of her rule there. But though Austria, Great Britain, and presently France, were all equally interested in maintaining the Ottoman empire, the failure of the Congress of Vienna (1815) to take action regarding the guarantee of Turkey' seemed to endorse Russia's claim to regard the Eastern Question as her "domestic concern" in which Europe had no right to interfere.
'This was due to the sultan's obstinate refusal to ratify the Treaty of Bucharest. As Castlereagh put it, it was impossible to guarantee territories of which the boundaries were in dispute.
The Greek Revolt.—When, in March 1821, the news reached the Powers assembled at the Congress of Laibach that Prince Alex ander Hypsilanti, a Greek officer in Russian service, had crossed the Pruth and raised the standard of revolt in the Danubian Prin cipalities, it was feared that his claim to have Russian support was well founded. The Emperor Alexander I., however, yielding to Metternich's influence, repudiated Hypsilanti's action, and the re volt, unsupported by the Rumanian people, collapsed.
It was different, however, when, on April 2, Archbishop Ger manos of Patras raised the standard of revolt in the Morea; here the Greek population rose en masse, massacred the Muslims and by September had completed the liberation of the peninsula by capturing the capital, Tripolitza. The revolt now spread north of the Isthmus, and, above all, to the Greek islands, whose loss— since they were the only recruiting grounds of the Ottoman navy— deprived Turkey of the command of the sea, thus frustrating all efforts to suppress the rising until the intervention of Mehemet Ali of Egypt at the end of 1824.
The unexpected success of the insurgents threatened to produce a European crisis ; for the hideous reprisals of the Turks, culmi nating in the execution of the Orthodox Patriarch Gregorios (April 22, 1821), roused intense feeling in Russia and it needed the united efforts of Castlereagh and Metternich—who met at Hanover in October—to persuade the Emperor Alexander not to stultify his mission as the peace-maker of Europe by intervening in Turkey.
The accession of George Canning to office (Aug. 18 2 2) made no immediate change in British policy; but in March 1823 he recog nized the belligerency of the Greeks, in order to make their pro visional Government responsible for their piracies. It was not, however, until Sultan Mahmud appealed to his vassal, Mehemet Ali of Egypt, to assist him with his trained army and fleet, that the Powers made any concerted effort to influence the situation.
The Emperor Alexander now proposed that the Powers should impose a settlement on the basis of Greek principalities tributary to the sultan. Metternich, who took this as implying an extension of Russian influence, countered by proposing an independent Greek State. A conference was summoned at St. Petersburg; but, as the majority favoured collective intervention, on a principle which Great Britain had always opposed, the British representa tive was withdrawn, and the meeting resulted in nothing but a futile offer of mediation (March 25, 1825).
Mehemet Ali Intervenes.—Meanwhile Ibrahim, Mehemet Ali's adopted son, had landed at Modon and begun the systematic conquest of the Morea. His fleet commanded the sea, and on land the Greek guerilla fighters had no chance against the trained Egyp tian troops; only the heroic defence of Missolonghi (May 1825 April 1826) relieved the gloom of this terrible year. The death of the Tsar Alexander I. (Dec. 1, 1825), however, changed the Euro pean situation. His successor, Nicholas I., had begun his reign by quelling a serious mutiny of the troops, and a war with Turkey seemed an admirable way of restoring the morale of his army. A step in this direction was taken when, at the outcome of the Duke of Wellington's congratulatory mission to the new tsar (Jan. 1826), a protocol was signed at St. Petersburg under which Great Britain and Russia were to offer their mediation with a view to a settlement on the basis of tributary principalities, and if the medi ation were rejected, the Powers might take action "jointly or separately." Nicholas now sent an ultimatum to the Porte, demanding the execution of the terms of the Treaty of Bucharest ; and since the sultan had just massacred the Janissaries (q.v.) Turkey could not resist. On Oct. 1 was signed the Treaty of Akkerman, which con ceded all the Russian claims.
The Treaty of London.—This action of Russia, together with the barbarities of Ibrahim—who threatened to depopulate Greece and colonize it with fellaheen and negroes—stirred the other Pow ers to activity. A conference met in London and on July 6, 1827, the Protocol of St. Petersburg was turned into the Treaty of Lon don. This treaty Austria and Prussia refused to sign, and the set tlement of the Greek Question therefore passed into the hands of Great Britain, France and Russia, who engaged to procure the au tonomy of Greece under the sultan's suzerainty. There was to be no breach of friendly relations with Turkey; but should the sultan refuse mediation, the Powers were to send consuls to Greece. Meanwhile, an armistice was to be proposed to both sides, to be enforced by such means as might "suggest themselves to the pru dence" of the contracting Powers. The readiest means seemed to be a "peaceful blockade" of Ibrahim in the Morea.
Navarino and the Russo-Turkish War.—On Oct. 20, in or der to bring peaceful pressure on Ibrahim, who had rejected the armistice, Admiral Codrington sailed the allied fleet into the Bay of Navarino, where the Turco-Egyptian fleet lay at anchor. A chance encounter led to a general engagement and the total de struction of the Ottoman navy. The British Government tried to explain away this "untoward event" ; but Sultan Mahmud refused to regard the demonstration as "peaceful," and proclaimed a holy war. The Emperor Nicholas seized the occasion and there fol lowed the Russian invasion of Turkey, which ended with the Treaty of Adrianople (1829). The other Powers, meanwhile, feared that Russia would thus secure her influence over liberated Greece, and in July 1828 Britain, France and Russia signed the Protocol of London, by which France was entrusted with the task of ousting Ibrahim from the Morea. By the time the French troops arrived, however, this object had already been achieved by a naval demonstration by Codrington at Alexandria. By a protocol signed at London on Nov. 16, 1828, the conference placed the Morea and the Cycladees under the guarantee of the three Powers, this guarantee being extended on March 22, 1829---af ter General Church's victories over the Turks north of the Isthmus—to the mainland south of the line Arta-Volo and including the island of Euboea. These territories were to be erected into a tributary prin cipality governed by a prince chosen by the Powers.
The Russian victory and the fact that the terms of the Treaty of London were embodied in the treaty of Adrianople led the other Powers to acquire merit by insisting on further concessions. On Feb. 3, 183o, a protocol of the London Conference settled that Greece should be an independent principality and be offered to Leopold of Coburg (afterwards King of the Belgians) . Leopold having refused the honour another protocol laid down that Greece should be an independent sovereignty, extended the frontier to the line Arta-Volo and proposed Prince Otto of Bavaria as its ruler. King Louis of Bavaria accepted the offer on behalf of his young son, but stipulated that he should be king. This was agreed, and on May 13, 1832, another Treaty of London (antedated the 7th) was signed, placing the new Kingdom of Greece under the guarantee of the three Powers. (See GREECE : History.) Revolt of Mehemet Ali.—The Greek question was still un settled when a new phase of the Eastern Question was opened by the revolt of Mehemet Ali, pasha of Egypt. The immediate occa sion, though not the pretext for his revolt, was the sultan's refusal to give him the pashaliks promised as the price of his intervention in Greece; he feared, too, that if he waited till the reform of the Turkish army was completed, he would share the fate of Hussein of Bosnia and Mustafa of Scutari, whom the sultan had crushed in the spring of 1831. On Nov. 1, 1831, accordingly, an Egyptian force entered Syria, met the fleet under Ibrahim at Jaffa, and at once besieged Acre. The garrison's resistance delayed the Egyp tian advance ; at Constantinople efforts were made to persuade the sultan to come to terms; and only in May 1833 was the ban of outlawry launched against Mehemet Ali. Meanwhile, Ibrahim had been pushing on. He had already occupied Gaza and Jerusalem before Acre fell (May 2 7) . On June 15 he was in Damascus. On July 9 and 11 he defeated the Ottoman advance-guard at Homs and Hamah, and on the 17th crushed the main Turkish army, under Hussein Pasha, at the pass of Beilan. Pushing on into Ana tolia, he gained a crowning victory at Konia over another Otto man army under Reshid Pasha (Dec. 23), and advanced to Afium Karahissar and Kiutayah. Nothing lay between him and Con stantinople but the uncertain attitude of the Powers.
After the first defeats Sultan Mahmud, in his rage and despair, had turned first to Great Britain for aid. But, though Stratford Canning wrote from Constantinople, urging the necessity for up holding the sultan's authority even by arms, Palmerston was not prepared for an isolated intervention which would involve a breach with France and Russia. The news that no active aid could be expected from England was followed by that of the disastrous de feat at Konia, which chanced to coincide with the arrival in Constantinople of a special Russian envoy, Count Muraviev, who at once renewed the tsar's previous offer of ships and troops to protect the capital. The sultan, in desperation, accepted, and on Feb. 20, 1833, a Russian squadron entered the Bosporus.
The French and British representatives had in vain tried to per suade Mahmud to reverse his fatal decision. They now agreed to take a new line, and induced the Porte to invite the Russians to withdraw by undertaking that France would persuade Mehemet Ali to accept the Sultan's terms. But the Emperor Nicholas sent peremptory orders for his fleet to remain until Ibrahim should have recrossed the Taurus mountains, and Mehemet Ali scornfully re jected the sultan's offers; he insisted on his full demands—Syria, Icheli, Aleppo, Damascus and Adana. The two Western Powers, intent on getting the Russians away, now pressed the Porte to yield; and, as the result of this combined pressure on both sides, and incidentally of a famine in the capital, an arrangement was reached. On April 8 was signed the Convention of Kutayah, under which all the Egyptian demands were conceded. The im mediate result, for the Powers, was to throw Turkey wholly into the arms of Russia. Russia had given the sultan deeds, not words, and to Russia he committed himself. Before the Russian forces left there was signed in the palace of Unkiar Skelessi the famous treaty (June 8, 1833) which, under the guise of an offen sive and defensive alliance, practically made Russia the custodian of the gates of the Black sea.
This temporary settlement was nowhere expected to prove per manent. Sultan Mahmud dreamed only of revenge, and engaged German officers—Moltke among them—to reorganize his army. The crisis came in 1838. In 1834 the Syrians had revolted against Mehemet Ali's tyranny; now the Arabs of the Hauran were in arms. The sultan, urging that he must rescue his subjects from oppression, could no longer be restrained, and on April 21, 1839, the Ottoman army invaded Syria, only to meet with a crushing de feat by Ibrahim at Nezib (June 23) . Before the news reached Constantinople the old sultan died ( July 1), leaving his throne to Abd-ul-Mejid, a lad of 16.
Finally, the news reached the capital that Ahmed Pasha, the Ottoman admiral-in-chief, had handed over his fleet to Mehemet Ali, on the pretext that the sultan's advisers were sold to Russia. So far as the Ottoman empire was concerned, Mehemet Ali was now master of the situation. He had, however, to walk warily.
At the outset these showed an apparently united front, the am bassadors of the five Powers on July 27 presenting a joint note to the Porte, in which they declared that an agreement had been reached in the Eastern Question and urged the Ottoman Govern ment "to suspend all definite decision made without their concur rence." But the Powers were actually agreed only on the need for agreement. Britain, especially, insisted on this ; for she feared isolated action by Russia under the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. Yet t o preserve even apparent unity was almost impossible. France and Britain had hitherto acted together through fear of Russian de signs, and Austria was now also reverting to her traditional policy of antagonism to Russia. Everything depended on the attitude of the Emperor Nicholas, and this was ultimately determined by his growing distrust of Austria and his hatred of the democratic regime in France. The first caused him to reject Metternich's proposal of a conference. The second led him to seek to loosen the Anglo French entente by making direct overtures to Great Britain. In short, he announced through the Russian ambassador in London, Baron Brunnow, that he was prepared to accept the British views on the Turco-Egyptian question, to allow the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi to lapse, and to act in the Ottoman empire only in concert with the other Powers, in return for an agreement closing the Dardanelles to the warships of all nations. Brunnow was empow ered to arrange a coalition to settle the Egyptian question.
To this proposal all the Powers agreed, including France, and for nearly a year negotiations continued. In France public opinion violently supported Mehemet Ali's claims, while Palmerston be lieved that the Ottoman empire would never be secure until "the desert had been placed between the pasha and the sultan." The deadlock thus created developed into a crisis when, on Feb. 20, 1840, Thiers came into power in France. Not only did he reject a compromise which, on May 7, Guizot, as French ambassador, arranged with Palmerston, but it presently transpired that, without openly breaking with the concert, and without informing the other Powers, he was encouraging a "direct arrangement" between Mehemet Ali and the Porte. The discovery of what seemed an underhand intrigue by France to secure her "complete individual triumph" at Constantinople and Alexandria, led at once to a strong countermove from the other Powers, who on July 15, without the concurrence of France, signed with the Porte a Convention for The Settlement of the affairs of the Levant. By the instrument it was agreed that, the terms to be given to Mehemet Ali having been arranged with the Porte, the signatory Powers would force the pasha to accept them. If he yielded within ten days he was to re ceive the hereditary pashalik of Egypt, the administration of southern Syria for life and possession of the fortress of Acre. After ten days the offer of Syria was to be withdrawn, and after another ten days the sultan was to be free to take such action as his own interests and the counsels of his allies might suggest.
The news of this "mortal affront" caused immense excitement in Paris, and Thiers, declaring that the alliance with Great Britain was shattered, hurried on preparation for war. The immediate effect was that Mehemet Ali, confident of French 'assistance, maintained a defiant attitude. The unexpected outcome of the armed intervention of the Powers, however, soon changed the situation. The allied fleet, under Sir Charles Napier, had hardly appeared off Beirut (Aug. 11) when the Syrians rose in revolt against Ibrahim's tyranny. On Sept. 11, Suleiman Pasha not having obeyed the summons to evacuate the town, the bombard ment of Beirut began. On Oct. 3 the town fell, and Ibrahim, cut off from his communications by sea and surrounded by a hostile population, began a hurried retreat. On Nov. 3, Acre sur rendered to the allied fleet. The Legends of Mehemet Ali's in vincibility and humane and enlightened rule were now pricked bubbles. The only question was whether he should retain Egypt.
Already, on Sept. 15, the sultan had, in accordance with the terms of the Convention of London, declared him deposed. But the news of this, and of the events in Syria, produced an exceed ingly dangerous temper in France ; there was loud clamour for war; and it looked as though the pacific Louis Philippe were faced by the alternative of war or revolution. To most of the British cabinet it looked as though concessions must be made to France for the sake of European peace. Therefore, when Guizot, on Oct. 8, presented to Palmerston what was practically a French ultimatum, "it was determined that this intimation should be taken in a friendly spirit," and that Palmerston should come to an agreement with the ministers of the other Powers jointly to persuade the Porte not to insist on depriving Mehemet Ali so far as Egypt was concerned. This did not at once stop the war fever in Paris; but Louis Philippe did not want war; the dis missal of Thiers, and the appointment of Guizot as foreign min ister in the new Government under Marshal Soult, made for more moderate counsels, and by Dec. 4, the danger was past.
Nine days earlier Sir Charles Napier had appeared with the British squadron before Alexandria and had induced Mehemet Ali to submit to the sultan and restore the Ottoman fleet, in exchange for a guarantee of the hereditary pashalik of Egypt. Gentle pressure by the combined Powers on the Porte did the rest. On Feb. 13, 1841, the sultan issued a firman appointing Mehemet Ali hereditary pasha of Egypt, a second firman of the same date investing him with the government of Nubia, Darfur, Kordofan, Sennaar and their dependencies.
In vain the Ottoman Government suggested various compro mises. Napoleon, now Emperor of the French, needed a war, and the Emperor Nicholas' refusal to recognize him as an equal em bittered him against Russia. Nicholas, too, thought the moment opportune for carrying out his plans for ousting the Turks. He believed that he could rely on the neutrality of Austria, out of gratitude for his assistance to her in crushing the Hungarian insurrection in 1849. Great Britain's benevolence seemed to be assumed when the pacific Lord Aberdeen became prime minister in Dec. 1852. The tsar even revived his earlier idea of an arrange ment with Great Britain for the partition of Turkey. In the famous conversations (Jan. 9 and 14, 1853) with the British ambassador at St. Petersburg, Sir Hamilton Seymour, he spoke of Turkey as the "Sick Man," and gave his ideas as to the disposal of his inheritance : the Balkans should be divided into a series of Christian States, Great Britain receiving compensation in Egypt, Cyprus and Crete. The comment on this by Lord John Russell, on behalf of the British Government, was to deny that Turkey was sick, and to insist that the whole question must be settled by general agreement. But Nicholas was deceived by the hesitations of Aberdeen, who was hopelessly divided between his fear of Russia and his dislike of the Turks; he was deceived, too, by his ambassador, Baron Brunnow, who reported that in England the pacifist influence of Bright and Cobden was supreme. Accordingly, after ordering the mobilization of his forces, he des patched Gen. Menshikov to Constantinople with an ultimatum demanding the preservation of the status quo as regarded the holy places and Russia's right to protect Christians in Turkey.
Menshikov, a blustering soldier, reached Constantinople on April 19, but the crisis was delayed by the diplomacy of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the British ambassador, who persuaded the Porte to yield respecting the holy places, but to resist the demand for a protectorate over the Christians.
On May 5, arguments and threats having failed, Menshikov presented the ultimatum; on the 22nd the Porte rejected it. This meant war, and on June 22 the Russians crossed the Pruth and proceeded to occupy the Principalities.
This was met by a collective protest of the Powers, and Austria concentrated her forces on the Serbian frontier. In these circum stances Russia agreed to a conference, which met at Vienna in August. The four points on which the other Powers insisted were : the substitution of an international for a Russian pro tectorate of the Principalities; (2) freedom of navigation on the Danube; (3) maintenance of the integrity and independence of Turkey, and (4) renunciation by Russia of her claim to protect the orthodox subjects of Turkey. The conference drafted a con vention, to be proposed to Russia by the Porte, confirming the rights granted by the treaties of 1774 and 1829 and by the firmans recently issued, and conceding to the orthodox rite a share in all privileges, etc., granted to other Churches under the Capitulations. Russia accepted this on condition that no modifications were made "under bellicose influences." But when, on Aug. 19, the Porte accepted the draft, it was with an amendment reserving to the sultan the right to protect the Christians. This amendment the tsar refused to accept ; and, since this seemed to show that he intended to press his extreme claims, the British fleet was ordered to pass the Dardanelles, ostensibly to protect the sultan from the danger of a Muslim rising. The British Government announced that no aggressive action would be taken unless the Russians crossed the Danube or attacked an Ottoman port on the Black sea. The immediate casus belli which opened the Crimean War was the destruction by the Russian fleet of an Ottoman squadron in the harbour of Sinope on Nov. 3, On Jan. 3, 1854, a combined British and French squadron entered the Black sea; it was not, however, till March 27 that France and Great Britain declared war against Russia.
The Russians now advanced into the Balkan peninsula, but on June 3 an Austrian ultimatum forced them to retire not only from the Balkans, but from the Danubian Principalities which Austria occupied. Although the immediate menace to Turkey was thus removed, the Allies determined to continue the war and to secure the acceptance of the Four Points, and on Sept. 14 their combined armies landed in the Crimea. (See CRIMEAN WAR.) The initial disasters of the war bent the stubborn resolution of the "Iron Tsar," and on Nov. 28, strongly urged by Frederick William IV. of Prussia, he consented to accept the Four Points. It was too late. The successes of the Allies were bringing them fresh strength. On Dec. 2 Austria signed with them a formal defensive alliance, and in Jan. 1855 Cavour's determination to secure a position for the Kingdom of Sardinia in the councils of the Powers brought the Piedmontese into the Allied camp. On March 2 the Emperor Nicholas died, and the succession of Alexander II. seemed to promise peace. Conferences were re sumed at Vienna; but honour and prestige were involved on both sides, and the war dragged on. The fall of Sevastopol (Sept. 9) might have been taken as decisive, but it was not till December that an Austrian ultimatum persuaded the tsar to yield. The terms of peace were to be settled by a congress in Paris.
The Treaty of Paris was signed on March 3o, 1856. By this instrument the Eastern Question seemed to be settled, in the sense desired by the Allies. By the cession of a portion of Bes sarabia, Russia was thrust back from the mouths of the Danube, of which the navigation was declared free ; Russian naval power was destroyed in the Black sea, which was made neutral; the right of Russia to intervene in Turkey was formally repudiated, and the Ottoman empire, in return for elaborate promises of reform, was admitted to the concert of the Powers. Wallachia and Moldavia, with their existing privileges, were placed under the collective guarantee of the Powers, while remaining under the suzerainty of the Porte. It was not till three years later that the union of the Rumanian nation was accomplished by the elec tion of John Alexander Cuza as prince in both principalities.
It opened in July 1875, when the Christian Slays of Herce govina rose against Turkish misrule. The failure of the Turks to suppress the insurrection and the consequent danger of a general conflagration led to the intervention of the Powers, and on Dec. 3o, 1875, Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary agreed to the terms of a joint note, drawn up by Count Andrassy, for presentation to the Porte. This declared that the time had come for joint action to compel Turkey to translate her promises of reform into acts. It demanded the formal recognition of the equal status of the Christian religion, and certain reforms in Bosnia Hercegovina which were to be watched over by a mixed com mission of Christians and Muslims. Great Britain and France having adhered, the "Andrassy Note" (q.v.) was presented to the Porte on Jan. 31, 1876.
The sultan, as usual, promised everything and performed noth ing. Meanwhile the revolt spread. In May the signs were omi nous; Serbia was arming, and Prince Milan gave the command of his troops to the Russian general Chernayev; Montenegro also was arming. The three emperors thought it time to take action, and on May 13 signed the Berlin Memorandum, which proposed combined action of the fleets, the enforcement of a two months' armistice, and further action if no settlement were reached. This broke down on the opposition of Great Britain, Disraeli arguing that it would only encourage the insurgents to go on. On May 24 the British fleet was ordered to Besika bay, for the defence of Turkey in case of need. On June 3o Serbia declared war on Turkey, and on July 2 Montenegro followed suit. On July 8 the Emperors Alexander II. and Francis Joseph met at Reichstadt and signed a convention defining the policy of Austria and Russia. There was to be no intervention so long as the contest was un decided. In the event of the defeat of Serbia, the two Powers would combine to preserve the status quo. In the event of her victory, Austria-Hungary was to receive Bosnia-Hercegovina and Russia the ceded portion of Bessarabia. This agreement, which was significant in the light of later events, secured the neutrality of Austria-Hungary during the forthcoming Russo-Turkish War.
Meanwhile a fresh complication had arisen. In May the Bul garian peasants had also risen and massacred many Turkish of ficials. The Turks, on their march northwards against the Serbs, took horrible vengeance, and the news of the "Bulgarian atroc ities" caused immense excitement in England, and more espe cially in Russia. The Serbs, too, were soon in danger of being overwhelmed, and it was only a Russian ultimatum that pre vented the Turks from advancing on Belgrade. In August the British Government, which wished to prevent the isolated action of Russia, persuaded Prince Milan of Serbia to ask for the media tion of the Powers, and took advantage of this to urge the Porte to come to terms with the Serbs and Montenegrins, for fear of a worse thing. This attempt at mediation, however, broke down at the obstinacy of both the Serbs and Turks. The Serbs were feeling increasingly certain of Russian support ; as for the Turks, the deposition of Sultan Abd-ul-Aziz in May, and of his imbecile successor Murad in August, had infused a new spirit into their government; for the astute and ruthless Abd-ul-Hamid II. was now sultan. His policy was to pose as a reformer, and, for the rest, to procrastinate in the hope of splitting the European con cert. He countered a British proposal for a comprehensive scheme of reforms in the Ottoman empire, to be embodied in a protocol concluded between the Porte and the Powers, by issuing an elaborate scheme himself (Oct. 12) But the patience of Russia was now exhausted ; on Oct. 15 Gen. Ignatiev arrived in Constantinople, and on the 31 st presented an ultimatum demand ing the conclusion of an armistice with Serbia within 48 hours. On Nov. 2 the Porte yielded, and the field was cleared for fresh diplomatic action. On the 4th, Lord Derby proposed a conference at Constantinople on the basis of the integrity of Turkey. All the Powers accepted : but on the 8th the Emperor Alexander declared publicly that, if the Powers did not at once take effective measures in concert to enforce reforms, he would act alone.
The conference opened on Dec. 31, but it was soon clear that the Porte had no intention of accepting its decisions. On the I 1 th a constitution for the Ottoman empire was solemnly proclaimed, and the Porte rejected the demands of the conference on the ground that they must now be submitted to the new parliament. The case foreseen by the tsar had now arisen; the conference had proved abortive; and when on March 19, 1877, the new Turkish parliament met, almost its only act was to reject the demands presented by Russia. On April 24 Russia declared war. The events of the war are described elsewhere. (See Russo TURKISH WARS.) So far as the relations between the Powers were concerned, the most critical period was after Gen. Gurko's capture of Adrianople (Jan. 2o, 1878), when the Russian ad vance threatened Constantinople and the straits. The British Government on Jan. 14 warned the tsar that any treaty between Russia and Turkey which might affect the engagements of 1856 and 1871 "would not be valid without the assent of the Powers who were parties to those treaties," and on the 23rd the British fleet was ordered to Gallipoli. On the 31 st the preliminaries of peace between Russia and Turkey were signed at Adrianople, the terms of the armistice allowing the Russians to advance to within a few miles of Constantinople. The Grand Duke Nicholas now pushed forward to the lines of Chataldja; whereupon the British fleet was ordered to enter the Sea of Marmora. The situation was now extremely critical, for Austria-Hungary declared the terms of the Convention of Adrianople to be inconsistent with her in terests, and it soon became clear that the only way of peace lay through a European congress. On Feb. 5 Count Andrassy for mally invited the great Powers to a conference, and Russia, which was in no condition to continue the war with Great Britain and Austria ranged against her, had perforce to agree.
Before the final arrangements for the congress could be made, however, the Convention of Adrianople was converted into the Treaty of San Stefano (March 3) . This seemed to realize the worst fears of the Powers. In default of the payment of a huge war indemnity, Turkey was to cede to Russia, Batum, Ardahan and Kars in Asia, and the Dobruja in Europe—this latter to be exchanged with Rumania for Bessarabia. Serbia, Rumania and Montenegro were to be independent States, Bosnia and Herce govina were to receive autonomous institutions under the joint control of Russia and Austria-Hungary; above all, Bulgaria was to be erected into an autonomous principality, stretching from the Danube to the Aegean and embracing Eastern Rumelia and Mace donia, and its prince was to be advised for two years by a Rus sian commissioner supported by an army of occupation.
The news of the conclusion of this treaty, which seemed not only to bar Austrian advance in the Balkans but to be fatal to British interests by giving Russia a crushing preponderance in the East, again brought war very near. But in the end the strong representations of the Powers, backed by the diplomacy of Bis marck persuaded the tsar to consent to submit the treaty to the approaching congress.
This met in Berlin on June 13 and, after heated debates, ar rived at a definite settlement a month later. By the Treaty of Berlin, signed on July 13, 1878, the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano were greatly modified. (See BERLIN, CONGRESS AND TREATY OF.) Its signature was hailed in Great Britain as a great diplomatic victory; the preponderance of Russia in the East had been checked ; and Lord Beaconsfield boasted that he had secured "peace with honour," but the treaty represented, in fact, the start ing-point of the latest and most disastrous phase of the Eastern Question which culminated in the World War.
Three new sovereign States were created by the treaty, Ru mania, Serbia and Montenegro, but in the case of the former two at least the boundaries assigned to them left them bitterly dissat isfied. Rumania resented the enforced cession of Bessarabia to Russia in exchange for the less desirable Dobruja, and was bound sooner or later to cast covetous eyes on Transylvania with its preponderantly Ruman population. Serbia was in even worse case. She received indeed an increase of territory, at the expense of Bulgaria, but other terms of the treaty seemed to have been specially devised to make her dream of a Southern Slav union for ever unrealizable; for the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, which was to be garrisoned by the Austrians but still administered by the Turks, cut her off from Montenegro, while the permission given to Austria-Hungary to occupy and administer Bosnia-Hercegovina gave the Habsburg Monarchy what seemed likely to prove a permanent foothold in the Balkan peninsula. The foreign trade of Serbia (mainly pigs), cut off from access to the sea, was placed almost wholly at the mercy of Austria.
The attitude of Italy was more doubtful. Though a member of the Triple Alliance, she resented the strengthening of Austria's position on the opposite coast of the Adriatic ; for the rival ambitions of the Italians, the Serbs and the Habsburg monarchy were now adding an Adriatic question to all the others. Then, too, there was the question of Tripoli, the last remnant of the Ottoman empire in northern Africa still available for Italian expansion. The reversions of this had been reserved for Italy when France had occupied Tunis, but the disquieting activities of the Emperor William II. led to suspicions of German designs upon it. The result was a rapprochement between Italy and Russia, advertised in Oct. 1909 by the proposal of the Tsar Nicholas II. to pay a State visit to Rome.
The alarms of Italy were increased by the Agadir incident of July 1911, and she determined to take action at once. On Sept. 27, an Italian ultimatum was presented to the Porte demanding its consent to an Italian occupation of Tripoli under the sover eignty of the sultan; on the 29th she declared war on Turkey. But for fresh developments in the Balkans the war which fol lowed might have dragged on indefinitely. But threatened by a new and more instant danger, the Porte suddenly came to terms.
By the Treaty of Lausanne (Oct. 18, 1912), Tripoli, Rhodes and the Dodecanese archipelago were, under a thin disguise, ceded to Italy, which thus also obtained a foothold in the Aegean and was brought into conflict with Greek aspirations.
Meanwhile Greece too had, on May Io, concluded a defensive alliance with Bulgaria, though no mention was made in the treaty of Macedonia, and the Bulgarians, in the event of war arising out of the admission of the Cretan Deputies to the Greek parlia ment, only bound themselves to observe a benevolent neutrality. This treaty, too, was followed by a military convention (Sept. 22).
The crisis was provoked by a serious rising against the Young Turk regime in Albania. The movement rapidly spread into Macedonia; and the Albanians, flushed with victory, demanded the cession to them of the vilayets of Monastir and Skoplie, which Greece and Serbia had earmarked respectively as their own. Clearly, if their ambitions were to be realized, it was time for the new Balkan League to intervene. Bulgaria, violently ex cited by the news of a terrible massacre of Macedonian Bulgars by the Turks, was more than willing to take part. The Powers, appealed to by the League to join in demanding a drastic system of reforms in Macedonia, united only in urging concession upon the Porte and patience on the members of the League; and, when preparations for war continued, they contented themselves with threatening the Balkan States that, if they went to war, the Powers would see that they gained nothing by it. In view of the dislocation of the European Concert it seemed safe to ignore these warnings, and on Oct. 12 Montenegro declared war on Turkey.
The story of the Balkan wars is told elsewhere. (See BALKAN WARS.) Here it must suffice to note their outcome. The unex pected collapse of the Turks created a wholly new situation which forced the intervention of the Powers. On Dec. 3, 1912, an armistice was concluded, and on the 13th a conference of the belligerent States met in London to settle terms of peace, the ambassadors of the five Great Powers sitting simultaneously to watch over and direct the settlements. (See LONDON, CONFER ENCES OF.) The conference broke up on Feb. 1, 1913, as the result of Enver Pasha's coup d'etat of Jan. 23 which led the Balkan States to denounce the armistice. But one thing it had accomplished. It had been agreed by the Powers that Albania should be erected into an independent principality, and that Scutari should be placed under its sovereignty. Thus, so long as Austria-Hungary held the Dalmatian coast, Serbia would be effectually cut off from the Adriatic seaboard and forced into rivalry with Bulgaria and Greece for access to the coast of the Aegean at Salonika. This would lead to the breakup of the Balkan League, which threatened to be a barrier to the east ward pressure of the Central European Powers.
The Treaty of London, signed on May 3o, 1913, under the mediation of the Powers, proved less a settlement than the cause of fresh dispute. Crete and all Turkey in Europe beyond the line Enos-Midia were ceded to the Balkan allies ; the question of Albania and that of the islands were left to be settled by the Powers. It was inevitable that the victors should quarrel over the spoils, the more so as the creation of an autonomous Albania had profoundly modified the conditions under which the partition treaties between them had been concluded.
The quarrel was precipitated by the complete collapse of new Turkish efforts at resistance. Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria were alike victorious; but Greece and Serbia, by the chances of war, now held the territories which Bulgaria coveted, and they showed no disposition to surrender them. Rumania, too, now joined in the scramble, demanding a rectification of the frontier of the Dobruja; and though on May 7 Bulgaria signed an agreement conceding this demand, Rumania concluded a military convention with Serbia and Greece. The rupture came on the night of June 29, with a sudden attack by the Bulgarians on the Serbs.
The war was soon over, and Bulgaria, utterly defeated, had to submit to hard terms. By the Treaty of Bucharest (Aug. 10, 1913) she ceded Rumania a considerable strip of the Dobruja, with the fortress of Silistria. In the south she received only a narrow strip to give her access to the Aegean at Dedeagatch. She restored Adrianople, Demotica and Kirk Kilissa to Turkey. Serbia and Greece, on the other hand, received large accessions of territory. Serbia acquired central Macedonia, including Okkrida and Monastir, Kosovo, and the eastern half of Novi Pazar, the western half going to Montenegro. Greece obtained Epirus, southern Macedonia, Salonika and the seaboard as far east as Mesta, thus including the port of Kavala. Crete, too, was soon afterwards assigned by the Powers to Greece, together with all the Turkish islands, except Imbros and Tenedos—which com mand the Dardanelles—and Rhodes and the Dodecanese archi pelago, which were in the occupation of Italy.
The Crisis of 1914.—This settlement, as was inevitable, satis fied nobody. Greece desired to round off her territories to the north by acquiring southern Albania ; she wished to complete her empire in the Aegean by adding to it Rhodes and the Dodecanese. This brought her into conflict with Italy, which held firmly to the islands and regarded the new Albanian principality as her peculiar interest. Bulgaria, of course, was profoundly dissatis fied; and her sense of grievance at the settlement—especially the loss of Thrace to Turkey—was not mitigated by the con sciousness that the fault was her own. The most fateful outcome of the settlement, however, was the simultaneous strengthening and discontent of Serbia. Cut off from the Aegean by the Greek occupation of Salonika, it was inevitable that she should aspire to find an outlet to the Adriatic, which could only be done at the expense of the Habsburg monarchy. National irredentism— the vision of the oppressed Slays of the dual monarchy united with their liberated brethren—combined with economic necessity to throw the Serbs into antagonism to Austria-Hungary. Hence the agitation which culminated in the crime of Sarajevo, the immediate occasion of the World War. Austrian statesmen now saw, or thought they saw, in the rise of the Serbian power, not only a bar to the expansion of the monarchy southwards, but an instant menace to its very existence, and so in July 1914 sent the fatal ultimatum to Belgrade. The nightmare vision which for more than a century had tormented the cabinets of Europe was now to become a reality. Hitherto it had been possible for the powers to suppress or to isolate the perpetual fires due to the shrinkage of Turkey. Now, suddenly, they had sent out a flame which lighted conflagration in all the world.
With the end of the World War the Eastern Question, in the sense defined, also came to an end ; for the Ottoman empire had ceased to exist. It left, however, a plentiful aftermath of ques tions, some of which—like that of Albania and the Adriatic coast generally—remain dangerous sources of unrest.