ARMED PEACE The Preponderance of Germany.—The concert of Europe, damaged by these wars among the great Powers, was replaced by the preponderance of the new German empire founded on an un disputed military superiority. All the European Powers remodelled their armies on the Prussian pattern by adopting universal military service ; they increased their establishments and their military ex penditure. The small neighbouring States, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, lived in constant fear of aggression. But Bismarck, who was directing the policy of Germany, did not wish to enlarge her borders; he said "Germany is surfeited." He wished to use military power, so he said in 1872, only to "maintain peace and the state of affairs created by the Treaty of Frankfurt." Be cause Germany could only be defeated by the collective forces of several powers, as Napoleon I. had been, Bismarck had a "coali tion nightmare," as the Russian envoy, Shuvalov, told him in 1878. His policy consisted in preventing the formation of a coali tion by allying Germany to the States which accepted her suprem acy, and in isolating the powers which he feared to see coalescing against her. During the 20 years in which he dominated the policy of Europe, relations between the States, except in the Balkan pen insula, were reduced to interviews between the chief statesmen, to newspaper articles, to diplomatic combinations, and to agreements or defensive alliances which were in effect inoperative.
In 1866 Bismarck had secured that Prussia did not take any Austrian territory, so that no ill-feeling was left behind, but the creation of the German empire prevented Austria from having any idea of recovering her former position in Germany. The entente cordiale between the two countries was achieved when the old enemy of Prussia, Beust, was replaced at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Austria by Andrassy, the representative of the Magyars allied to Germany against the Slays (Dec. 1871) . In Russia, Alexander recalled, in a toast to William, the old friendship be tween the German and Russian armies, and the close relations of the two sovereigns. Italy was disquieted by Catholic demonstra tions in France in favour of the temporal power of the pope, and the crown prince, Humbert, paid a visit to the emperor in Berlin (May 1872). The governments of the three empires struck by the insurrection of the Commune (q.v.) in Paris, wrongly ascribed to the action of the International (q.v.), wished to concert mea sures in common against the social revolution, as they had done in 1815 against the political revolution. Bismarck took advantage of this to pave the way for an entente. The interview of the three emperors at Berlin (187 2) appeared to the world as a gesture of European importance. Their ministers for foreign affairs, Bis marck, Gorchakov and Andrassy, considered means whereby the peace of Europe might be maintained. It was decided that in all matters of international import, the three Powers should consult among themselves in order to work in concert. This agreement, called "the alliance of the three Emperors" (Dreikaiserbund) was not safeguarded by any formal treaty. It was officially defined as an alliance for the maintenance of peace without written engage ments, and Bismarck declared that "Europe will recognize the new German empire as the bulwark of general peace." The entente was broken by the rivalry of the two ministers, Bismarck and Gorchakov. Bismarck, who had become very irri table, complained that Gorchakov treated him "like a servant who does not come quickly enough when called" ; he wrote to him begging him to consider him "no longer as a pupil in the art of diplomacy, but as a colleague responsible for the policy of a great empire." From that time the two rivals sought to checkmate each other. Gorchakov took advantage of the strained relations between France and Germany. The German general staff held that the law voted in France to create new battalions was a sign that France was preparing for the next war. An aide-de-camp of the emperor, Radowitz, was sent to St. Petersburg on a secret mission (Feb. 1875) ; rumour ran in the diplomatic world that he had come to ask if Russia would remain neutral in a war against France. An official German newspaper published an alarming article "War in Sight," April 9. The French ambassador in Russia, Gen. Le Flo, obtained an audience with Alexander and asked him if he would cover France with his sword. Alarm however soon subsided. But it began again after the demarche of the German ambassador in Paris, Prince Hohenlohe, who told the French minister for foreign affairs, Decazes, that his Government regarded the French arma ments "as a threatening act." Decazes asked for Russian help. The general uneasiness of the diplomatic world affected the Brit ish Government. When the tsar paid a visit to William in Berlin, May 11, the British ambassador there, Odo Russell, was instructed to support the Russian ambassador at the interview between Bis marck and Gorchakov and a stop was put to the rumours of war. Gorchakov sent a circular to Russian agents dated from Berlin in which he said "Now peace is assured." There remained in France the impression that the tsar had protected France when she had been threatened by Germany. Bismarck explained the affair as a deliberate arrangement between Gorchakov and Gontaut-Biron by which they could pose as the saviours of peace. He retained a certain ill-feeling against Gorchakov, which put an end to the entente between Russia and Germany.